( 2026:HHC:9807 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA. CMP(M) No.345 of 2026 and LPA No.174 of 2026 Decided on: 31st March, 2026 State of H.P and another .......Applicants versus Deep Chand Vaidya ...Respondent Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice G.S.Sandhawalia, Chief Justice. The Hon’ble Mr.Justice Jiya Lal Bhardwaj, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the applicants: Mr.Varun Chandel, Additional Advocate General. G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice (Oral) The present appeal is directed against the judgment in CWP No.6659 of 2021, decided on 05.10.2023. As per office note, it is barred by two years and 151 days and in the application for condonation of delay, it has been mentioned as 950 days. 2. Counsel for the State has submitted that a review petition No.50 of 2024 had been filed, which eventually was dismissed on 04.01.2025 and, therefore, has sought to make submissions as such to condone the delay. However, a close perusal would go on to show that even if the benefit of 1 Whether the reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. ( 2026:HHC:9807 ) 2 limitation has to be given from the date of the review, there is inordinate delay as present appeal was only filed on 05.03.2026. The certified copy had been applied on 07.01.2025, after dismissal of the review petition on 04.01.2025 and was duly delivered on 21.02.2025. 3. It has also been mentioned in the application for condonation of delay that the same was thereafter forwarded by the office of the Advocate General and received by the appellant on 01.03.2025. The matter was then forwarded to the Director Health Services on 03.03.2025, who had further forwarded the same to the Administrative Department on 28.03.2025. The matter was then taken up with Law Department in April, 2025 and various queries were raised. It is only on 28.10.2025, the Administrative Department Health had conveyed the advice of the Law Department to challenge the judgment and, therefore, apparently it took over seven (7) months to come to the conclusion. The matter does not stop there. Thereafter the drafting of the Letters Patent Appeal and forwarded only to the Advocate General on 23.02.2026, after a period of another four months and thus the appeal came to be filed on 05.03.2026. ( 2026:HHC:9807 ) 3 4. Counsel for the State has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in N.Balakrishnan vs. M.Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCC 123 that there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant that alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him, if there appears a reasonable grounds, delay can be condoned and the costs can be imposed. A perusal of the judgment in question would go on to show that the trial Court had accepted the explanation to condone the delay of 883 days in fling the application, which order was interfered with by the learned Single Judge of the High Court. Resultantly, the Apex Court as such had come to the conclusion that the High Court went wrong in reversing the finding as the explanation set up by the appellant was found satisfactory to the trial Court and the High Court was exercising its revisional jurisdiction while passing the judgment. It was noticed that the Advocate had left the profession and had joined as a Legal Assistant, which had led to the delay in filing of the appeal. In such circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the aforesaid judgment would not be of much help to the State. ( 2026:HHC:9807 ) 4 5. In Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and another (2010) 5 SCC 459, it has been held that in absence of any plausible and tangible explanation for long delay, there was no valid reason to condone the delay. 6. In Chief Postmaster General and others versus Living Media India Limited and another (2012) 3 SCC 563, it has been held that liberal concession may have to be adopted, but the department cannot take advantage of its own impersonal machinery and they have to perform the duty with diligence and commitment and condonation of delay is an exception. 7. In Esha Bhattacharjee versus Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others (2013) 12 SCC 649, the principles of limitation were culled out as under: “i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation. ( 2026:HHC:9807 ) 5 iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in 7 respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of ( 2026:HHC:9807 ) 6 judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.” 8. Resultantly, keeping in view the above, we find that at least two gaps have not been justified by the State for approximately over four months each and, therefore, in such circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the State is not able to make out a case for condonation of delay in the present case. 9. Therefore, for the reasons given above, we dismiss the application for condonation of delay in the absence of sufficient cause. Resultantly, the appeal is also dismissed. ( G.S. Sandhawalia ) Chief Justice ( Jiya Lal Bhardwaj ) March 31, 2026 Judge (naveen)