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2026 DAILYLAW 14274 (DEL)

SANGEETHA CHADHA v. MR. PANKAJ KUMAR PRASAD

CRL.M.C./5887/2026 · 2026-08-12

Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav

body2026

Judgment text

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$~113 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI # CNR No. DLHC010371252026 + CRL.M.C. 5887/2026 & CRL.M.A. 24567/2026 SANGEETHA CHADHA .....Petitioner Through: Mr. Sumant De, Mr. Divakar Kumar, Mr. S. Pathak and Ms. Akshra Santosh, Advs. versus MR. PANKAJ KUMAR PRASAD .....Respondent Through: Mr. Mandeep Baisala, Mr. Dhananjay Singh, Mr. Sourabh Soni, Mr. Kavesh Bidhuri, Mr. Shobhit Anand and Mr. Divyansh, Advs. CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV O R D E R % 12.08.2026 1. During the pendency of the application under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881[Act], the petitioner has invoked the provisions of Section 143A of the NI Act seeking an interim relief of 20% of the cheque amount towards interim compensation. 2. The said application came to be rejected by the concerned Court vide order dated 25.04.2025. In paragraph no.15 of the said order, it has come on record that the accused has been making payment to the complainant after issuing the cheque in question. In paragraph 18, it was further noted that the accused had already made some payment during the proceedings, as the This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 14/08/2026 at 11:40:28 same had been admitted by the complainant on different dates of hearing. Against the said order, the petitioner approached the Revisional Court. The Revisional Court vide the impugned order, while relying on the decision in the case of Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava v. State Of Jharkhand1 has held that during trial, various payments have been paid by the accused which stands accepted by the petitioner would prima facie establish that the provisions of Section 143 of the Act may not be required to be invoked. In Paragraphs 13, 15 and 18, the following findings have been rendered: “13. Under sub-section (5) of Section 143-A, it is provided that the amount of interim compensation can be recovered as if it were a fine under Section 421CrPC. Therefore, by a legal fiction, the interim compensation is treated as a fine for the purposes of its recovery. Section 421CrPC deals with the recovery of the fine imposed by a criminal court while passing the sentence. Thus, recourse can be taken to Section 421CrPC for recovery of interim compensation, which reads thus: “421. Warrant for levy of fine.—(1) When an offender has been sentenced to pay a fine, the Court passing the sentence may take action for the recovery of the fine in either or both of the following ways, that is to say, it may— (a) issue a warrant for the levy of the amount by attachment and sale of any movable property belonging to the offender; (b) issue a warrant to the Collector of the district, authorising him to realise the amount as arrears of land revenue from the movable or immovable property, or both, of the defaulter: Provided that, if the sentence directs that in default of payment of the fine, the offender shall be imprisoned, and if such offender has undergone the whole of such imprisonment in default, no Court shall issue such warrant unless, for special reasons to be recorded in writing, it considers it necessary so to do, or unless it has made an order for the payment of expenses or compensation out of the fine under Section 357. (2) The State Government may make rules regulating the manner in which warrants under clause (a) of sub-section (1) are to be executed, and for the summary determination of any claims made by any person other than the offender in respect of any property attached in execution of such warrant. (3) Where the Court issues a warrant to the Collector under clause (b) 1 2024 4 SCC 419 This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 14/08/2026 at 11:40:28 of sub-section (1), the Collector shall realise the amount in accordance with the law relating to recovery of arrears of land revenue, as if such warrant were a certificate issued under such law: Provided that no such warrant shall be executed by the arrest or detention in prison of the offender. 15. For recovery of the interim compensation, the immovable or movable property of the accused can be sold by the Collector. Thus, non-payment of interim compensation fixed under Section 143-A has drastic consequences. To recover the same, the accused may be deprived of his immovable and movable property. If acquitted, he may get back the money along with the interest as provided in sub-section (4) of Section 143-A from the complainant. But, if his movable or immovable property has been sold for recovery of interim compensation, even if he is acquitted, he will not get back his property. 18. In the case of Section 143-A, the power can be exercised even before the accused is held guilty. Sub-section (1) of Section 143-A provides for passing a drastic order for payment of interim compensation against the accused in a complaint under Section 138, even before any adjudication is made on the guilt of the accused. The power can be exercised at the threshold even before the evidence is recorded. If the word “may” is interpreted as “shall”, it will have drastic consequences as in every complaint under Section 138, the accused will have to pay interim compensation up to 20% of the cheque amount. Such an interpretation will be unjust and contrary to the well- settled concept of fairness and justice. If such an interpretation is made, the provision may expose itself to the vice of manifest arbitrariness. The provision can be held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In a sense, sub-section (1) of Section 143-A provides for penalising an accused even before his guilt is established.” 3. Even otherwise, this Court, at this point of time, does not find any perversity or apparent illegality on the face of record warranting interference under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 4. Bearing in mind the overall facts and circumstances, no interference is called for. 5. Petition along with pending application stands dismissed. PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV, J AUGUST 12, 2026/P This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 14/08/2026 at 11:40:28