2026:HHC:26669 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 491 of 2012 Reserved on: 20.06.2026 Date of Decision: 06.07.2026 State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Dula Ram & Ors ...Respondent _______________________________________ Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Appellant/State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. For Respondents No.1, 3 and 4 : Mr Bimal Gupta, Senior Advocate, with Ms Simran, Advocate. For Respondents No. 2, 5 and 6 : Mr Anil Chauhan, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 31.03.2012 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Nahan, District HP (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondents (accused before learned Trial Court) were acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 41 and 42 of Indian Forest Act read with Rules 11 and 12 of Himachal Pradesh Forest Produce 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:26669 Transit (Land Routes) Rules, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as Transit Rules). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Section 420 and 120B of the IPC and Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act, read with Rule 11 and 12 of the Transit Rules. It was asserted that SI/SHO Manish Chauhan (not examined), ASI Bihari Lal, ASI Madan Lal, HHC Bhagmal, HHC Mukesh Kumar, Constable Ravinder Singh (PW3), HHG Amarjeet Singh, HHG Rajinder Singh, HHG Mukh Ram, HHG Mani Pal, HHG Ram Swaroop, witnesses Inder Prakash (PW1), and Padam Kumar were present at Gajrot for nakabandi on 09.09.2007. A vehicle bearing registration No. HP-18-3222 came from Sangrah. Three persons were travelling in the vehicle, who disclosed their names as Dula Ram, Laiq Ram and Dula Ram. They got frightened after seeing the police. They revealed that they were escorting a truck bearing registration No. HR-38G- 0492, which was following them. The truck was carrying the timber concealed beneath the apple boxes. Ramesh Kumar was also escorting the truck. But he had stopped on the way. A truck bearing registration No. HR-38G-0492 came to the spot. The police stopped 3 2026:HHC:26669 the truck. The truck was covered with a blue tarpaulin. The driver identified himself as Pawan Kumar, and the person sitting beside the driver identified himself as Naresh Kumar. The police checked the truck and found the timber kept beneath the apple boxes. No person could produce a permit for transporting the timber. The vehicles were taken to the police station. The apple boxes were unloaded, and 181 scants of timber, 70 boxes of apples, and 3 bags of potatoes were found in the truck. The timber had no seizure hammer, but had a hammer mark of P. R. S. The police seized the timber, truck, 70 boxes of apples, and 3 bags of potatoes vide memo (Ext.PW1/A). The police seized the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-18-3222, along with the documents vide memo (Ext.PW1/C). The police searched the occupants of the vehicles and prepared the memos of their personal search (Ext.PW1/D to Ext.PW1/J). Rattan Kashyap (PW2) measured the timber and found its volume to be 13.10 M3 and its value to be ₹4,37,395/-. The seizure hammer RAS2 FID was put on the timber. A report (Ext.PW2/A) and the details of the measurement (Ext.PW2/B) were prepared. Rukka (Ext.PW3/A) was prepared, which was sent to the Police Station, where FIR (Ext.PW3/B) was registered. Munish Chauhan investigated the matter. He prepared the site plans and recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version. Karam Singh (PW4) produced the 4 2026:HHC:26669 details of the vehicles that had crossed the forest check post (Ext.PW4/B). The detail was seized vide memo (Ext.PW4/A). The photographs were taken, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to them for the commission of offences punishable under Section 120B of the IPC and Sections 41 and 42 of the Forest Act, read with Rules 11 and 12 of the Transit Rules, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined nine witnesses to prove its case. Inder Parkash (PW1) did not support the prosecution's case. Rattan Kashyap (PW2) measured the timber. Ravinder Singh (PW3) was a member of the police party. Karam Singh (PW4) produced the record of the Forest Check Post. Shiv Charan (PW5) witnessed the sale of the boxes of apples and bags of potatoes. Laiq Ram (PW6) proved that no illicit felling had taken place. Manga Ram (PW7) witnessed the recovery of the documents. HC Govind Ram (PW8) proved the entry in the daily diary. ASI Khalil Ahmad (PW9) signed the FIR. 5 2026:HHC:26669 5. The prosecution failed to complete the evidence despite being granted many opportunities. Hence, the learned Trial Court closed the evidence vide order dated 21.03.2012. 6. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), denied the prosecution's case in its entirety. Accused Dula Ram, Liaq Ram and Dula Ram stated that the police had demanded the jeep, but they refused, and a false case was made against them. Accused Pawan Kumar stated that the truck was transporting the apple boxes to Parwanoo and no timber was loaded in it. Accused Naresh Kumar also stated that no timber was loaded in the truck. Accused Ramesh Kumar stated that he was informed that his jeep had been apprehended, and when he went to the Police Station, he was implicated. The accused did not produce any evidence in their defence. 7. Learned Trial Court held that Inder Parkash (PW1) had not supported the prosecution's case regarding the recovery of the forest produce. The testimony of Ravinder Singh (PW3) was not satisfactory. The timber was not produced before the Court, and an adverse inference had to be drawn against the prosecution. The offences punishable under Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest 6 2026:HHC:26669 Act are non-cognizable, and no action could have been taken against the accused. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the material on record. The statements of prosecution witnesses were discarded without any cogent reasons. It was wrongly held that the offences punishable under Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act were non- cognizable. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant/State, Mr Bimal Gupta, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Ms Simran, learned Counsel for respondents No. 1, 3 and 4, and Mr Anil Chauhan, learned counsel for respondents No. 2, 5 and 6. 10. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant/State, submitted that the prosecution had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. Nothing was suggested to the witnesses as to why they were deposing against the accused. The learned Trial Court erred in 7 2026:HHC:26669 discarding the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 11. Mr Bimal Gupta, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Ms Simran, learned Counsel for respondents No. 1, 3 and 4, submitted that there are various contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses. It is highly improbable that the occupants of the jeep would disclose that a truck was following them, which was carrying the timber concealed beneath the apple boxes. The case property was not produced before the Court, and the learned Trial Court was justified in drawing an adverse inference against the prosecution. Learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 12. Mr Anil Chauhan, learned counsel for respondents No. 2, 5 and 6, adopted the submission of Mr Bimal Gupta, learned Senior Counsel and prayed that the appeal be dismissed. 13. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8 2026:HHC:26669 14. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed on page 438: “24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 15. This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, wherein it was observed: 21. We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event, should the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudarv. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka 9 2026:HHC:26669 (2023) 9 SCC 581 and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471. 16. A similar view was taken in Tulasareddi v. State of Karnataka, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 89, wherein it was observed: “29. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court, it can be said that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the findings of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court. Further, if the view taken is a possible view, the Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible. The following principles have to be kept in mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the appeals against an order of acquittal: (a) whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; (b) whether the judgment is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence on record; (c) an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a compelling reason for interference.’ (d) The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; (e) If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and (f) The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 10 2026:HHC:26669 17. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 18. Learned trial Court held that the offences punishable under Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act are non-cognizable. This finding cannot be sustained. Hon’ble Division bench of this Court held in State of H.P. v Prem Chand (deceased) and Anr. Reference in Criminal Appeal No. 220 of 2014 decided on 05.01.2026 that the offence punishable under Section 42 of the Indian Forest Act read with Rule 11 and 12 of H.P. Transit Rules, is bailable, but cognizable. Therefore, the conclusion of the learned Trial Court that the learned Trial Court could not have taken cognisance and tried the accused cannot be sustained. 19. Learned Trial Court held that the timber was not produced before the Court, and an adverse inference has to be drawn against the prosecution. This cannot be faulted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pawan Kumar v. State of H.P., (2019) 4 SCC 182: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 39: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 359 that when the seized wood and the vehicle were not produced, and only one sample was produced, the accused cannot be convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Section 379 of the IPC and Section 42 of the Forest Act. It was observed at page 183: - 11 2026:HHC:26669 “4. We have heard the learned counsel for the respondent in opposition to the appeal and considered the nature of the evidence available. Non-production of the seized wood and the vehicle, the primary evidence of the offence, renders the prosecution's case fragile and unsustainable. Mere production of the seizure memo does not tantamount to the production of the seized woods and the lorry. Unless the seized wood was produced, mere production of a sample, and there is no material in support that the sample was out of the same 22 logs, we are unable to sustain the conviction of the appellants.” 20. Therefore, in view of the binding precedent of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the prosecution's case would become doubtful because of the non-production of the case property before the Court. 21. Inder Parkash (PW1), who was associated as an independent witness, did not support the prosecution's version. He specifically denied that the occupants of the jeep disclosed that a truck bearing registration No. HR-38G-0492 was transporting the apple boxes and the scant of timber. He was permitted to be cross- examined and denied the previous statement recorded by the police. Therefore, no advantage can be derived from his testimony. 22. Constable Ravinder Singh (PW3) admitted in his cross- examination that his signatures were not obtained on any of the documents. He could not tell the time of preparing the memos. The statement of the witness that he could not tell the time of the 12 2026:HHC:26669 preparation of the memos and the absence of his signature on the memos would make his presence on the spot highly doubtful. 23. There is no other witness to support the prosecution's case. Rattan Kashyap (PW2) measured the timber. Karam Singh (PW4) proved that the truck had crossed the forest check post. Shiv Charan (PW5) witnessed the auction. Laiq Ram (PW6) stated that no illicit felling had taken place in his jurisdiction. Manga Ram (PW7) witnessed the recovery. HC Govind Ram (PW8) proved the entry in the daily diary, and Khalil Ahmed (PW9) proved the FIR. All these witnesses have not proved the prosecution's case that the accused were transporting the timber. 24. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court will not interfere with a reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible. 25 In view of the above, the present appeal fails and is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. 26. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondents are directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹50,000/- each with one surety each of the like amount 13 2026:HHC:26669 to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/learned Trial Court, which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the respondents on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 27. A copy of the judgment, along with the record of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 6th July, 2026 (Nikita)