2026:HHC:26716 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 199 of 2025 Reserved on: 19.06.2026 Date of Decision: 06.07..2026. Shashi Pal Sharma ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & another ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner No.2 : Mr Ajay Kumar, Senior Advocate with Mr Vinay Kumar, Thakur, Advocate. Proceedings against petitioner No.1 stand abated vide order dated 10.09.2025. For Respondents/State : : Mr Jitender K. Sharma, Additional Advocate General, for respondent No.1 Mr Neeraj Gupta, Senior Advocate, with Mr Sandeep Mahajan, Advocate, for respondent No.2. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:26716 The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of F.I.R. No.8 of 2021, dated 15.01.2021, registered at Police Station Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P. for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of Indian Penal Code (IPC) and consequential proceedings arising out of it pending before learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant made a complaint to the police, asserting that Jagat Rai and Shashi Pal Sharma (the present petitioners) had executed a sale deed of the land bearing Khasra No. 2027 in the informant's favour on 27.11.2006, as the attorney of Smt. Indira Rani. However, Shashi Pal and Jagat Rai sold the resin extracted from the trees with the permission of the office of the District Forest Officer, Palampur, District Kangra. They continued to file their affidavits by falsely proclaiming that they were the owners of Khasra No. 2027. Therefore, it was prayed that an action be taken against them. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The police found that the petitioners had executed a sale deed of Khasra number 2027 on 27.11.2006 in favour of the informant, and a mutation was attested on 3 2026:HHC:26716 09.01.2008. Petitioners Jagath Rai Chaudhary and Shashi Pal Sharma executed affidavits in the years 2007 and 2010 stating that they were the owners of Khasra No. 2027. They made a wrongful gain for themselves and caused a wrongful loss to the informant. The documents were sent to the SFSL, and as per the report, the disputed signatures matched the admitted and the specimen signatures of the petitioners. Hence, the police filed the charge sheet before the Court for taking action against the accused/petitioners. 3. Being aggrieved by the registration of FIR and filing of the charge sheet, the petitioners have approached this Court for quashing the FIR and the consequential proceedings arising out of it. They asserted that a bare reading of the FIR shows that no prima faice case is made out against them. A civil dispute between the parties is being given a cloak of criminality. A breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal liability. No document of the transfer of Khasra No. 2024, 2025 and 2026 had been executed in favour of the informant. The Resin Contractor had also not tapped any tree after 2008 in the disputed area. No agricultural certificate was ever issued in the informant’s name, and the certificate produced by him is forged, which violates the provisions of the 4 2026:HHC:26716 H.P. Tenancy and Land Reform Act. The agreement executed between the parties was without consideration, and the cheques issued towards the payment were dishonoured. The agreement was executed with the Resin Contractor before the sale, and the informant was told about this fact. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R and consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed. 4. The State has filed a reply, opposing the petition and reproducing the contents of the FIR. It was asserted that the police conducted the investigation and found a prima facie case for filing the charge sheet before the Court. The petitioners were selling the resin without any authority. The other civil dispute between the parties was being projected in the present matter to confuse the Court. Hence, it was prayed that the petition be dismissed. 5. No reply was filed by respondent no. 2/informant. 6. Petitioner No.1 died during the pendency of the present petition, and the proceeding qua him abated as per the order dated 10.09.2025. 5 2026:HHC:26716 7. I have heard Mr Ajay Kumar, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Vinay Kumar Thakur, learned counsel for petitioner No.2 and Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for respondent No.1 and Mr Neeraj Gupta, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Sandeep Mahajan, learned counsel for respondent No.2 8. Mr Ajay Kumar, learned Senior Advocate, for petitioner No.2, submitted that an agreement to sell was executed between the parties regarding Khasra Nos. 2025 and 2026. An agreement to sell does not confer any title upon a person. The informant had produced a forged certificate showing that he was an agriculturalist. A civil suit is pending between the parties. The present petition has been filed as a counterblast to the civil suit to compel the petitioners to withdraw the civil suit filed by them. A civil dispute cannot be given the colour of criminality. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R and consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed. He relied upon the following judgments in support of his submissions: -  Nazibul Rahim Khan & ors. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & another: 2026 INSC 619;  Anukul Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr: 2025 INSC 1153. 6 2026:HHC:26716 9. Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent No.1/State submitted that the allegations in the FIR, prima facie, show the commission of a cognizable offence. The police investigated the matter and found that the petitioners continued to sell the resin in Khasra number 2027 by executing the affidavits that they were the owners of the land, despite the fact that they had sold the land to the informant. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter, and this Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to scuttle the proceedings pending before the learned Trial Court. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 10. Mr Neeraj Gupta, learned Senior Advocate for respondent No.2, adopted the submissions of Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent No.1/State and further submitted that the mere pendency of the civil dispute between the parties does not mean that no criminal act was done by the petitioners. The petitioners, by pretending themselves to be the owners of Khasra No.2027, extracted the resin from it. It is a clear-cut case of cheating the forest department by making a false representation and submission of 7 2026:HHC:26716 false documents. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 11. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. 8 2026:HHC:26716 (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the 9 2026:HHC:26716 proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 13. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High 10 2026:HHC:26716 Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 14. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. It is undisputed that the petitioner had sold Khasra No. 2027 to the informant on 27.11.2006, as the power of attorney of Indira Rani, the owner. The result of the investigation showed that the petitioners executed the affidavits in the years 2007 and 2010, proclaiming themselves to be the owners of Khasra No.2027. Thus, prima facie, the petitioners had executed false affidavits claiming the ownership of Khasra No. 2027 in the years 2007 and 2010, when they had already sold this Khasra number to the informant in the year 2006. 11 2026:HHC:26716 16. It was submitted that the certificate produced by the informant showing that he was an agriculturalist was fake because, as per the information supplied by the Tehsildar, no agricultural certificate was issued in favour of the informant. This submission will not help the petitioner. If the certificate produced by the informant was forged, the land is liable to be confiscated by the State and will not revert to the petitioner. Hence, even if it is assumed that the forged certificate was produced, it will not make the petitioners the owners of the land comprised Khasra No. 2027, and no advantage can be derived from the plea that the certificate was forged. 17. It was submitted that a civil suit is pending between the parties, and the present petition has been filed as a counterblast to the civil suit. The submission will not help the petitioners. The allegations in the FIR disclose that false affidavits were filed in the years 2007 and 2010, which were used to secure the permit for tapping the resin from the trees existing on Khasra No. 2027. Therefore, the mere pendency of the litigation between the parties will not wipe out the criminality attached to the acts of the petitioner. 12 2026:HHC:26716 18. A heavy reliance was placed upon an agreement (Annexure P-5), in which the land bearing Khasra Nos. 2024 to 2027 was handed over to the Resin Contractor with effect from the year 2007 to 2018, to submit that this agreement was executed before the sale in favour of the informant. This submission will not help the petitioners because the police had specifically found that affidavits were executed in the years 2007 and 2010 by the petitioners, stating that they were the owners. Even if an agreement existed before the execution of the sale deed in favour of the informant, the petitioners were duty-bound to inform the other party about the sale having been made in favour of the informant. Continuing to act as an owner of the land, which was sold by the petitioners to the informant, would show that the petitioner made a false representation knowing fully well that the false representation was false. Thus, prima facie, an offence punishable under Section 420 of the IPC is made out against the petitioners. 19. The FIR has also been registered for forgery. However, the forgery is not made out by executing affidavits containing the false recitals that the petitioners were the owners of Khasra no. 2027. It was held in Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 13 2026:HHC:26716 751, that execution of the sale deed by a person by describing himself as an owner does not amount to forgery. It was observed:- 9. Let us first consider whether the complaint averments, even assuming to be true, make out the ingredients of the offences punishable either under Section 467 or Section 471 of the Penal Code. 10. Section 467 (insofar as it is relevant to this case) provides that whoever forges a document which purports to be a valuable security shall be punished with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine. Section 471, relevant to our purpose, provides that whoever fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine any document which he knows or has reason to believe to be a forged document, shall be punished in the same manner as if he had forged such document. 11. Section 470 defines a forged document as a false document made by forgery. The term “forgery” used in these two sections is defined in Section 463. Whoever makes any false documents with the intent to cause damage or injury to the public or any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into an express or implied contract, or with the intent to commit fraud or that the fraud may be committed, commits forgery. 12. Section 464 defining “making a false document” is extracted below: “464. Making a false document.—A person is said to make a false document or false electronic record— First.—Who dishonestly or fraudulently— (a) makes, signs, seals or executes a document or part of a document; (b) makes or transmits any electronic record or part of any electronic record; 14 2026:HHC:26716 (c) affixes any digital signature on any electronic record; (d) makes any mark denoting the execution of a document or the authenticity of the digital signature, with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document or a part of document, electronic record or digital signature was made, signed, sealed, executed, transmitted or affixed by or by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed, executed or affixed; or Secondly,—Who, without lawful authority, dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document or an electronic record in any material part thereof, after it has been made, executed or affixed with a digital signature either by himself or by any other person, whether such person be living or dead at the time of such alteration; or Thirdly.—Who dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, seal, execute or alter a document or an electronic record or to affix his digital signature on any electronic record knowing that such person by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication cannot, or that by reason of deception practised upon him, he does not know the contents of the document or electronic record or the nature of the alteration. Explanation 1.—A man's signature of his own name may amount to forgery. Explanation 2.—The making of a false document in the name of a fictitious person, intending it to be believed that the document was made by a real person, or in the name of a deceased person, intending it to be believed that the document was made by the person in his lifetime, may amount to forgery. 15 2026:HHC:26716 [Note.— The words ‘digital signature’ wherever they occur were substituted by the words ‘electronic signature’ by the Amendment Act 10 of 2009. (emphasis supplied) 13. The condition precedent for an offence under Sections 467 and 471 is a forgery. The condition precedent for forgery is making a false document (or false electronic record or part thereof). This case does not relate to any false electronic record. Therefore, the question is whether the first accused, in executing and registering the two sale deeds purporting to sell a property (even if it is assumed that it did not belong to him), can be said to have made and executed false documents, in collusion with the other accused. 14. An analysis of Section 464 of the Penal Code shows that it divides false documents into three categories: 1. The first is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently makes or executes a document with the intention of causing it to be believed that such a document was made or executed by some other person, or by the authority of some other person, by whom or by whose authority he knows it was not made or executed. 2. The second is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document in any material part, without lawful authority, after it has been made or executed by either himself or any other person. 3. The third is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, execute or alter a document knowing that such person could not, by reason of (a) unsoundness of mind; or (b) intoxication; or (c) deception practised upon him, know the contents of the document or the nature of the alteration. In short, a person is said to have made a “false document” if (i) he made or executed a document claiming to be 16 2026:HHC:26716 someone else or authorised by someone else; or (ii) he altered or tampered with a document; or (iii) he obtained a document by practising deception, or from a person not in control of his senses. 15. The sale deeds executed by the first appellant clearly and obviously do not fall under the second and third categories of “false documents”. It, therefore, remains to be seen whether the claim of the complainant that the execution of sale deeds by the first accused, who was in no way connected with the land, amounted to committing forgery of the documents with the intention of taking possession of the complainant's land (and that Accused 2 to 5 as the purchaser, witness, scribe and stamp vendor, colluded with the first accused in execution and registration of the said sale deeds) would bring the case under the first category. 16. There is a fundamental difference between a person executing a sale deed claiming that the property conveyed is his property, and a person executing a sale deed by impersonating the owner or falsely claiming to be authorised or empowered by the owner to execute the deed on the owner's behalf. When a person executes a document conveying a property, describing it as his, there are two possibilities. The first is that he bona fide believes that the property actually belongs to him. The second is that he may be dishonestly or fraudulently claiming it to be his, even though he knows that it is not his property. But to fall under the first category of “false documents”, it is not sufficient that a document has been made or executed dishonestly or fraudulently. There is a further requirement that it should have been made with the intention of causing it to be believed that such a document was made or executed by, or by the authority of a person, by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made or executed. 17. When a document is executed by a person claiming a property which is not his, he is not claiming that he is someone else, nor is he claiming that he is authorised by 17 2026:HHC:26716 someone else. Therefore, execution of such a document (purporting to convey some property of which he is not the owner) is not execution of a false document as defined under Section 464 of the Code. If what is executed is not a false document, there is no forgery. If there is no forgery, then neither Section 467 nor Section 471 of the Code is attracted. 20. It was further held that a Sale Deed executed conveying a property not owned by the seller may amount to cheating to the purchaser but not to any other person. It was observed:- 18. Let us now examine whether the ingredients of an offence of cheating are made out. The essential ingredients of the offence of “cheating” are as follows: (i) deception of a person either by making a false or misleading representation or by dishonest concealment or by any other act or omission; (ii) fraudulent or dishonest inducement of that person to either deliver any property or to consent to the retention thereof by any person or to intentionally induce that person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and (iii) such act or omission causing or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property. 19. 19. To constitute an offence under Section 420, there should not only be cheating, but as a consequence of such cheating, the accused should have dishonestly induced the person deceived (i) to deliver any property to any person, or (ii) to make, alter or destroy wholly or in part a valuable security (or anything signed or sealed and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security). 18 2026:HHC:26716 20. When a sale deed is executed conveying a property claiming ownership thereto, it may be possible for the purchaser under such a sale deed to allege that the vendor has cheated him by making a false representation of ownership and fraudulently induced him to part with the sale consideration. But in this case, the complaint is not by the purchaser. On the other hand, the purchaser is made a co-accused. 21. It is not the case of the complainant that any of the accused tried to deceive him either by making a false or misleading representation or by any other action or omission, nor is it his case that they offered him any fraudulent or dishonest inducement to deliver any property or to consent to the retention thereof by any person or to intentionally induce him to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived. Nor did the complainant allege that the first appellant pretended to be the complainant while executing the sale deeds. Therefore, it cannot be said that the first accused, by the act of executing sale deeds in favour of the second accused, the second accused, by reason of being the purchaser, or the third, fourth and fifth accused, by reason of being the witness, scribe and stamp vendor in regard to the sale deeds, deceived the complainant in any manner. 22. As the ingredients of cheating as stated in Section 415 are not found, it cannot be said that there was an offence punishable under Sections 417, 418, 419 or 420 of the Code. 23. When we say that the execution of a sale deed by a person, purporting to convey a property which is not his, as his property, is not making a false document and therefore not forgery, we should not be understood as holding that such an act can never be a criminal offence. If a person sells a property knowing that it does not belong to him and thereby defrauds the person who purchased the property, the person defrauded, that is, the purchaser, may complain that the vendor committed the fraudulent act of cheating. But a third party who is not the purchaser under the deed may not be able to make such a complaint. 19 2026:HHC:26716 24. The term “fraud” is not defined in the Code. The dictionary definition of “fraud” is “deliberate deception, treachery or cheating intended to gain advantage”. Section 17 of the Contract Act, 1872, defines “fraud” with reference to a party to a contract. 25. In Vimla (Dr.) v. Delhi Admn. [AIR 1963 SC 1572] This Court explained the meaning of the expression “defraud” thus: (AIR pp. 1576-77, para 14) “14. … the expression ‘defraud’ involves two elements, namely, deceit and injury to the person deceived. Injury is something other than economic loss, that is, deprivation of property, whether movable or immovable, or of money, and it will include any harm whatever caused to any person in body, mind, reputation or such others. In short, it is a non- economic or non-pecuniary loss. A benefit or advantage to the deceiver will almost always cause loss or detriment to the deceived. Even in those rare cases where there is a benefit or advantage to the deceiver, but no corresponding loss to the deceived, the second condition is satisfied.” The above definition was, in essence, reiterated in State of U.P. v. Ranjit Singh [(1999) 2 SCC 617: 1999 SCC (Cri) 293]. 26. The Penal Code, however, defines “fraudulently”, an adjective form of the word “fraud” in Section 25, as follows: “25. ‘Fraudulently.—A person is said to do a thing fraudulently if he does that thing with intent to defraud but not otherwise.” 27. The term “fraudulently” is mostly used with the term “dishonestly”, which is defined in Section 24 as follows: “24. ‘Dishonestly’.—Whoever does anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another person is said to do that thing ‘dishonestly’.” 28 [Ed.: Para 28 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./149/2009 dated 6-10-2009. To “defraud” or do something fraudulently is not, by itself, made an offence 20 2026:HHC:26716 under the Penal Code, but various acts when done fraudulently (or fraudulently and dishonestly) are made offences. These include: (i) Fraudulent removal or concealment of property (Sections 206, 421 and 424). (ii) Fraudulent claim to property to prevent seizure (Section 207). (iii) Fraudulent suffering or obtaining a decree (Sections 208 and 210). (iv) Fraudulent possession/delivery of counterfeit coin (Sections 239, 240, 242 and 243). (v) Fraudulent alteration/diminishing weight of the coin (Sections 246 to 253). (vi) Fraudulent acts relating to stamps (Sections 255 to 261). (vii) Fraudulent use of false instrument/weight/measure (Sections 264 to 266). (viii) Cheating (Sections 415 to 420). (ix) Fraudulent prevention of debt being available to creditors (Section 422). (x) Fraudulent execution of a deed of transfer containing a false statement of consideration (Section 423). (xi) Forgery, making or executing a false document (Sections 463 to 471 and 474). (xii) Fraudulent cancellation/destruction of valuable security, etc. (Section 477). (xiii) Fraudulently going through the marriage ceremony (Section 496). It follows, therefore, that by merely alleging or showing that a person acted fraudulently, it cannot be assumed that he committed an offence punishable under the Code or any other law unless that fraudulent act is specified to be an offence under the Code or other law.” 21. In Mir Nagvi Askari Vs CBI 2009 (15) SCC 643, the 21 2026:HHC:26716 accused was charged with making false entries in the record of the bank. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that making wrong entries by itself will not attract criminal liability unless it is proved that the document was false within the meaning of Section 464 of IPC. It was observed:- “[229] A person is said to make a false document or record if he satisfies one of the three conditions as noticed hereinbefore and provided for under the said section. The first condition being that the document has been falsified with the intention of causing it to be believed that such a document has been made by a person, by whom the person falsifying the document knows that it was not made. Clearly, the documents in question in the present case, even if it be assumed to have been made dishonestly or fraudulently, had not been made with the intention of causing it to be believed that they were made by or under the authority of someone else. [230] The second criterion of the section deals with a case where a person without lawful authority alters a document after it has been made. There has been no allegation of alteration of the voucher in question after they have been made. Therefore, in our opinion, the second criterion of the said section is also not applicable to the present case. [231] The third and final condition of Section 464 deals with a document, signed by a person who, due to his mental capacity, does not know the contents of the documents which were made, i.e. because of intoxication or unsoundness of mind, etc. Such is also not the case before us. Indisputably, therefore, the accused before us could not have been convicted for the making of a false document. [232] The learned Special Judge, therefore, in our opinion, erred in holding that the accused had prepared a false document, which clearly, having regard to the provisions of 22 2026:HHC:26716 the law, could not have been done. [233] Further, the offence of forgery deals with the making of a false document with the specific intentions enumerated therein. The said section has been reproduced below. "463. Forgery.--Whoever makes any false documents or electronic record part of a document or electronic record with, intent to cause damage or injury], to the public or any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery." [234] However, since we have already held that the commission of the said offence has not been convincingly established, the accused could not have been convicted for the offence of forgery. The definition of "false document" is a part of the definition of "forgery". Both must be read together. [Dr. Vimla v. Delhi Administration, 1963 Supp2 SCR 585]. 22. This question was also considered in Sheila Sebastian versus R. Jawaharaj & Anr ETC. 2018 (7) SCC 581, and it was held that unless the ingredients of Section 464 of IPC are satisfied, a person cannot be convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 465 of IPC. It was observed:- “[26] The definition of "false document" is a part of the definition of "forgery". Both must be read together. 'Forgery' and 'Fraud' are essentially matters of evidence which could be proved as a fact by direct evidence or by inferences drawn from proved facts. In the case at hand, there is no finding recorded by the trial Court that the respondents have made any false document or part of the document/record to execute the mortgage deed under the guise of that 'false document'. Hence, neither respondent no.1 nor respondent no.2 can be held as makers of the 23 2026:HHC:26716 forged documents. It is the imposter who can be said to have made the false document by committing forgery. In such an event, the trial court, as well as the appellate court, misguided themselves by convicting the accused. Therefore, the High Court has rightly acquitted the accused based on the settled legal position, and we find no reason to interfere with the same”. 23. It was laid down in Bandekar Bros. (P) Ltd. v. Prasad Vassudev Keni, (2020) 20 SCC 1: (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 626: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 707, that making false debit notes to claim the amount mentioned in them will not amount to forgery as is understood in law. It was observed: “50. Section 463 IPC speaks of “forgery” as being the making of a “false document” or “false electronic record”, or a part thereof, to do the various things that are stated in that section. Unless a person is said to make a false document or electronic record, Section 463 does not apply at all. The making of a “false document” is then dealt with in Section 464 IPC. On the facts of the present case, we are not concerned with the categories of false documents identified under the heads “Secondly” and “Thirdly” of Section 464. Shri Mishra states that the making of the debit notes by the respondents in order to falsely claim amounts owing to them would fall within the “First” category under Section 464. 51. The “First” category of Section 464 makes it clear that anyone who dishonestly or fraudulently makes or executes a document with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made or executed by or by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made, can be said to make a false document. Several judgments of this Court have held that, assuming dishonesty or fraud, the second ingredient of the “First” 24 2026:HHC:26716 category of Section 464 is that the document itself must be made by or by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority the person who creates the forgery knows that it was not made. If the second ingredient is found missing, the offence of forgery is not made out at all. Thus, in Devendra v. State of U.P. [Devendra v. State of U.P., (2009) 7 SCC 495 : (2009) 3 SCC (Civ) 190 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 461], this Court set out the following facts : (SCC p. 499, paras 5-6) “5. On or about 22-8-1997, a sale deed was executed by Appellants 1 and 2 in favour of Appellants 3 and 4. On 24-8- 2005, a suit was filed by Respondent 2 and others for cancelling the aforesaid deed of sale dated 22-8-1997, which was registered as Civil Suit No. 382 of 2005. The said suit is still pending in the Court of the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Ghaziabad. In the said suit, however, it was averred that Solhu had four sons, whereas in Suit No. 135 of 1982, it was stated that Solhu had five sons. The appellants filed an application under Order 9 Rule 13 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the Court of the Deputy District Magistrate (First Class), Ghaziabad, praying for dismissal of Suit No. 135 of 1982. An application for impleadment was also filed by the appellants in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 17667 of 1985. 6. On or about 21-9-2005, Respondent 2 filed an application in Police Station Kavinagar, Ghaziabad, wherein the City Magistrate, by an order dated 17-9-2005, passed an order to hear the complainant and register a first information report. Thereafter, Respondent 2 filed a first information report at Police Station Sahni Gate on 21-9-2005. The appellants filed an application for quashing the said first information report before the High Court. It was marked as Criminal Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 10568 of 2005.” 52. This Court held that the sale deed executed did not constitute a “false document” under Section 464 IPC as follows : (Devendra case [Devendra v. State of U.P., (2009) 7 SCC 495 : (2009) 3 SCC (Civ) 190 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 461], SCC pp. 502-503, paras 18-20) 25 2026:HHC:26716 “18. Section 463 of the Penal Code reads as follows: ‘463. Forgery.—Whoever makes any false documents or false electronic record or part of a document or electronic record, with intent to cause damage or injury, to the public or any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery.’ According to Mr Das, making a false document to support any claim over title would constitute forgery within the meaning of the said provision and as a document was created for the purpose of showing one-third share in the joint property by the appellants, although they were not entitled to do so, they must be held to have committed an offence. 19. Making of any false document, in view of the definition of “forgery”, is the sine qua non thereof. What would amount to the making of a false document is specified in Section 464 thereof. What is, therefore, necessary is to execute a document with the intention of causing it to be believed that such a document inter alia was made by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made. 20. The appellants are the owners of the property. They have executed a sale deed. Execution of the deed of sale is not denied. If somebody is aggrieved by the false assertions made in the said sale deed, it would be the vendees and not the co-sharers. The appellants have not been alleged to be guilty of creating any false document.” 53. In Mohd. Ibrahim v State of Bihar [Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 929], it was held that the execution of a sale deed by somebody in his own name qua property which is not his does not constitute making a “false document” under Section 464 IPC, because he does not impersonate the owner or falsely claim to be authorised or empowered by the owner to execute the deed 26 2026:HHC:26716 on the owner's behalf. The Court held : (SCC pp. 756-57, paras 13-17) “13. The condition precedent for an offence under Sections 467 and 471 is a forgery. The condition precedent for forgery is making a false document (or false electronic record or part thereof). This case does not relate to any false electronic record. Therefore, the question is whether the first accused, in executing and registering the two sale deeds purporting to sell a property (even if it is assumed that it did not belong to him), can be said to have made and executed false documents, in collusion with the other accused. 14. An analysis of Section 464 of the Penal Code shows that it divides false documents into three categories: 1. The first is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently makes or executes a document with the intention of causing it to be believed that such a document was made or executed by some other person, or by the authority of some other person, by whom or by whose authority he knows it was not made or executed. 2. The second is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document in any material part, without lawful authority, after it has been made or executed by either himself or any other person. 3. The third is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, execute or alter a document knowing that such person could not, by reason of (a) unsoundness of mind; (b) intoxication; or (c) deception practised upon him, know the contents of the document or the nature of the alteration. In short, a person is said to have made a “false document” if (i) he made or executed a document claiming to be someone else or authorised by someone else; or (ii) he altered or tampered with a document; or (iii) he obtained a 27 2026:HHC:26716 document by practising deception, or from a person not in control of his senses. 15. The sale deeds executed by the first appellant clearly and obviously do not fall under the second and third categories of “false documents”. It, therefore, remains to be seen whether the claim of the complainant that the execution of sale deeds by the first accused, who was in no way connected with the land, amounted to committing forgery of the documents with the intention of taking possession of the complainant's land (and that Accused 2 to 5 as the purchaser, witness, scribe and stamp vendor, colluded with the first accused in execution and registration of the said sale deeds) would bring the case under the first category. 16. There is a fundamental difference between a person executing a sale deed claiming that the property conveyed is his property, and a person executing a sale deed by impersonating the owner or falsely claiming to be authorised or empowered by the owner to execute the deed on the owner's behalf. When a person executes a document conveying a property, describing it as his, there are two possibilities. The first is that he bona fide believes that the property actually belongs to him. The second is that he may be dishonestly or fraudulently claiming it to be his, even though he knows that it is not his property. But to fall under the first category of “false documents”, it is not sufficient that a document has been made or executed dishonestly or fraudulently. There is a further requirement that it should have been made with the intention of causing it to be believed that such a document was made or executed by, or by the authority of a person, by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made or executed. 17. When a document is executed by a person claiming a property which is not his, he is not claiming that he is someone else, nor is he claiming that he is authorised by someone else. Therefore, execution of such a document (purporting to convey some property of which he is not the owner) is not execution of a false document as defined under Section 464 of the Code. If what is executed is not a 28 2026:HHC:26716 false document, there is no forgery. If there is no forgery, then neither Section 467 nor Section 471 of the Code is attracted.” 24. Therefore, even if the contents of the affidavits are false, they would not fall within the definition of a false document as is understood in law, and no offence of forgery would be made out. 25. It is undisputed that the charge sheet has been filed before the learned Trial Court, and the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the 29 2026:HHC:26716 materials and take a call whether any case for discharge is made out or not.” 26. It was submitted that there is a delay in reporting the matter to the police, and the F.I.R. is liable to be quashed due to the delay. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983 that the F.I.R. cannot be quashed on the ground of delay. It was observed: 37. It is settled law that a delay in registration of the FIR for offences punishable with imprisonment of more than three years cannot be the basis of interdicting a criminal investigation. The delay will assume importance only when the complainant fails to give a plausible explanation, and whether the explanation is plausible or not, has to be decided by the Trial Court only after recording the evidence. In this context, the Supreme Court in Skoda Auto Volkswagen (India) Private Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 5 SCC 795 has held, “The mere delay on the part of the third respondent complainant in lodging the complaint, cannot by itself be a ground to quash the FIR. The law is too well settled on this aspect to warrant any reference to precedents…” (Emphasis supplied) 27. Therefore, the FIR cannot be quashed because of the delay. 28. In Nazibul Rahim Khan (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that if an aggrieved person wishes to invoke civil and criminal remedies, there should not be an unreasonable or inordinate gap between the two. In the present case, the informant 30 2026:HHC:26716 has not invoked any civil remedy, and the cited judgment does not apply to the present case. 29. In Anukul Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a civil dispute cannot be converted into criminal proceedings. In the present case, there is no civil dispute because the petitioner/accused had filed false affidavits claiming ownership of the land, which is purely a criminal offence; therefore, the cited judgment also does not apply to the present case. 30. No other point was urged. 31. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. The pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. 32. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 06th , June 2026. (ravinder)