1 2026:CGHC:4807 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 625 of 2016 1 - Pardeshi Das Mahant S/o Itwaridas Mahant Aged About 29 Years R/o Purani Basti, Neem Chowk, Korba, District Korba Chhattisgarh. , Chhattisgarh ... Appellant (s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, Police Station Kotwali, Korba, District Korba Chhattisgarh. , Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Appellant : Shri J.K.Saxena, Advocate For Respondent/State : Shri Rishi Raj Pithava, Dy.GA (Hon’ble Shri Justice Arvind Kumar Verma) Judgment on Board 28/01/2026 This criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been preferred by the appellant calling in question the legality and correctness of the judgment dated 14.09.2015 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), 2 Korba in Sessions Trial No. 34/2014 whereby the appellant has been convicted under Sections 363 and 366(A) of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment along with fine, while he has been acquitted of the charge under Section 376(1) IPC. Being aggrieved by his conviction and sentence, the appellant has approached this Court. 2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 18.12.2005, mother of the prosecutrix lodged a missing report at Police Station Kotwali, Korba stating that her daughter had gone missing. On the basis of the said information, missing report No. 69/2005 was registered and search proceedings were undertaken. She could not be traced for several years. It is the prosecution case that during investigation conducted subsequently, on 21.06.2013 the prosecutrix was recovered from the custody of the present appellant. Her statement was recorded during investigation wherein she allegedly stated that the appellant had taken her away by alluring her and thereafter committed sexual intercourse with her. On the basis of her statement, Crime No. 346/2013 was registered against the appellant for offences punishable under Sections 363, 366(A) and 376 IPC was filed and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions for trial. The learned trial Court framed charges against the appellant for offences punishable under Sections 363, 366(A) and 376(1) IPC. The appellant denied the allegations and pleaded false implication. 3. To bring home the charges, the prosecution examined eight 3 witnesses and produced documentary evidence including recovery memos, investigation papers and school records relating to the age of the prosecutrix. 4. After appreciation of evidence, the trial Court acquitted the appellant of the charge under Section 376 IPC but convicted him under Sections 363 and 366(A) IPC and imposed sentence accordingly. Hence this appeal. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant contends that the entire prosecution case collapses in view of the admission of the prosecutrix herself that she voluntarily accompanied the appellant and thereafter married him. It is further submitted that the appellant and prosecutrix are presently residing together happily as husband and wife and two children have been born out of their wedlock, which clearly demonstrates the consensual nature of their relationship. It is argued that there is complete absence of evidence to show that the prosecutrix was forcibly taken or enticed away. It is further submitted that the prosecution has failed to establish her minority by legally admissible evidence as neither birth certificate nor medical examination was produced. He therefore submits that when the trial Court itself found evidence insufficient to convict under Section 376 IPC, conviction under Sections 363 and 366(A) IPC on the same evidence is unsustainable. He submits that from the testimony of the prosecutrix, it clearly emerges that she had accompanied the appellant voluntarily and thereafter entered into a marital relationship with him. She has 4 categorically deposed that both of them went to Bilaspur where they resided together, performed marriage in a temple and continued to live as husband and wife. She has also deposed that after marriage they cohabited continuously and two children were born out of their wedlock. Her testimony also reveals that she continued to reside with the appellant for years without raising any protest or complaint, thereby lending strong support to the defence version that her departure from her parental home was voluntary. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the evidence of the prosecutrix herself demolishes the prosecution case inasmuch as she has categorically admitted that she voluntarily accompanied the appellant to Bilaspur and thereafter both of them solemnized marriage in a temple and continued to reside together as husband and wife. It is contended that their matrimonial relationship has continued uninterruptedly for several years and two children have been born out of their wedlock. Even according to her own testimony, she continued to reside with the appellant without any protest or complaint, which clearly indicates that there was neither any inducement nor forcible taking as alleged by the prosecution. 7. It is argued that the prosecution has failed to legally establish that the prosecutrix was a minor at the time of the alleged occurrence. The attempt of the prosecution to prove minority rests solely upon school records produced through the teacher/headmistress examined during trial, but the said entries were admittedly recorded on the basis of 5 information furnished at the time of admission and not on the basis of any authentic birth record. No birth certificate or medical age determination test was produced. Hence, there is no legally reliable evidence proving the prosecution version regarding the alleged occurrence. 8. Learned counsel further submits that the evidence of the mother of the prosecutrix merely shows that she lodged a missing report and expressed suspicion against the appellant, which by itself cannot constitute proof of kidnapping or inducement in absence of substantive evidence. It is thus contended that the conviction recorded by the trial Court is unsustainable in law and liable to be set aside. He contended that the material available on record clearly establishes that the prosecutrix was a consenting party who voluntarily accompanied the appellant and thereafter entered into a matrimonial relationship with him, and thus the prosecution case, in substance, is one arising out of consent rather than any criminal act attributable to the appellant 9. Learned State counsel supports the judgment of conviction and submits that school records establish that the prosecutrix was a minor and therefore consent becomes immaterial. It is argued that removal of a minor girl from lawful guardianship itself constitutes offence. However, it is fairly conceded that no birth certificate or medical age determination report was produced during trial. 10. During the course of argument, it has been stated by the learned State counsel that the appellant and the prosecutrix have got married. 6 11. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully examined the entire evidence on record, this Court finds that the most crucial issue relates to the age of the prosecutrix and the voluntariness of her conduct. 12. The evidence of the prosecutrix, who was examined as PW-2, assumes central importance. In her deposition before the Court, she admitted that she knew the appellant prior to the alleged incident and that both were having a love affair. She has stated that she went along with the appellant to Bilaspur, where they resided together. She has further stated that they performed marriage in a temple and thereafter both continued to reside together as husband and wife. She has also admitted that after marriage they lived together continuously and two children were born out of their wedlock. In para 6 she has deposed that “vkjksih vkSj esjs nkEiR; thou ls nks larku mRiUu gks x;k gS ftls ls,d larku 8 lky dk gS vkSj nwljk pkj lky dk gSA” It also emerges from her testimony that she continued to live with the appellant without any protest or complaint. This evidence of the prosecutrix clearly indicates that she had accompanied the appellant voluntarily and thereafter entered into a marital relationship with him. So far as the medical examination of the prosecutrix is concerned, she has stated no medical examination was conducted. 13. The prosecution attempted to establish minority of the prosecutrix mainly through school records produced by the teacher or 7 headmistress examined during trial. The admission register recorded her date of birth as 08.08.1991 (Ex.P-1). However, in cross- examination it was admitted that the entry in the register was made on the basis of information furnished at the time of admission and no birth certificate or official document was produced before the school authority. No ossification test or medical age determination was conducted either at the time of recovery or during investigation. 14. Thus, apart from the school entry based upon unverified parental information, there is no legally reliable evidence proving age of the prosecutrix at the time of the alleged occurrence. The mother of the prosecutrix (PW-3) has deposed about lodging of missing report and suspicion against the appellant. Police witnesses proved recovery and procedural aspects of investigation. However, there is no evidence indicating use of force or coercion by the appellant in taking the prosecutrix away. Medical evidence also does not materially assist the prosecution in view of the long lapse of time between alleged occurrence and recovery. 15. So far as the teacher of the Primary School, Purani Basti, Korba is concerned, she has stated that she is not the author of the school admission and discharge register. admitted that the date of birth was entered at the time of admission on the basis of information supplied by guardians, without verification from any birth certificate or contemporaneous public record. The Supreme Court has held that the transfer certificate which is issued by government school and is duly 8 signed by the Headmaster would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act 1872. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the prosecutrix in the absence of any material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The Supreme court held that the date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. 16. In paragraphs 40,42,43,44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu (Supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under : “ 40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June,1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person,who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined.- 9 42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit, observed as follows:- "The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted." 10 43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, where this Court observed as follows:- "The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue"." 44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P. held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose 11 of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted.” 17. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs.State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under : “33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person 12 as nearly as may be. XXXX XXXX XXXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub-section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a 13 person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinized and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7 This Court has observed that a hyper technical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the 14 JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.” 18. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under : “14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through “an ossification test” or “any other latest medical age determination test” conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was 15 considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence.” 19. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs.in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: 20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by 16 obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year.” 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: “Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) 17 (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference.” 20. Similarly, in Mahadeo v. State of Maharashtra (2013) 14 SCC 637, the Supreme Court observed that though school records may be considered, the Court must be satisfied about their authenticity and reliability, particularly with respect to the source of the date of birth mentioned therein. In the present case, though the school records were exhibited through school authorities, the prosecution failed to examine the author of the entry or to establish the source of information on the basis of which the date of birth of the prosecutrix was recorded in the school register. There is no evidence to show whether the date of birth was recorded on the basis of any contemporaneous document such as a birth certificate, or merely on the oral declaration of the parents at the time of admission. In Mahadeo (supra), the Supreme Court has laid down that : “the date given in the matriculation or equivalent certificate must first of all be 18 considered for the purpose of determining the age of the prosecutrix on the date of offence and, if that is not available, other means of determining the age of prosecutrix must be resorted to. While laying down this proposition, the Supreme Court took inspiration from rule 12(3) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (referred hereinafter as “Rules of 2007”). The said rule provided various means of assessing the age of a juvenile in conflict with law. The Supreme Court applied the same parameters for determining the age of a prosecutrix under the POCSO. Under rule 12(3) of the Rules of 2007, the age determination inquiry shall obtain evidence relating to the age of the juvenile firstly, from the matriculation or equivalent certificates if available [r. 12(3)(a)(i)] and in its absence, the date of birth certificate from the school first attended (other than a play school) [r. 12(3)(a)(ii)], and in its absence, the birth certificate given by a municipality, corporation or a panchayat [r. 12(3)(a)(iii)]. Thereafter, the Supreme Court refers to rule 12(3)(b) and opines that it is only in the absence of any of the means provided in rr. 12(3)(a) (i) to (iii), that medical opinion could be sought to determine the age of the juvenile. Thereafter, the Supreme Court applies the same standard to determine the age of the prosecutrix under POCSO. 15. The question before this Court is whether the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mahadeo supra binds all inferior Courts to accept the date of birth of the prosecutrix as entered in the school register as an indelible fact, prohibiting any enquiry into the reliability of such an entry? In Haryana Financial Corporation and anr., Vs.Jagdamba Oil Mills and Anr – (2002) 3 SCC 496, the Supreme Court held in paragraph 19 that judgements are not to be interpreted as statutes and the observations of the Courts are not to be assigned the mathematical rigidness of a Euclid’s theorem. The observations of the Court are to be understood in the backdrop of the facts in which the judgment was passed.” 19 21. A plain reading of the judgment in Mahadeo (supra) reveals that the Supreme Court had to borrow the means of determining the age of the prosecutrix from the provisions of r.12(3) (i) to (iii) of the Rules 8 of 2007, on account of the absence of an analogous provision in the POCSO. However, the Supreme Court never intended its opinion to forbid an enquiry by the Courts into the reliability of the date of birth of the prosecutrix, as entered in the school register. Such a view is further sustainable in the light of stringent and draconian provisions in the POCSO which require that the enquiry by the Court to ascertain the guilt of an accused under the provisions of the POCSO should be detailed and intense to ensure that there is no miscarriage of justice by convicting an innocent or acquitting the guilty. The judgment does not require that the Courts consider the date of birth of the prosecutrix entered in the school register as gospel truth.” 22. In the absence of proof of the source of the date of birth, reliance solely on school records becomes unsafe. Applying the above principles, this Court finds that the prosecution has failed to establish the age of the prosecutrix with the degree of certainty required in criminal law. It is a settled principle that where two views are possible, the one favourable to the accused must be adopted. In Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 263, the Supreme Court reiterated that while school records may be considered, their evidentiary value depends upon strict proof of their origin and authenticity. 23. In the present case, the prosecution relied solely on school 20 admission register to establish date of birth. It is now well settled that an entry in school records is relevant only when it is shown to have been made on the basis of authentic and verified information. In the present case, the entry is admittedly based upon information supplied at the time of admission without production of any birth certificate or official record. No attempt was made by the investigating agency to secure municipal birth records or to subject the prosecutrix to medical age determination. In absence of reliable evidence, the prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the prosecutrix was a minor at the time of the alleged occurrence. 24. Equally significant is the conduct of the prosecutrix herself. She clearly admitted that she voluntarily accompanied the appellant, married him in a temple and thereafter resided with him as husband and wife. It has also come in evidence that two children have been born from the said relationship and both parties are still residing together peacefully. Such prolonged cohabitation and absence of protest or complaint completely undermine the prosecution allegation that she was forcibly taken away or induced by deceitful means. 25. There is no convincing evidence showing that the appellant employed force, coercion or inducement. The element of “taking” or “enticing” necessary to constitute offences under Sections 363 or 366(A) IPC is conspicuously absent. Furthermore, recovery of the prosecutrix after several years without any intervening complaint or attempt to escape further supports the inference that she accompanied 21 the appellant voluntarily. The trial Court, while acquitting the appellant of rape, failed to appreciate the impact of these facts while recording conviction under Sections 363 and 366(A) IPC on the same evidence. Such conviction cannot be sustained. 26. In view of the foregoing analysis and upon careful appreciation of the entire evidence available on record, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had kidnapped or induced the prosecutrix so as to attract the offences under Sections 363 and 366(A) of the Indian Penal Code. The evidence of the prosecutrix herself clearly indicates that she had voluntarily accompanied the appellant and thereafter entered into a marital relationship with him, and both have continued to reside together as husband and wife for several years, out of which two children have also been born. The circumstances emerging from the record unmistakably indicate that the case arises out of a consensual relationship rather than a criminal act. 27. Further, the prosecution has also failed to produce legally reliable and cogent evidence to conclusively establish that the prosecutrix was a minor at the time of the alleged occurrence. The conviction recorded by the learned trial Court, therefore, cannot be sustained in law. 28. Accordingly, the appeal deserves to be and is hereby allowed. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 14.09.2015 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Korba in Sessions Trial No. 34/2014 are set aside. 22 29. The appellant is acquitted of the charges levelled against him. He shall be released forthwith, if not required in connection with any other case. Fine amount, if deposited, shall be refunded in accordance with law. Ordered accordingly. Sd/- (Arvind Kumar Verma) Judge SUGUNA DUBEY Digitally signed by SUGUNA DUBEY Date: 2026.02.03 16:05:32 +0530