Page No.# 1/56 GAHC040007962023 2026:GAU-AP:920 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : CRL.A(J)/10/2023 Ramesh Yadav S/o Shri Kamlesh Yadav, Resident of Gajipur, Uttar Pradesh, presently lodging at District Jail, Tezu, Lohit District (Arunachal Pradesh) VERSUS THE STATE OF AP Through Public Prosecutor. Advocate for the Petitioner : S V Darang, Legal Aid Counsel Advocate for the Respondent : P P of AP, Taying Nega,Tao Tarin,Jumgam Jini,Binter Picha Linked Case : CRL.A(J)/11/2023 Subash @ Haradhan Mandal (A-1) Age: 50 Occupation : Address:S/o Shri Anil Mandal Resident of Cooch Bihar West Bengal Presently lodging at District Jail Tezu Lohit District Arunachal Pradesh. Page No.# 2/56 VERSUS THE STATE OF AP Age: 0 Occupation : Address:Through the Public Prosecutor. ------------ Advocate for : Nikita Danggen Advocate for : P P of AP appearing for THE STATE OF AP: Advocate appearing for respectively. BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE KARDAK ETE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PRANJAL DAS Date on which judgment was reserved : 28.07.2026 Date of pronouncement of judgment : 11.09.2026 Whether the pronouncement is of the : Yes operative part of the judgment? Whether the full judgment has been : NA pronounced? JUDGMENT AND ORDER(CAV) (Pranjal Das J.) 1. These two criminal appeals are being disposed of by this common judgment and order, as both arise out of the judgment of conviction dated 03.06.2022 and the order on sentence dated 06.06.2022 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, East Siang District, Pasighat, in PSG Sessions Case No. 5 of Page No.# 3/56 2018, arising out of Pasighat P.S. Case No. 23 of 2018. 2. By the impugned judgment, the appellants herein, namely, Subash @ Haradhan Mandal (A1) and Ramesh Yadav (A2), have been convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 302/201/120(B)/34 of the Indian Penal Code. For the offence under Section 120(B)IPC read with Section 302 IPC, the appellants were sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/-, with a default sentence of simple imprisonment for three months. For the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, the appellants were sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/-, with a default sentence of simple imprisonment for three months. For the offence under Section 201 read with Section 34 IPC, the appellants were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, with a default sentence of simple imprisonment for one month. It was further directed that all the substantive sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently. The appellants were also granted the benefit of set-off under Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 3. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of conviction and order on sentence, the appellants have preferred separate criminal appeals before this Court. Criminal Appeal No. 10 (AP) of 2023 has been filed by appellant Ramesh Yadav (A2), while Criminal Appeal No. 11 (AP) of 2023 has been preferred by appellant Subash @ Haradhan Mandal (A1). Since both the appeals have been filed from jail, where the appellants are presently undergoing their sentences, learned Legal Aid Counsel have been appointed to represent and prosecute their appeals before this Court. Page No.# 4/56 4. The original TCR was called for and the same is received. 5. The Registry prepared the paper book. 6. Learned counsel, Mr. B. Picha, has entered appearance on behalf of the informant, who is the wife of the deceased. 7. The prosecution case, in brief, before the learned Trial Court was that on 07.02.2018, Smti. Ibom Nyori lodged a written complaint at the Mebo Police Outpost under Pasighat Police Station alleging that her husband, Bomge Nyori, who was serving as a Cashier at the Mebo Branch of Arunachal Pradesh Rural Bank, had been found murdered inside his office by an unknown person. 8. The complaint was forwarded to the Officer-in-Charge, Pasighat Police Station, where it was registered as Pasighat P.S. Case No. 23/2018 under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. Investigation was accordingly taken up. Upon completion of the investigation, the Investigating Officer submitted a charge-sheet against the present appellants, namely, Subash @ Haradhan Mandal (A1) and Ramesh Yadav (A2), for offences punishable under Sections 302/201/120(B)/34 of the IPC. A charge-sheet was also submitted against a third accused, Sukumar Mandal (A3), for the offence punishable under Section 212 of the IPC. 9. Upon compliance with the requisite formalities and after hearing the parties, the learned Trial Court framed charges against accused Nos. 1 and 2 under Sections 120(B)/302/201/34 of the IPC, and against accused No. 3, Sukumar Mandal, under Section 212 of the IPC. Page No.# 5/56 10. When the charges were read over and explained, accused Ramesh Yadav (A2) and Sukumar Mandal (A3) pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. Accused Subash @ Haradhan Mandal (A1), however, pleaded guilty. Notwithstanding such plea, the learned Trial Court, in the interest of justice, proceeded to conduct a full-fledged trial against all the accused persons. 11. In support of its case, the prosecution examined 19 (nineteen) witnesses, exhibited 18 (eighteen) documentary exhibits and produced 3 (three) material exhibits. Upon closure of the prosecution evidence, the statements of the accused persons were recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The defence did not adduce any evidence. 12. Upon conclusion of the trial, the learned Trial Court convicted accused Subash @ Haradhan Mandal (A1) and Ramesh Yadav (A2) and sentenced them in the manner already noticed hereinabove. The third accused, Sukumar Mandal (A3), however, was acquitted of the charge under Section 212 of the IPC. Aggrieved by their conviction and the sentences imposed, accused Nos. 1 and 2 have preferred the present appeals, which are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. 13. Ms. N. Danggen, learned Legal Aid Counsel appearing for the appellant in Crl.A.No. 11 (AP) of 2023 and Ms. S. V. Darang, learned legal Aid Counsel for the appellant in Crl.A.No. 10 (AP) of 2023, submits that there are no eyewitness to the occurrence and that the conviction of the appellants rests merely on suspicion, unsupported by a complete and cogent chain of circumstantial evidence. It is contended that PW-8, who could have been a Page No.# 6/56 material witness, did not support the prosecution case and was declared hostile. Learned counsel further submits that the Call Detail Records (CDRs), on which the prosecution sought to rely, were never duly proved during the trial and therefore, cannot be read in evidence. It is further contended that there is no reliable material connecting either of the appellants with the commission of the alleged offence. 14. It is also submitted that the Investigating Officer failed to corroborate the alleged extra-judicial confession said to have been made by appellant No. 1, Subash @ Haradhan Mandal (A1), before PW-19. According to the learned Legal Aid Counsels, except for the self-incriminating statements made by the appellants during their examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, there is no independent evidence from which their guilt can be inferred. It is argued that even if the evidence relating to the alleged discovery pursuant to the disclosure statements of the appellants is accepted, the same, by itself, is insufficient to sustain the conviction. 15. Placing reliance upon several judicial precedents, learned Legal Aid Counsels submit that a conviction cannot be founded solely on the basis of self- incriminating statements made by an accused during examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. In support of their submissions, reliance has been placed on the following decisions: (i) State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Raghubir Singh reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 940 (ii) Edmund S. Lyngdoh v. State of Meghalaya, reported Page No.# 7/56 in (2016) 15 SCC 572 16. Per contra, Mr. T. Ete, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State, supports the impugned judgment and submits that the incriminating circumstances emerging from the examination of the appellants under Section 313 Cr.P.C., are not to be viewed in isolation but can legitimately be considered in conjunction with the other evidence adduced by the prosecution. It is contended that the learned Trial Court committed no error in relying upon the said materials while recording the conviction of the appellants for the offences charged. 17. Mr. Ete, learned Additional Public Prosecutor submits that certain facts established by the prosecution also constitute relevant conduct within the meaning of Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act. He submits that the evidence on record clearly discloses a premeditated plan to eliminate the deceased, who was working as the cashier of the bank and thereafter, commit robbery of the bank. It is also submitted that appellant No. 1, Subash @ Haradhan Mandal (A1), had made an extra-judicial confession before his brother, who was arraigned as accused No. 3 but was subsequently acquitted by the learned Trial Court. In support of his submissions, reliance has been placed on the following decisions: (i) State of Maharashtra vs. Sukhdev Singh and another reported in (1992) 3 SCC 700 (ii) State of HP vs. Wazir Chand and others (1978) 1 SCC 130 : AIR 1978 SC 315 Page No.# 8/56 (iii) Sanatan Naskar vs. State of W.B., reported in (2010) 8 SCC 249 (iv) Harivadan Babubhai Patel vs. State of Gujarat, (2013) 7 SCC 45 (v) Mahavir Singh vs. State of Haryana, (2014) 6 SCC 716 (vi) Virsa Singh vs. State of Punjab AIR 1958 SC 465 (vii) State of Rajasthan vs. Gurbachan Singh and others, 2022 15 SCC 817 (viii) Yashpal Mittal vs. State of Punjab, (1977) 4 SCC 540 18. Mr. B. Picha, learned counsel appearing for the victim side, submits that there is no rule of law that the testimony of a police official is inherently unreliable merely because of his official status. According to him, the evidence of police witnesses, like that of any other witness, must be subjected to careful scrutiny and appreciation by the Court. 19. In rejoinder, learned Legal Aid Counsels for the appellants reiterate their earlier submissions and further contend that the prosecution case suffers from material discrepancies between the prosecution evidence adduced during trial and the statements recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. It is submitted that, Page No.# 9/56 viewed as a whole, the evidence on record is wholly insufficient to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. It is, therefore, prayed that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentences be set aside. 20. We have carefully perused the memorandum of appeals, the impugned judgment of conviction and order on sentence, the oral and documentary evidence adduced during the trial as well as the exhibits brought on record. 21. We have given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties and have also carefully examined the decisions cited at the Bar. 22. As already stated earlier, 19 witnesses were examined by the prosecution during the trial. Before proceeding further, the testimony of these 19 witnesses may be summarized and it may be seen as to what extent they have implicated the convict appellants. (i) Thus, PW-1, I. Nyori is the informant of the case and wife of the deceased. She identified one of the accused persons during the trial. From her testimony, it emerges that on the evening of the day of the incident, when the victim did not return home, she called one of his colleagues who had left office earlier that day. Thereafter, she asked another colleague whose house was near the office to find out the situation. Thereupon, one person came and asked her to accompany to the bank. Upon reaching there, she found the car of her husband outside the bank and many people were present. Thereafter, she was informed that her husband was no more. She proved the FIR as Exhibit-1 and her signature thereon as Exhibit-1 (A). Subsequently, she came to know that three persons were arrested in connection with this case and upon going to the Page No.# 10/56 police station, she saw those three persons and that these were the persons standing in the dock of the Court at the time of her deposition. Surprisingly, the informant was not cross-examined by the defence. (ii) PW-2, N. Nitan identified A1 Subhash Mandal but did not know the other accused persons. He stated about the said accused Subhash Mandal running a shop near the bank. PW-2 was a bank employee. On that day, he was working at home and in the evening around 7 pm, he was informed that the car of the deceased was outside the bank and door was kept open without the light being open, whereupon, he rushed there. Later, he came to know that dead body of the deceased was lying inside the office and he was amongst the persons who identified the dead body. He stated that deceased was assaulted with a UPS battery on the backside of his head. PW2 was also not cross-examined. (iii) PW-3, A Parme, identified accused Subhash Mandal but not the other two accused persons. He testified that on the day of the incident, the victim left for Pasighat to collect cash, returned around 1 pm and handed over the cash to him and thereupon after counting the cash, he again handed it back to the deceased. He testified that cash was about 12 lakhs. He left the bank around 2 pm. Later, he got information from the wife of the deceased that he had not returned home. Thereupon, he sent one of his friends to find out and came to know that the car of the deceased is outside the bank with door open and lights were off. Later he reached the bank and came to know that unknown persons killed the deceased. He saw the dead body of the deceased and it was full of blood. Later, he came to know that accused persons present in the dock at the time of his deposition were arrested in connection with this case. Cross examination was declined. (iv) PW-4, N Meghu, identified A1-Haradhan Mandal and Sukumar Mandal who was later acquitted and not the other person. He stated that these two persons identified by him were running shop near the bank. All that emerges Page No.# 11/56 from his testimony is that on the day of the incident he had gone to the bank to deposit some money being Rs 4.2 lakhs and returned home. Cross examination was declined. (v) PW-5, T. Ratan, identified Haradhan Mandal (A1) during his deposition. He was working in the bank where the deceased was a cashier. He also testified about the deceased leaving for Pasighat and returning around 1pm and one of the staff counting the cash along with the deceased and that it was Rs 12 lakhs. He also left home at around 3.40pm. Later, he came to know in the evening around 7.30pm that deceased had not returned home and upon being asked by his wife he went to the office but found the door unlocked but with no light in the office and car of the deceased was still in the parking place. Later, he came to know about the incident. PW-5 stated that public cannot know the arrival of cash in the bank. Cross examination was declined. (vi) PW-6, Dr. T. Pertin, conducted post-mortem examination which he exhibited as Exhibit-2 and his signature there on is Exhibit-2(A). He stated that the cause of death was due to injuries on vital organ i.e. brain caused by blunt, moderate and heavy object. The nature of injuries would be homicidal and homicide cannot be ruled out. Cross examination was declined. (vii) PW-7, Nalo Nyitan, is a seizure witness testifying about seizure of one mobile, spectacles, car key, small dagger and UPS material. He proved the seizure memo as Exhibit-2 (A) and his signature there on is Exhibit-2 A (1). He stated that these items were seized in his presence by the IO of the case. (viii) PW-7, Nalo Neetan, was further examined during which he stated that on 7-2-2018 in his presence police seized one UPS battery, bag, mobile handset, vehicle keys, dagger and there was blood stain on the UPS battery and dagger and also on the bag and that there was blood all over the place of occurrence. He proved as Material Exhibit-2, the dagger shown to him and identified it to be Page No.# 12/56 the same as the seized one during his trial. UPS battery was exhibited as Material Exhibit-3, which he identified during deposition. (ix) In cross examination, he reiterated about the blood stains on the materials. He denied that the materials shown to him in the court during his depositions were not the same materials seized by the police on that day. (x) PW-8, Rupam Deka, who identified A1 as Kokon Mandal but did not know the others. He stated about being suggested by his brother-in-law to pick up the wife and children of his own brother whereupon he brought them to Jonai. This witness turned hostile. Cross examination by defense was declined but the prosecution conducted cross examination whereupon he stated that his brother- in-law called him and asked him to pick up the wife and children of his brother from Mebo whereupon he picked up the wife and children on his motorcycle. He denied that, he told the police that his brother-in-law's brother told him that while trying to rob the bank they had killed the cashier. However, he admitted the statement that after being released from bail he confirmed that his brother- in-law's brother namely Subhash Mandal and others had killed the cashier of Rural Bank of Mebo. (xi) PW-9, Arbind Pangging is also a seizure witness who proved his signature as Exhibit-2A(ii) as his signature on the seizure list. He stated about Caesar in his presence of broken spectacle, sling bag, car key, UPS battery, dagger, machete and one mobile phone. In cross examination, he admitted that he had signed the seizure list in the police station and did not see these materials during his deposition. However, he denied that he had not seen those materials at the place of occurrence. (xii) PW-9 was again called for examination whereupon he stated that on 07.02.2018 in his presence police seized one UPS battery, bag, mobile handset, vehicle, keys and dagger. He stated about dead body of the deceased found Page No.# 13/56 lying on the ground and the UPS battery used as weapon of offence was on his head. He also stated about blood stain on the UPS battery and it being seen as a weapon of offence. He also proved the dagger as Material Exhibit 2 and identified it during the deposition and also the UPS battery as Material Exhibit 3. In cross examination, he denied that he had deposed falsely. (xiii) PW-10, Kenedy Perme, testified that one day while coming from his field he was stopped by the police official SIB Pait, near the residence of accused Ramesh Yadav and at that time the witness was ASM of Namsingh village. He stated about being shown a monitor, stabilizer, DVR and router in police vehicle where Ramesh Yadav was also present and that police told him that these were recovered from the pond of Yamut Perme, the Gaon Bura. He proved the seizure list as Exhibit 3 and his signature thereon as Exhibit 3. The material objects were proved as Material Exhibit 1. Cross examination was declined. (xiv) PW-11, Gunon Megu, testified that police picked him up to witness recovery from his pond at Tengabari area belonging to Yamut Perme, Gaon Bura. He stated about one monitor, stabilizer, DVR box and router taken out from the pond but stated that he did not know who had kept those materials in the pond. He proved his signature as Exhibit 3 (b) on the seizure list (Exhibit 3) and proved the material objects as Material Exhibit 1. (xv) PW-12, Kayong Panggeng, testified that near the pond of Yamut Perme, he found appellant Ramesh Yadav standing and upon being asked by police and him to disclose about missing materials, Ramesh showed towards a pond and from there police recovered some machines in his presence whereupon he signed on the seizure list identifying his signature as Exhibit-3 (c). He proved the material objects as Material Exhibit-1. (xvi) PW-13, Kenter Koyu, testified that upon getting information about the incident he went to the bank and upon entering saw the dead body lying on the Page No.# 14/56 floor with UPS battery on his head and that neck was totally bent due to the pressure of the UPS battery and there was blood all over the floor. PW 13 is a inquest witness who identified his signature as Exhibit 4 (a) on the inquest report being Exhibit 4. He did not state anything significant in his cross- examination (xvii) Exhibit PW-14, Mon Bahadur Pradhan, is not a relevant witness as he stated that he does not know anything about the incident. Cross-examination was also declined. (xviii) PW-15, Bomri Nyori, who stated that he knew all the accused persons standing in the dock at the time of his deposition though he could not mention the name of Sukumar Mandal. He testified that on the night of 07.02.2018 around 10 p.m., he received a phone call from his brother Bomar Nyori that the victim Bomri Nyori was found murdered in the bank at Mebo, whereupon he reached Mebo on the next morning and straightaway went to the medical and saw the dead body there. He stated that his head was crushed. He stated about performing the last rites of the deceased. Subsequently, he and others received an information that culprits have been arrested and whereupon he went to the police station to see them and upon asking why they had killed his elder brother, accused Subhash Mandal and Ramesh Yadav confessed that they had killed his brother for money. In cross-examination, he reiterated by denying the suggestion in this regard that accused Ramesh confessed when they visited him in jail. (xix) PW-16, Inspector Atan Taki, testified that on the day of the incident, he was on leave but upon being informed by the SP on phone, he rejoined his duty on 08.02.2018 and in the meantime the case had already been registered and IO of the case had started investigation. He enquired from the neighbours including the shop nearby. He also enquired from Subhash Mandal who was running a small shop opposite the bank and from his shop the entrance of the Page No.# 15/56 bank could be seen. On being asked, he told that he did not see any activities on the previous evening as it was dark. PW-16 stated that at that time he did not know that Subhash Mandal was himself the main accused. He further testified that on the next day he came to know that Subhash Mandal had fled away. Later they went to Jonai and subsequently Subhash Mandal was arrested from railway station in Cooch Bihar when he was trying to leave for Gujarat and brought to Pasighat. And during interrogation he disclosed the name of Ramesh Yadav as being partner in crime. He further testified that thereupon, Ramesh Yadav was arrested and upon interrogation he disclosed about the electronic gadgets being CCTV camera, desktop and DVR of the bank taken by him in a gunny bag loaded in his private car and dropped in a water pond. PW-16 stated that Ramesh Yadav led them to the pond and one diver was engaged and the electronic materials were brought out and seized. He stated that during investigation Subhash Mandal admitted his guilt and stated that he and Ramesh Yadav planned to loot money from the bank. He stated that Ramesh Yadav was engaged to watch people within the bank compound while he entered the bank and requested the deceased to update his bank account. And when he was busy doing so, he hit him on the backside of his head with iron rod whereupon the deceased fell on the ground. Thereafter, he lifted a battery lying nearby and smashed the head of the deceased killing him on the spot. Thereafter, Ramesh Yadav packed all the electronic gadgets in a gunny bag and threw in the pond. He proved as material exhibit 1 the seized materials being monitor, stabilizer, DVR box, router, etc. upon being led by accused Ramesh Yadav. He proved the UPS as Material Exhibit-3. In cross-examination he admitted that he was not a seizure witness of the case. He stated that he did not remember the name of the diver who had brought out the electronic gadgets from the pond. He also admitted that he did not see the iron rod for the court. (xx) PW-17, SI B. Pait, was the investigating officer of the case. He stated about seizure weapon of offense being UPS battery, iron rod and knife and that DVR, CCTV, monitor, camera of APR bank nearby were recovered from a pond at Page No.# 16/56 the Tengabari area of Namsingh on being led by accused Ramesh Yadav. The said recovered items were sent to forensic laboratory in Kolkata. He stated that Subhash Mandal and Ramesh Yadav planned to rob the bank and during the operation Ramesh Yadav was engaged to observe the movement of public and Subhash Mandal went inside and requested the deceased to update his passbook and while he was doing so hit him on his head with iron rod felling him and thereafter seeing him alive he hit him further on his head with a UPS battery killing him on the spot. Subsequently, due to nervousness he could not open the locker with the key which he found in the wallet of the deceased which he had taken out from his pocket. He threw the wallet of the deceased in a bucket in the bathroom of the bank. Subsequently, the electronic items were wrapped up by Ramesh Yadav and dumped at some place and into a pond in Namsingh village. PW-17 stated that Subhash Mandal and Ramesh Yadav committed cold-blooded murder of the victim late Bomge Nyori. He stated about recovery of the DVR, CCTV camera and router stabilizer desktop from the pond at Tengaberi area in Namsingh. The rod could not be found as it was stated to be to have been thrown on the general playground. PW17 proved the FIR as Exhibit-1 and the signature of the then OC T. Bucker as Exhibit-1 (b). He proved the seizure memo as Exhibit 2(A) and his signature thereon as Exhibit 2 (A)(iii). He proved another seizure memo as Exhibit 3 pertaining to the seizure of stabilizer DVR router. He proved the charge-sheet as Exhibit 14 and his signature thereon as Exhibit 14(b), (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g). In cross- examination he admitted that during investigation he did not find concrete evidence or eyewitness to the incident and admitted that he had filed the charge-sheet on the basis of statements and recovery of seized materials being led by one of the accused, Ramesh Yadav. He admitted that he did not forward the accused persons for recording confessional statement. He stated that during investigation they found that Subash Mandal and Ramesh Yadav planned to commit robbery in the bank, but there was no evidence to kill someone in their plan. He denied that there were no lapses in the investigation but admitted that he did not call forensic team to assist in the investigation. He also admitted that Page No.# 17/56 he did not collect the call detail records to find out any calls between Subash Mandal and Ramesh Yadav. He denied that he had not filed the charge-sheet properly. In re-examination by the prosecution, PW 17 stated that at the relevant time the SP Pasighat was monitoring the investigation of the case. (xxi) PW-18 is another police official being SI K. Pertin, who stated that after the retirement of the IO SI B. Pait on 17.08.2021, he was endorsed to submit the supplementary charge-sheet. He stated about the previous IO seizing the material objects on disclosure statement made by the co-accused Ramesh Yadav. He stated about collecting the CFSL report and that in the said report the scientist opined that the DVR hard drive could not be read with the available tools in the laboratory and as such the data could not be retrieved. He proved the supplementary charge-sheet as Exhibit 16 and his signature thereon as Exhibit 16 (a). He proved the FSL report as Exhibit 18. He proved as material Exhibit 1 (A), the DVR box, material Exhibit 1(B), hard drive and material Exhibit 1 (C), as the router. (xxiii) PW-19 is a police official being SI V. Lowang. He stated that on 07.02.2018, the night of the incident, he was on night duty at the Pasighat police station, whereupon he was informed that a murder had taken place at the rural bank at Mebo, whereupon he accompanied O.C. to the place of occurrence and found one person lying in a pool of blood inside the bank and later, came to know that he was the cashier. Later, he came to know that the deceased was the cashier of the bank, Bomge Nyori. PW-19 stated about actively assisting the I.O. of the case. He stated about checking the room of Subhash Mandal and growing suspicious as he had suddenly disappeared after the incident, though his shop was situated just opposite the bank. PW-19 further stated that while checking his room, he found that there were half-eaten food and untouched curry, whereupon their suspicions grew stronger, and his phone was switched off. Later, with the help of West Bengal police, they arrested him from Cooch Bihar Railway Station. During the transit remand itself, he revealed that he had Page No.# 18/56 murdered the cashier with the help of Ramesh Yadav. Information was sent, and subsequently, Ramesh Yadav was also apprehended. He stated further that he accompanied the I.O. of the case to recover the DVR box of the bank from a pond at Tengabari area, Namsingh and that accused Ramesh Yadav disclosed the place and led them to the place where he concealed the DVR after the incident. He further testified that on being shown by him, the I.O. took the help of one diver and the DVR was brought out from the pond and seized by the I.O. He proved the photograph of the pond as Exhibit 5 within bracket small c, and the photograph of the electronic items recovered from the pond as Exhibit 5 within bracket d and within bracket small e. He proved as material exhibit 1 the seized items from the pond. He also proved as material exhibit 3 the UPS. In cross-examination, BW 19 stated that as per his finding, Sukumar Mandal was, he stated in cross-examination that during investigation it was found that Sukumar Mandal (later acquitted), who stays at Mebo was found missing from Mebo, and Subash Mandal was also found missing at the same time. Later both of them were apprehended from Koch Bihar Railway Station. BW 19 also stated in cross-examination that on the way back from Koch Bihar, Subash Mandal disclosed that he had killed the cashier with the help of Ramesh Yadav. 23. There are no eyewitnesses to the occurrence and the case is based upon circumstantial evidence. However, during their examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., and upon being asked about the incident, both the convict appellants narrated a detailed answer which is grossly self-incriminating and to some extent unusually detailed. Now, considering the fact that there are no eyewitnesses, the case is based on circumstantial evidence and the self- incriminating statement of the convict appellants during their examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is the most incriminating material in the prosecution case - we deem it necessary to reproduce their answers to question No. 1 in its entirety as herein below: Page No.# 19/56 “Statement of accused Sri Subash @ Haradhan Mandal (A-1): 1. PW-1, Smti Ibom Nyori lodged an FIR (P.Ext-1) against an unknown person for killing her husband inside the Rural bank, Mebo and after about 20 days on being informed by the IO, that three persons were arrested in connection with this case, she went to PS and saw you. What do you have to say on this? Ans: I would like to state that on 07.02.2018, accused Ramesh Radav called me at 11: 30 AM, when I was in my shop at Mebo. He enquired me about whereabout the cashier Lt. Bomge Nyori. My shop is located just opposite to the Rural bank. And as on that day, the vehicle of Lt. Bomge Nyori was not seen parked as generally it used to be. So, I informed accused Ramesh Yadav that the cashier was not present in the bank on that day, and I do not know the whereabout of the cashier. Then, he suddenly told me that he has seen the vehicle of the deceased at Pasighat at main market. He told me that the deceased is going to Rural bank at Pasighat and he will chase the deceased and called me back later on. He also told me that the deceased is going with a black leather bag in the Rural bank at Pasighat. Generally, if the cheque is deposited in the bank at Mebo for withdrawal of cash say about 3-4 lakhs, they give 1-2 days to the customer to manage the cash from the main branch of Pasighat. So, on that day, the cashier was going to withdraw the cash from Pasighat main branch. And on that day, the accused Ramesh Yadav chased the deceased at Pasighat from 11:30 to 2:00 PM. And at about 2 PM, he called me while on the way from Pasighat to Mebo and told me that he will chase the deceased by his own car upto Mebo Tinali and from there, he will come on foot after parking his vehicle at Mebo Tinali and then asked me to observe and see whether the deceased cashier will straight away to go to bank or his resident. Then, I could notice that at about 2:20 PM, the deceased cashier as usual has parked his vehicle near my shop and he entered into the bank carrying his black leather bag. Accused Ramesh Yadav told me that he was carrying a withdrawn cash money in his said black leather bag. Page No.# 20/56 Then, at about 2:30 PM, accused Ramesh again called me from general field Mebo. On being asked I informed him about the deceased cashier entering the back after parking his car, near my shop. Then he told me to close my shop at 3:00 PM and then, he will come and knock the door to discuss with me. At about 3:00PM there was lot of customer in my shop, so I could not close my shop at 3:00 PM as told by accused Ramesh. The accused was scolding me by a phone asking me to close the shop at the earliest. And by the time, I closed the shop, it was already 3:30 PM. After about 2-3 minutes of closing the shop, accused Ramesh came to my shop. On being knocked by the accused Ramesh, I opened the door. He entered my shop and brought one bottle of whisky OC Blues. He also brought with him one iron rod and a dagger. Then, he asked me if a person is hit with the said rod, would the person die at once or not. Then, I told him that if it hit on the vital part, the person would fall and die. Then, he asked me to go inside the bank with the iron rod and execute the plan. The plan was made earlier about 1 month back to rob the bank. It was planned to be executed on 07.02.2018. But, I refused to go inside the bank at that time. He convinced me that since I am known to the deceased cashier, he will open the door for me also. Then, I told him that the deceased cashier is a good person and he is my customer and also helpful person, so, I told him that I cannot kill him. Then, accused Ramesh told me that generally the good person die early. Then, I told him that the deceased cashier has two child, what will happen to them. Then, accused Ramesh told me that if the cashier die, his wife will get the job. Then, we took alcohol inside my shop. After taking 2 peg of whisky, accused Ramesh told me that in his leather bag, at least the cashier withdrawn and carried about 7-8 lakhs cash money from Pasighat bank which he himself seen with his eyes. We kept on discussion about the money. I told him that that 7-8 lakhs money by now must have been kept inside the locker. Then, he told me that he had already surveyed the locker. It has a key system and the key is with the deceased cashier. And if we get key, it means we get money. We kept on discussion about the possibilities of the execution of the plan. Page No.# 21/56 My shop is on the above and the bank is just opposite to my shop across the road below. There was a hole in my shop from where one could see the bank very clearly. Accused Ramesh peeped on that hole and conducted survey on the bank. He told me that at that time, there were 2 more ladies staff were still inside the bank, besides cashier. At about 4:30 one lady staff, Ane Perme left the bank. Then, after about 10 minutes, another lady staff Tokmem Ratan also left the bank. Now, only the cashier was alone still inside the bank. Then at that time, the electricity of the Mebo market has gone. It was dark. Then, at that time, accused Ramesh told me that now it was the right opportunity to go as no one would see in the dark. I was wearing a jumper at that time. Then, on being asked by Ramesh, I took the iron rod and kept on my back inside the jumper and kept the dagger in my jumper pocket. Then, we both went out together from the shop. And as planned, I entered the bank from the front and as the bank does not have any boundary wall, accused Ramesh went towards the backside. He went across the boundary wall of the general ground on the one side of the bank and hide himself behind the wall. Since the bank main door was not locked, so when I pushed it easily opened. When, I entered the bank, since there was no light, the cahier was putting off the switch and ready to go home carrying his bag. Then, on seeing me, he asked me in hindi "Are Subash aap samne hoke itna late mein aya hain" then I told him, I was late as at the day time I had been to Pasighat. As tutored by accused Ramesh, I told the cashier that I deposited my passbook at the day time for update and came to take my passbook back. Then, he told me come and take. Then, he went back inside followed by me. He brought about 60-70 passbook from cashier chamber to the main counter and was selecting it to find out my passbook. He was facing me back selecting the passbook. So, at that time, I took out the iron rod from my back and hit him on his head due to which he fell on ground. Since, it was dark, I took out my mobile and when torched on, I saw he was profusely bleeding from nose etc. Then, I got scared by seeing. So I immediately called accused Ramesh. He was already in the bank and asked me to open the back door, and also he asked me to disconnect the CCTV, so that he can enter. Then, Page No.# 22/56 I disconnected 2-3 wires and cut about 2 wires with my dagger. The phone was still on line as I was using earphone. He then, asked me I had got the key of locker. And I told him that the key is on the counter. Then, I told him to come immediately, otherwise I walk out from the bank. Then, he entered inside the bank and saw with his mobile light that the cashier was still alive. Then, he said that if he remained alive, we will be in trouble. So, we were looking for something to finish him. Then, he found one old battery in the kitchen cum store. He brought the battery and hit the deceased cashier on his head thereafter, the cashier died on the spot. Then, we took the key from counter kept by the cashier while searching for my passbook, and went to the locker room. We tried to open the locker, but it was not opened. We tried 2-3 times to open the locker, but it did not open. Then, he says now we are helpless, we have to go back. He asked me to go back to my room and he also go back at Namsing in Tengabari. He also asked me to keep my phone switch off and not to call him for 2-3 months. On his direction, I wrapped up all the CCTV monitor with hard disk, stabilizer, setup box etc in the banks curtain and handed over to him. Accordingly, accused Ramesh took those CCTV materials and carried with him to his vehicle which was parked at Tinali and I also went back to my room. I left the dagger mistakenly inside the bank and threw away the iron rod on the backside of the general ground. After reaching room, I was nervous, scared and restless and was not at all at peace. So, I called one of my friend Dagang Dai to have alcohol with me, and he came to my room which is located some around 30-40 meters away from my shop. We took alcohol in my room. It was around 8:30 PM and as my room is not very far away from them, we heard the crying sound of victim's family. On being requested by my friend, we also went to bank to see. My friend did not know anything about the fact. So, I also behave like innocent. We saw lot of people gathered in the bank and the police also were present in the bank. Page No.# 23/56 We were with the public till about 10:30 PM. On my request, Dagang Dai also ready to stay with me at that night. The dead body of the deceased was brought to the medical, Mebo, which is also nearby my home. Since my house is nearby, we also joined the public burning fire for whole night. Even, I gave hot water to the police party. The Police were investigating about the case. I also gave my statement before the police stating that after closing my shop at 3 PM, I was sleeping as was sick. After conducting postmortem, the dead body of the deceased was taken to village at about 12 midnight. On the next day, I heard from my police friend that they have found the finger prints etc and the culprit will be caught soon. So, I got scared and went to my elder brother Sukumar Mandal's house and disclosed the same to my sister-in- law as my brother was not present at that time. Being scared, they left the Mebo for Jonai on 09.02.2018. And on 10.02.2018, I also left Mebo for West Bengal to my Aunty's house. In the meantime, the I.O. B. Pait also called me and asked me to surrender before the police. So, after long discussion I decided to surrender before the Jonai police. So, On 26.02.2018, I accordingly went to Railway station Cooch Behar with a plan to surrender. My father asked my elder brother Sukumar Mandal to see me off at railway station. So, I went to book the ticket and my elder brother Sukumar was on the queue to collect gate pass for his return for home. At that time, we both were arrested by the police. After arrest, I gave the same statement before the police. Statement of accused Sri Ramesh Yadav(A-2): 1. PW-1, Smti Ibom Nyori lodged an FIR (P.Ext-1) against an unknown person Page No.# 24/56 for killing her husband inside the Rural bank, Mebo and after about 20 days on being informed by the IO, that three persons were arrested in connection with this case, she went to PS and saw you. What do you have to say on this? Ans: I would like to tell the detail of the incident. Earlier, I have given my statement before the police which is with the charge sheet, but the police has not recorded my statement properly. They have recorded my statement basing on the statement of accused Subash Mondal. So, I would like to give the detail statement of the fact before this court. Subash and me were planning to loot the Rural bank, Meho for about 3 months prior to the incident. In fact, we tried to attempt once, but at that time, Subash informed me that there were so many people around the bank, so we dropped the attempt at that time. In the meantime, we had been kept discussion and planning over phone. On the incident day, I came to Pasighat for some work. On being called by Subash, I went to Mebo in my car around 4 PM. I parked my vehicle in highway. And Subajsh's shop is located just opposite to the Bank, going upper side of the Highway. Then, we discussed in his shop and we also took 1 quarter bottle and whisky while discussing. Later on, Subash closed the shop. He asked me to watch for the people from the field, near the bank and he himself will go inside the Bank. He also told me to call him immediately, if anybody comes inside the bank. Then, he entered inside the bank after sending me in the field. I did not see the time, but it was dark by then. One could see from near, but cannot see from distance. After sometime, he called me from inside the bank and asked me to inform him by giving him miss call twice if anyone approached towards him. After about 15-20 minutes, Subash came out from the bank from the back side towards the field side with a bundle wrapped in curtain. He handed me over and asked me either to bury it inside the soil or to throw it in the water. And he will discuss with me on the next day. On being asked about the money, he told me Page No.# 25/56 that it was not right time to talk about and it will be delayed. And told me that he will discuss with me tomorrow or some other time as and when the time permits. Then, I took the wrapped items and went to Namsing at Tengabari area and threw it in a pond in the Tengabari area. Before throwing the items inside the pond, I saw that it was a CCTV material like DVR box etc. Thereafter, I went back home. At home, I loaded Sarso Papad in 407 vehicle which was to be taken to Pasighat on the next morning. On the next morning, the vehicle had gone to Pasighat and after sometime, 1 heard, murder took place in Rural Bank at Mebo. There was a hue and cry at Namsing village also. Then, I also got scared and could not disclose the last evening's incident to anyone. I spent 2-3 days just thinking about what to do and what not to do. I was wondering, how accused Subash could murder a person. And after few days, I heard that Subash Mondal fled Mebo along with his other family members. I could not disclose the incident due to fear of being arrested. Later on, accused Subash was arrested from West Bengal. He might have disclosed that I was also present with him in the Bank in the incident evening. So, the police has arrested me. During interrogation, I narrated the entire fact of the incident evening. And also disclosed that I threw the CCTV material wrapped in curtain handed over to me by Subash Mondal in the pond at Tengabari. On being asked, I led the police to the pond at Tengabari and shown them the place where I threw the CCTV item from where the police has recovered the same from the pond with the help of one boy. They took the recovered material and brought them back to the police station. After keeping me for some days in the thana, I was sent to the Judicial custody.” Page No.# 26/56 24. Apart from the aforesaid self-incriminating statement of the convict appellants during their examination under 313 Cr.P.C., the other parts of the prosecution evidence containing incriminating materials may be enumerated herein below:- 24.1. From the testimony of PW-10, Kennedy Perme, it is revealed that he signed as a seizure witness pertaining to a seizure of monitors, stabilizers, DVR and routers. However, his testimony also reveals that police mainly showed him these materials in the police vehicle where Ramesh Yadav, one of the convict appellants, was also present. PW10 has fairly admitted in his testimony that the police told him that these were recovered from the pond of Yamur Perme, the Gaon Burah. 24.2. Similarly, PW-11, Gunonmuke Megu also stated about recovery of monitors, stabilizers, DVR box, routers taken out from a pond. From his testimony, it appears that he has witnessed these materials being taken out of the pond, but he has not explicitly stated the same. He has also not stated anything regarding as to on whose behest, if any, these materials were recovered. 24.3. The testimony of PW-12, Kayong Pange, is a little more detailed and more significant. He stated that near the pond of Yamur Perme, he found appellant Ramesh Yadav and upon being asked by the police and also the witness himself to disclose about missing materials, Ramesh showed towards the pond and from there, the police recovered some machines and he signed as a seizure witness. Page No.# 27/56 24.4. PW16 is a police officer who had assisted the I/O of the case and from his testimony, it emerges that convict appellant, Ramesh Yadav, led them to the pond and after engaging one diver, electronic materials were brought out and seized. However, he did not remember the name of the diver at the time of his deposition. 24.5. PW-17, S.I.B Pait, the I/O of the case, also stated about recovery of DVR, CCTV, monitor, camera of APR bank from a pond at Tengabadi area on being led by accused Ramesh Yadav. 24.6. PW-16, the police officer who assisted the I/O, had stated in his deposition that on the next day of the incident, he came to know that convict appellant Subhash Mandal had fled away. It may be mentioned here that from the evidence, it has emerged that Subhash Mandal had a shop just in front of the bank branch, where the incident had taken place. 24.7. PW19, a police officer, has revealed in his testimony that convict appellant Subhash Mandal suddenly disappeared after the incident though his shop was situated just opposite the bank. He further stated that upon checking his room, their suspicions grew stronger as they found half-eaten food, untouched curry and that his phone was also switched off. 24.8. PW-19 also testified about accompanying the I/O to the pond at Tengabari area where Ramesh Yadav disclosed the place and led them to the place and upon his showing, the I/O took the help of a diver and DVR was brought out from the pond and seized by the I.O. 25. Before proceeding further, the basic principles regarding proof by Page No.# 28/56 circumstantial evidence in a criminal trial as enunciated in the cardinal decision of Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116 may be reproduced herein below: “A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade & Anr vs State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047] Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be Page No.# 29/56 proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 26. The principles were christened as the golden principles (Panchsheel) of proof by circumstantial evidence. 27. With regard to the incriminating materials appearing in the prosecution evidence, the infirmities and deficiencies thereof may be enumerated as follows: 27.1. With regard to question No.1, during examination of the convict appellants under Section 313 Cr.P.C., they have given a detailed reply narrating the entire incident and self-incriminating themselves as being involved in the same. However, the confession like self-incriminating statement of both the convict appellants have emerged only by way of their answers to question No.1 during their such examination as mentioned above. Despite such nature of the self-incriminating statement emerging in examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., no any confessions were recorded during the investigation. 27.2. Though a dagger purportedly carried by the convict appellants was found inside the bank and seized, and it is also stated to have bloodstains, but unfortunately, neither fingerprints were taken nor the dagger along with the bloodstains subjected to any forensic examination. Similarly, the inverter battery which was supposed to be one of the weapons of offence was also found to be bloodstained. But even here, the investigation did not collect any materials for Page No.# 30/56 forensic examination. 27.3. The materials and evidence regarding the abscondence of convict appellants Subash @ Haradhan Mandal after the incident, even though his shop was located right in front of the bank where the incident took place, has been revealed through the testimony of police officials (PW-16 and PW-19). 27.4. Though PW-12, PW-16, PW-17 (I/O) and PW-19 have stated about recovery of electronic items including DVR etc. from the pond upon showing by the convict appellant Ramesh Yadav, but no written disclosure statement of Ramesh Yadav has been separately adduced in evidence in support of the same. It may be mentioned here that it is from the self-incriminating statements under section 313 Cr.P.C., it emerges that electronic items from the bank at the time of the incident were packed in a bag by the convict appellants and later, the convict appellants threw the bag in a pond. 28. Now one important question that emerges is as to what extent, the self- incriminating statements of the convict appellants during their examination under section 313 Cr.P.C. can be used against them. It also has to be determined as to whether there are other cogent incriminating materials free from fatal infirmities, which can be used along with the self-incriminating statements under section 313 Cr.P.C. To address this question, some of the case laws relied upon by the learned counsels may be looked at and discussed. 29. The learned counsel for the appellants has referred to the decision of State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Raghubir Singh reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 940 and the decision of Edmund S. Lyngdoh v. State of Page No.# 31/56 Meghalaya, reported in (2016) 15 SCC 572 to buttress their contentions though the answers to the question number one of the appellants during their examination under 313 Cr.P.C is self-incriminating, but the said material cannot be used to convict the appellants. 30. We have perused the aforesaid two decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellants. In Edmund S. Lyngdoh (supra), the Court held that the statement under section 313 Cr.P.C is not evidence and though his answers on the basis of his answers adverse inference can be drawn against him but it cannot be a substitute for evidence which the prosecution must adduce the relevant paragraph Nos. 21 and 22 pointed out by the learned counsel may be reproduced herein below:- “21. Where the accused gives evasive answers in his cross- examination under Section 313 CrPC, an adverse inference can be drawn against him. But such inference cannot be a substitute for the evidence which the prosecution must adduce to bring home the offence of the accused. The statement under Section 313 CrPC is not evidence. In Bishnu Prasad Sinha v. State of Assam [Bishnu Prasad Sinha v. State of Assam, (2007) 11 SCC 467 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 766] , this Court held that conviction of the accused cannot be based merely on his statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC which cannot be regarded as evidence. It is only the stand or version of the accused by way of explanation explaining the incriminating evidence/circumstances appearing against him. The statement made in defence by the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C can certainly be taken aid of to lend credence to other evidence led by the prosecution. The statements made under Section 313 Cr.P.C must be considered not in isolation but in conjunction with the other prosecution evidence. Page No.# 32/56 22. In the present case, it is not as if the High Court arrived at the conclusion and based conviction only on the statement made by the first accused under Section 313 CrPC. As seen from the reasonings of the High Court extracted above, the statement of the first accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C was taken with the evidence of PW 6 and PW 13 and Item 7(17) of Ext. P-5 as a link to complete the chain of circumstances against A-1. As elaborated earlier, the answers given by the first accused were considered not in isolation but in conjunction with other oral and documentary evidence. We find no substance in the contention that the High Court erred in taking the statement of the first accused under Section 313 CrPC as a link to complete the chain of circumstances.” (emphasis added) 31. Similarly, in the case of Raghubir Singh (supra), the Court delved into the subject matter and held in para 6 that conviction cannot be based solely on statements made by the accused in examination under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C and that such statements cannot be considered in isolation but in conjunction with the evidence adduced by the prosecution. In the said decision, the Hon’ble Apex Court referred to the case of Manu Sao Vs. State of Bihar, 2010 12 SCC 310 and also an earlier decision rendered in the case of Vijendrajit Ayodhya Prasad Goel v. State of Bombay, (1953) 1 SCC 434. The relevant paragraph No. 6 of Raghubir Singh (supra) pointed out by the learned counsel may be reproduced herein below:- “6. A perusal of the impugned judgment shows that on consideration of the evidence, there is a finding recorded by the High Court that the guilt of the accused has been established. According to the High Court, this was the only possible finding which could have been recorded based on the evidence on record. Before we consider the evidence, we may note that in paragraph 12 of the judgment of the Sessions Court, after remand, it is recorded that in the statement of accused Vijay under Section 313 of Page No.# 33/56 the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short, ‘the Cr. P.C.’), he stated that he had intimacy with the prosecutrix for one year. She had been charging money for that. Accused Sunil in his statement under Section 313 of the Cr. P.C. stated that the prosecutrix used to accompany him even before the alleged occurrence and used to charge money. He stated that on the day of the incident, the prosecutrix demanded Rs. 100/-, but he could pay only Rs. 50/-. The Sessions Court further recorded that accused Ravi, in his statement under Section 313 of the Cr. P.C., also stated that sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix was with her consent and as he did not pay any money to her, she made a false allegation. The plea of accused Raghubir and Hari was that they were falsely implicated. Accused-Raghubir, in his statement under Section 313 of the Cr. P.C. stated that since he had accompanied one Chunni Pradhan (discharged accused), false allegations have been made against him. Accused Hari in his statement under Section 313 of the Cr. P.C. stated that as he was an employee of Chunni Pradhan, he was also dragged into the case. Thus, three out of five accused have come out with a case that they had sexual intercourse with the consent of the prosecutrix. They went to the extent of alleging that they used to pay her consideration. Sub-section (4) of Section 313 of the Cr. P.C. provides that the answers given by the accused in his examination under sub-section (1) of Section 313 of the Cr. P.C. may be taken into consideration in the trial. This Court had an occasion to consider the scope of sub-section (4) of Section 313 of the Cr. P.C. in the case of Manu Sao v. State of Bihar1. Paragraphs 14 to 17 of the said decision read thus: “14. The statement of the accused can be used to test the veracity of the exculpatory nature of the admission, if any, made by the accused. It can be taken into consideration in any enquiry or trial but still it is not strictly evidence in the case. The provisions of Section 313(4) explicitly provides that the answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such enquiry or trial and put in evidence against the accused in any other enquiry or trial for any other offence for which such answers may tend to show he has committed. In other words, the use is permissible as per the provisions of the Code but has its own limitations. The courts may rely on a portion of the Page No.# 34/56 statement of the accused and find him guilty in consideration of the other evidence against him led by the prosecution, however, such statements made under this section should not be considered in isolation but in conjunction with evidence adduced by the prosecution. 15. Another important caution that courts have declared in the pronouncements is that conviction of the accused cannot be based merely on the statement made under Section 313 of the Code as it cannot be regarded as a substantive piece of evidence. In Vijendrajit Ayodhya Prasad Goel v. State of Bombay [(1953) 1 SCC 434 : AIR 1953 SC 247 : 1953 Cri LJ 1097], the Court held as under: (AIR p. 248, para 3) “3. … As the appellant admitted that he was in charge of the godown, further evidence was not led on the point. The Magistrate was in this situation fully justified in referring to the statement of the accused under Section 342 as supporting the prosecution case concerning the possession of the godown. The contention that the Magistrate made use of the inculpatory part of the accused's statement and excluded the exculpatory part does not seem to be correct. The statement under Section 342 did not consist of two portions, part inculpatory and part exculpatory. It concerned itself with two facts. The accused admitted that he was in charge of the godown, he denied that the rectified spirit was found in that godown. He alleged that the rectified spirit was found outside it. This part of his statement was proved untrue by the prosecution evidence and had no intimate connection with the statement concerning the possession of the godown.” 16. On similar lines reference can be made to a quite recent judgment of this Court in Ajay Singh v. State of Maharashtra [(2007) 12 SCC 341 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 371] where the Court held as under : (SCC p. 347, paras 11-13) “11. So far as the prosecution case that kerosene was found on Page No.# 35/56 the accused's dress is concerned, it is to be noted that no question in this regard was put to the accused while he was examined under Section 313 of the Code. 12. The purpose of Section 313 of the Code is set out in its opening words—‘for the purpose of enabling the accused personally to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him’. In Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat [1951 SCC 1060 : AIR 1953 SC 468 : 1953 Cri LJ 1933] it has been laid down by Bose, J. (AIR p. 469, para 8) that the statements of the accused persons recorded under Section 313 of the Code ‘are among the most important matters to be considered at the trial’. It was pointed out that : (AIR p. 470, para 8) ‘8. … The statements of the accused recorded by the committing Magistrate and the Sessions Judge are intended in India to take the place of what in England and in America he would be free to state in his own way in the witness box [and that they] have to be received in evidence and treated as evidence and be duly considered at the trial.’” This position remains unaltered even after the insertion of Section 315 in the Code and any statement under Section 313 has to be considered in the same way as if Section 315 is not there. 13. The object of examination under this section is to give the accused an opportunity to explain the case made against him. This statement can be taken into consideration in judging his innocence or guilt. Where there is an onus on the accused to discharge, it depends on the facts and circumstances of the case if such statement discharges the onus.” 17. The statement made by the accused is capable of being used in the trial though to a limited extent. But the law also places an obligation upon the court to take into consideration the stand of the accused in his statement and consider the same objectively and in its entirety. This Page No.# 36/56 principle of law has been stated by this Court in Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat. [1951 SCC 1060 : AIR 1953 SC 468 : 1953 Cri LJ 1933]” Therefore, the conviction cannot be based solely on the statements made by an accused under sub-section (1) of Section 313 of the Cr. P.C. The statements of the accused cannot be considered in isolation but in conjunction with the evidence adduced by the prosecution. The statements may have more relevance when under a statute, an accused has burden of discharge. When the law requires an accused to discharge the burden, the accused can always do so by a preponderance of probability. But, while considering whether the accused has discharged the burden, the court can certainly consider his statement recorded under Section 313. In this case, the accused has no burden to discharge. In the present case, while appreciating the evidence adduced by the prosecution, the statements of the three accused that they maintained a physical relationship with the prosecutrix by paying her money will have to be considered. Dr. Shashi Thakur (PW-4), who had examined the victim, noted inflammation in the private parts of the victim. In the cross- examination, PW-4 opined that it is not necessary that in a case of forcible sexual intercourse, an injury should be there on the body of the victim. Absence of injuries on the person of the prosecutrix is by itself no ground to infer consent on the part of the prosecutrix.” (emphasis added) 32. On the other hand, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Mr. Ete has referred to the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Sukhdev Singh and another reported in (1992) 3 SCC 700. He has drawn attention to paragraph Nos. 51, 52 and 53 of the said decision which may be reproduced herein below:- “51. That brings us to the question whether such a statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code can constitute the sole basis for conviction. Page No.# 37/56 Since no oath is administered to the accused, the statements made by the accused will not be evidence stricto sensu. That is why sub-section (3) says that the accused shall not render himself liable to punishment if he gives false answers. Then comes sub-section (4) which reads: “313. (4) The answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial, and put in evidence for or against him in any other inquiry into, or trial for, any other offence which such answers may tend to show he has committed.” Thus the answers given by the accused in response to his examination under Section 313 can be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial. This much is clear on a plain reading of the above sub-section. Therefore, though not strictly evidence, sub-section (4) permits that it may be taken into consideration in the said inquiry or trial. See State of Maharashtra v. R.B. Chowdhari [(1967) 3 SCR 708 : AIR 1968 SC 110 : 1968 Cri LJ 95] . This Court in the case of Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of M.B. [1951 SCC 1060 : 1953 Cri LJ 1933 : AIR 1953 SC 468] held that an answer given by an accused under Section 313 examination can be used for proving his guilt as much as the evidence given by a prosecution witness. In Narain Singh v. State of Punjab [(1963) 3 SCR 678 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 730] this Court held that if the accused confesses to the commission of the offence with which he is charged the Court may, relying upon that confession, proceed to convict him. To state the exact language in which the three-Judge bench answered the question it would be advantageous to reproduce the relevant observations at pages 684-685: “Under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the first sub- section, insofar as it is material, the Court may at any stage of the enquiry or trial and after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before the accused is called upon for his defence shall put questions to the accused person for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstance appearing in the evidence against him. Examination under Section 342 is primarily to be directed to those matters on which evidence has been led for the prosecution to ascertain from the accused Page No.# 38/56 his version or explanation — if any, of the incident which forms the subject-matter of the charge and his defence. By sub-section (3), the answers given by the accused may ‘be taken into consideration’ at the enquiry or the trial. If the accused person in his examination under Section 342 confesses to the commission of the offence charged against him the court may, relying upon that confession, proceed to convict him, but if he does not confess and in explaining circumstance appearing in the evidence against him sets up his own version and seeks to explain his conduct pleading that he has committed no offence, the statement of the accused can only be taken into consideration in its entirety.” Sub-section (1) of Section 313 corresponds to sub-section (1) of Section 342 of the old Code except that it now stands bifurcated in two parts with the proviso added thereto clarifying that in summons cases where the presence of the accused is dispensed with his examination under clause (b) may also be dispensed with. Sub-section (2) of Section 313 reproduces the old sub-section (4) and the present sub-section (3) corresponds to the old sub-section (2) except for the change necessitated on account of the abolition of the jury system. The present sub-section (4) with which we are concerned is a verbatim reproduction of the old sub-section (3). Therefore, the aforestated observations apply with equal force. 52. Even on first principle we see no reason why the court could not act on the admission or confession made by the accused in the course of the trial or in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code. Under Section 12(4) of the TADA Act a Designated Court shall, for the purpose of trial of any offence, have all the powers of a Court of Session and shall try such offence as if it were a Court of Session so far as may be in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Code for the trial before a Court of Session, albeit subject to the other provisions of the Act. The procedure for the trial of Session cases is outlined in Chapter XVIII of the Code. According to the procedure provided in that Chapter after the case is opened as required by Section 226, if, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused for reasons to be recorded. If, however, the Page No.# 39/56 Judge does not see reason to discharge the accused he is required to frame in writing a charge against the accused as required by Section 228 of the Code. Where the Judge frames the charge, the charge so framed has to be read over and explained to the accused and the accused is required to be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried. Section 229 next provides that if the accused pleads guilty, the Judge shall record the plea and may, in his discretion, convict him thereon. The plain language of this provision shows that if the accused pleads guilty the Judge has to record the plea and thereafter decide whether or not to convict the accused. The plea of guilt tantamounts to an admission of all the facts constituting the offence. It is, therefore, essential that before accepting and acting on the plea the Judge must feel satisfied that the accused admits facts or ingredients constituting the offence. The plea of the accused must, therefore, be clear, unambiguous and unqualified and the Court must be satisfied that he has understood the nature of the allegations made against him and admits them. The Court must act with caution and circumspection before accepting and acting on the plea of guilt. Once these requirements are satisfied the law permits the Judge trying the case to record a conviction based on the plea of guilt. If, however, the accused does not plead guilty or the learned Judge does not act on his plea he must fix a date for the examination of the witnesses i.e. the trial of the case. There is nothing in this Chapter which prevents the accused from pleading guilty at any subsequent stage of the trial. But before the trial Judge accepts and acts on that plea he must administer the same caution unto himself. This plea of guilt may also be put forward by the accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code. In the present case, besides giving written confessional statements both Accused 1 and Accused 5 admitted to have been involved in the commission of murder of General Vaidya. We have already pointed out earlier that both the accused have unmistakably, unequivocally and without any reservation whatsoever admitted the fact that they were responsible for the murder of General Vaidya. It is indeed true that Accused 1 did not name Accused 5 as the driver of the motor cycle, perhaps he desired to keep him out, but Accused 5 has himself admitted that he was driving the motor cycle with Accused 1 on the pillion seat and to facilitate the crime he had brought the motor cycle in line with the Maruti car so that Accused 1 may have an opportunity of firing at his Page No.# 40/56 victim from close quarters. There is, therefore, no doubt whatsoever that both Accused 1 and Accused 5 were acting in concert, they had a common intention to kill General Vaidya and in furtherance of that intention Accused 1 fired the fatal shots. We are, therefore, satisfied that the learned trial Judge was justified in holding that Accused 1 was guilty under Section 302 and Accused 5 was guilty under Section 302/34 IPC. 53. As pointed out earlier, learned counsel for Accused 1 and 5 contended that although a statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code can be taken into consideration in an inquiry or trial since it is not ‘evidence’ stricto sensu and not being under oath, it has little probative value. Reliance was placed on R.B. Chowdhari case [(1967) 3 SCR 708 : AIR 1968 SC 110 : 1968 Cri LJ 95] in support of this proposition. The two decisions of the High Courts to which our attention was drawn do not in fact militate against the view which we are inclined to take in regard to the admission of guilt made by the two accused in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Code. In the case of Jit Bahadur Chetri [1977 Cri LJ 1833 (Gau HC)] only one witness was examined and immediately thereafter the statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 of the Code. The deposition of the sole witness did not reveal that he had seen the accused causing the injury in question. The question that was framed was not consistent with this evidence and hence the High Court found that the trial court had acted illegally. It was held that such an answer cannot be construed as pleading guilty within the meaning of the provisions of the Code and hence the learned Magistrate had acted contrary to law in convicting and sentencing the accused on the basis of that plea. It will thus be seen that the Court came to the conclusion that the accused could not be stated to have pleaded guilty and hence the conviction was set aside. In the other case of Asokan [1982 Cri LJ 173 (Ker HC)] the High Court of Kerala pointed out that in a criminal case the burden of establishing the guilt beyond reasonable doubt lies on the prosecution and that burden is neither taken away, nor discharged, nor shifted merely because the accused sets up a plea of private defence. It was pointed out that if the prosecution has not placed any incriminating evidence such an admission made by the accused will be of no avail unless the admission constitutes an admission of guilt of Page No.# 41/56 any offence. In that case also the admission made by the accused read as a whole did not constitute an admission of guilt of the offence charged. On the contrary it was in the nature of a plea of private defence. In such circumstances, the High Court came to the conclusion that in the absence of a unequivocal, unmistakable and unqualified plea of guilt, the Court could not have convicted the accused on the statement made by him under Section 313 of the Code. This decision also does not, therefore, help the defence.” (emphasis added) 33. Similarly, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor has referred to the case of State of HP vs. Wazir Chand and others, (1978) 1 SCC 130 : AIR 1978 SC 315. The Hon’ble Apex Court in para 19 examined the issue as to whether a part of the incriminating statement of the accused can be taken into account and held it in affirmative after referring to some earlier decisions. The relevant paragraph Nos. 19 and 20 of the said decision pointed out by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor may be reproduced herein below:- “19. There was at one point of time some controversy whether the statement of the accused can be accepted in part and rejected in part. This situation arose where a part of the statement was inculpatory and a part of the statement was exculpatory. In Narain Singh v. State of Punjab [(1963) 3 SCR 678 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 730] it was held that it is not open to the Court to dissect the statement and to pick out a part of the statement which may be incriminative, and then to examine whether the explanation furnished by the accused for his conduct is supported by the evidence on the record. If the accused admits to have done an act which would but for the explanation furnished by him be an offence, the admission cannot be used against him divorced from the explanation. The question again figured before this Court in Nishi Kant Jha v. State of Bihar [(1969) 1 SCC Page No.# 42/56 347 : (1969) 2 SCR 1033] , wherein the Court held that the Court may rely on a portion of the statement of the accused and find him guilty in consideration of the other evidence against him led by the prosecution. In Nishi Kant Jha case there was no eye-witness to the commission of the crime and the evidence was all circumstantial and the statement of the accused that he was present at the scene of the crime was a vital circumstance which taken in conjunction with other circumstances led the Court to come to the conclusion that he was guilty of the crime imputed to him. The ratio of the aforementioned cases was again examined in Sampat Singh v. State of Rajasthan [(1969) 1 SCC 367 : (1969) 3 SCR 228] . On the facts of the case, after accepting a part of the statement of the accused it was held that he caused injuries in exercise of the right of self-defence but he exceeded the same. It was observed that it is permissible for the Court to rely on a portion of the statement of the accused and find him guilty in consideration of the other evidence against him led by the prosecution.” (emphasis added) 34. In the case of Sanatan Naskar vs. State of W.B., reported in (2010) 8 SCC 249, the Hon’ble Apex Court discussed the scope of Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. and the evidentiary value of statements made during such examination. The relevant paragraph Nos. 21, 22, 23 and 24 may be reproduced herein below:- “21. The answers by an accused under Section 313 CrPC are of relevance for finding out the truth and examining the veracity of the case of the prosecution. The scope of Section 313 CrPC is wide and is not a mere formality. Let us examine the essential features of this section and the principles of law as enunciated by the judgments which are the guiding factors for proper application and consequences which shall flow Page No.# 43/56 from the provisions of Section 313 CrPC. 22. As already noticed, the object of recording the statement of the accused under Section 313 CrPC is to put all incriminating evidence to the accused so as to provide him an opportunity to explain such incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the evidence of the prosecution. At the same time, also permit him to put forward his own version or reasons, if he so chooses, in relation to his involvement or otherwise in the crime. The court has been empowered to examine the accused but only after the prosecution evidence has been concluded. It is a mandatory obligation upon the court and, besides ensuring the compliance therewith, the court has to keep in mind that the accused gets a fair chance to explain his conduct. The option lies with the accused to maintain silence coupled with simpliciter denial or, in the alternative, to explain his version and reasons for his alleged involvement in the commission of crime. This is the statement which the accused makes without fear or right of the other party to cross-examine him. However, if the statements made are false, the court is entitled to draw adverse inferences and pass consequential orders as may be called for in accordance with law. The primary purpose is to establish a direct dialogue between the court and the accused and to put every important incriminating piece of evidence to the accused and grant him an opportunity to answer and explain. Once such a statement is recorded, the next question that has to be considered by the court is to what extent and consequences such statement can be used during the enquiry and the trial. Over the period of time, the courts have explained this concept and now it has attained, more or less, certainty in the field of criminal jurisprudence. 23. The statement of the accused can be used to test the veracity of the exculpatory nature of the admission, if any, made by the accused. It can be taken into consideration in any enquiry or trial but still it is not strictly evidence in the case. The provisions of Section 313(4) CrPC explicitly provide that the answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such enquiry or trial and put in evidence for or against the accused in any other enquiry into or trial for any other offence for which such answers may tend to show he has committed. In other words, Page No.# 44/56 the use is permissible as per the provisions of the Code but has its own limitations. The courts may rely on a portion of the statement of the accused and find him guilty in consideration of the other evidence against him led by the prosecution, however, such statements made under this section should not be considered in isolation but in conjunction with evidence adduced by the prosecution. 24. Another important caution that Courts have declared in the pronouncements is that conviction of the accused cannot be based merely on the statement made under Section 313 CrPC as it cannot be regarded as a substantive piece of evidence. In Vijendrajit Ayodhya Prasad Goel v. State of Bombay [(1953) 1 SCC 434 : AIR 1953 SC 247 : 1953 Cri LJ 1097] the Court held as under : (AIR p. 248, para 3) “3. … As the appellant admitted that he was in charge of the godown, further evidence was not led on the point. The Magistrate was in this situation fully justified in referring to the statement of the accused under Section 342 as supporting the prosecution case concerning the possession of the godown. The contention that the Magistrate made use of the inculpatory part of the accused's statement and excluded the exculpatory part does not seem to be correct. The statement under Section 342 did not consist of two portions, part inculpatory and part exculpatory. It concerned itself with two facts. The accused admitted that he was in charge of the godown, he denied that the rectified spirit was found in that godown. He alleged that the rectified spirit was found outside it. This part of his statement was proved untrue by the prosecution evidence and had no intimate connection with the statement concerning the possession of the godown.” (emphasis added) 35. The prosecution has also referred to the case of Harivadan Babubhai Patel vs. State of Gujarat, (2013) 7 SCC 45 in support of its contention that the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events would be applicable in an instant case. The relevant paragraph Nos. 16 to 19 may be reproduced Page No.# 45/56 herein below:- “16. The next limb of attack relates to the confessions made by the accused persons and the issue of leading to discovery of articles. It is submitted that the confession part is absolutely inadmissible and that apart, when the panch witnesses had not supported the panchnama, the recovery or discovery of the seized articles cannot be utilised against the appellant. There can be no shadow of doubt that the confession part is inadmissible in evidence. It is also not in dispute that the panch witnesses have turned hostile but the fact remains that the place from where the dead body of the deceased and other items were recovered was within the special knowledge of the appellant. 17. In this context, we may usefully refer to A.N. Venkatesh v. State of Karnataka [(2005) 7 SCC 714 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1938] wherein it has been ruled that : (SCC p. 721, para 9) “ 9. By virtue of Section 8 of the Evidence Act, the conduct of the accused person is relevant, if such conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact. The evidence of the circumstance, simpliciter, that the accused pointed out to the police officer, the place where the dead body of the kidnapped boy was found … would be admissible as conduct under Section 8 irrespective of the fact whether the statement made by the accused contemporaneously with or antecedent to such conduct falls within the purview of Section 27 [of the Evidence Act] or not….” In the said decision, reliance was placed on the principle laid down in Prakash Chand v. State (Delhi Admn.) [(1979) 3 SCC 90 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 656 : AIR 1979 SC 400] . It is worth noting that in the said case, there was material on record that the accused had taken the investigating Page No.# 46/56 officer to the spot and pointed out the place where the dead body was buried and this Court treated the same as admissible piece of evidence under Section 8 as the conduct of the accused. 18. In State of Maharashtra v. Damu [(2000) 6 SCC 269 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1088] it has been held as follows : (SCC p. 283, para 35) “35. … It is now well settled that recovery of an object is not discovery of a fact as envisaged in [Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872]. The decision of the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor [(1946- 47) 74 IA 65 : AIR 1947 PC 67] is the most quoted authority for supporting the interpretation that the ‘fact discovered’ envisaged in the section embraces the place from which the object was produced, the knowledge of the accused as to it, but the information given must relate distinctly to that effect.” 19. The same principle has been laid down in State of Maharashtra v. Suresh [(2000) 1 SCC 471 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 263] , State of Punjab v. Gurnam Kaur [(2009) 11 SCC 225 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1311] ,Aftab Ahmad Anasari v. State of Uttaranchal [(2010) 2 SCC 583 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1054] , Bhagwan Dass v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2011) 6 SCC 396 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 985 : AIR 2011 SC 1863] , Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2010) 6 SCC 1 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1385 : AIR 2010 SC 2352] and Rumi Bora Dutta v. State of Assam [(2013) 7 SCC 417] .” (emphasis added) 36. The decision in Mahavir Singh vs. State of Haryana, (2014) 6 SCC 716 relied upon by the prosecution discusses the proposition that if the witness is not cross-examined on a point the correctness or legality of the same cannot be raised. The relevant para 15, 16 and 17 may be reproduced herein Page No.# 47/56 below:- “15. A large number of issues have been raised by the learned counsel for the appellant particularly that independent witness had not been examined. Various issues have been raised regarding recovery of clothes of Suraj Mal, recovery of V-shaped chappals, serious discrepancies in the inquest report and recovery of the clothes of the appellant. In the trial court, no question had been put to Ramphal (PW 15), the investigating officer or Lakhpal Singh (PW 11), ASI or any other material witness who could furnish explanation for such discrepancies. 16. It is a settled legal proposition that in case the question is not put to the witness in cross-examination who could furnish explanation on a particular issue, the correctness or legality of the said fact/issue could not be raised. (Vide Atluri Brahmanandam v. Anne Sai Bapuji [(2010) 14 SCC 466 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 644 : AIR 2011 SC 545] and Laxmibai v. Bhagwantbuva [(2013) 4 SCC 97 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 480 : AIR 2013 SC 1204] .) 17. In the instant case, we had gone through the cross-examination of the witnesses who could furnish an explanation for the discrepancies pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant. However, we came to the conclusion that the defence had never put any question in these regards to the material witness who could furnish the explanation for the same. So the chain of all the circumstantial evidence is complete and no link is missing and the accused persons had an opportunity to commit the murder of the deceased”. (emphasis added) 37. The decision in Virsa Singh vs. State of Punjab AIR, 1958 SC 465 Page No.# 48/56 was relied upon by the prosecution in support of its contention that during the crime the convict appellants had intention to cause the bodily injury found on the body of the deceased and that medically the same was found to be sufficient to cause death. The relevant paragraph Nos. 12 and 13 may be reproduced herein below:- “12.To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under S. 300 "thirdly"; First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present; Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and, Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. 13. Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and, of course, the burden is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under S. 300 "thirdly". It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that there was no intention even to cause Page No.# 49/56 an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature (not that there is any real distinction between the two). It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind, they must face the consequences; and they can only escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced, that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional.” (emphasis added) 38. The decision in State of Rajasthan vs. Gurbachan Singh and others, (2022) 15 SCC 817 relied upon by the prosecution discusses the law of common intention. In the context of this decision the learned Additional Public Prosecutor submits that common intention can be formed at the spur of the moment also and even during the occurrence itself. The relevant paragraph Nos. 17 to 20 may be reproduced herein below:- “17. Given the aforesaid position, we are of the view that Section 34IPC i.e. common intention, is clearly attracted in the case of Gurbachan Singh, whose case cannot be distinguished, so as to exclude him as one who did not share common intention with Darshan Singh, Balvir Singh, and Manjit Singh. Section 34IPC makes a co-perpetrator, who had participated in the offence, equally liable on the principle of joint liability. For Section 34IPC to apply, there should be common intention among the co-perpetrators, Page No.# 50/56 which means that there should be community of purpose and common design. Common intention can be formed at the spur of the moment and during the occurrence itself. 18. Common intention is necessarily a psychological fact and as such, direct evidence normally will not be available. Therefore, in most cases, whether or not there exists a common intention, has to be determined by drawing inference from the facts proved. Constructive intention, can be arrived at only when the court can hold that the accused must have preconceived the result that ensued in furtherance of the common intention. 19. The impugned judgment [Gurbachan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 2008 SCC OnLine Raj 1291] observes that common intention cannot be inferred from the conduct of Gurbachan Singh, as he was only armed with “lathi” and had struck only on the feet of Teja Singh. However, we are of the opinion that common intention to inflict injuries and cause the death of Teja Singh, can be gathered from the conduct and action of Gurbachan Singh. 20. First, it is deducible from the quoted paragraph of the impugned judgment [Gurbachan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 2008 SCC OnLine Raj 1291] read with the depositions of Harbhajan Singh (PW 1) and Jasveer Kaur (PW 2), that Gurbachan Singh had come prepared with “lathi” along with others who had carried “toka”, axe and “gandasi”. This is corroborated by the fact that blood-smeared “lathi” was recovered from the possession of Gurbachan Singh. The evidence establishes the participation of Gurbachan Singh, in commission of the offence with co- participants/co-convicts.” (emphasis added) Page No.# 51/56 39. In the case of Yashpal Mittal vs. State of Punjab, (1977) 4 SCC 540 relied upon by the prosecution. The Hon’ble discussed the law of conspiracy in Paragraph No. 9, which can be reproduced herein below:- “9. The offence of criminal conspiracy under Section 120-A is a distinct offence introduced for the first time in 1913 in Chapter V-A of the Penal Code. The very agreement, concert or league is the ingredient of the offence. It is not necessary that all the conspirators must know each and every detail of the conspiracy as long as they are co-participators in the main object of the conspiracy. There may be so many devices and techniques adopted to achieve the common goal of the conspiracy and there may be division of performances in the chain of actions with one object to achieve the real end of which every collaborator must be aware and in which each one of them must be interested. There must be unity of object or purpose but there may be plurality of means sometimes even unknown to one another, amongst the conspirators. In achieving the goal several offences may be committed by some of the conspirators even unknown to the others. The only relevant factor is that all means adopted and illegal acts done must be and purported to be in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy even though there may be sometimes mis-fire or over-shooting by some of the conspirators. Even if some steps are resorted to by one or two of the conspirators without the knowledge of the others it will not affect the culpability of those others when they are associated with the object of the conspiracy. The significance of criminal conspiracy, under Section 120-A is brought out pithily by this Court in Major E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay [AIR 1961 SC 1762 : (1962) 2 SCR 195, 228 : (1962) 2 Cri LJ 828] thus: “The gist of the offence is an agreement to break the law. The parties to such an agreement will be guilty of criminal conspiracy, though the illegal act agreed to be done has not been done. So too, it is not an ingredient of Page No.# 52/56 the offence that all the parties should agree to do a single illegal act. It may comprise the commission of a number of acts. Under Section 43 of the Penal Code, 1860, an act would be illegal if it is an offence or if it is prohibited by law. Under the first charge the accused are charged with having conspired to do three categories of illegal acts and the mere fact that all of them could not be convicted separately in respect of each of the offences has no relevancy in considering the question whether the offence of conspiracy has been committed. They are all guilty of the offence of conspiracy to do illegal acts, though for individual offences all of them may not be liable.” We are in respectful agreement with the above observations with regard to the offence of criminal conspiracy.” (emphasis added) 40. It has emerged from the prosecution evidence, including the statements of the convict appellants under Section 313 Cr.P.C., that the shop of the convict appellant Haradhan Mandal was located just opposite the bank. In their statements under Section 313 Cr.P.C., both the convict appellants have stated about their plan to commit robbery of the bank, which was hatched in advance and sought to be executed on the day of the incident, during which the victim, who was the cashier in the bank, was killed, but the convict appellants failed to take the money from the bank. 41. We have already seen from the discussed case laws that a conviction cannot be based solely upon the statement of an accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C., but such statement can be taken into account along with other parts of the prosecution evidence to arrive at a finding. Further, it is also permissible to Page No.# 53/56 segregate the statement and take into account the inculpatory part thereof to arrive at a finding, along with the other prosecution evidence. 42. It has emerged from the statement of convict appellant Ramesh Yadav that the other co-accused, Haradhan Mandal, during the commission of the offence, packed the CCTV monitor, stabilizer and setup box in a bag and handed it over to Ramesh Yadav, who, in turn, wrapped up the items and threw them into a pond at Tengabari. 43. It is important to note that, from the testimony of PW-12, PW-16, PW-17 and PW-19, it has emerged that, upon being shown the location by the convict appellant Ramesh Yadav, these materials were recovered from the pond with the help of a diver. The said pond has been revealed from the testimony of the witnesses to be located at Tengabari, thus corroborating the statement of convict appellant Ramesh Yadav. For example, PW-17 has specifically stated about the recovery of these materials from a pond in the Tengabari area upon being led by Ramesh Yadav. 44. We have found the testimony of PW-12, PW-16, PW-17 and PW-19 regarding the leading to discovery to be cogent and reliable. Such evidence of leading to discovery lends vital corroboration to the self-incriminating statement of the convict appellants. 45. As has been held in the case of A.N. Venkatesh (supra), the statement of the convict appellant Ramesh Yadav about throwing these materials into the pond and the subsequent developments narrated above also constitute conduct within the meaning of Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act. This aspect of the Page No.# 54/56 prosecution evidence also lends corroboration to the prosecution story as contended by the prosecution. 46. It has emerged from the materials that the shop of the convict appellant, Haradhan Mandal, was located right in front of the bank and it appears that he was on good terms with the deceased victim. However, from the testimony of PW-16, it has emerged that on the next day of the incident, despite having a shop just in front of the place of incident, the convict appellant, Haradhan Mandal, fled away. This has also been corroborated by the testimony of PW-19, who has stated about the sudden disappearance of the convict appellant Haradhan Mandal, despite his shop being located opposite to the bank. Another vital aspect that emerges from the testimony of PW-19 is that, upon checking his room, he found half-eaten food and untouched curry, and the phone of the convict appellant Haradhan Mandal was also switched off. Thus, the aforesaid testimony regarding the abscondence of the convict appellant Subash @ Haradhan Mandal constitutes a further incriminating circumstance, cogently proved and the same forms a vital component of the chain of circumstances revealed from the incriminating statements of both the convict appellants in their examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. 47. Upon appreciating the prosecution evidence and the statements of the convict appellants in their entirety, we are of the considered opinion that - the self-incriminating statements of the convict appellants during their examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., together with the discovery of materials at the behest of convict appellant Ramesh Yadav, his conduct regarding the same and the sudden disappearance and abscondence of Subash @ Haradhan Mandal, the other convict appellant, soon after the incident - leave no room for doubt in our Page No.# 55/56 minds that both the convict appellants, in furtherance of the criminal conspiracy and also in pursuance of their common intention, attempted to rob the bank on the day of the incident and in the process, committed the tragic murder of the victim, who was a cashier in the bank. The nature of the homicidal injuries revealed from the prosecution evidence makes it abundantly clear that the convict appellants, at the time of the incident, intended to kill the victim. The convict appellants, after the commission of the crime, also tried to cause disappearance of evidence by removing the electronic components from the bank branch, so as to screen themselves from punishment. 48. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the chain of circumstances proved, as discussed above, leads to the conclusion that the convict appellants, in furtherance of their criminal conspiracy and common intention, committed the murder of the victim and also caused disappearance of evidence of the crime. Therefore, we do not find any infirmity in the conviction of the convict appellants under Sections 120(B)/302/34/201 of the IPC and the said conviction is hereby, upheld and confirmed. 49. The convict appellants have been imposed with imprisonment for life along with fine for the offence of murder and they have also been imposed with rigorous imprisonment for 2 years along with fine for the conviction under Section 201 IPC. 50. Considering the cold-blooded murder of the victim and the gruesome manner in which he was killed by the convict appellants, one of whom was in a relationship of trust and friendliness with the victim, we do not find any scope for making any alteration in the sentence. In any case, imprisonment for life is Page No.# 56/56 the minimum sentence for the offence of murder. Consequently, the sentences imposed by the learned Trial Court upon the convict appellants for their conviction are also upheld and confirmed. 51. Resultantly, the impugned judgment of conviction dated 03.06.2022 and the order of sentence dated 06.06.2022, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, East Siang, Pasighat, in PSG Sessions Case No. 5/2018 (arising out of Pasighat PS Case No. 23/2018), are hereby upheld and confirmed. 52. The substantive sentences will continue to the concurrent. Further, the wife of the deceased shall be granted adequate victim compensation, as directed by the learned Trial Court. 53. Accordingly, the criminal appeals stand dismissed. 54. Return the original case record to the learned Trial Court. JUDGE JUDGE Comparing Assistant CHECKED & VERIFIED Digitally signed by Jumbi Bam Date: 2026.09.14 13:48:25 +05'30'