1 2026:CGHC:11535 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP227 No. 221 of 2026 Smt. Firdos Ahmad W/o Naim Ahmad Aged About 41 Years R/o Behind Raza Masjid, Moudahapara, Tahsil And District Raipur (C.G.) --- Petitioner versus Smt. Usha Jindal W/o Shri Mukesh Jindal, R/o Quarter No. 206, New Delhi Sweets, Samta Colony, Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.), At Present R/o Near O.P. Jindal, School, Near Jindal Provisional Store, Kharsiya Road, Raigarh, District Raigarh (C.G.) --- Respondent WP227 No. 222 of 2026 Smt. Firdos Ahmad W/o Naim Ahmad Aged About 41 Years R/o Behind Raza Masjid, Moudahapara, Tahsil And District Raipur (C.G.) ---Petitioner Versus Smt. Usha Jindal W/o Shri Mukesh Jindal R/o Quarter No. 206, New Delhi Sweets, Samta Colony, Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.), At Present R/o Near O.P. Jindal School, Near Jindal Provisional Store, Kharsiya Road, Raigarh, District Raigarh (C.G.) --- Respondent For Petitioner : Shri Shikhar Sharma and Shri Raghvendra Pradhan, Advocates For Respondent : Shri Sharad Mishra and Suraj Patel, Advocates (Hon’ble Shri Justice Sachin Singh Rajput) Order on Board dated 10.03.2026 Since the orders under challenge in these two Writ Petitions are one and the same – dated 10.02.2026 and 18.09.2025, they are being disposed of by this common order:- 2. The petitioner in these petitions is challenging the order dated 10.02.2026 (Annexure P-1) passed by the Board of Revenue, Circuit Court, 2 Raipur, CG affirming the order dated 18.09.2025 (Annexure P-2) passed by the Commissioner, Raipur Division. 3. For convenience, the facts are taken from WP(227) 221/2026. The respondent herein filed an application before the Tahsildar, Raipur for making demarcation of her land bearing Khasra No. 172/4, area 0.140 hectare situate at village Gogaon, Patwari Halka No. 107/50. The said application was registered as Case No. 330/A-12/year-2017. The Tehsildar directed the concerned Revenue Inspector and Patwari to submit their report after making demarcation of the said land. Revenue Inspector and Patwari accordingly made demarcation of the said land and submitted the report to Tehsildar. On the basis of demarcation report, the Tehsildar registered the eviction proceedings against the petitioner upon the application made by the respondent under Section 250 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code (for short the (“CGLRC”) and then passed the order dated 22.06.2022 for eviction of the petitioner. Against the demarcation report submitted by the Revenue Inspector and Patwari before the Tehsildar, the petitioner filed a revision before the Additional Collector, Raipur who by order dated 31.05.2023 set aside the order dated 28.07.2018 passed by the Tehsildar in respect of demarcation proceedings by recording a finding that no division is made in the revenue map of the land for which the application for demarcation was made, and that the Revenue Inspector and Patwari have not properly considered the four sides of the land of the petitioner. Additional Collector also directed the Tahsildar to properly demarcate the land and then proceed in accordance with law. Petitioner also challenged the order of eviction dated 22.06.2022 by filing appeal before the Sub Divisional Officer, Raipur in which respondent also appeared, contested the case, filed written submission as also the copy of the order dated 31.05.2023 passed by the Additional 3 Collector. Sub Divisional officer allowed the said appeal vide order dated 21.06.2023. Respondent however is stated to have not challenged the said order dated 31.05.2023 for a considerable period of time in spite of having the knowledge. It however came to be challenged after more than two years i.e. on 03.07.2025 by way of revision before the Commissioner along with an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Learned Commissioner vide order dated 18.09.2025 allowed the said application for condonation of delay. Against the order dated 18.09.2025, the petitioner filed a revision before the Board of Revenue which came to be dismissed vide order impugned dated 10.02.2026. Hence this Petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the orders dated 10.02.2026 and 18.09.2025 (Annexures P-1 and P-2 respectively) are illegal, and arbitrary and therefore liable to be set aside. He submits that both the Courts below have not properly appreciated the facts and circumstances of the case and also the grounds for condonation of delay. It is submitted that the respondent has not explained the huge delay of more than two years in filing the revision before the Commissioner for challenging the order dated 31.05.2023, and for that the revision should have been dismissed on the ground of delay itself. He submits that learned Commissioner without proper appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the case and without taking into consideration the pleadings has passed a laconic order condoning the delay, which is bad in law. In support of his argument, reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of H. Guruswamy and others v. A. Krishaniah Since deceased by Lrs decided on 8.1.2025 in Civil Appeal No. 317 of 2025. 5. On the other hand, counsel for the respondent supports the orders impugned to be just and proper and submits that delay was neither 4 deliberate nor intentional. He submits that the respondent is a housewife and she had no knowledge of the ex parte proceedings before the learned Additional Collector. He submits that there was no negligence on her part which led to delay in filing the revision. He submits that merely because the reference of order dated 31.03.2023 finds place in the subsequent proceedings and therefore the respondent had knowledge of the same, is totally misconceived. He thus submits that the order dated 18.09.2025 and 10.02.2026 passed by the Commissioner Raipur Division and Board of Revenue respectively and fully justified, and therefore do not call for any interference in this petition in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 6. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the documents on record. 7. The crux of the arguments advanced by counsel for the petitioner is that the Commissioner, Raipur by its order dated 18.9.2025 has condoned a huge delay of more than two years on the part of the respondent in filing the revision, which has subsequently been maintained by the Board of Revenue by order impugned dated 10.02.2026. Of course, dealing with delay aspect of the matter it has time and again been noted by the Supreme court that the concepts such as “liberal approach”, “Justice oriented approach”, “substantial justice” should not employed to frustrate or jettison the substantial law of limitation, but in the present case the delay in filing the revision before the Commissioner, Raipur Division does not appear to be deliberate or intentional. The Supreme Court has further noted that the rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties, rather they are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy. As already said, this is not the position in the case in hand, rather it is a recourse to ensure that the merit is not put to peril. Dealing with an identical 5 issue in the matter of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others reported in (1987) 2 SCC 107 it has been held by the Supreme Court as under:- “3……………..Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the 'State' which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step- motherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant- non-grata status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time barred, is therefore. set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides.” 8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Sheo Raj Singh(Deceased) 6 Through Legal Represenatives vs Union Of India and Anr reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 has observed as under: “40. We can also profitably refer to Koting Lamkang (supra), cited by Mr. Sen, where the same Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of this Court which decided University of Delhi (supra) was of the view that the impersonal nature of the State’s functioning should be given due regard, while ensuring that individual defaults are not nit-picked at the cost of collective interest. The relevant paragraphs read as follows: “7. But while concluding as above, it was necessary for the Court to also be conscious of the bureaucratic delay and the slow pace in reaching a government decision and the routine way of deciding whether the State should prefer an appeal against a judgment adverse to it. Even while observing that the law of limitation would harshly affect the party, the Court felt that the delay in the appeal filed by the State, should not be condoned. 8. Regard should be had in similar such circumstances to the impersonal nature of the Government's functioning where individual officers may fail to act responsibly. This in turn, would result in injustice to the institutional interest of the State. If the appeal filed by the State are lost for individual default, those who are at fault, will not usually be individually affected.” (underlining ours, for emphasis) 41. Having bestowed serious consideration to the rival contentions, we feel that the High Court’s decision to condone the delay on account of the first respondent’s inability to present the appeal within time, for the reasons assigned therein, does not suffer from any error warranting interference. As the aforementioned judgments have shown, such an exercise of discretion does, at times, call for a liberal and justice-oriented approach by the Courts, where certain leeway could be provided to the State. The hidden forces that are at work in preventing an appeal by the State being presented within the prescribed period of limitation so as not to allow a higher court to pronounce upon the legality and validity of an order of a lower court and thereby secure unholy gains, can hardly be ignored. Impediments in the working of the grand scheme of 7 governmental functions have to be removed by taking a pragmatic view on balancing of the competing interests.” 9. Reference can also be made to the judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of M.K. Prasad v P. Arumugam reported in (2001) 6 SCC 176, in the case of N. Balakrishnan Vs. M.Krishnamurthy reported in (1996) 7 SCC 123 and in the matter of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649. 10. Thus considering the aforementioned factual and legal aspect of the case this Court is of the considered opinion that the dispute should be resolved on its own merit and not on technical trivialities. It transpires from the record that the delay occasioned in this case is also not deliberate nor intentional, and being that the order passed by the Commissioner condoning the delay in filing the revision, which has been confirmed by the Board of Revenue cannot be said to be illegal or arbitrary warranting interference in this writ petition particularly in exercise of limited supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The case law cited by learned counsel for the petitioner in the given facts and circumstances of the case, with due respect, would not help the petitioner. The petitions thus fail and are hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Sachin Singh Rajput) Judge Jyotishi AVANISH JYOTISHI Digitally signed by AVANISH JYOTISHI Date: 2026.03.16 15:34:15 +0530