1 2026:CGHC:5902-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 656 of 2022 1 - Pappu @ Mithilesh Manjhi S/o Ravi Manjhi Aged About 19 Years R/o Sakari, Thana- Vidhan Sabha, District- Raipur (C.G.) ... Appellant (s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through- Thana Vidhan Sabha, Distt. Raipur (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) For appellant (s) : Mr. Azad Siddiqui, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. S. S. Baghel, Govt. Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 03.02.2026 1. Heard Mr. Azad Siddiqui, Advocate for the appellant and also Mr. S. S. Baghel, Govt. Advocate for the Respondent/ State. SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Digitally signed by SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Date: 2026.02.11 10:22:04 +0530 2 1. The present appeal has been filed by the appellant against the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 10/01/2022 passed by learned Addl. Sessions Judge, FTC (Special Court), Raipur (CG) in Special Criminal Case No. 65/2019 whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced in the following manner:- S. No. Conviction Sentence 1. Under Section 363 of IPC 3 years R.I. and fine of Rs. 500/- in default of payment of fine, further S.I. for 01 month. 2. Under Section 366 of IPC 3 years R.I. and fine of Rs. 500/- in default of payment of fine, further S.I. for 01 month. 3. Under Section 376(3) of IPC 20 years R.I. and fine of Rs. 50,000/- in default of payment of fine, further S.I. for 06 months. 4. Under Section 376 (2)(n) of IPC 10 years R.I. and fine of Rs. 5000/- in default of payment of fine, further S.I. for 03 months. All sentences will run concurrently 2. Brief facts of the case are that the father of the victim (PW/2) lodged a missing report on 27.03.2019 that his minor daughter is missing since 26.03.2019 and her whereabout could not be traced out. The missing report was recorded in Rojnamcha (Ex-P/7) and the inquiry started. The FIR (Ex-P/18) was registered against unknown person for the offence under Section 363 of IPC and the Police started investigation. During the investigation, the victim 3 recovered from the possession of the appellant on 31.03.2019 and recovery panchanama (Ex-P/1) was prepared in presence of the witnesses. The victim was sent for her medical examination to District Hospital, Raipur, where (PW/4) Dr. Padmaja Dubey has medically examined her and gave her MLC report (Ex P/16). During the medical examination, no external injuries have been found on the body of the victim and opined that no definite opinion can be given about forceful recent sexual intercourse, sexual intercourse might have occurred it can be confirmed from chemical analysis of slides and cloths. Two slides of her vaginal swab were prepared, sealed and handed over to the Police for chemical examination. She was sent for counseling to Sakhivan Staff Centre and the Police obtained the counseling report (Ex-P/4). The Spot Map (Ex-P/8) was prepared by the Police and (Ex-P/12) was prepared by the Patwari. With respect to the age and date of birth of the victim, the Police has seized the school register (Ex-P/31) and after retaining the attested true copy of the same (Ex-P/31c), the original register was returned back to the school and the said school register was seized vide (Ex-P/27). The statement of the the prosecution witnesses and victim under Section 161 and 164 have also been recorded. The appellant was arrested on 01.04.2019 and he too was sent for his chemical examination to District Hospital, Raipur, where he was medically examined by Dr. S. K. Bhandari (Ex-P/3) and after examination he gave his report (Ex-P/14). After his medical examination, the 4 doctor has found the accused is able to perform sexual intercourse. One progress report card of Class-6 of the victim has also been seized vide seizure memo (Ex-P/9). The leggings of the victim, vaginal slide of the victim and underwear of the appellant were sent for its chemical examination to FSL, Raipur, from where, report (Ex-P/30) was received and according to the FSL report, the leggings of the victim and underwear of the appellant were found to be stand with smean and sperm, but no smean and sperm were found on the vaginal slide of the victim. After completion of usual investigation, chrge-sheet was filed against the appellant for the offence under Section 363, 366, 376 of IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act before the learned trial Court. 3. The learned trial Court has framed the charges for the offence under Sections 363, 366, 376(3) and 376 (2)(n) of IPC and Sections 6 of POCSO Act against the appellant. The appellant denied the charge and claimed trial. 4. In order to prove the charge, the prosecution has examined as many as 07 witnesses. Statement of the appellant under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. has also been recorded in which he denied the material appears against him and plead innocence and submitted that he has been falsely implicated in the offence. 5. After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence led by the prosecution, the learned trial Court has convicted the appellant and sentenced him as mentioned in earlier part of this judgment. Hence this appeal. 5 6. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are material omission and contradiction in the evidence of prosecution witnesses which cannot be made basis to convict the appellant for the offence in question. There is no cogent and clinching evidence to prove that the victim was minor on the date of incident and less than 18 years of age. The school record has not been proved in accordance with law and the basis on which the entries in the school record have been made with respect to date of birth of the victim has also not been produced by the prosecution. There is no birth certificate, Kotwari register or Ossification test report of the victim. The victim being a major girl, having love affair with the appellant and she on her own will, eloped with him without raising any objection or protest. She travelled with the appellant by train up to Nagpur and resided there with him and thereafter they had gone to Pune but during that period she has not made any complaint to anyone who met her on the way and during her residing at Nagpur and Pune. Even she has not raised any protest at the time when the appellant made physical relation with her and there is no sign of any protest on her body. The doctor has not found any injuries on her body during her medical examination and the entire evidence clearly suggests that the victim was consenting party in making physical relation with the appellant and therefore, no offence of kidnapping 6 or rape are made out against the appellant and he is entitled for acquittal. 7. On the other hand, learned State counsel vahementally opposes and has submitted that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable about but for minor omission or contradictions, the evidence of prosecution witnesses are reliable and sufficient to hold guilty of the appellant in the case. The school register has been proved by (PW/7) who is the Director of School and the entries in the school registry are relevant to determine the age of the victim. He would further submit that even if no injuries have been found on the body of the victim, the offence cannot be diluted. From the evidence of victim, it clearly established that she was minor on the date of incident and she was kidnapped by the appellant and kept her away from her lawful guardianship and made forceful relation by the appellant which comes under the definition of rape. She have been a minor girl cannot consenting in making physical relation with the appellant. From all the aspects, the offence of the appellant has been proved by the prosecution and his conviction and sentence is in accordance with law and needs no interference. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 9. The first and foremost question arises for consideration would be the age of the victim as to whether the victim was minor and less than 18 years of age on the date of incident or not. 7 10.The prosecution has mainly relied upon the School Register (Ex- P/31c) which is the school register. The said school register is sought to be proved by PW/7 who is the Director of the School. He stated in his evidence that Police has seized the school register vide seizure memo (Ex-P/27) and after retaining its attested true copy (Ex-P/31c), the original register was returned back to him. Today, he brought the original register with him. According to the entries in the school register, the date of birth of the victim is 24.10.2004 and she admitted in Class-6 in the school. In cross-examination, he admitted that the basis on which the date of birth of the victim is recorded has not been enclosed in the school register. He vahementally stated that her parents had come at the time of her admission in the school along with the birth certificate of the victim. He further admitted that, who has got admitted in the school is not mentioned in the school register. The Police has also seized a progress report cart of the victim (Article- A/1) in which also, the date of birth of the victim is mentioned as 24.10.2004 11.The admissibility of the school register has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 40,42,43,44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2011(2) SCC 385, the Supreme Court has observed as under: "40.Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid 8 certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. 42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit1, observed as follows:- "The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove 9 the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted." 43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal2, where this Court observed as follows:- "The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue"." 44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfercertificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose 10 of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the victim although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted." 12. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under: "33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. XXXX 11 XXXX XXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub- section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to 12 determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not 13 conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015." 13. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under : "14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test" conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to thedescription of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 14 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: "20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year." 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: "Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence 15 thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate fromthe school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three- judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference." 14. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the PW/1 victim has stated in her evidence that her date of birth is 24/10/2004. Her progress report card of Class-6 is annexed with the case as Article-A/1. Though, the suggestion has been given about entry of wrong date of birth, but she denied. 15.PW/2, who is the father of the victim has stated in his evidence that the date of birth of the victim is 24.10.2004. In cross- examination, he stated that, he has got admitted the victim in the school in Class-6. He further stated that at the time when the 16 victim was admitted in the school, he was not having any document with respect to her date of birth. The victim has born at U.P. He has not produced any record with respect to her date of birth to the Police. Except this evidence, no other evidence like Birth certificate, Kotwari register, ossification test report has been produced by the prosecution. Even, there is no other record of her initial schooling and the school register (Ex-P/31c) is of Class-6. When the entries made in the initial schooling register and there is no evidence about the same, as to on what basis her date of birth has been recorded in the Class-6, it cannot be said that the prosecution has proved that the entries made in the school register is correct date of birth of the victim. From the evidence led by the prosecution as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court is of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish the date of birth of the victim and also failed to establish that she was minor on the date of incident, yet, the learned trial Court has held her minor. 16.So far as the offence of kidnapping and rape are concerned, we again examined the evidence of victim (PW/1) 17.The victim has stated in her evidence that she knew the appellant because of the reason that he regularly visited to her vicinity. He proposed her that he is loving her. On 26.03.2019, at about 5 AM, the appellant called her near over-bridge and she was taken by him. Firstly, he has take her to Raipur railway station and took her to Nagpur. They stayed at Nagpur in his relatives house and 17 thereafter, he took her to Pune. She stayed with him for about 5 days. In between that period, the appellant made physical relation with her. On 31.03.2019, her father recovered her from the possession of the appellant. In cross-examination, she stated that when her father called her, she herself came to Raipur. From her evidence, it is nowhere appeared that while going with the appellant from the village up till Nagipur and Pune, she has not made any complaint to anyone and has not raised any alarm. Even when they stayed at Nagpur in the relatives’ house of the appellant, she has not made any complaint to anyone. Even while making forceful relation with her, there is no evidence that she protested or tried to come out from the clutches of the appellant. There is no marks of protest, teeth bite or nail scratch on the body of the appellant. In Para-12 of her cross-examination, when she stated that on being called by her father, she on her own will came to Raipur, clearly demonstrate that there was no force used by the appellant but she on her own will eloped with him and engage in making consensual physical intercourse. 18.PW/2, the father of the victim has stated that on 26.03.2019 at about 5 AM when his wife informed him about missing of the victim, they started searching her and when they could not found her, he lodged report to the Police (Ex-P/7). On 31.03.2019, the victim was recovered and Police proceeding were started. He further stated in his examination in chief when victim was recovered and she disclosed that the Police took her to Nagpur 18 and Pune and kept her about about 05 days. The appellant performed marriage with her while applying vermilion on her head in a temple and made physical relation with her. The evidence of the father of the victim also clearly goes to show that the victim was in love affair with the appellant and she eloped with him, both of them performed marriage in the temple and engaged in making physical relation. Though, the fact of marriage have not been stated by the victim in her evidence, but the said fact has been disclosed by her father in his examination in chief. 19.In the case of S. Varadarajan Vs. State of Madras, AIR 1965 SC 942, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the taking and allowing a minor to accompany a person and has held in Para 9 and Para 10 of its judgment that:- “9. It must, however, be borne in mind that there is a distinction between "taking" and allowing a minor to accompany a person. The two expressions are not synonymous though we would like to guard ourselves from laying down that in no conceivable circumstance can the two be regarded as meaning the same thing for the purposes of of the Indian Penal Code. We would limit ourselves to a case like the present where the minor alleged to have been taken by the accused person left her father's protection knowing and having capacity to know the full import of what she was doing voluntarily joins the accused person. In such a case we do not think that the accused can be said to have taken her away from the keeping of her lawful guardian. Something more has to be shown in a case of this kind and that is some kind of inducement held out by the accused person or an active participation by him in the formation of the intention of the minor to leave the house of the guardian. 19 10. It would, however, be sufficient if the prosecution establishes that though immediately prior to the minor leaving the father's protection no active part was played by the accused, he had at some earlier stage solicited or persuaded the minor to do so. In our, opinion if evidence to establish one of those things is lacking it would not be legitimate to infer that the accused is guilty of taking the minor out of the keeping of the lawful guardian merely because after she has actually left her guardian's house or a house where her guardian had kept her, joined the accused and the accused helped her in her design not to return to her guardian's house by taking her along with him from place to place. No doubt, the part played by the accused could be regarded as facilitating the fulfillment of the intention of the girl. That part, in our opinion, falls short of an inducement to the minor to slip out of the keeping of her lawful guardian and is, therefore, not tantamount to "taking". 20.Reverting to the facts of the case, it is also necessary to note here that when the victim was examined by the doctor, no any injury either external or internal were found on her body and there is no sign of any protest or struggle in her body. Although, in the FSL report (Ex-P/13), semen and sperms were found on the leggings and underwear of the victim as has already been considered that the victim is the consenting party in making physical relation with the appellant, the presence of semen and sperms on the cloths of the victim and appellant does not have any specific bearing in the case. 21.The version of the victim commands great respect and acceptability, but if there are some circumstances which cast some doubt in the mind of the court on the veracity of the victim's 20 evidence, then it will not be safe to rely on the said version of the victim. There is contradiction and omissions in the statement of the victim and her parents. The law is well settled that in case of rape, conviction can be maintained even on the basis of sole testimony of the victim. However, there is an important caveat which is that the testimony the victim must inspire confidence. Even though the testimony of victim is not required to be corroborated, if her statement is not believable then the accused cannot be convicted. The prosecution has to bring home charges levelled against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt, which prosecution has failed to do in the instant case. 22.Considering all the facts of the case and the evidence available on record, this Court is of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant kidnapped the victim and committed rape upon ger. 23.For the foregoing reasons, the appeal filed by the appellant is Allowed. The judgment of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant is set aside. The appellant is acquitted from all the charges levelled against him. The appellant is reported to be in jail since 01.04.2019. He be released forthwith if not required in any other case. 24.Keeping in view the provisions of Section 481 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the appellant- Pappu @ Mithilesh Manjhi is directed to furnish a personal bond for a sum of Rs. 25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court 21 concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 25.The trial court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice sagrika