Union of India and others vs. Bhupinder Singh and Anr. CMP(M) No.559 of 2026 02.07.2026 Present: Mr.Shashi Shirshoo, CGC for the applicants. Respondent No.1 ex-parte. Mr.Lovneesh Kanwar, Senior Advocate with Mr.Tek Chand, Advocate for respondent No.2. By way of present application, the applicants/petitioners have prayed for condonation of delay in filing the revision petition. There is delay of 110 in filing the revision petition. It has been averred in the application that copy of order dated 06.06.2025 was applied on 05.07.2025 and the same was ready on 21.07.2025 and received by the applicants/petitioners on 22.07.2025. Thereafer the matter was examined and legal opinion was obtained from the counsel. After receipt of the legal opinion, the matter was placed before the higher authorities, including the Principal Director, DGDE and the Ministry of Defence for consideration, whereupon it was decided to assail the order dated 06.06.2025 and subsequent orders by way of filing revision petition. 2. It has further been averred that the lease has expired on 25.06.2021 and the same can be extended in terms of Ministry of Defence policy dated 30.03.2017, for which, the respondent is required to apply for grant of ex- post facto sanction for renewal/extension of lease, but the respondent has not applied for the same till date despite repeated letters dated 04.11.2024 and 04.12.2025. It has been averred in the application that the delay in filing the revision petition is neither intentional nor willful, but has occurred due to the circumstances explained above. It has also been averred that no prejudice will be caused to the other side in case the application is allowed. It has further been averred that the applicants/petitioners would not gain anything by filing the present petition beyond the period of limitation. 3. Respondent No.2 filed reply to the application and averred that the applicants/petitioners have failed to show sufficient cause for delay in filing the revision petition and their inability to show sufficient cause demonstrates gross negligence. The explanation given in the application for not filing the petition within time is vague and the delay is on account of lack of due diligence and inaction. It has also been averred that on account of delay in filing the petition, a vested right has accured in favour of the respondents, which right should not be disturbed in the absence of sufficient cause, especially when the applicants/ petitioners have failed to be vigilant about their rights. 4. The applicants/petitioners have filed rejoinder to the reply and controverted the pleas taken by the respondents. It has been averred in the rejoinder that the delay has occurred on account of administrative and procedural requirements involved in processing the matter at various levels and obtaining approval/sanction from the competent authorities for filing the present petition. So far as the plea taken by the respondents that they have a vested right, the verdict of the Court is a matter of record. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the record carefully. 6. Learned counsel representing the applicants/ petitioners while placing reliance upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another vs. Mst.Katiji and others, (1987) 2 SCC 107, State of Nagaland vs. Lipok AO and others, (2005) 3 SCC 752 and Raheem Shah and another vs. Govind Singh and others, (2023) 18 SCC 764 has contended that the Court has to take liberal approach while considering the application for condonation of delay and the applicants/petitioners were not required to explain each and every day’s delay and thus the delay in filing the revision petition may be condoned. 7. On the other hand, Mr.Lovneesh Kanwar, learned senior counsel duly assisted by Mr.Tek Chand, Advocate has placed heavy reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.11794 of 2025, Shivamma (Dead) by LRs vs. Karnataka Housing Board and Ors., to contend that the applicants/petitioners have to explain the delay and since there is no plausible explanation given in the application, the same deserves to be rejected. 8. As per judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mst. Katiji’s case (supra), the Court has held that the Courts should adopt a liberal approach while considering the application for condonation of delay. It has been held in the aforementioned judgment that litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late and refusing to condone the delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. The relevant para of the judgment is reproduced hereunder:- “3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:- 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non- deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the 'State' which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is admin- istered in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for according a stepmotherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant. "1. Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period." Praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even handed justice on mertis in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time barred, is therefore. set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides.” 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lipok AO’s case (supra) has held that sufficient cause cannot be laid down by hard-and-fast rules. The Court while considering the application has to exercise discretion whether the party acted with reasonable diligence in prosecuting the matter. It has also been held that the delay by the State machinery on account of red-tape in the process of making decision is a common feature and, therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. The expression “sufficient cause” should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day’s delay. The relevant para of the judgment is reproduced as under:- “15. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay - intentional or otherwise - is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice- oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice- oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants.” 10. The above view has again been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Raheem Shah’s case (supra), wherein taking que from the earlier judgment passed in Lipok AO’s case (supra), it has been held that the Court should adopt justice oriented approach rather than the iron- cast technical approach. 11. No doubt, as per the judgment cited by the learned counsel representing respondent No.2 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shivamma’s case (supra), it has been held that there is no room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and further, the limitation has to be applied with equal force with respect to the applications filed by the State agencies. However, keeping in view the fact that in the present case, the delay is not so much, which requires the dismissal of the application. 12. It is settled law that the parties should be allowed to contest the matter on merits, rather than rejecting the claim on technacilities. In the present case, the applicants/petitioners have explained the delay in filing the revision petition, which cannot be said to be intentional and willful inasmuch as the applicants/petitioners were not going to gain anything by filing the review petition late. 13. Resultantly, the present application is allowed and the delay in filing the revision petition is ordered to be condoned. The application stands disposed of. Civil Revision No. of 2026 Be registered. 14. Notice. Mr. Tek Chand, Advocate appears and waives service of notice on behalf of respondent No.2. Notice be issued to respondent No.1, returnable for 19th August, 2026. Steps be taken within a week. CMP No. of 2026 (CMPST No.18154 of 2026) Be registered. 15. By way of present application, the applicants/petitioners have prayed for staying the execution and implementation of order dated 06.06.2025 and consequential proceedings arising therefrom passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Solan in Execution Petition No.379 of 2013, titled, Bhupinder Singh and Ors. vs. Union of India and Anr. 16. During the pendency of the revision petition, the impugned order 06.06.2025 passed by learned Senior Civil Judge, Solan in Execution Petition No.379 of 2013, titled, Bhupinder Singh and Ors. vs. Union of India and Anr. is ordered to be stayed till the next date of hearing. 17. Reply to the application by the appearing respondent be filed within a period of four weeks. List on 19th August, 2026. 2nd July, 2026 ( Jiya Lal Bhardwaj ) (naveen) Judge