1 2026:CGHC:19267-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 297 of 2026 1 - Jashraj Singh Rajpurohit S/o Shri Pokarsingh Rajpurohit, Aged About 35 Years R/o Village Indagaon, Tah. Mainpur, District Gariyaband Chhattisgarh. 2 - Rajendra Singh Rajpurohit S/o Shri Pokarsingh Rajpurohit Aged About 40 Years R/o Village Indagaon, Tah. Mainpur, District Gariyaband Chhattisgarh. ... Appellants versus 1 - The State of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary Forest Department Mantralya Mahanadi Bhawan Atal Nagar New Raipur Distt- Raipur (C.G.) 2 - The Deputy Director Udanti Seetanadi Tiger Reserve Distt- Gariyaband (C.G.) 3 - The Forest Range Officer Indagaon (Dhurwagu D) Bafar Distt- Gariyaband (C.G.) 4 - The Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue) Mainpur Distt- Gariyaband (C.G.) 5 - The Tahsildar Tahsil Office- Mainpur Distt- Gariyaband (C.G.) 6 - The Secretary Gram Panchayat Indagaon Tahsil Mainpur Distt- Gariyaband (C.G.) ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellants : Mr. Manoj Kumar Sinha, Advocate For Respondents-State : Mr. Prasun Kumar Bhaduri, Deputy Advocate General ANURADHA TIWARI Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2026.04.28 10:18:39 +0530 2 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 27.04.2026 1. Heard Mr. Manoj Kumar Sinha, learned counsel for the appellants as well as Mr. Prasun Kumar Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General for the State on I.A. No.02, which is an application for condonation of delay of 05 days in filing the instant appeal. 2. After hearing the learned counsel for the appellants and considering the reasons mentioned in the application, we are of the considered opinion that sufficient cause has been shown in the application and accordingly, I.A. No.02 is allowed and delay of 05 days in filing the instant appeal is hereby condoned. 3. On 20.04.2026 and 21.04.2026, the matter was taken up for consideration, wherein notice was directed to be issued and duly served upon respondent No.6, as it was found to be a necessary party before this Court. 4. Despite service of notice, none appeared on behalf of respondent No.6 to contest the present writ petition when the matter was called out on both occasions. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants as well as learned counsel for the State submit that due and sufficient opportunity 3 has already been afforded to respondent No.6, yet there is no representation on its behalf. 6. In the aforesaid circumstances, and with the consent of learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned State counsel, this Court deems it appropriate to proceed with the hearing of the matter in absence of respondent No.6. 7. By way of this writ appeal, appellants have prayed for following relief(s):- “1. Set aside the order dated 08.01.2026 (Ann.A/1) passed in WPC No.2907/2024 (Jashraj Singh Rajpurohit and another Vs State of CG & ors) to the extent it directs the appellants to vacate 108 sq. meters of land. 2. Restore the earlier interim protection granted by the learned Single Judge on 14.06.2024 in WPC No.2907/2024. 3. Direct maintenance of status quo till final disposal of the writ petition, in the interest of justice.” 8. The present intra-court appeal has been filed challenging the order dated 08.01.2026 (Annexure-A/1) passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (C) No. 2907/2024, whereby the interim order dated 14.06.2024 granting stay on the operation and effect of the impugned letter dated 17.05.2024 (Annexure P/1) has been modified. It is the case of the appellant that such modification, at the interlocutory stage, has virtually resulted in a 4 final determination of rights without adjudicating the writ petition on merits, thereby frustrating the very purpose of the writ proceedings and rendering the petition infructuous. Accordingly, the present intra-court appeal has been preferred assailing the said order. 9. Brief facts of the case are that the appellants/writ petitioners, residents of Village Indagaon, Tahsil Mainpur, District Gariyaband, are in settled possession over land bearing Khasra No. 696, Rakba 0.35 hectare, which is recorded as Government land in the revenue records. It is their case that their names have been recorded as occupiers pursuant to a proposal passed by Gram Panchayat Indagaon in the year 2000, and thereafter on 17.10.2000, the Gram Panchayat resolved to allot the subject land to the appellants/writ petitioners after following due procedure, for the purpose of livelihood including running of a flour mill. It is further stated that on 01.04.2015, the appellants/writ petitioners submitted an application seeking permission/NOC for construction of house over the said land, asserting their continuous possession and earlier Panchayat proposal in their favour, and also requested permission for repair of an old dilapidated kaccha structure existing on the land. 10. The appellants/writ petitioners claim that they have been regularly paying taxes to the Gram Panchayat, last paid up to April 2024, and that receipts have been duly issued, besides alleging that 5 they have been granted permission by the Gram Panchayat for construction and peaceful enjoyment of the land. It is their further case that they are running shops and residing with their family members over the subject land since the year 2000 without any interference. 11. However, on the basis of a complaint made by one Kanhaiya Manjhi, a demarcation was conducted on 16.02.2024, wherein it was alleged that the appellants/writ petitioners have encroached upon an area admeasuring 0.01 hectare (108 sq. mtr.) of Khasra No. 696. Consequently, an impugned notice/order dated 17.05.2024 (Annexure P/1) was issued by the Forest Authority directing eviction, which is under challenge in Writ Petition No. 2907/2024. The learned Single Judge, by order dated 14.06.2024, had stayed the effect and operation of the impugned notice; however, the said interim order was subsequently modified on 08.01.2026 directing the appellants/writ petitioners to vacate the said portion of 108 sq. ft. while keeping the remaining part intact. It is contended that such modification virtually amounts to a final determination of rights at the interim stage and therefore the present intra-court appeal has been filed challenging the same. 12. Being aggrieved by the order dated 08.01.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (C) No. 2907/2024, whereby the interim order dated 14.06.2024 granting stay over the impugned notice dated 17.05.2024 (Annexure P/1) has been 6 modified to the extent directing the appellants/writ petitioners to vacate the land admeasuring 108 sq. ft. forming part of Khasra No. 696, the present intra-court appeal has been preferred. It is submitted that the learned Single Judge, while modifying the interim protection already granted, has virtually adjudicated the rights of the parties at an interlocutory stage without finally deciding the writ petition on merits, thereby altering the nature and effect of the interim order to the prejudice of the appellants/writ petitioners. 13. Accordingly, the legality and propriety of the said modifying order dated 08.01.2026 is under challenge in the present appeal. 14. Learned counsel for the appellants/writ petitioners respectfully submits that the impugned order dated 08.01.2026 (Annexure-A/1) passed by the learned Single Judge is bad in law, arbitrary and unsustainable, inasmuch as by way of modification of an interim order, the learned Court has virtually granted final relief to the respondents by directing the appellants/writ petitioners to vacate possession over 108 sq. ft. of land forming part of Khasra No. 696. It is submitted that such a direction, at an interlocutory stage where the writ petition is still pending consideration, has the effect of conclusively determining the rights of the parties without adjudication on merits, which is impermissible in law. It is well settled that interim orders cannot be converted into final adjudication of rights, and reliance is placed 7 on State of U.P. v. Ram Sukhi Devi, (2005) 9 SCC 733 and Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Dunlop India Ltd., (1985) 1 SCC 260, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has cautioned that interim directions should not virtually dispose of the main matter or disturb settled possession in a manner prejudging the lis. In the present case, the direction to vacate possession effectively renders the writ petition infructuous even before final adjudication, thereby causing grave prejudice to the appellants/writ petitioners. 15. It is further submitted that the impugned order has been passed without recording any proper findings on the essential parameters required for grant or modification of interim relief, namely prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury. The learned Single Judge has not undertaken any judicial assessment of these mandatory considerations while modifying the earlier protective order dated 14.06.2024. In absence of such findings, the modification order suffers from non-application of mind and is liable to be set aside on this ground alone, as it does not satisfy the well-established principles governing interim jurisdiction. 16. Learned counsel further submits that the appellants/writ petitioners are in continuous, peaceful and settled possession over the subject land since the year 2000, supported by Gram Panchayat resolution, payment of taxes and permissions for construction. It is settled law that a person in settled possession 8 cannot be dispossessed except by due process of law, and summary eviction at an interim stage is impermissible. Reliance is placed on Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu, (2004) 1 SCC 769, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that even a person in settled possession is entitled to protection against forcible dispossession otherwise than in accordance with law. The impugned direction, therefore, runs contrary to settled principles of law and cannot be sustained. 17. It is also submitted that the appellants/writ petitioners are running shops and residing with their families over the subject land, and the impugned direction results in immediate deprivation of livelihood and shelter without final adjudication of rights. Such action is violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, as the right to livelihood forms an integral part of the right to life as held in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) 3 SCC 545. The impugned order, therefore, imposes irreversible civil consequences without following fair procedure, which is constitutionally impermissible. 18. Lastly, it is submitted that there is no change in circumstances recorded or demonstrated which could justify modification of the earlier interim order dated 14.06.2024. It is settled law that interim orders cannot be altered or vacated in the absence of any material change in facts or circumstances. The impugned order does not disclose any such supervening circumstance warranting 9 such drastic modification. On the contrary, if the appellants/writ petitioners are dispossessed during pendency of the writ petition, they will suffer irreparable loss inasmuch as their shops and residence will be demolished and restoration, even if ultimately successful, would be rendered meaningless. Therefore, the balance of convenience is squarely in favour of the appellants/writ petitioners, and the impugned order deserves to be set aside in the interest of justice. 19. On the other hand, learned State counsel opposes the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants/writ petitioners and submits that the writ appeal is misconceived and devoid of merit. It is contended that the learned Single Judge has merely modified the interim order to a limited extent after due consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, and the same cannot be construed as a final adjudication of rights of the parties. It is further submitted that no prejudice is caused to the appellants/writ petitioners as the writ petition is still pending consideration and shall be decided on its own merits in accordance with law. 20. Learned State counsel further submits that the present controversy essentially involves adjudication of rights over Government land, and the main contesting party in the writ proceedings is respondent No.6, who is a necessary and proper party. It is submitted that respondent No.6 is directly concerned 10 with the subject matter in dispute, and therefore effective adjudication of the writ petition cannot be undertaken in its absence. Hence, any grievance raised by the appellants/writ petitioners at this stage is premature. 21. It is also submitted that the learned Single Judge has exercised discretion while modifying the interim protection and such discretionary order ought not to be interfered with in intra-court appeal unless it is shown to be perverse or contrary to settled principles of law. Learned State counsel, therefore, prays for dismissal of the present appeal, leaving it open for the learned Single Judge to finally adjudicate the writ petition on its own merits. 22. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants/writ petitioners as well as learned State counsel at length and perused the material placed on record. 23. Learned counsel for the appellants/writ petitioners has assailed the impugned order dated 08.01.2026 mainly on the ground that the modification of interim order virtually amounts to grant of final relief and results in dispossession at an interlocutory stage without adjudication of the writ petition on merits, whereas learned State counsel has opposed the same contending that the order is only an interim arrangement passed in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction and that the main contesting party is respondent No.6, whose presence is necessary for effective adjudication of dispute. 11 24. After considering the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties, the learned Single Judge has passed the interim order dated 14.06.2024 in the following terms :- “Mr. Manoj Kumar Sinha, Advocate for the Petitioner. Mr. D.R. Minj, Government Advocate Respondents No. 1 to 5/State. Heard. Issue notice to the respondents. Mr. D.R. Minj, Government Advocate accepts notice on behalf of the Respondents No. 1 to 5/State. Hence, no process fee is required to be paid for issuance of notice to these respondents. Learned counsel for the respondents prays for and is granted 03 weeks time to file reply. Issue notice to Respondent No. 6 on payment of process fee, as per rules. Notice be made returnable within 03 weeks. Also heard on I.A. No. 01/2024 which is an application for grant of in-terim relief. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the letter 17.05.2024 (Annexure P/1) for eviction from the land bearing Khasra No.696, admeasuring 0.35 hectares is issued in violation of principles of natural justice. No show cause notice was issued to the petitioner providing him an opportunity of hearing. He 12 also contended that even the demarcation proceeding conducted on 16.02.2024 was not in presence of the petitioner and he was also not noticed. Learned counsel for the respondent/State would oppose the submission of the counsel for the petitioner and would submit that the petitioner was in possession of the forest land and it was ascertained by way of demarcation conducted by the forest officials of the Forest Department. He further submitted that he will also file reply to the application for grant of interim relief. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case and also, the submission of the counsel for the parties in particular, the submission of the counsel for the petitioner that the letter 17.05.2024 (Annexure P/1) directing the petitioner to evict the land within 01 day from the date of notice and it was issued in violation of principles of natural justice, purely as an interim measure, it is directed that the effect and operation of the impugned letter dated 17.05.2024 (Annexure P/1) shall remain stayed till the next date of hearing. List this case in the week commencing 28.07.2024.” 25. Thereafter, vide order dated 08.01.2026, the learned Single Judge has passed the interim order in the following terms :- 13 “Mr. Manoj Sinha, counsel for the petitioner. Mr. Shobhit Mishra, Dy. Govt. Advocate for the State. Learned State counsel would submit that the interim order is operating in favour of the petitioner since 14.06.2024 and would pray for vacating the interim order passed by this Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the forest officer is not the authority to remove petitioner’s encroachment from the land bearing Khasra No. 696 area admeasuring 0.35 hectare out of which 108 sq.ft. belongs to forest department. From perusal of the records, it is quite vivid that the petitioner has not placed on record any document to demonstrate that the petitioner is owner of the land bearing Khasra No. 696 area admeasuring 0.35 hectare. In view of the above, the interim order passed by this Court on 14.06.2024 is modified to the extent that the petitioner shall vacate the possession of the land admeasuring 108 sq.ft. of Khasra No. 696 area admeasuring 0.35 hectare. The remaining part of the interim order dated 14.06.2024 passed by this Court shall remain intact. List this case on 13th February, 2026 for final disposal in motion hearing list.” 14 26. Upon due consideration of the entire material on record as well as the rival submissions advanced at the Bar, this Court is of the considered view that the impugned order dated 08.01.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained in law. The learned Single Judge, while exercising interim jurisdiction, has proceeded to modify the earlier order dated 14.06.2024 in such a manner that it virtually results in directing dispossession of the appellants/writ petitioners from a portion of the subject land admeasuring 108 sq. ft., even though the writ petition itself is still pending adjudication. Such a direction, in effect and substance, travels beyond the scope of interim adjudication and amounts to granting final relief, which is impermissible in law at the interlocutory stage. It is well settled that interim orders are intended only to preserve the status quo and protect the subject matter of lis and not to finally determine rights of the parties, which is the exclusive domain of final adjudication after exchange of pleadings and full hearing. 27. This Court further finds that the impugned order does not reflect due consideration of the settled parameters governing grant or modification of interim relief, namely prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury. The learned Single Judge has primarily proceeded on the premise of absence of documentary proof of ownership, without undertaking a complete prima facie evaluation of the rival claims, long-standing possession of the appellants/writ petitioners since the year 2000, Gram Panchayat 15 resolutions, tax receipts, and alleged permissions. Non- consideration of these material aspects renders the impugned order legally unsustainable, being in violation of well-established principles governing exercise of discretionary interim jurisdiction. 28. This Court is also of the opinion that the appellants/writ petitioners have made out a strong case of settled possession, which cannot be lightly disturbed without due process of law. The direction to vacate possession at an interim stage, particularly when the validity of the very eviction notice dated 17.05.2024 is under challenge, causes serious prejudice and irreversible consequences, including deprivation of livelihood and shelter. Such consequences cannot be justified in absence of final adjudication, more so when the writ petition is still pending consideration before the learned Single Judge. The balance of convenience, therefore, clearly lies in favour of maintaining the earlier interim protection granted on 14.06.2024, which merely preserved the subject matter pending final adjudication. 29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned order dated 08.01.2026 is hereby set aside and quashed. Consequently, the interim order dated 14.06.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (C) No. 2907/2024 is restored in its entirety and shall continue to operate until final disposal of the writ petition. 30. Accordingly, the present intra-court appeal stands allowed. 16 31. Since the writ petition is still pending consideration before the learned Single Judge, it is further observed that the same deserves to be decided expeditiously in accordance with law. The learned Single Judge is requested to make an endeavour to finally dispose of Writ Petition (C) No. 2907/2024 expeditiously, preferably within a period of six weeks from the date of its first listing, without being influenced by any observation made in this order, which are only for the purpose of deciding the present intra- court appeal. 32. The interim order dated 14.06.2024 passed by the learned writ Court is hereby restored and shall continue to remain in force during the pendency of the writ petition. 33. There shall be no order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Anu