BIHAR STATE POWER HOLDING COMPANY LTD. THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN CUM MANAGING DIRECTOR v. THE CHAIRMAN CUM MANAGING DIRECTOR, URJA VIKAS NIGAM LTD., JHARKHAND
LPA/825/2025 · 2026-03-12
Arun Kumar Rai, Sujit Narayan Prasad
body2026
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 14082 (JHR) · dailylaw.ai ]
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[ 2026 DAILYLAW 14082 (JHR) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI L.P.A. No.825 of 2025
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Bihar State Power Holding Company Ltd. having its registered office at Vidyut Bhawan Jawahar Lal Nehru Marg, Patna-800001 through its Chairman-cum-Managing Director.
…. ….
Appellant
(Petitioner in writ petition)
Versus
1. The Chairman cum Managing Director, Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd., having its office at Nepal House Compound, P.O.- Hinoo Town & Dist.-Ranchi, P.S.-Jagannathpur.
2. Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. through its Secretary, having its office at Nepal House Compound, P.O.-Hinoo Ranchi, P.S.- Jagannathpur.
3. Mr. Rajib Ranjan, Chairman Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd., at present residing at Macon Guest House, Ranchi, P.O and P.S.- Doranda
4. The Electricity Superintending Engineer, Electric Supply Circle, Jamshedpur, P.O. and P.S.-Bistupur
5. The Electrical Executive Engineer, Adityapur, Jamshedpur, P.O. & P.S.-Adityapur.
6. M/s Usha Martin limited, an existing company within the meaning of the Companies Act 1956, having its registered office at 2A, Shakespeare Sarani, Kolkata-700071 (also having its office at Tatiilwai-835103, Ranchi) through its General Manager and/or Principal Officer Nand Kishore Patodia, resident of Deputy Para, P.S. Lalpur, Ranchi
.... .... Respondents With L.P.A. No.828 of 2025
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1. Bihar State Power Holding Company Ltd. having its registered office at Vidyut Bhawan, Jawahar Lal Nehru Marg, P.O-GPO & P.S-Patliputra, Patna-800001 through its Chairman-cum-
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Managing Director.
2. Chairman cum Managing Director, Bihar State Power Holding Company Ltd. having its registered office at Jawahar Lal Nehru (Bailey Road), P.O.-GPO & P.S-Patliputra, Patna-800001.
…. ….
Appellants
(Respondent Nos.1&2 in Writ petition)
Versus
1. M/s Usha Martin limited, an existing company within the meaning of the Companies Act 1956, having its registered office at 2A, Shakespeare Sarani, (also having its office at Tatiilwai-835103, Ranchi) through its General Manager and/or Principal Officer Nand Kishore Patodia, resident of Deputy Para, P.S. Lalpur, P.O.- Lalpur, Ranchi
2. Nand Kishore Patodia, S/o Late R.D Patodia, residing at Deputy Para, P.O-Lalpur, P.S. Lalpur, Ranchi. .... .... Respondents (Petitioner Nos.1&2 in Writ Petition)
3. Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. & Electricity Board within the meaning of section 5 of Electricity (Supply) Act 1948 duly constituted u/s 62 of the Bihar Re-organisation Act, having its office at Nepal House Area, P.O-Doranda, P.S.-Doranda, Doranda, Ranchi.
4. Secretary, JUVNL, having its office at Nepal House Area, P.O- Doranda, P.S.-Doranda, Doranda, Ranchi.
.... .... Respondents
(Respondent Nos.3&4 in Writ Petition)
CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI
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For the Appellants : Mr. Umesh Prasad Singh, Sr. Adv.
(Through V.C.)
: Mr. Manoj Tandon, Advocate
: Ms. Neha Bhardwaj, Advocate
(In Both the appeals)
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For Resp. No.6 : Mr. M.S. Mittal, Senior Advocate
Mr. Salona Mittal, Advocate
(In L.P.A. No.825 of 2025)
For the JUVNL : Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, Advocate General
: Mr. Mrinal Kanti Roy, Sr. S.C.
Mr. Rishi Ranjan Vats, Advocate
Mr. Parul Parasar, Advocate
For Resp. Nos.1&2 : Mr. M.S. Mittal, Senior Advocate
Mr. Salona Mittal, Advocate
(In L.P.A. No.828 of 2025)
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C.A.V. on 09.02.2026
Pronounced on 12/03/2026 Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. Prayer
1. Since both the appeals arising out of common order/judgment dated 04.09.2025, as such, with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, these cases are being taken up together and are being disposed of by this common order/judgment.
2. Both these appeals, have been preferred under Clause-10 of the Letters Patent, are directed against the common
order/judgment dated 04.09.2025 passed in W.P.(C) No.5750 of 2001 (impugned in L.P.A. No.825 of 2025) and W.P.(C) No.4374 of 2001 (impugned in L.P.A. No.828 of 2025), whereby and whereunder, the writ petition being W.P.(C) No.5750 of 2001 filed by the B.S.E.B. has been dismissed and writ petition being W.P.(C) No.4374 of 2001 filed by the Usha Martin Limited has been allowed, directing the B.S.E.B. to refund the amount of Rs.5 Crore to the petitioner-Usha Martin Ltd. with interest at the rate of 7.5 per cent per annum. 2026:JHHC:6780-DB
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Factual Matrix
3. Since the similar issues are involved in both the cases, as such, for the sake of convenience, the brief facts of one of the cases, are being referred hereinbelow. 4. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ petition being W.P.(C) No.4374 of 2001, required to be enumerated, which read as under: - (i)
It is the case of the writ petitioner (W.P.(C) No.4374 of 2001) that the writ petitioner-M/s Usha Martin Limited is a company. The respondent Nos.1 and 3 to the writ petition are Electricity Boards within the meaning of Section 5 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. On or about 14th of January 2000, the respondent no.1 has disconnected electricity supply to the Steel Melting Shop at the factory premises of the writ petitioner at Jamshedpur alleging that the petitioner no.1 to the writ petition, i.e., M/s Usha Martin Limited, was pilfering electricity. (ii)
On 17th January 2000 the respondent no.1 raised a provisional compensatory bill upon the petitioner no.1 for a sum of Rs.40,39,50,747/- under the provisions of clause 16.9 of the Tariff. The petitioner craves leave to refer to a copy of the said provisional compensatory bill dated 17th January 2000 at the time of hearing of this petition, if necessary. (iii)
Further, challenging the disconnection electricity effected on the 14th January 2000 and also challenging the said provisional compensatory bill dated 17th January 2000 for
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Rs.40,39,50,747/- the petitioner no.1 (M/s Usha Martin Limited) instituted a writ petition being CWJC No.223 of 2000 (R). The said CWJC No.223 of 2000 (R) was disposed of vide order dated 27th January 2000 which inter alia provides as follows:-
"The impugned bill is, therefore, quashed giving liberty to the respondent Board to raise a fresh bill after giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioners.
The petitioners instead of waiting for show cause notice, shall file a detailed objection/representation to the inspection report before the General Manager cum Chief Engineer, Singhbhum Area, Jamshedpur within two weeks from today."
"I am of the opinion that for the ends of justice it would be proper for the Board to restore the supply of electricity in the event the petitioner deposit with the Board a sum of Rs.5 crore in cash and bank guarantee for a sum of Rs.15 crore from Nationalised Bank. Accordingly I direct the respondent Board to restore the supply of electricity in the factory premises of the petitioner within 24 hours from the date of such deposit. It is needless to say that in the event any liability of the petitioner is found for payment of additional amount then the same shall be adjusted out of the amount deposited by the petitioner and in the event the petitioner is not found liable to pay any additional amount to the Board then the amount deposited in cash as well as bank guarantee shall be refunded to the petitioner."
(iv)
Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the order dated 27th January 2000, the petitioner no.1 preferred LPA No.25 of 2000 (R) which was disposed vide order dated 3rd February
2000. In terms of the said order dated 27th January 2000 as modified on 3rd February 2000 the petitioner no.1 duly made payment of Rs.5 crores to the respondent no.1 whereupon electricity connection to the said factory of the petitioner no.1 was restored by the respondent. In terms of the said order dated 27th
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January 2000, the petitioner no.1 also furnished a bank guarantee to the respondent no.1 for a sum of Rs.15 crores.”
(v) The disputes between the petitioner no. 1 and the respondent no.1 had been referred for adjudication by the General Manager cum Chief Engineer, Singhbhum Area, thereafter, petitioner duly made a representation before the said General Manager cum Chief Engineer, Singhbhum Area of the respondent no.1 and the adjudication proceedings before the said General Manager cum chief Engineer duly commenced.
The petitioner no.1 instituted yet another writ petition being CWJC No.1397 of 2000 (R). (vi) The CWJC No.1397 of 2000 (R) was dismissed vide order dated 14th July, 2000. Being aggrieved with the said order dated 14.07.2000 passed in CWJC No. 1397 of 2000 (R), the petitioner preferred an appeal being LPA No.256 of 2000 (R). (vii) While the said LPA No.256 of 2000 (R) was pending w.e.f 15th November 2000, a new State of Jharkhand was created by virtue of the Bihar Reorganization Act. After the creation of the new State of Jharkhand, the State Government has constituted Jharkhand State Electricity Board, the respondent no.3 to the writ petition by issuance of notification. (viii) Thereafter, the Jharkhand State Electricity Board had already came into existence while the said LPA No.256 of 2000(R) was pending. The order dated 21.03.2001 was passed inter-alia adding the Jharkhand State Electricity Board as a party
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to the said LPA No.256 of 2000 (R). (ix) The said LPA No.256 of 2000 (R) was disposed of vide
order dated 11th April 2001 by directing inter alia as follows:-
"The judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 27-1-2000 passed in CWJC No.223 of 2000 (R) is modified only to the limited extent that the adjudication, as ordered in paragraph 13 of that judgment, shall now be done by the Chairman, Jharkhand State Electricity Board, Ranchi, in place of the General Manager cum Chief Engineer, Singhbhum Area, Jamshedpur."
(x)
In terms of the said order dated 11th April 2001 the adjudication proceedings duly commenced before Sri Rajiv Ranjan, Chairman, Jharkhand State Electricity Board. The petitioner No.1 and the respondents nos.1 and 3 duly appeared before the said Chairman, Electricity Board and made elaborate
submissions and representations. The Chairman, Jharkhand State Electricity Board duly adjudicated upon the disputes between the parties and made his order in respect thereof on 4th August 2001. The said order dated 4th August 2001 inter alia provides as follows:-
"I have carefully examined technical and analytical part of the FIR, the Inspection Report, the representations made by Usha Beltron, various written submissions to the General Manager-cum- Chief Engineer and to the undersigned and the presentations, arguments and submissions made by Bihar State Electricity Board and Jharkhand State Electricity Board during the course of the hearing in my office. I conclude as follows: a) The allegations as contained in the Inspection Reports and FIR of Bihar State Electricity Board lack correct information, inadequate in knowledge on technical matters in the area of steel making, steel making equipments and
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distribution of load, demand etc. It cannot be relied upon to prima facie make a case of alleged theft or pilferage of electricity against Usha Beltron. b) In none of the Inspection Reports any allegation has been made and only some observations of subjective nature have been recorded. Inspection Reports also do not mention detection of unauthorized load during the course of inspection. In the technical analysis of FIR, the allegation was primarily based on determination of undisclosed additional quantity billet production allegedly with stolen power. BSEB overlooked the need to take clarification from the company if any billet has been purchased over and above Usha Beltron's own production. The conclusive proof of the fact that no undisclosed additional steel billet has been produced shows that allegation of pilferage of electricity is not correct. c) While the FIR it has not been mentioned but later on written submission has been made regarding using bamboo poles for hooking 33 KV line, which in the opinion of General Manager cum Chief Engineer is not technically feasible in the present case. No prima facie case of the theft or pilferage electricity is made on this ground. d) The consumption of electrical energy recorded by the metering equipment at the premises of the Steel Plant of Usha Beltron also tallies with the record maintained at the Gamharia substation during the allegation period and this is considered as a technically sound proof of the fact that there has been no pilferage of electricity by Usha Beltron.
e) The 12 months record post reconnection and switching over to 132 KV system and incoporating calibrated double electronic meters at the Steel plant end as well as Gamharia substation end clearly shows that both in terms of energy consumption norm an demand it is consistent with the allegation period. This is also conclusive technical evidence that neither there has been a pilferage of unmetered energy nor there has been any unauthorised demand increase. Thus, in my considered opinion, the allegation of theft or and or pilferage of electricity and or unauthorized increase in load by Usha Beltron Limited has been wrongly made. 2026:JHHC:6780-DB
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I thus conclude that no fresh bill under clause 16.9 is to be raised for the reasons as mentioned above. Hon'ble Justice M.Y. Eqbal of the Patna High Court Ranchi Bench vide his order in CWJC No.223 of 2000 (R) had directed that if the petitioner is not found liable to pay, then the amount deposited by the petitioner in cash as well as Bank Guarantee shall be refunded to the petitioner. Since the petitioner has not been found liable, I direct Bihar State Electricity Board to refund Rs.5 crores (Rupees Five Crores) deposited with them in cash to Usha Beltron Ltd., within 10 days from the date of this order. I am also permitting Usha Beltron Ltd., vide this
order, to cancel the Bank Guarantee of Rs.15 crores submitted to Bihar State Electricity Board."
Before passing of the said order on 4th August 2001 an application had been filed by the Chairman, Jharkhand State Electricity Board in LPA No. 256 of 2000 (R) for extension of time to make his order. The said application was disposed of vide
order dated 07.08.2001 by extending and regularising the making of the order dated 4th August 2001 beyond the time stipulated by this Court. By the said order dated 4th August 2001 the Chairman, Jharkhand State Electricity Board has categorically and repeatedly held that the allegation of pilferage made by the respondent no.1 was "wrongly made". By the said order dated, Bihar State Electricity Board was also directed to refund the sum of Rs.5 crores within ten days from the date of the said order. (xi) In spite of the said order dated 4th August 2001 and although a period of ten days from the date thereof had expired the respondent No.1 failed and neglected to make payment of the
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said sum of Rs.5 crores and to refund the same to the petitioner no.1. By the letter dated 20th August, 2001 the petitioner no.1 has called upon the respondent no.1 to make payment of the said sum of Rs.5 crores in terms of the order dated 04.08.2001 passed by the adjudicator. By the said letter the petitioner No. 1 also demanded from the Respondent No. 1 also demanded interest from Respondent No. 1 @ 18% per annum to be calculated with effect from 03.02.2000 till realisation. Although the said letter dated 20.08.2001 was duly received by Respondent No. 1, the Respondent No. 1 sat tight over the matter of making refund of the said sum of Rs. 5 crores to the petitioner No. 1 and as such the petitioner No. 1 again vide its Registered Letter dated 31.08.2001 demanded from the Respondent No. 1 the refund of the said sum of Rs. 5 crores with interest @ 18 % per annum, but the said refund has not been made to the petitioner No. 1 by the Respondent No. 1. (xii) It is the case of the petitioner no.1 that the respondent no.1 had wrongfully and illegally disconnected the electricity connection of the petitioner no.1 and the petitioner No.1 in the process was compelled, inter alia, to make payment of the said sum of Rs.5 crores as a condition precedent for obtaining restoration of electricity supply.
Even after it had been established and held that there was no pilferage of electricity by the petitioner No. 1 and although the said order dated 4th August 2001 specifically directs the respondent no.1 to refund the said sum of
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Rs.5 crores to the petitioner no.1 the respondent no.1 has wrongfully, illegally and with a malafide motive and intention failed to refund the said sum of Rs.5 crores to the petitioner no.1. (xiii) The respondent no. 1 has reaped the benefit of the said sum of Rs.5 crores deposited with it on 03.02.2000 in terms of the orders dated 27th January 2000 as modified on 3rd February 2000. Inasmuch as it has now been decided and adjudicated that the respondent no.1 had wrongfully disconnected electricity to the factory premises of the petitioner No. 1 on 14th January 2000 and it is just proper and necessary that the respondent no.1 be directed to pay interest on the said sum of Rs.5 crores to the petitioner no.1 calculated from the date 03.02.2000 till the date of refund. (xiv) Being aggrieved with the aforesaid order 04.08.2001, writ petition being W.P.(C) No.5750/2001 was filed by the B.S.E.B. to quash the order dated 04.08.2001 and W.P.(C) No.4374/2001 has been filed by the M/s Usha Martin Limited Company to direct respondent B.S.E.B. to comply with the order dated 04.08.2001 and to refund the amount of 5 crores. (xv) The learned Single Judge vide order dated 04.09.2025 dismissed the writ petition filed by the B.S.E.B., i.e., W.P.(C) No.5750 of 2001 and allowed the writ petition filed by the M/s Usha Martin Limited, i.e., W.P.(C) No.4374 of 2001, which is the subject matter of the instant appeals.
Submissions of the learned counsel for the Appellants-
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B.S.P.H.C.L.
5. Mr. Umesh Prasad Singh, learned senior counsel for the appellants, in both the appeals, has taken the following grounds in assailing the impugned judgment:- (i) Learned Single Judge has not appreciated the fact that the principle of natural justice has grossly been violated by the adjudicator. (ii) The enquiry committee was constituted by the
order passed by this Court, vide order dated 11.04.2001 passed in LPA No.256/2000(R) but later on, an order was passed in WP(C) No.2434 of 2001, by which, it has been directed that committee constituted shall not function but the learned adjudicator has acted upon the report of one of the member of the said committee, namely, S.N. Dwivedi and has passed the order but the copy of said report has not been supplied to the appellant at the evidence/argument stage and as such, serious prejudice has been caused, since, the said report could not have been gone through and in that way, no rebuttal has been pointed out before the adjudicator. (iii) The aforesaid specific ground has been raised before the learned Single Judge but the same has not been considered in right perspective, rather, only on the issue that the appellant is to show the prejudice if any
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caused due to non-supply of the said report order impugned has been passed, by which, writ petition filed by the appellant has been dismissed. (iv) It has been contended that the learned Single Judge has also not appreciated the fact properly that the said report of S.N. Dwivedi, which has been taken into
consideration by the adjudicator, and based upon that, the order dated 04.08.2001 was passed, hence, non- supply of the said report at the argument/evidence stage has seriously prejudiced the case of the appellants. (v) The contention has been raised that even otherwise also, it is the principle of Audi alteram partem, i.e., if any document is being taken by any adjudicator or the quasi-judicial functionary or the Court of law, then, the same is to be provided to the other side on the principle that the person cannot be condemned without providing an adequate and sufficient opportunity. But due to non-supply of the said report, the order has been passed by the adjudicator, hence, the order passed by the adjudicator cannot be said to be proper but the aforesaid fact having not been taken into consideration by the learned Single Judge and as such, the order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from an error and hence, is fit to be set aside. (vi) Reliance upon the following judgments rendered
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by the Hon’ble Apex Court on the issue of compliance of the principle of natural justice, has been made: (i) A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262; (ii) Union of India v. J.N. Sinha, (1970) 2 SCC 458; (iii) St. Anthony's College v. Rev. Fr. Paul Petta, 1988 Supp. SCC 676; (iv) Uma Nath Pandey v. State of U.P., (2009) 12 SCC 40; (v) SBI v. Rajesh Agarwal, (2023) 6 SCC 1
Submissions of the learned counsel for the Respondent-writ petitioner
6. Per contra, Mr. M.S. Mittal, learned senior counsel for the respondent-writ petitioner (Usha Martin Ltd.) has taken the following grounds in defending the impugned judgment: - (i) The consideration has been given by the learned Single Judge of causing prejudice due to non-supply of the enquiry report and by holding therein that the appellant has not raised any issue of causing prejudice due to non-supply of the enquiry report and as such, merely because the enquiry report has not been submitted, the order passed by the adjudicator, cannot be said to suffer from an error, which fact has been taken into consideration by the learned Single Judge, while dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant.
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(ii) The learned Single Judge has not committed any error while passing the impugned judgment, since, the enquiry report has not at all has been taken into
consideration by the adjudicator, rather, the adjudicator has applied its own independent mind, as would be evident from the face of the order passed by the adjudicator (impugned before the learned Single Judge) and as such, taking the ground that the copy of the enquiry report since has not been supplied to the appellant, a serious prejudice has been caused, is not proper to be accepted. (iii) Learned Senior Counsel has relied upon the judgments in order to strengthen the argument that in a case, if the documents have not been supplied, then, a prejudice is shown to be there, which is to be shown by the litigant concerned, the appellant herein. (iv) It has been contended that merely reference to a document, without placing any much reliance thereupon does not attract the requirement of mandatory disclosure and in the absence of demonstrated prejudice, the plea of violation of natural justice is misconceived. (v) In order to fortify this limb of argument the learned counsel for respondent has relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh Vrs. Sudhir Kumar Singh, (2021) 19
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SCC 706 and Shadi Lal Gupta Vs. State of Punjab, (1973) 1 SCC 680. Submission of the learned counsel for the JUVNL
7. JUVNL is also the respondent, who is being represented by Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. Mrinal Kanti Roy, Advocate.
8. It has been submitted by him that it is contest in between the appellant and the respondent-writ petitioner and as such, he is to say nothing but so far as the prayer made in the instant appeals that in case of any adverse order of refund, the amount which has been deposited in the coffers of the appellant is required to be refunded.
9. Learned Senior Counsel has further submitted that the same is not acceptable, since, as per the MoU in between the appellant and the respondent-writ petitioner, both are the parties relevant to the proceeding and once the amount has been accepted by the appellant in case of direction for refund, the same will be the liability of the appellant.
Analysis
10. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, gone through the pleadings and the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment as also the documents available on records.
11. This Court, needs to first consider the following issues; (i) Whether due to non-supply of the report of SN.
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Dwivedi on the basis of which the adjudicator passed the order dated 04.08.2001, can be said to be in the teeth of the principle of Audi alteram partem. (ii) Whether non-supply of the said report having not been supplied in favour of the appellant, then, will it not be said that the order passed by this Court has been defied. (iii) Whether accepting the plea taken by the respondent showing the issue of prejudice due to non-supply of the said report, will it not amount to frustrating the
order passed by the High Court for just and proper of the adjudication, the enquiry committee was constituted that to with the consent of the parties, since, both the parties have accepted the order. (iv) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the prejudice is not available on the face of the order if the document which has not been supplied to the appellant, is prevail upon in the matter of decision making by the adjudicator. 12. Since all the issues are interlinked and as such, the same are being taken up together. 13. This Court, before considering the aforesaid issues, thought it proper to refer the underlying principle of the observance of principle of nature justice. 14. We need to bear in mind that the principles of natural justice are
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not mere legal formalities. They constitute substantive obligations that need to be followed by decision-making and adjudicating authorities. The principles of natural justice act as a guarantee against arbitrary action, both in terms of procedure and substance, by judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative authorities. 15. Two fundamental principles of natural justice are entrenched in Indian jurisprudence : (i) nemo judex in causa sua, which means that no person should be a Judge in their own cause; and (ii) audi alteram partem, which means that a person affected by administrative, judicial or quasi-judicial action must be heard before a decision is taken. 16. The courts generally favour interpretation of a statutory provision consistent with the principles of natural justice because it is presumed that the statutory authorities do not intend to contravene fundamental rights. Application of the said principles depends on the facts and circumstances of the case, express language and basic scheme of the statute under which the administrative power is exercised, the nature and purpose for which the power is conferred, and the final effect of the exercise of that power, reference in this regard be made to judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court Union of India v. J.N. Sinha (supra) . 17. It needs to refer herein that before casting liability upon one or the other, the requirement is to provide effective opportunity of
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hearing to the party concerned before taking any adverse decision which leads to civil consequence. 18.
Further, the law has been laid down that even though, there is no stipulation of observance of principle of natural justice in the statutory provision, but it will be said to be string to the statutory provision for the reason that if any decision is being taken which leads to civil consequence, then the mandatory requirement to follow the cardinal principles of natural justice, as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, relevant paragraph of the aforesaid
judgment is being quoted as under:
"221. It is well established that even where there is no specific provision in a statute or rules made thereunder for showing cause against action proposed to be taken against an individual, which affects the rights of that individual, the duty to give reasonable opportunity to be heard will be implied from the nature of the function to be performed by the authority which has the power to take punitive or damaging action. This principle was laid down by this Court in the State of Orissa v. Dr (Miss) Binapani Dei [AIR 1967 SC 1269, 1271 : (1967) 2 SCR 625 : (1967) 2 LLJ 266] in the following words: "The rule that a party to whose prejudice an order is intended to be passed is entitled to a hearing applies alike to judicial tribunals and bodies of persons invested with authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequences. It is one of the fundamental rules of our constitutional set-up that every citizen is protected against exercise of arbitrary authority by the State or its officers. Duty to act judicially would, therefore arise from the very nature of the function intended to be performed: it need not be shown to be superadded. If there is power to decide and determine to the prejudice of a person, duty to act judicially is implicit in
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the exercise of such power. If the essentials of justice be ignored and an order to the prejudice of a person is made, the order is a nullity. That is a basic concept of the rule of law and importance thereof transcends the significance of a decision in any particular case."
19. Further, in the case of Rajesh Kumar v. CIT, (2007) 2 SCC 181 the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed which is being quoted as under:
“30. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India [(1981) 1 SCC 664] Chinnappa Reddy, J., in his dissenting judgment summarised the legal position in the following terms: (SCC pp. 712-13, para 106)
"106.
The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people, nurtured by Binapani [(1967) 2 SCR 625 : AIR 1967 SC 1269] , Kraipak [A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262] , Mohinder Singh Gill [Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr., (1978) 1 SCC 405] , Maneka Gandhi [Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248] . They are now considered so fundamental as to be 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' and, therefore, implicit in every decision-making function, call it judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. No wider right than that provided by statute can be claimed nor can the right be narrowed. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. The implication of natural justice being presumptive it may be excluded by express words of statute or by necessary intendment. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest, the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced."
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20. Further from the date of rendering the judgment in the case of Maneka Gandhi Vrs. Union of India and Anr.
(supra), the concept of the ‘principle of natural justice’ has become broadened by way of consideration made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the subsequent judgments holding therein that even if the reason is not there in the decision taken by the adjudicator, the same will amount to violation of principle of natural justice, since, reason has been said to be the soul of the order, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar, (2003) 11 SCC 519, wherein, it has been held at paragraph-19 as under:
"... ... ...Reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion. Without the same, it becomes lifeless. ... ..."
21. Likewise, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496, wherein, at paragraph- 47, it has been held as under:
"47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds: (a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. 2026:JHHC:6780-DB
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(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts.
(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice..... ...... ....."
22. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court has also dealt with the issue that there is no straight-jacket formula in observing the principle of natural justice, rather, it is to be tested on the basis of the facts involved in any individual cases. 23. The principle of natural justice is not to be followed in a case where there is no chance of change in the final outcome even if the opportunity would have been given to the person concerned on the principle of empty formality and futile exercise and in such circumstances, the principle of natural justice is not to be followed, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Escorts Farms Ltd. v. Commissioner, Kumaon
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Division, Nainital, U.P. & Others, [(2004) 4 SCC 281] wherein, at paragraph-64 it has been observed which is quoted hereunder:-
“64. ... ... Rules of natural justice are to be followed for doing substantial justice and not for completing a mere ritual of hearing without possibility of any change in the decision of the case on merits. In view of the legal position explained by us above, we, therefore, refrain from remanding these cases in exercise of our discretionary powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.”
24. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner, Central Excise, Gauhati & Ors. [(2015) 8 SCC 519] has taken similar view at paragraph-45 which reads as under: -
"45.
Keeping in view the aforesaid principles in mind, even when we find that there is an infraction of principles of natural justice, we have to address a further question as to whether any purpose would be served in remitting the case to the authority to make fresh demand of amount recoverable, only after issuing notice to show cause to the appellant. In the
facts of the present case, we find that such an exercise would be totally futile having regard to the law laid down by this Court in R.C. Tobacco [(2005) 7 SCC 725]."
25. The reference of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India and Ors. Vrs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, reported in (1991) 1 SCC 588 is to be taken into
consideration. Although, the judgment rendered in the case of Md. Ramzan (supra) was based upon the factual aspects in
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the case of departmental proceeding on the fact that due to non-supply of 2nd show cause notice, the entire departmental proceedings will be vitiated. But the said proposition has been diluted by the Hon’ble Apex in the judgment rendered in the case of Managing Director ECIL, Hyderabad and Ors. Vrs. B. Karunakar and Ors., reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727, wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down the issue of prejudice that due to non-supply of the show cause notice, the prejudice is required to be shown by the delinquent employee, then, only the Departmental proceeding will be vitiated in the eye of law. 26. The factual aspect of the Managing Director ECIL, Hydrabad Vs. B. Karunakar (supra) which was the consideration made by the Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Apex Court after having been referred for consideration of the judgment rendered in the case of Union of India Ors Vs. Mohd. Ramzan (supra) has laid down the proposition, in which circumstances, due to non-supply of enquiry report and non-issuance of second show cause notice the departmental proceeding will be vitiated. The relevant consideration has been made at paragraph 31 of the said judgment, which reads as under:
“31. Hence, in all cases where the enquiry officer's report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the Courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he
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has not already secured it before coming to the Court/Tribunal and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non- supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, the Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short cuts.
Since it is the Courts/Tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not any internal appellate or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. Where after following the above procedure, the Court/Tribunal sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/management to proceed with the inquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered, should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and to what benefits, if any and the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled. The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish
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the report, should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law.”
27.
After having referred the judgment as hereinabove, which is relevant for appreciation of the argument advanced on behalf of the parties, this Court, again needs to refer herein the certain admitted facts for better appreciation of the factual aspect. 28. The dispute with respect to exaggerated billing for a sum of Rs.40,39,50,747/- under the provisions of clause 16.9 of the Tariff on the allegation of theft of electricity by the respondent- writ petitioner, is the subject matter. 29. It is evident that inspection was carried out in the premises of consumer M/s. Usha Beltron Limited (now Usha Martin Limited) (writ petitioner of 4374 of 2001) at the Adityapur Industrial Area, Jamshedpur by the B.S.E.B on 04/12/1999 and 13/01/2000. It was alleged that there was unauthorized use of theft and consequently FIR was lodged being FIR No. 2/2000 at Gamharia PS. The Line was disconnected on 13.01.2000. The Bihar State Electricity Board raised a provisional compensatory bill on 17.01.2000 for a sum of Rs.40.39,50,747.00 under Clause 16.9 of the Tariff. 30. The respondent-writ petitioner has approached to this Court challenging the bill by filing series of litigations. 31. The consumer M/s. Usha Beltron Limited (now Usha Martin Limited)
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filed a writ petition being CWJC No. 223/2000 (R) and this Court, vide order dated 27.01.2000 had set aside the impugned bill of Rs.40.39,50,747.00 primarily on the reason that no opportunity was given to the petitioner prior to raising of the bill to show cause as to why it should not be saddled with the liability of the aforesaid amount on account of theft of electricity and liberty was given to the Respondent Board (appellant herein) to raise a fresh bill after giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner(respondent herein). 32.
32. The petitioner (respondent Usha Martin herein) filed a LPA against this order being LPA No. 25/2000 and vide order dated 03.02.2000 the order under appeal was modified to the extent that a sum of Rs.5.00 crore shall be deposited on the very next date and on such deposit, the electricity line was to be restored within 12 hours and the Bank Guarantee was to be deposited by 11.02.2000 and it has further been observed that if the Bank Guarantee is not deposited within the fixed time, then the amount of Rs.5.00 crores, so deposited by the appellants, shall be adjusted against the future bills. 33. In pursuant to the said order Petitioner filed a detailed Representation before the General Manager cum Chief Engineer, Bihar State Electricity Board, Singhbhum Area, Jamshedpur and requested to pass a reasoned Order after giving an opportunity of hearing to the Writ Petitioner (Usha Martin Limited). 34. The petitioner (respondent company herein) again filed a writ
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petition being CWJC No. 1397/2000 (R) for revoking the authority of the General Manager cum Chief Engineer to adjudicate the dispute raised by the petitioner mainly on the ground that he had denied to follow the principles of natural justice, however, the Hon'ble Court did not entertain the writ petition and dispose of the same, vide
order dated 14.07.2000.
35. The Division Bench of this court in LPA No. 256/2000 (R) vide order dated 11.04.2001 directed that the Chairman of Jharkhand State Electricity Board to adjudicate upon the dispute and pass order accordingly, for ready reference, the relevant portion is quoted herein below :-
"The Learned Counsel for the parties submit and agree that instead of the General Manager cum Chief Engineer, Singhbhum Area, Jamshedpur as was directed by the learned Single Judge, the adjudication of the dispute should be taken place with the Chairman, Jharkhand State Electricity Board. The appellants will not have any objection to the Chairman, Jharkhand State Electricity Board, adjudicating upon the dispute forming the subject matter of CWJC No. 223 of 2000 (R)."
36. Simultaneously, this Court has further passed an order that the Chairman, J.S.E.B. to take assistance of the technical person who shall be of the rank of General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer.
37. It is a case of the appellant that the adjudicator (Chairman of the J.S.E.B.) has privately availed the service of one S.N. Dwivedi, General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer and on the
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basis of report submitted by him, adjudicator passed order dated 04.08.2001.
38. It is evident that the various orders have been passed by the High Court from time to time, wherein, the issue of constitution of committee has also been taken note. The adjudicator, while deciding the issue, has also considered the finding recorded by Mr. S.N. Dwivedi, as would be evident from the part of the
order of the adjudicator, as available at page-66 & 67 to the writ petition being W.P.(C) No.4374 of 2001, for ready reference, the relevant part being (b) and (e) of the order dated 04.08.2001, is being referred as under:- b) Keeping in consideration the Hon'ble High Court, Ranchi Bench's Order in CWJC 223 of 2000 (R) and LPA No. 256 of 2000 (R) which authorized me to devise my own procedure for conducting the proceedings in commence with the principles of natural justice and taking into consideration the technical complexity involved in the matter referred to me for adjudication, vide orders No. 26 and 33 dated 7th May, 2001 and 11th May, 2001, I had constituted a committee consisting of the following: i. Mr. S.N. Dwivedi, General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer, transmission Zone-1, Jharkhand State Electricity Board, Ranchi as the Chairman. ii. Mr. K.N. Choudhury, OSD to Chairman, Jharkhand State Electricity Board. iii.Mr. Kripal Singh, Assistant General Manager of MECON, Ranchi iv. Mr. S. V. Singh, Senior Manager (Electrical) of MECON, Ranchi
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e) Consequent to the above order, I did not allow the committee members to join the proceedings. However, as
directed by the Hon'ble High Court, in LPA No. 256 of 2000 (R), I have taken the assistance of Mr. S.N. Dwivedi, General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer, Transmission Zone-1, Jharkhand State Electricity Board, Ranchi to assist me in technical matter related to this case. I have followed the principles of natural justice during the hearing and the parties were fully satisfied the way the proceedings were conducted. All parties also agreed that I can take the help of Mr. S.N. Dwivedi, General Manager- cum-Chief Engineer, Transmission Zone-1, Jharkhand State Electricity Board, Ranchi to assist me to come to a logical conclusion in this case. 39. Thus, the fact about making reference of the said report on the issue of theft of electricity cannot be disputed by the respondent writ petitioner and has not been disputed, since, the reference of finding of the enquiry report with respect to the issue of theft has been taken note by the adjudicator and based upon that, the conclusion has been arrived at that it is not a case of theft and the consequential order was passed saying that the bill is not proper. 40. The appellant has carried the said order by challenging it before the writ Court, wherein, the specific ground has been taken that due to non-supply of copy of the said report, a serious prejudice has been caused and not only that, it is in violation to the principle of natural justice. 41. The learned Single Judge has not agreed to such submission by making an observation in the impugned judgment that the
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adjudicator has not taken into consideration the content of the enquiry report and further, the prejudice could not have been shown by the appellant, hence, merely because the copy of the said report has not been supplied, the order passed by the adjudicator, cannot be said to suffer from an error, which is the subject matter of the present appeals. 42. We are now proceeding to consider the issues as have been formulated hereinabove based upon the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties and the settled position of law, as has been enumerated in the judgments referred hereinabove. 43.
The issue, i.e., due to non-supply of the copy of the report of S.N. Dwivedi, no prejudice has been caused to the appellant is concerned, this Court is of the view that if such contention will be accepted, then, what will be the significance/implication of the
order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court and the Coordinate Benches of this Court by relegating the matter to be decided by the adjudicator and for his assistance, it has further been directed that with respect to any technical aspect, it shall be open for adjudicator to take help but such technical persons should not be below the rank of the General Manager in the Electricity Board. 44. The question of prejudice is to be taken into consideration if there is no such direction passed by the Court of law but when the Court of law has passed an order that too the High Court, here in the present case directing the Chairman-cum-Managing Director
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to act as an adjudicator and for his assistance, a technical person was directed to be consulted which itself clarifies that this Court has also considered the seriousness of the issue and more particularly, the proper adjudication of the issue based upon the factual appreciation and on consideration of the aforesaid aspect of the matter, the adjudicator was appointed . 45. The said technical person (S.N. Dwivedi) has also submitted a report to the adjudicator but why the adjudicator has not supplied the copy of the said report to the contesting party at particular stage is not understandable that too, when the said arrangement was made in pursuant to the order passed by this Court. 46. The adjudicator once has been conferred with the power in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, then, it was the bounden duty to comply with the order in entirety and not in piecemeal as he has acted while passing an order, since, on the one hand, he has passed an order in the capacity of adjudicator by adjudicating the issue by acting on the report given by the technical person, while, on the other hand, has not supplied the copy of the said report in favour of the contesting party, the appellant herein. 47. Therefore, this Court is of the view that it cannot be said that only because no prejudice has been caused, the copy of the said report is not to be supplied to the contesting party,
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otherwise, the same will amounts to sitting upon the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court, which is not permissible. 48.
Further, the question of prejudice is to be assessed from the face of the order. 49. This Court, in order to assess the same, has gone through the
order passed by the adjudicator and found that the reference of the said report has been made and not only that in the conclusion part the most of thing has been concluded on the basis of the said enquiry report.
50. Thus, the order passed by the adjudicator, is based upon the finding of the said report, since, in the conclusion part, the adjudicator has come to the conclusion based upon the finding of the said report and has observed that it is not a case of theft and basis upon that, all the consequential decision taken by the licensee, the appellant herein, has been quashed and set aside.
51. This Court, therefore, is of the view that if the prejudice is apparent from the face of the order, then, there is no requirement to consider with respect to the issue of raising the prejudice as is being argued on behalf of the learned counsel for the respondent-writ petitioner.
52. Further, this Court is of the view that our judicial system is based upon the principle of fairness and transparency wherein
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it is utmost require that each and every document is to be provided to the parties so as to mandatory disclosure of all the factual aspects be made to the contesting respondents, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Tea Takano Vrs. Securities and Exchange Board of India, reported in (2022) 8 SCC 162, wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has affirmed that quasi-judicial authorities must disclose all materials relied upon during adjudication.
53. It cannot be disputed that keeping the party unaware of the information influencing a decision undermines the transparency of the judicial process. The Hon’ble Apex Court once has come out the proposition in the case of Maneka Gandhi (Supra) making the principle of natural justice in built and as such, the ground of prejudice as is being taken is become irrelevant, in the
facts of the present scenario. 54. The only question is that once the High Court has directed to have a constitution of the Committee for the purpose to arrive at just and proper fact finding, which is to be considered by the adjudicator, then, without any here and there, the copy of the said report ought to have been supplied to the parties concerned, so as to follow the principle of fairness and transparency in the adjudicatory process. 55. The matter would have been different if the said report would not have been taken into consideration but that can also not be
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possible in view of the direction already passed by this Court in aid to the adjudicator that he can take assistance of technical person and once the report has been submitted by the said technical person which has been followed by the adjudicator, and non-supply thereof amounts to violation of principle of natural justice and contrary to the principle of fairness and transparency. 56. The well settled principle is that the justice must be the actual justice and Justice must not only be done, but must also be seen to be done. The transparency in the judicial functioning has also been taken into consideration by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Swapnil Tripathy Vrs. Supreme Court of India, (2018) 10 SCC 639, wherein, it has been laid down that the right to know is the facets of Article 19(1)(a). 57. Here in the instant case also, adjudicator has relied upon the report of the technical person which would be evident from part of the order dated 04.08.2001 as quoted and referred hereinabove but the said report was not supplied to contesting party at relevant stage is contrary to the facets of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. 58. We have also considered the principle of Nemo judex in causa sua which is integral part of Article 14, demanding impartiality and non-supply of the document in the present case, cannot be termed to be correct endeavour taken by the Chairman of the Board, the adjudicator. 59. This Court, based upon the aforesaid reasoning, is hereby
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answering the issues as formulated and referred hereinabove. 60.
Coming across the order passed by the learned Single Judge, this Court has found that the learned Single Judge has admitted the fact of the said report and its significance by making reference of the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court but came to the conclusion that the content of the said report has not been taken into consideration by the adjudicator and as such, no prejudice has been caused. 61. But, this Court is of the view based upon the observation made by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment that fact about the reference of the said report as has been taken by the adjudicator in the order passed has been referred in detail and the conclusion of the adjudicator is also based upon the finding recorded by the enquiry committee, this Court, therefore, is of the view that the learned Single Judge while coming to the conclusion since has come out with the view that no prejudice has been caused, since, the content of the report has not been taken into consideration, is contrary to the record. 62. The learned Single Judge has also not appreciated the fact properly since it has been referred in paragraph-11 of the impugned order that the copy of the said report was supplied before the adjudicator after closure of the hearing. 63. The learned Single Judge has not gone into the extent that why the adjudicator in the capacity of exercising the power of quasi- judicial functionary in absence of the other side has relied upon
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the said report by taking note of the content in the order dated 04.08.2001 which was passed for the purpose of adjudicating the matter. 64. The order passed by the learned Single Judge, therefore, needs interference. 65. Accordingly, the order dated 04.09.2025 passed in W.P.(C) No.5750 of 2001 and W.P.(C) No.4374 of 2001 is, hereby, quashed and set aside. 66.
The question remains that the matter now again needs to be adjudicated. 67. The adjudicator has been appointed by the order passed by this Court dated 11.04.2001 passed in LPA No.256 of 2000(R), this Court, therefore, is of the view that order passed by the adjudicator is to be seen on the principle that if any error has been committed said to be incurable, then, in order to rectify the error, the matter is to be remitted from the aforesaid stage only. 68. Here in the instant case, the adjudicatory process of the adjudicator itself has been found to be not proper being in violation of the principle of natural justice due to non-supply of copy of the report of technical person S.N. Dwivedi as has been discussed hereinabove and as such, this Court, is of the view that the order passed by the adjudicator dated 04.08.2001 needs interference. 69. Accordingly, the order dated 04.08.2001, is also hereby, quashed and set aside. 2026:JHHC:6780-DB
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70. Since, the Division Bench of this Court has already taken a view by appointing Chairman of the then licensee to act as adjudicator and as such, this Court is of the view that by following the principle of binding precedence of the order passed by the Coordinate Bench, the Chairman of the licensee again needs to be appointed as an adjudicator. 71. Accordingly, the Chairman J.S.E.B., is being appointed as an adjudicator. 72. The adjudicator is directed to decide the issue on the basis of material already available on record including the report of Mr. S.N. Dwivedi within the period of three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. 73. The authority concerned is directed to ensure the supply of the copy of the said report (Mr. S.N. Dwivedi) and other relevant documents upon which reliance if being placed. 74. So far as the argument advanced on behalf of Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, learned senior counsel, the same is not to be considered at this stage, since, whatever has been submitted is not available in the pleading as also no cause of action, is available.
Hence, making any order on this issue, will not be proper and as such, this Court has thought it proper to leave this issue open for its adjudication in case of any cause of action, if will arise. 75. With the aforesaid observations/directions, the instant appeals stand disposed of. 2026:JHHC:6780-DB
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76. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, stands disposed of. (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) I Agree. (Arun Kumar Rai, J.) (Arun Kumar Rai, J.)
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