2026:JHHC:12490 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI WP(C) No.5799 of 2018 ----- 1.Ashok Kumar Keshri, son of late Dwarika Prasad Keshri 2(a)Smt. Shashi Devi Keshari (wife) 2(b)Mikku Kumar Keshri (son) 2(c)Praveen Kumar Keshri @ Bittu Kumar Keshri (son) 2(d) Navnit Kumar Keshri (son) 2(e)Suraj Kumar Keshri (minor son) 2(f)Khushi Kumari Keshri (minor daughter) 2(g)Komal Keshri (minor daughter) 2(h)Kajal Keshri (minor daughter) Sl. no. 2(a) to (h) are resident of Chaudharna Bazar, Jora Mandir Road, PO and PS Garhwa, District Garhwa 2(i)Barkha Kumari Keshri (married daughter), wife of Shravan Kumar, resident of Gangachak, Malikana Masaurhi, PO and PS Masauhri, District Patna (Bihar) 3.Dileep Keshri, son of late Dwarika Prasad Keshri 4.Rakesh Kumar Keshri 5.Shiv Kumar Keshri Sl. nos. 4 and 5 are son of Sri Ram Nath Prasad Keshri 6. Ram Chandra Prasad Keshri, aged about 77 years, son of Late Mathura Prasad, (Petitioner no. 6 is represented through his Power of Attorney Holder namely Rakesh Kumar Keshri, son of Ram Nath Prasad Keshri, who is petitioner no. 4 of this case. 7. Murli Manohar Keshri, aged about 70 years, 8. Kunj Bihari Keshri, aged about 63 years, 9. Krishna Murari Keshri, aged about 67 years. Serial nos. 7, 8 and 9 are son of Late Haridwar Prasad All are resident of Chaudhrna Bazar, Jora Mandir Road. P. O. & P.S. Garhwa, District- Garhwa. … Petitioner(s). Versus 1. The State of Jharkhand, 2. The Deputy Commissioner, Garhwa, P.O. & P.S. Garhwa, District- Garhwa; 3. The Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Garhwa, P.O. & P.S. Garhwa, District- Garhwa; 4. The Circle Officer, Garhwa, P.O. & P.S. Garhwa, District- Garhwa … Respondent(s). CORAM : SRI ANANDA SEN, J. ------ For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. Ram Prakash Singh, Advocate Mr. Dhananjay Kumar, Advocate Mr. Sandip Singh Munda, Advocate For the State : Mr. Anup Kr. Agrawal, AC to GA-IV …...... 2026:JHHC:12490 2 18 /28.04.2026: Heard the learned counsel representing the petitioners and the learned counsel representing the respondents. 2. In this writ petition the petitioners have prayed for the following reliefs: A. For quashing Notice issued by respondent no. 4, without mentioning any date, for cancellation of Jamabandi, pertaining to land of village-Uchri, khata no. 62, plot no. 453, having an area 8.22 acres for which demands are running in page no. 98/II, in favour to the common ancestor of the petitioners namely Late Mathura Prasad (Annexure- 5) and to this effect, appear before the respondent no. 4 with documents on 02-09-2003. B. For quashing of letter contained memo no. 1028, dated 18-08-2017, (Annexure-6) issued by the respondent no. 4 for initiating a proceeding under section 4 (h) of the Bihar Land Reform Act and it is registered as Case No. 5/2017-18, pertaining to land of mouza Uchri, p.s. no. 241, khata no. 62, plot no. 453, having an area 4.81 acres, halka no. 07 of register -II, Vol. II at page no. 98, and to appear before the respondent no. 4 to appear on 24-08-2017. C. For quashing order dated 24-04-2018 (Annexure 11), issued by respondent no. 3 initiating a proceeding under section 4 (h) of the Bihar Land Reform Act, pertaining to land of mouza - Uchri, p.s. no. 241, khata no. 62, plot no. 453, having an area 4.81 acres to appear on 04-05-2018. D. For quashing order dated 24-07-2018 (Annexure-13) passed by respondent no. 2, passed in Circle Officer, Garhwa Case No. 5/2017-18, whereby and where under, the respondent no.2 has cancelled the Jamabandi which was recorded in favour to the common ancestor of the petitioners namely Mathura Prasad (son of Mahadeo Sao) pertaining to land of village Uchri, PS Garhwa, Khata no. 62, Plot no. 453 having area 4.81 acres. E. For quashing the order dated 24.01.2020 (Annexur-18) passed by the respondent no. 3 in Misc. Case no. 01/2018 in compliance of the order passed in WP(C) No. 420 of 2018 by this Hon’ble Court, whereby and whereunder the respondent no. 3 held that the Jamabandi has not been opened by the competent authority and for this petitioner claim over the government land is not in accordance with rule, therefore right over the property in question of the petitioners/tenure holder/ zamindar is not tenable and accordingly the case has been disposed off. 3. The petitioners have prayed to quash the final order 2026:JHHC:12490 3 passed in Misc. Case No. 1 of 2018 by the Deputy Commissioner Land Reforms by invoking provision under section 4(h) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act wherein it is held that the petitioners are not the title holder of the land in question and transfer of title seems to be under doubt and thus, it is the State who is the title holder after coming into force of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. 4. Admittedly the petitioners are claiming title over the land in question pursuant to deed nos. 2452 dated 21.07.1942, 3076 dated 16.11.1942 and 3430 dated 02.09.1943. Admittedly the petitioners were accepted as tenant by the State and the rent was being assigned for that. Thereafter suddenly this long standing Jamabandi in the name of the petitioners was rejected by the impugned order dated 24.01.2020 in Misc. Case No. 1 of 2018. 5. The issue involved in this writ petition has already been decided by this Court and coordinate Bench’s, one being WP(C) No. 1256 of 2019 titled “Antardhari Sao vs. The State of Jharkhand and Others”. It has been held that after long period of 30 to 40 years, proceeding under section 4(h) cannot be initiated by the State. In this case proceeding has been initiated after 55 years from the rent fixation and opening of the Jamabandi. This long standing Jamabandi cannot be cancelled by the Revenue Authorities that too by invoking section 4(h) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. 6. In the judgment passed by this Court in WP(C) No. 1256 of 2019 dated 19.02.2024 by referring to several judgments, this Court in paragraph no. 16 has held as follows: 16. Section 4(h) of the Act does not provide for any period of limitation. When there is no period of limitation prescribed in the statute to initiate the proceeding, it does not mean that this proceeding can be initiated at any time as per the wish of the authority and person, who is initiating the proceeding. In absence of any prescribed period for limitation, the proceeding should be initiated within a reasonable time frame.” 7. This Court thereafter went out to decide what would be 2026:JHHC:12490 4 the reasonable period. By referring to several judgments of this Court and Supreme Court, this Court has held in paragraph nos. 19, 20 and 21 held as follows: 19. Ultimately in para 18 of the aforesaid judgment the learned Division Bench of this Court has held that whenever an open ended time limit is given to any authority to exercise its power, specially under the land laws, the said powers ought to be exercised within a reasonable period and surely 47 long years is not a reasonable period. It has also been held by the Division Bench that after a long lapse of time no such power could have been exercised by the Collector or any person delegated with the powers to initiate the proceeding under Section 4(h) of the Act, 1950. 20. Further, if we take a clue from the Limitation Act, 1963, in the schedule whereunder we find that as per the Article 111 and 112 to recover possession of land of any public street or road etc. the period of limitation is 30 years from the date of dispossession and for filing any suit (except the suit before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in exercise of its original jurisdiction), by the Government, the period of limitation is 30 years. If we carefully go through the schedule of the Limitation Act, we find that the maximum period of limitation which is prescribed in said schedule is 30 years. Thus, as per the Limitation Act also, no proceeding can be initiated beyond a period of 30 years so far as the some of the entries are concerned. In the rest it is either 3 years or 12 years or in some cases 30 days or 90 days. 21. In this case, the proceeding under Section 4(h) of the Act, 1950 has been initiated after 69 years from the date of promulgation of the Act. This is a very long period which by any stretch of imagination, cannot be said to be a reasonable period to initiate the proceedings under Section 4(h) of the Act, 1950. Further a suit for recovery of possession and declaration of title will also be barred in view of the Limitation Act as 69 years have lapsed. When a remedy is barred under the Limitation Act, the said remedy cannot be availed by taking recourse to a Statute where limitation has not been prescribed.” 8. In paragraph no. 22 it was held that even if the Additional Collector has power to issue any notice under the Act, he does not have a power to initiate a proceeding after more than 60 years. Initiating the proceeding after 60 years is an abuse of the process of the Court. The case in hand is similar. The 2026:JHHC:12490 5 respondents cancelled the long standing Jamabandi of the petitioners by invoking section 4(h) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act that too after more than 50-55 years, this is impermissible. 9. Once the petitioners were in possession of the land in question and claims genuine title and if the claim of the State is somewhat contrary and if the State claims title over the land, it was the State to approach the Civil Court for declaration of their right, title and interest, which admittedly they have not done. The State adopted different measure and through the Revenue Authorities had tried to get the title declared in their favour, which is impermissible. 10. Thus, the impugned order dated 24.01.2020 passed in Misc. Case No. 1 of 2018 is set-aside. 11. The respondents are directed to restore the Jamabandi of the petitioners in respect of land of Mouza-Uchri, PS No. 241, Khata No. 62, Plot No. 453, area 4.81 acres, Halka No. 07 of Register-II, Vol-II. 12. Further if the State wants to claim title over the land in question, it is open to the State to approach appropriate Civil Court having competent jurisdiction. 13. Accordingly, this writ petition stands allowed. (ANANDA SEN, J.) 28.04.2026 Tanuj/CP-2 08.05.2026