1 2026:CGHC:13999-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 2782 of 2025 Sanjay Shrivastava S/o Ramesh Kumar Shrivastava Aged About 48 Years R/o 27 Kholi, Vikas Nagar, Police Station Civil Lines Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, C.G. ... Petitioner versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Police Station Civil Lines, Bilaspur, C.G. 2 - Rekha Shrivastava W/o Sanjay Shrivastav Aged About 48 Years R/o Pallaw Bhavan Ayodhya Nagar, Present R/o Hemu Nagar, Near Murra Bhatta, P.S. Torva, District Bilaspur, C.G. ---- Respondents (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Virendra Verma, Advocate For Respondent No.1/State : Mr. Nitansh Jaiswal, Deputy Govt. Advocate For Respondent No.2 : Mr. Vijay K. Deshmukh, Advocate along with Ms. Tejaswi Mandavi, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri R avindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 24/03/2026 1. Heard Mr. Virendra Verma, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, as well as Mr. Nitansh Jaiswal, learned Deputy Government Advocate VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Digitally signed by VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Date: 2026.04.01 10:53:30 +0530 2 appearing for the respondent No.1/State, and Mr. Vijay K. Deshmukh along with Ms. Tejaswi Mandavi, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.2. 2. This petition has been preferred under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, wherein the petitioner seeks quashment of the impugned order dated 25.11.2021 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Bilaspur (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No. 159/2021, arising out of Crime No. 138/2021 registered at Police Station Civil Lines, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur (C.G.), whereby charges have been framed against the petitioner under Sections 376(2)(n), 420, 496, 506, 294 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner has also prayed for quashment of the First Information Report as well as the entire charge-sheet dated 16.03.2021 filed before the learned trial Court. 3. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner seeking for the following reliefs:- “i. That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly pleased to allow the instant petition under section 528 of B.N.S.S. 2023 filed by the petitioner. ii. The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the F.I.R. bearing no. 138/2021 u/s 376, 420 of I.P.C. iii. That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly pleased to quash entire charge sheet filed on dated 3 16.03.2021 before Learned Special Judge (FTC) Bilaspur (in Session Trial case no. 159/2021). iv. That, Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the impugned order dated 25.11.2021, wherein the learned trial court has framed the charges under section 376(2)(n), 420, 496, 506, 294, 323 of I.P.C. against the petitioner.” 4. The facts of the case as emerges from the pleadings of the petition are that, on 25.01.2021, the respondent No.2/prosecutrix lodged a complaint before Police Station Civil Lines, Bilaspur alleging that the present petitioner had entered into a relationship with her and had fraudulently performed a love marriage with her in the year 2014. It was further alleged that on the pretext of such relationship, the petitioner established physical relations with her and continued to exploit her over a period of time. The prosecutrix also alleged that she had borne the entire expenses of the medical education of the petitioner’s daughter and had, on several occasions, given money to the petitioner. ******* On the basis of the aforesaid complaint, an FIR bearing Crime No. 138/2021 was registered against the petitioner for the offences punishable under Sections 376 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code at Police Station Civil Lines, Bilaspur. During the course of investigation, the statements of as many as 11 witnesses were recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., and the statement of the prosecutrix was also recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the competent Magistrate. 4 ******* After completion of investigation, the police filed a charge-sheet against the petitioner on 16.03.2021. During investigation, additional offences under Sections 496, 506, 294 and 323 of the IPC were also incorporated. The matter was thereafter committed to the Court of Sessions and registered as Sessions Trial No. 159/2021 before the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Bilaspur. ******* At the stage of framing of charge, the petitioner raised objections and sought to rely upon certain documents to demonstrate that he had been falsely implicated in the case. It was contended that the prosecutrix was his legally wedded wife and that the relationship between them was consensual, and therefore, no offence under Section 376 IPC was made out. It was further contended that the prosecutrix had voluntarily provided financial assistance towards the education of the petitioner’s daughter and there was no element of cheating or inducement so as to attract the offence under Section 420 IPC. ******* However, the learned trial Court, without adequately considering the defence raised by the petitioner and the material placed on record, proceeded to pass the impugned order dated 25.11.2021, whereby charges under Sections 376(2)(n), 420, 496, 506, 294 and 323 of the IPC were framed against the petitioner. ******* Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR, filing of the charge-sheet, and the order framing charges, the petitioner has preferred the present petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 seeking quashment of the aforesaid proceedings. 5 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the impugned order dated 25.11.2021 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Bilaspur is wholly illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the settled principles governing framing of charge, inasmuch as the learned trial Court has failed to properly appreciate the material available on record and has mechanically framed charges against the petitioner without there being sufficient ground for proceeding. It is submitted that the entire prosecution case, even if taken at its face value and accepted in its entirety, does not disclose the commission of any offence under Section 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code. Learned counsel would contend that the respondent No.2/prosecutrix herself has admitted in earlier proceedings that she had solemnized a love marriage with the petitioner and was fully aware of his marital status. Therefore, the essential ingredient of “misconception of fact” as required for constituting the offence of rape on the pretext of marriage is completely absent in the present case. The relationship between the parties, at best, was consensual in nature and continued for a considerable period of time, and thus, the same cannot be given a criminal colour so as to attract the provisions of Section 376 IPC. ******* It is further submitted that the prosecutrix has, in fact, initiated proceedings under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking maintenance from the petitioner, thereby acknowledging the status of the petitioner as her husband. This conduct of the prosecutrix clearly demolishes the allegation that the petitioner had deceitfully established physical relations with her on a false promise of marriage. 6 The said fact has not been properly considered by the learned trial Court while passing the impugned order. ******* Learned counsel would further submit that the ingredients of the offence under Section 420 IPC are also not made out, as there is no material to show that the petitioner had any dishonest intention from the very inception of the alleged transaction. It is contended that the prosecutrix voluntarily extended financial assistance towards the education of the petitioner’s daughter out of her own free will and affection, and at no point of time was there any inducement or fraudulent misrepresentation on the part of the petitioner. In absence of mens rea at the inception, the offence of cheating cannot be sustained. It is also argued that the learned trial Court has failed to consider the documentary evidence placed by the petitioner, which clearly indicates that the prosecutrix has been using different identities at different points of time. Reference is made to the documents filed along with the petition, including the proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, wherein the prosecutrix has described herself as Rekha Verma, wife of Jitendra Verma, and the documents obtained through RTI showing different names of her child and herself. These documents create serious doubt about the credibility and veracity of the prosecutrix and indicate that the petitioner has been falsely implicated. ******* Learned counsel would further submit that the prosecutrix was also involved in a criminal case under the provisions of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, which further casts a serious doubt on her conduct and credibility. The said aspect has also been ignored by the learned trial Court while framing charges against the petitioner. It is next 7 contended that even in the earlier complaint made by the prosecutrix in the year 2020, she had clearly stated that she was aware of the fact that the petitioner was already married at the time when she entered into a relationship with him. On the basis of such complaint, the police had registered a non-cognizable offence, which clearly demonstrates that the present FIR is an afterthought and has been lodged with an ulterior motive to harass and pressurize the petitioner. ******* Learned counsel would also submit that the conduct of the prosecutrix in not appearing before the trial Court in Sessions Trial No. 159/2021 and simultaneously pursuing the maintenance proceedings shows that the present criminal case has been initiated only to exert pressure upon the petitioner and is nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is further argued that the learned trial Court, while framing charges, has not applied its judicial mind and has failed to consider whether there exists a prima facie case against the petitioner. The order impugned is cryptic and non-speaking, and does not reflect any reasoning as to how the ingredients of the alleged offences are made out. It is settled law that though at the stage of framing of charge, detailed appreciation of evidence is not required, however, the Court is duty bound to see whether the basic ingredients of the offence are prima facie disclosed, which has not been done in the present case. ******* In view of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner would pray that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the B.N.S.S., 2023, to prevent abuse of the process of law and to secure the ends of justice, and accordingly quash the FIR bearing Crime No. 138/2021, the charge- 8 sheet dated 16.03.2021, as well as the impugned order dated 25.11.2021 framing charges against the petitioner. 6. Learned State counsel would submit that the present petition seeking quashment of FIR, charge-sheet and the order framing charges is wholly misconceived and not maintainable in law. It is contended that the FIR bearing Crime No. 138/2021 was registered on the basis of a written complaint disclosing commission of cognizable offences under the Indian Penal Code, and the police authorities have acted strictly in accordance with law in registering the same and proceeding with the investigation. It is further submitted that at the stage of registration of FIR and investigation, the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations cannot be examined in detail, and the FIR is only intended to set the criminal law into motion. ******* Learned counsel would further submit that the allegations made by the prosecutrix clearly disclose a prima facie case against the petitioner, including allegations of continuous exploitation on the pretext of marriage and financial inducement. During the course of investigation, statements of witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C. as well as the statement of the prosecutrix under Section 164 Cr.P.C. have been recorded, and upon due consideration of the material collected, the police have filed the charge-sheet. It is thus submitted that there exists sufficient material to proceed against the petitioner and the learned trial Court has rightly framed charges after considering the record of the case. At this stage, meticulous appreciation of evidence or adjudication on disputed facts is impermissible. 9 ******* It is further argued that the law with regard to quashment of FIR is well settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 wherein it has been held that the inherent powers of the High Court are to be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases. The present case does not fall within any of the categories warranting interference. The defence sought to be raised by the petitioner involves disputed questions of fact, which can only be adjudicated during trial on the basis of evidence. Therefore, in absence of any patent illegality or abuse of process of law, this Hon’ble Court may not exercise its inherent jurisdiction at this stage and the petition, being premature and devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed. 7. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 would submit that the present petition filed by the petitioner is wholly misconceived, devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed at the threshold, as the same has been filed with mala fide intention and by suppressing material facts from this Hon’ble Court. It is contended that the respondent No.2 is legally wedded wife of the petitioner, and after the death of her first husband, she solemnized marriage with the petitioner in the year 2014 and both of them lived together as husband and wife for a considerable period. The petitioner himself has admitted the said relationship in earlier proceedings, including his bail application, wherein he has specifically acknowledged cohabitation and marital relations with respondent No.2. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner disputing the relationship is false and contrary to record. 10 ******* Learned counsel would further submit that the allegations made by the petitioner regarding different names and identities of respondent No.2 are completely baseless and misleading. It is clarified that the respondent No.2 is known as Rekha Verma, daughter of Late Bacchulal Verma, and the documents relied upon by the petitioner have either been misinterpreted or do not pertain to the respondent No.2 at all. The documents forming part of the charge-sheet, including statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. as well as bank records, clearly establish the identity of respondent No.2. It is further submitted that the petitioner has deliberately placed irrelevant and unrelated documents on record to create confusion and to malign the reputation of respondent No.2. ******* It is also argued that there is sufficient prima facie material available on record to proceed against the petitioner for the offences alleged, and the learned trial Court has rightly framed charges after due consideration of the evidence collected during investigation. The respondent No.2 has been diligently pursuing her legal remedies, including proceedings for maintenance, and the present petition has been filed only to delay the trial and to evade the petitioner’s legal obligations. It is thus submitted that the petition deserves to be dismissed with exemplary costs, as it amounts to abuse of the process of law and an attempt to obstruct the course of justice. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire record of the case including the FIR, charge-sheet, statements recorded during investigation and the impugned order framing charges. 11 9. At the outset, it is well settled that the power of this Court under Section 528 of the B.N.S.S. (pari materia to Section 482 Cr.P.C.) is to be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of law and to secure the ends of justice. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Haji Iqbal @ Bala v. State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 946, has held that while exercising such jurisdiction, the Court is not required to confine itself only to the averments in the FIR, but may also examine the attending circumstances and material collected during investigation to ascertain whether the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious. In Para 14 of its judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that : “14. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint 12 is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the 13 issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.” 10. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, it is evident that the relationship between the petitioner and respondent No.2 was not a case of forcible exploitation, but rather a long-standing association between two adults. The material available on record, including the earlier complaint and surrounding circumstances, indicates that the respondent No.2 was aware of the marital status of the petitioner and had voluntarily entered into a relationship with him. The conduct of the parties further reveals that they lived together for a considerable period, thereby indicating conscious and voluntary participation on the part of respondent No.2. 11. At this juncture, it is also appropriate to take note of subsequent judicial proceedings between the parties, which have a direct bearing on the nature of their relationship. This Court finds that in Criminal Revision No. 177 of 2024 (Rekha Verma v. Sanjay Shrivastava), decided on 12.11.2024, a Single Bench of this Court, upon due consideration of the material available on record, has recorded a categorical finding that the respondent No.2 and the present petitioner had lived together in a live-in relationship for a considerable period and that, for the purposes of proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C., the respondent No.2 is to be treated as the wife of the petitioner. Consequently, an amount of Rs.15,000/- per month has been awarded as interim maintenance in favour of respondent No.2. 14 12. It is further borne out from the record, including the proceedings before the learned Family Court in MJC Case No. 245/2025 (arising out of MJC No. 457/2021), that pursuant to the aforesaid order, the respondent No.2 is receiving maintenance from the petitioner, and the petitioner has been complying with the said order by making payment of maintenance amount. The order-sheet dated 26.04.2025 reflects payment of Rs.15,000/- towards maintenance, thereby reinforcing the subsistence and acknowledgment of such relationship between the parties. 13. The aforesaid judicial determination and the conduct of the parties assume considerable significance, as they prima facie establish that the relationship between the petitioner and respondent No.2 was not clandestine or induced by deception, but rather a long-standing cohabitation akin to marriage. It is well settled that where a man and woman live together for a considerable period as husband and wife, a presumption of marriage arises in favour of such relationship, unless rebutted by cogent evidence. In the present case, such presumption not only arises but also stands fortified by a judicial finding granting maintenance to respondent No.2 by treating her as the wife of the petitioner. 14. In such circumstances, the allegation that the physical relationship between the parties was established on account of any “misconception of fact” or fraudulent inducement becomes inherently doubtful. On the contrary, the material on record indicates a consensual and acknowledged domestic relationship, which has also been recognized in collateral judicial proceedings. 15 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Uday v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC 46, has categorically held that where a woman is a mature adult and has consciously consented to a physical relationship despite being aware of the consequences, such consent cannot be said to be vitiated by misconception of fact. In paragraphs 23 and 25 of this judgment it has been held that: “23. Keeping in view the approach that the Court must adopt in such cases, we shall now proceed to consider the evidence on record. In the instant case, the prosecutrix was a grown up girl studying in a college. She was deeply in love with the appellant. She was however aware of the fact that since they belonged to different castes, marriage was not possible. In any event the proposal for their marriage was bound to be seriously opposed by their family members. She admits having told so to the appellant when he proposed to her the first time. She had sufficient intelligence to understand the significance and moral quality of the act she was consenting to. That is why she kept it a secret as long as she could. Despite this, she did not resist the overtures of the appellant, and in fact succumbed to it. She thus freely exercised a choice between resistance and assent. She must have known the consequences of the act, particularly when she was conscious of the fact that their marriage may not take place at all on 16 account of caste considerations. All these circumstances lead us to the conclusion that she freely, voluntarily, and consciously consented to having sexual intercourse with the appellant, and her consent was not in consequence of any misconception of fact. 25. There is yet another difficulty which faces the prosecution in this case. In a case of this nature two conditions must be fulfilled for the application of Section 90 IPC. Firstly, it must be shown that the consent was given under a misconception of fact. Secondly, it must be proved that the person who obtained the consent knew, or had reason to believe that the consent was given in consequence of such misconception. We have serious doubts that the promise to marry induced the prosecutrix to consent to having sexual intercourse with the appellant. She knew, as we have observed earlier, that her marriage with the appellant was difficult on account of caste considerations. The proposal was bound to meet with stiff opposition from members of both families. There was therefore a distinct possibility, of which she was clearly conscious, that the marriage may not take place at all despite the promise of the appellant. The question still remains whether even if it were so, the appellant knew, or had reason to believe, that the 17 prosecutrix had consented to having sexual intercourse with him only as a consequence of her belief, based on his promise, that they will get married in due course. There is hardly any evidence to prove this fact. On the contrary the circumstances of the case tend to support the conclusion that the appellant had reason to believe that the consent given by the prosecutrix was the result of their deep love for each other. It is not disputed that they were deeply in love. They met often, and it does appear that the prosecutrix permitted him liberties which, if at all, is permitted only to a person with whom one is in deep love. It is also not without significance that the prosecutrix stealthily went out with the appellant to a lonely place at 12 O'clock in the night. It usually happens in such cases, when two young persons are madly in love, that they promise to each other several times that come what may, they will get married. As stated by the prosecutrix the appellant also made such a promise on more than one occasion. In such circumstances the promise loses all significance, particularly when they are over come with emotions and passion and find themselves in situations and circumstances where they, in a weak moment, succumb to the temptation of having sexual relationship. This is what appears to have happened in this case as well, and the prosecutrix willingly 18 consented to having sexual intercourse with the appellant with whom she was deeply in love, not because he promised to marry her, but because she also desired it. In these circumstances it would be very difficult to impute to the appellant knowledge that the prosecutrix had consented in consequence of a misconception of fact arising from his promise. In any event, it was not possible for the appellant to know what was in the mind of the prosecutrix when she consented, because there were more reasons than one for her to consent.” 16. Similarly, in Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 18 SCC 191, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has drawn a clear distinction between a false promise of marriage and a mere breach of promise, holding that consensual physical relationship between adults would not constitute rape unless it is established that the promise to marry was false from the very inception and was made with a mala fide intention to deceive. In paragraphs 15, 23 and 24 of this judgment, it has been held that: “15. Section 375 defines the offence of rape and enumerates six descriptions of the offence. The first clause operates where the women is in possession of her senses and, therefore, capable of consenting but the act is done against her will and the second where it is done without her consent; the third, fourth and fifth when there is consent but it is not such a consent 19 as excuses the offender, because it is obtained by putting her, or any person in whom she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt. The expression "against her 'will'" means that the act must have been done in spite of the opposition of the woman. An inference as to consent can be drawn if only based on evidence or probabilities of the case. "Consent" is also stated to be an act of reason coupled with deliberation. It denotes an active will in mind of a person to permit the doing of the act complained of. Section 90 of the IPC defines "consent" known to be given under fear or misconception:- "Section 90: Consent known to be given under fear or misconception.—A consent is not such a consent as it intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception" Thus, Section 90 though does not define "consent", but describes what is not "consent". Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. If the consent is given by the complainant under misconception of fact, it is vitiated. 20 Consent for the purpose of Section 375 requires voluntary participation not only after the exercise of intelligence based on the knowledge of the significance and moral quality of the act, but also after having fully exercised the choice between resistance and assent. Whether there was any consent or not is to be ascertained only on a careful study of all relevant circumstances. 23. Thus, there is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex. The court, in such cases, must very carefully examine whether the complainant had actually wanted to marry the victim or had mala fide motives and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the later falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is also a distinction between mere breach of a promise and not fulfilling a false promise. If the accused has not made the promise with the sole intention to seduce the prosecutrix to indulge in sexual acts, such an act would not amount to rape. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused and not solely on account of the misconception created by accused, or where an accused, on account of circumstances which he could 21 not have foreseen or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her despite having every intention to do. Such cases must be treated differently. If the complainant had any mala fide intention and if he had clandestine motives, it is a clear case of rape. The acknowledged consensual physical relationship between the parties would not constitute an offence under Section 376 of the IPC. 24. In the instant case, it is an admitted position that the appellant was serving as a Medical Officer in the Primary Health Centre and the complainant was working as an Assistant Nurse in the same health centre and that the is a widow. It was alleged by her that the appellant informed her that he is a married man and that he has differences with his wife. Admittedly, they belong to different communities. It is also alleged that the accused/appellant needed a month's time to get their marriage registered. The complainant further states that she had fallen in love with the appellant and that she needed a companion as she was a widow. She has specifically stated that "as I was also a widow and I was also in need of a companion, I agreed to his proposal and since then we were having love affair and accordingly we started residing together. We used to reside sometimes at my home whereas some time at his home." Thus, they 22 were living together, sometimes at her house and sometimes at the residence of the appellant. They were in a relationship with each other for quite some time and enjoyed each other's company. It is also clear that they had been living as such for quite some time together. When she came to know that the appellant had married some other woman, she lodged the complaint. It is not her case that the complainant has forcibly raped her. She had taken a conscious decision after active application of mind to the things that had happened. It is not a case of a passive submission in the face of any psychological pressure exerted and there was a tacit consent and the tacit consent given by her was not the result of a misconception created in her mind. We are of the view that, even if the allegations made in the complaint are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, they do not make out a case against the appellant. We are also of the view that since complainant has failed to prima facie show the commission of rape, the complaint registered under Section 376(2)(b) cannot be sustained.” 17. Further, in Sonu @ Subhash Kumar v. State of U.P. 2021 SCC OnLine SC 181 and Shambhu Kharwar v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1032, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that prolonged 23 consensual relationships between adults, even if they subsequently fail, do not attract the offence under Section 376 IPC. 18. Recently also, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated that mere failure of a relationship or refusal to marry cannot be given a criminal colour, and consensual relationships cannot be converted into criminal offences in absence of clear evidence of deception from inception. 19. In light of the foregoing discussion, particularly considering (i) the long- standing cohabitation between the parties, (ii) the judicial finding rendered in Criminal Revision No. 177 of 2024 recognizing respondent No.2 as wife for the purpose of maintenance, and (iii) the admitted payment and receipt of maintenance pursuant thereto, this Court is of the considered opinion that the relationship between the parties was consensual and bore the attributes of a marital relationship. 20. Once such a relationship is evident and stands prima facie recognized in judicial proceedings, the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 376 IPC, namely absence of consent or consent obtained under misconception of fact, are not satisfied. The material on record does not disclose that the petitioner had any fraudulent or dishonest intention at the inception of the relationship. Rather, it reflects a voluntary association between two adults over a considerable period of time. 21. So far as the offences under Sections 420, 496, 506, 294 and 323 IPC are concerned, the allegations are either omnibus in nature or do not disclose the essential ingredients of the said offences. No specific material has been brought on record to prima facie establish dishonest intention at the inception so as to constitute the offence of cheating. In 24 the backdrop of the admitted relationship and financial dealings between the parties, continuation of criminal proceedings on such allegations would not be justified. 22. Continuation of the criminal proceedings in such circumstances, particularly when the relationship has been judicially recognized for the purpose of maintenance and is being acted upon by the parties, would amount to permitting misuse of the criminal justice process for settling personal disputes arising out of a failed relationship. 23. In view of the foregoing discussion and in light of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Haji Iqbal @ Bala, Uday, Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar, Sonu @ Subhash Kumar and Shambhu Kharwar (supra), this Court is of the considered opinion that the present case is a fit case for exercising inherent jurisdiction. 24. Accordingly, the petition deserves to be and is hereby allowed. The FIR bearing Crime No. 138/2021 registered at Police Station Civil Lines, Bilaspur, the charge-sheet dated 16.03.2021 filed in Sessions Trial No. 159/2021, and the impugned order dated 25.11.2021 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Bilaspur framing charges against the petitioner under Sections 376(2)(n), 420, 496, 506, 294 and 323 IPC are hereby quashed. 25. A copy of this order be forwarded to the trial Court for necessary steps and information. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice ved