1 25 BA 845.26 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR CRIMINAL APPLICATION (BA) NOS. 852/2026, 857/2026, 855/2026, 851/2026, 854/2026, 853/2026, 850/2026, 845/2026 (Digambar S/o Bholanath Dere Vs. State of Maharashtra) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Coram, Court's or Judge's orders appearances, Court's orders of directions and Registrar's orders - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Mr. V. S. Wankhade, Advocate for applicant. Mr. N. B. Jawade, APP for non-applicant/State. CORAM: M. M. NERLIKAR, J . DATED : 17/07/2026. Common Order Heard. 2. By these applications, the applicant is seeking bail in connection with crime registered with Police Station Sadar, Dist. Nagpur for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 409, 418, 467, 468, 471, 477-A, 411, 413, 381, 201 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. 3. The brief facts of the prosecution case are that the informant who is the Registrar (Administration), Motor Accident Claim Tribunal, Nagpur lodged a report with P.S.O. Sadar, Nagpur specifically alleging that the accused No. 1 Digamber Dere was working as Jr. Clerk / Nazar at MACT Nagpur from 11.06.2012 to 10.07.2023. It is alleged that the said Digambar did not maintain the entries and register properly and did not obtain signature on the 2 25 BA 845.26 said entries and in order to misappropriate the amount has prepared a forged order of the Tribunal and on the basis of the said order had diverted the amount in other accounts without taking any permission from the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal. It is also alleged that the said Digambar in order to misappropriate the amount had diverted the amount in the account of his relatives. The allegations against accused person are of cheating, criminal misappropriation, criminal breach of trust and by hatching the conspiracy with accused person, Digambar has committed the said offence. Based on this, the first information report was registered. 4. That the applicant is approaching this Court for grant of bail in eight similar crimes. The details of which are as under:- Sr. No. Criminal Application (BA) No. FIR No. Date of arrest Alleged amount misappropriated (Rs.) 1. 850/2026 718/2024 21/02/2024 6,84,96,884/- 2. 855/2026 08/2024 20/01/2025 2,46,75,368/- 3. 854/2026 09/2024 13/01/2025 2,97,87,216/- 4. 10/2024 10/2024 24/07/2024 31,00,000/- 5. 853/2026 11/2024 27/01/2025 57,37,339/- 6. 845/2026 14/2024 27/04/2024 31,20,339/- 7. 852/2026 15/2024 28/05/2024 61,00,470/- 8. 851/2026 16/2024 14/11/2024 96,68,863/- 3 25 BA 845.26 5. The learned counsel for the applicant submits that the applicant is in Jail since a long time, however he submits that there is no progress in the trial, therefore his fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India of speedy trial has been grossly violated. Therefore, a prayer is made for release on bail on the ground of delay in trial. 6. On the other hand, the learned APP submits that every effort is being taken to conclude the trial at the earliest. He further submits that the ground of delay in trial was not raised by the applicant in the Trial Court and on this ground, the application deserves to be rejected. Further, there are total 11 crimes registered against the applicant. Therefore, he submits that there is no merit in the applications and same deserve to be rejected. 7. I have considered the rival submissions. It appears from the record that the applicant is behind bars since a long time. Under such circumstances, though there is long incarceration, however, it cannot be ignored that there are total 11 crimes of similar nature registered against the applicant. In the case of Rajni v. State of Punjab, 2026 4 25 BA 845.26 SCC Online SC 1050 it is observed that criminal antecedents and specific role attribution is important factors while considering bail. Criminal antecedents are important to be considered as it shows whether the applicant will abide by conditions or not. 8. The fact also remains that the applicant has also not placed anything on record to show that there is delay in trial. Apart from one paragraph in the application contending infringement of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, there is nothing placed on record. Neither Roznama nor ordersheets have been annexed with the application so as to decide the application on the ground of delay in trial. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 has extensively dealt with Right to Speedy Trial of an accused person and laid down certain parameters to be considered by the Courts while balancing the Right to Speedy Trial, paragraph no. 86 reads as under- “86. In view of the above discussion, the following propositions emerge, meant to serve as guidelines. We must forewarn that these propositions are not exhaustive. It is difficult to foresee all situations. Nor is it possible to lay down any hard and fast rules. These propositions are: (1) Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the 5 25 BA 845.26 accused to be tried speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves the social interest also, does not make it any the less the right of the accused. It is in the interest of all concerned that the guilt or innocence of the accused is determined as quickly as possible in the circumstances. (2) Right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and re- trial. That is how, this Court has understood this right and there is no reason to take a restricted view. (3) The concerns underlying the right to speedy trial from the point of view of the accused are: (a) the period of remand and pre-conviction detention should be as short as possible. In other words, the accused should not be subjected to unnecessary or unduly long incarceration prior to his conviction; (b) the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his vocation and peace, resulting from an unduly prolonged investigation, inquiry or trial should be minimal; and (c) undue delay may well result in impairment of the ability of the accused to defend himself, whether on account of death, disappearance or non-availability of witnesses or otherwise. (4) At the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that it is usually the accused who is interested in delaying the proceedings. As is often pointed out, “delay is a known defence tactic”. Since the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies upon the prosecution, delay ordinarily prejudices the prosecution. Non-availability of witnesses, disappearance of evidence by lapse of time really work against the interest of the prosecution. Of course, there may be cases where the prosecution, for whatever reason, also delays the proceedings. Therefore, in every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the first question to be put and answered is — who is responsible for the delay? Proceedings taken by either party in good faith, to vindicate their rights and interest, as perceived by them, cannot be treated as delaying tactics nor can the time taken in pursuing such proceedings be counted towards delay. It goes without saying that frivolous proceedings or proceedings taken merely for delaying the day of reckoning cannot be treated as proceedings taken in good faith. The mere fact that an application/petition is admitted and an order of stay granted by a superior court is by itself no proof that the 6 25 BA 845.26 proceeding is not frivolous. Very often these stays are obtained on ex parte representation. (5) While determining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting in violation of Right to Speedy Trial) one must have regard to all the attendant circumstances, including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the workload of the court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on — what is called, the systemic delays. It is true that it is the obligation of the State to ensure a speedy trial and State includes judiciary as well, but a realistic and practical approach should be adopted in such matters instead of a pedantic one. (6) Each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. As has been observed by Powell, J. in Barker [33 L Ed 2d 101] “it cannot be said how long a delay is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate”. The same idea has been stated by White, J. in U.S. v. Ewell [15 L Ed 2d 627] in the following words: ‘… the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is necessarily relative, is consistent with delays, and has orderly expedition, rather than mere speed, as its essential ingredients; and whether delay in completing a prosecution amounts to an unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends upon all the circumstances.’ However, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, the fact of incarceration of accused will also be a relevant fact. The prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution. But when does the prosecution become persecution, again depends upon the facts of a given case. (7) We cannot recognize or give effect to, what is called the ‘demand’ rule. An accused cannot try himself; he is tried by the court at the behest of the prosecution. Hence, an accused's plea of denial of speedy trial cannot be defeated by saying that the accused did at no time demand a speedy trial. If in a given case, he did make such a demand and yet he was not tried speedily, it would be a plus point in his favour, but the mere non-asking for a speedy trial cannot be put against the accused. Even in USA, the relevance of demand rule has been substantially watered down in Barker [33 L Ed 2d 101] and other succeeding cases. 7 25 BA 845.26 (8) Ultimately, the court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors — ‘balancing test’ or ‘balancing process’ — and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. (9) Ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to the conclusion that right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open. The nature of the offence and other circumstances in a given case may be such that quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case, it is open to the court to make such other appropriate order — including an order to conclude the trial within a fixed time where the trial is not concluded or reducing the sentence where the trial has concluded — as may be deemed just and equitable in the circumstances of the case. (10) It is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time-limit for trial of offences. Any such rule is bound to be qualified one. Such rule cannot also be evolved merely to shift the burden of proving justification on to the shoulders of the prosecution. In every case of complaint of denial of right to speedy trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At the same time, it is the duty of the court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the complaint. The Supreme Court of USA too has repeatedly refused to fix any such outer time-limit in spite of the Sixth Amendment. Nor do we think that not fixing any such outer limit ineffectuates the guarantee of right to speedy trial. (11) An objection based on denial of right to speedy trial and for relief on that account, should first be addressed to the High Court. Even if the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay the proceedings, except in a case of grave and exceptional nature. Such proceedings in High Court must, however, be disposed of on a priority basis.” From the above exposition of law it is crystal clear that while dealing with bail applications on the ground of violation of right to speedy trial, the foremost question to be considered by the Court is- Who is responsible for the 8 25 BA 845.26 delay? As no material is placed before me, it is not possible for me to decide the application on the ground of delay in trial. Further, the Delhi High in the case of Phulmai Tamang @ Neha Versus State of Delhi, Bail Application 1395/2025 decided on 26.05.2025 in Para 7 observed that- “7. No doubt, delay in trial is a ground for grant of bail. But that is not the only ground. The Court has to keep in mind overall circumstances in the light of judicially sanctified parameters for grant of bail. Besides, while seeking bail on the ground of delay in trial, it is incumbent upon the applicant to place on record the ordersheets of the trial court in order to rule out the possibility that the matter is being adjourned at request of the applicant himself. In the present case, no such ordersheet has been placed on record.” Under such circumstances, the Court cannot come to a decision as to whether the applicant or the prosecution is responsible for causing delay in trial. Though this Court had given an opportunity to the advocate representing the applicant to file the bail application afresh however, he insisted on passing the order. Therefore I am not inclined to grant bail, hence all the applications are rejected. ( M. M. NERLIKAR , J.) Gohane