2026:HHC:26030 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA RSA Nos. 28 and 29 of 2009 Reserved on: 15.06.2026 Date of Decision: 02.07.2026 RSA No. 28 of 2009 1. Bidhia alias Bidhi Chand (since deceased) through his LRs. ...Appellants Versus Ghungar (since deceased) through his LRs & others. ...Respondents RSA No. 29 of 2009 2. Bidhia (since deceased) through his LRs. ...Appellants Versus Khemdi Ram (since deceased), through his LRs & others ...Respondents _____________________________________ Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes For the appellants : Mr Bhupender Gupta, Senior Advocate, with Mr Janesh Gupta, Advocate, in both the appeals. For the respondents : Mr Bimal Gupta, Senior Advocate, with Mr Trigun Negi, Advocate for respondents No.1(a) and 1(b) in RSA 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:26030 No. 28 of 2009 and for respondents No.1(a) to 1(d), 2(a) and 2(b) and 3(a) to 3(e) in RSA No. 29 of 2009. None for respondents No. 2 and 3 in RSA No. 28 of 2009. None for respondents No. 4 and 5 in RSA No. 29 of 2009. ______________________________________ Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeals are directed against the judgment and decree dated 04.12.2008 passed by the learned District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P. (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment and decree dated 28.06.2004, passed by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Court No.1, Dehra, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were set aside. (The parties shall be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial court for the sake of convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeals are that Bidhia instituted a civil suit for seeking declaration that he is in actual and physical possession of the suit land mentioned in the head note and para-1 of the plaint to the extent of 5/8th share and tenant under defendants No.2 and 3 to the extent of 3/8th share, and the entry showing the name of 3 2026:HHC:26030 defendant No.1 in the column of possession is wrong, illegal, null and void. A consequential relief of permanent prohibitory injunction for restraining defendant No.1 from interfering with the suit land or raising any construction over it was also prayed. It was also prayed in the alternative that the possession be delivered to the plaintiff by demolition or otherwise. It was asserted that previously the land was shown to be owned by Bhagat Ram, Milap Singh, Mohinder Singh, Ramesh Chand, Madan Lal and in the plaintiff’s possession as a tenant. The plaintiff became the owner of the suit land after the commencement of the HP Tenancy and Land Reforms Act to the extent of a 5/8th share. Defendants 2 and 3 were minors to the extent of a 3/8th share, and the proprietary rights were not conferred upon the plaintiff regarding their share. Defendant No.1 colluded with the settlement staff and got himself recorded as being in possession of the suit land. This entry is incorrect. Defendant No.1 threatened to interfere with the plaintiff’s possession. Hence, the suit was filed to seek the relief mentioned above. 3. Defendant No.1 filed a written statement taking preliminary objections regarding the lack of cause of action and the plaintiff being estopped by his act and conduct to file the 4 2026:HHC:26030 present suit. The contents of the plaint were denied on the merits. It was asserted that Hardeo, father of the plaintiff, defendant No.1 and Khemdi were recorded as tenants at will of the land measuring 56 Kanals and 8 marlas, including the suit land. The plaintiff was the eldest brother. Defendant No.1 and the other two brothers were minors. All the brothers assisted their father in the cultivation of the land. The plaintiff, being the eldest son, started managing the affairs of the family. He misused the confidence reposed in him by his father and substituted his name without any order of the competent authority. He got conferred the proprietary rights upon him without the knowledge of Hardeo or his sons. Defendant No.1 was found to be in possession during the settlement and was recorded as ‘Kabiz’. The defendant No.1 had become the owner by adverse possession. Therefore, it was prayed that the present suit be dismissed. 4. A separate written statement was filed by defendants No. 2 and 3, taking preliminary objections regarding lack of jurisdiction and cause of action. The contents of the plaint were denied on the merits. It was asserted that plaintiff or defendant No.1 had no relationship with defendant Nos. 2 and 3. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were in possession of the suit land, and they had 5 2026:HHC:26030 never inducted any person as a tenant. Therefore, it was prayed that the suit be dismissed. 5. Separate replications denying the contents of the written statement and affirming those of the plaint were filed. 6. Defendants, Khemdi Ram, Ghunger and Faquir, filed a separate suit seeking a declaration that they are co-owners along with the plaintiff and are in possession as tenants along with Ghungar over 3 shares under defendants No. 2 and 3 and owners of the suit land to the extent of 5/8th shares. It was asserted that Hardeo was a tenant on the payment of ‘Gala Batai’. He had four sons: Bidhia, Khemdi Ram, Ghunger and Faquir. He was illiterate, and Bidhia, being the eldest son, started managing the affairs of the family. He got himself recorded to be in possession. He also got conferred the proprietary rights upon himself regarding the 5/8th share. All the brothers were the tenants of the suit land. Hence, the suit was filed to seek the relief mentioned above. 7. The suit was opposed by filing a written statement taking preliminary objections regarding the lack of jurisdiction and the plaintiffs being estopped by their act and conduct from 6 2026:HHC:26030 filing the present. The contents of the plaint were denied on the merits. However, it was admitted that Bhagat Ram was the owner in possession of the suit land. It was specifically denied that he had inducted Hardeo or any other person to be a tenant. It was asserted that the defendants were still in possession, and a false suit was filed against them. Hence, it was prayed that the suit be dismissed. 8. Bidhia also filed a separate written statement taking preliminary objections regarding lack of locus standi and jurisdiction, the suit being liable to be stayed in view of the pendency of the earlier suit, the plaintiffs being estopped by their conduct from filing the suit, and the suit being collusive. The contents of the plaint were denied on the merits. It was asserted that Hardeo was not the tenant and Bidhia was the tenant for more than 40 years. His name was correctly recorded in the Jamabandi, and ownership was rightly conferred upon him. Therefore, it was prayed that the suit be dismissed. 9. Separate replications denying the contents of the written statements and affirming those of the plaint were filed. 7 2026:HHC:26030 10. Learned Trial Court consolidated both the suits and framed the following issues on 19.04.1997: - 1. Whether Bidhia was a tenant over the suit land, i.e. Khasra Nos. 209, 216 and 231, measuring 0-29-36 hecatres? OPD 2. Whether Hardeo was a tenant of the suit land, if so its effect? OPD. 3. Whether Ramesh Chand and Madan Lal never inducted Bidhia as a tenant? OPD-2. 4. Whether Bidhia got wrongly substituted himself as a tenant in place of Hardeo, if so effect?OPD-1 5. Whether Bidhia is entitled to the relief of injunction? OPP 6. Whether Khemdi, Ghungar, and Faqir are entitled to the relief of an injunction? OPD-1. 7. Whether Khemdi, Ghungar, and Faquir are entitled to the relief of declaration? OPD-1. 7-A. Whether, in the alternative, the defendant No.1 has become owner of the suit land by way of adverse possession as alleged? OPD-1. 8. Relief. 11. The parties were called upon to produce the evidence. Plaintiff Bidhi Chand examined himself (PW-1) and Prithi Ram (PW-2). The defendant No.1 Ghunger Ram examined himself 8 2026:HHC:26030 (DW-1), Khushi Ram (DW-2), Lekh Ram (DW-3), Ramesh Chand (DW-4) and Kushal Singh (DW-5). 12. Learned Trial Court partly decreed the suit filed by Bidhia and dismissed the suit filed by Khemdi and others. An appeal was filed against the judgment and decree. The learned Appellate Court held that the learned Trial Court had framed eight issues and taken them together for discussion. This was a violation of Order 20 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). Hence, the judgment and decree were set aside, and the matter was remanded to the learned Trial Court for fresh decision as per the law. 13. Learned Trial Court held that the plea taken by plaintiff Bidhia that Hardeo had abandoned the tenancy and he was inducted as a tenant was highly probable. He was continuously recorded in possession in the revenue record. An entry in the copy of the Jamabandi carries with it a presumption of correctness, and the evidence of the defendants was not sufficient to rebut the presumption. The name of defendant No.1 was recorded in a permissive capacity, and he could not claim the adverse possession. Hence, the learned Trial Court answered 9 2026:HHC:26030 issue No.1 in the affirmative, issue No. 3 partly in the affirmative, issues Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 7-A in the negative and partly decreed the suit filed by Bidhia and dismissed the suit filed by Khemdi, etc. 14. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court, two separate appeals were filed, which were decided by the learned District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court held that earlier Hardeo was recorded to be the tenant on the payment of Gala Batai. His name was substituted by the name of plaintiff Bidhia. The plea taken by him that Hardeo had become blind and he had surrendered the tenancy to the landowners was not satisfactory. The possession of defendant No.1 was recorded during the settlement, and the settlement operation was carried out with due care and caution. Hardeo had become a non- occupancy tenant of the suit land after the commencement of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, and all the legal heirs were enjoying the possession of the suit land after his death. Hence, the suit filed by Bidhia was dismissed. 10 2026:HHC:26030 15. Being aggrieved by the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Appellate Court, two separate appeals have been filed before the High Court, which were admitted on 26.02.2009 on the following substantial questions of law: Substantial question of law in RSA No. 28 of 2009 1. Whether the Lower Appellate Court has committed grave illegality in not taking into consideration the provision of the Punjab Tenancy Act, which was applicable at the relevant time when the plaintiff- appellant claimed the abandonment of tenancy by Shri Hardeo? Are not the findings of Lower Appellate Court illegal, erroneous, and perverse in insisting on the proof of relinquishment of tenancy when the revenue entries depicted the status of plaintiff-appellant to be the tenant under the then owner, who never questioned the status of plaintiff- appellant as a tenant? 2. Whether the Lower Appellate Court has committed a grave error of jurisdiction in failing to consider that the order of conferment of proprietary rights with the consent of the owner, Shri Bhagat Ram, with respect to the land under the tenancy of plaintiff-appellant attained finality, except for such land which was owned by defendants-respondents No.2 and 3, who were minors at the relevant time. When the tenancy was common for whole land, has not Lower Appellate Court acted in an erroneous and perverse manner to hold that the plaintiff-appellant has failed to prove the tenancy over the land in question when the owner under whom the right of tenancy was asserted never disputed such status? 3. Whether the impugned judgment and decree passed by Lower Appellate Court is erroneous, illegal and 11 2026:HHC:26030 perverse when it failed to consider the admissions made by defendant-respondent No.1 Shri Registrar the grant of land as Nautor when defendant-respondent No.1 Shri Ghunghar claiming their status to be landless while applying for grant of land as Nautor when defendant- respondent No.1 Sh. Ghunghar failed to prove his possession over the suit land; has not the Lower Appellate Court proceeded in an erroneous, illegal and perverse manner to hold him to be a joint tenant when the ingredients of joint tenancy were not at all established? Substantial question of law in RSA No. 29 of 2009 1. Whether the Lower Appellate Court has committed grave illegality in not taking into consideration the provision of the Punjab Tenancy Act, which was applicable at the relevant time when the plaintiff- appellant claimed the abandonment of tenancy by Shri Hardeo? Are not the findings of Lower Appellate Court illegal, erroneous, and perverse in insisting on the proof of relinquishment of tenancy when the revenue entries depicted the status of plaintiff-appellant to be the tenant under the then owner, who never questioned the status of defendant No.1- appellant as a tenant? 2. Whether the Lower Appellate Court has committed a grave error of jurisdiction in failing to consider that the order of conferment of proprietary rights with the consent of the owner, Shri Bhagat Ram, with respect to the land under the tenancy of defendant No.1- appellant attained finality, except such land which was owned by defendants-proforma respondents No.4 and 5, who were minors at the relevant time. When the tenancy was common for whole land, has not Lower Appellate Court acted in an erroneous and perverse manner to hold that defendant No.1-appellant has failed to prove the tenancy over the land in question 12 2026:HHC:26030 when the owner under whom the right of tenancy was asserted never disputed such status? 3. Whether the impugned judgment and decree passed by Lower Appellate Court is erroneous, illegal and perverse when it failed to consider the admissions made by plaintiffs-respondents claiming their status to be landless while applying for grant of land as Nautor when plaintiff-respondents failed to prove their possession over the suit lan, has not the Lower Appellate Court proceeded in an erroneous, illegal and perverse manner to hold them to be a joint tenant when ingredients of joint tenancy were not at all established? 4. Whether the Lower Appellate Court has failed to consider that the suit filed by plaintiffs/respondents was hopelessly barred by limitation, and civil court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain the suit of the nature as filed by the plaintiffs-respondents? 5. Whether the impugned judgment and decree passed by Lower Appellate Court is unsustainable in failing to apply the rule of estoppel, which was clearly established on record for entertaining the suit filed by plaintiffs-respondents on account of their admissions, as well as acts, conduct and acquiescence? 16. I have heard Mr. Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Janesh Gupta, learned counsel for the appellants in both the appeals and Mr. Bimal Gupta, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Trigun Negi, learned counsel for respondents No.1(a) and 1(b) in RSA No. 28 of 2009 and respondents No.1(a) to 1(d), 2(a) and 2(b) and 3(a) to 3(e) in RSA No. 29 of 2009. 13 2026:HHC:26030 17. Mr Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior Advocate for the appellants in both the appeals, submitted that the learned Appellate Court erred in setting aside the well-reasoned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court. The plea taken by the plaintiff, Bidhia, that Hardeo had abandoned the tenancy and he was inducted as a tenant by Bhagat Ram was duly proved on record. Bidhia was recorded to be in possession as a non- occupancy tenant on the payment of the rent. The entry continued without any objection from any person. A person recorded to be a tenant became the owner after the commencement of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. A mutation of conferment of proprietary rights was sanctioned in favour of Bidhia regarding 5/8th share, but could not be sanctioned regarding the share of the minors. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court to go into the question of conferment of proprietary rights is quite limited. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 18. Mr. Bimal Gupta, learned Senior Advocate, for respondents No.1(a) and 1(b) in RSA No. 28 of 2009 and respondents No.1(a) to 1(d), 2(a) and 2(b) and 3(a) to 3(e) in RSA 14 2026:HHC:26030 No. 29 of 2009 submitted that Bidhia had never claimed that Hardeo had abandoned the tenancy and he was inducted as a tenant by the owners. He led the evidence to this effect and learned Trial Court erred in relying upon the evidence beyond the pleadings. The entry in favour of plaintiff Bidhia was changed without any order of the competent authority and was liable to be ignored. This Court should not interfere with the findings of fact unless it is proved. No perversity has been shown in the present case. Hence, he prayed that the present appeals be dismissed. He relied upon the following judgments in support of his submissions: - 1. Tulsa Singh vs. Agya Ram & others 1994 SCC OnLine HP 15: AIR 1994 HP 167; 2. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors vs. Ajay Vij and others 2011:HHC:464; 3. Chet Ram vs. Jai Dei & others 2011:HHC:9054; 4. Shiam Parshad vs. Kasmir Singh & Ors. 2016:HHC:8828; 5. Parvati Devi & others vs. Inder Singh & others 2017 SCC OnLine HP2675; 6. Prem Sagar & others vs. Har Gopal Singh and others 2019 SCC OnLine HP2528 15 2026:HHC:26030 19. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. Substantial question of law No.4(RSA No.29 of 2009) 20. It is undisputed that a mutation of conferment of proprietary rights (Ext.P-7) regarding 5/8th share of Bhagat Ram, Milap Singh and Mahinder Singh was sanctioned in favour of Bidhia in the presence of Bhagat Ram, the original landlord, on 28.07.1976. The defendant claimed that proprietary rights could have been conferred upon Bidhia because Hardeo and not he was the tenant. This plea, if accepted, would have the effect of getting rid of the order passed by the competent authority under the provisions of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. It was laid down in Chuniya Devi versus Jindu Ram 1991 (1) Shimla Law Cases 213 that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to go into the conferment of the proprietary rights is barred except when there is a violation of the natural law, the statutory authorities have not acted in conformity with the fundamental principle of judicial procedure or have not complied with the provisions of the Act. This judgment was explained by this Court in Shankar Versus Rukmani 2003 (1) Shim. L.C. 300, and it was held that where an 16 2026:HHC:26030 order has been passed by the Land Reforms Officer, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to go into the validity of the order is barred. It was observed: - “4. So far the ratio in judgment in Chuhniya v. Jindu Ram's case (supra) is concerned, the reference before the Full Bench was whether the Civil Court has the jurisdiction in respect of the order of conferment of proprietary rights under Section 104 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 (hereinafter called 'the Act') which has been answered in the negative except in a case where it is found that the statutory authorities envisaged by the Act have not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of the judicial procedure or where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with. 5. The acquisition of proprietary rights by tenants other than non-occupancy tenants is dealt with in Chapter X of the Act. This Chapter consists of Sections 104 to 117. Section 112 of the Act provides for a bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Court for calling into question the validity of any proceedings or orders taken or made under this Chapter. By providing an appeal and revision against the order passed by the Land Reforms Officer under this Chapter, a further bar of jurisdiction has been provided under Section 115 to call in question any order made by the Collector, Commissioner or Financial Commissioner by declaring them final. It is also observed by the Full Bench in Chuhniya Devi v. Jindu Ram's case (supra) that from the Scheme of Chapter X, it is clear that there are bound to be occasions when the dispute about the relationship of landlord and tenant would arise in the proceedings which need to be adjudicated upon by the authorities as provided therein, before conferment of proprietary rights upon a tenant or before the resumption of land by the landowner. 6. Referring to sub-section (4) of Section 104 and Rule 29, the Full Bench has concluded in para 39 that: 17 2026:HHC:26030 "...........It is implicit in sub-section (4) of Section 104 that the Legislature envisaged that a dispute may arise whether a person cultivating the land of a landowner is a tenant or not when proceedings were in progress under Chapter X and provided that it shall be decided by the authorities contemplated under this Chapter who shall require the landowner to establish that a person cultivating his land is not a tenant." 7. It was in this context that the Full Bench further held in paragraph 40 : "Any inquiry by a Civil Court on the question was barred by the legislature by specifically providing in Sections 112 and 115, both occurring in Chapter X, that the validity of any order made under the Chapter shall not be called in question in any court and that the order shall be final except as expressly provided in the Chapter. The legislature knew its mind fully well. Where it wanted a dispute to be determined by the Civil Court, it provided so in Chapter X itself. One has only to look at Sections 107 and 109 (2). Not only did the Legislature rule out any determination by a Civil Court, by necessary implication, of other matters, it expressly said so in Sections 112 and 115." 8. While discussing the rationale for the exclusion of the Civil Court, the learned Judges have held in paragraph 44 that: "The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, in the matter of determination of the question whether a person cultivating the land of a landowner is his tenant or not for purposes of Chapter X, is both reasonable and understandable. Permitting such a question to be determined by the civil court also would have introduced an element of unpredictability, spread over a long period while the matter was under adjudication before the Civil Court at the trial or an appellate stage, which could have 18 2026:HHC:26030 made the effective implementation of measures of land reform aimed at by the Act, uncertain. The legislature could legitimately think of ruling out such a situation. It has done so by excluding the jurisdiction of the civil court expressly in that matter." 9. After analysing the judgment in Chuhniya Devi v. Jindu Ram's case (supra), we have no doubt that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred under the Act if the dispute pertaining to the relationship of landlord and tenant arises during the proceedings of conferment of proprietary rights upon the tenant and resumption of land by the landowner and the order in respect thereof has been passed by the authorities under the Act except in a case where it is found that the statutory authorities envisaged by that Act had not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of a judicial procedure or where the provisions of the Act had not been complied with. But if the dispute of landlord and tenant arises independently of the proceedings under the Act, the Civil Court has the jurisdiction.” 21. This aspect was also clarified by a Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court in Tajdin & Ors. Vs. Milkho Devi & Ors. Latest HLJ 2005 H.P. 825, wherein it was held: - “13. This judgment appears to have settled all the matters about which there was some conflict with regard to the interpretation of the judgment of the Full Bench in Chuhniya Devi v. Jindu Ram's case (supra). One factor which has to be kept in mind and should not be lost sight of white considering the import of the judgment of the Full Bench is that the question before the Full Bench was whether the civil court had jurisdiction in respect of an order conferring proprietary rights under Section 104 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 which had not been assailed under the provisions of the said Act. The Full Bench in para 39 again made it clear that a dispute may arise where the 19 2026:HHC:26030 person cultivating the land of a landowner is a tenant or not when proceedings were in progress under Chapter X. The Full Bench was dealing with the impact of the bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court under Sections T12 and 115 of the HP. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, both of which occur in Chapter X, and it is in this context that the observations made in para 40 have to be read. Again, in para 44 (quoted above), the Full Bench has clearly held that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in the matter of determining the question whether a person cultivating the land of the landowner is a tenant or not for the purposes of Chapter X is both reasonable and understandable. It is thus clear that the question before the Full Bench and its answer and the various observations were confined to disputes pertaining to the relationship of landlord and tenant arising out of and during the course of proceedings of conferment of proprietary rights on the tenant and Chapter X of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. The observations made in Chapter 45 have to be read in this context only. 14. This has been amply clarified by the Division Bench in Shankar case (supra) wherein after analyzing the entire law and the judgment in Chuhniya Devi's case (supra) the Division Bench held that if a dispute pertaining to the relationship of landlord and tenant arises during the proceedings of conferment of proprietary rights upon the tenant and the resumption of land by the landowner and the order in respect thereof has been passed by the authorities under the Act the Civil Court will have no jurisdiction except in a case where it is found that the competent authority has acted either in violation of the Rules of Natural Justice or contrary to the provisions of law laid down in the Act or the Rules. If the dispute regarding the relationship of landlord and tenant has no connection with the proceedings under Chapter X of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, the Civil Court would have jurisdiction to hear and decide this dispute. 20 2026:HHC:26030 15. I am not only bound but am in respectful agreement with the observations of the Division Bench in Shankar's case quoted hereinbefore. The bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court under Section 112 of the Tenancy and Land Reforms Act will only apply when the validity of proceedings or orders made under Chapter X is called in question in any Civil Court. Similarly, under Section 115 of the said Act, the order in appeal or revision passed by the Collector, Commission or Financial Commissioner can also not be challenged before the Civil Court unless the same is in violation of the principles of Natural Justice or is contrary to the provisions of the Rules or the Act. The foundation for this must be laid in the plaint. It is the averments made in the plaint which will show whether the Civil Court has or does not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” 22. In the present case, the dispute between the parties arose out of the order of the conferment of proprietary rights; therefore, it was essential for Ghungar etc. to plead and prove that the statutory authority had acted contrary to law or in violation of the principle of natural justice. There is no whisper in the plaint filed by them to this effect. It was asserted in para-3 that Bidhia got proprietary rights conferred upon himself without the knowledge of Hardeo and his brothers, which is not sufficient to confer the jurisdiction upon the Court as noticed above. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to go into the question of conferment of proprietary rights was partly barred, and the learned Appellate Court could not have granted the 21 2026:HHC:26030 declaration sought by Ghungar, etc. Hence, this substantial question of law is answered accordingly. Substantial questions of law No. 1 to 3 in both the appeals. 23. Copy of the Jamabandi for the year 1932-33 (Ext.AXX) shows Hardeo to be a tenant under Bhagat Ram on the payment of half share of the produce. A similar entry was recorded in the copy of the Jamabandi for the year 1944-45 (Ext.D-1). This entry was changed in the copy of Jamabandi for the 1952-53, and Bidhia was recorded to be a tenant on the payment of Gala Batai, half share of the produce. The area was increased in the copy of the jamabandi for the 1955-57, and the rent was reduced to 1/3rd of the produce. It was submitted that the change was unauthorised and no reliance could have been placed upon it. Hardeo continued to be a tenant, and the name of Bidhia could not have been substituted as per the law. This plea cannot be accepted. Hardeo never objected to the change in the revenue entry during his lifetime. He died on 24.02.1979 as per the death certificate (Ext.D-5). He never claimed during his lifetime that he was a tenant. Bhagat Ram was present at the time of attestation of the mutation. He also never claimed that Hardeo was the tenant and 22 2026:HHC:26030 not Bidhia. Not only this, Ghungar Ram and Faquir had applied for the allotment of the land under the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Village Common Land Vesting and Utilisation Scheme. Faquir made a statement (Ext. P-12) that he did not own any land, and he was not a tenant. His father was alive, and he had no land in his name. Similarly, Ghungar made a statement (Ext.P-13) that he was not the tenant of any land or the owner of any land. These statements were made on 08.09.1975 in the presence of Pardhan and contained an important admission that they were not tenant and Hardeo was also not the owner of any land. It was laid by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bishwanath Prasad v. Dwarka Prasad, (1974) 1 SCC 78: 1973 SCC OnLine SC 322 that a statement made by a party is admissible, irrespective of the fact whether the party appeared in the witness box or the admission was put to him in the cross-examination. It was observed at page 81: 8. There is no merit even in the contention that, because these three statements — Exs. G, G-2 and H had not been put to the first plaintiff when he was in the witness box or to the eighth defendant, although he had discreetly kept away from giving evidence; they cannot be used against him. Counsel drew our attention to Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act. There is a cardinal distinction between a party who is the author of a prior statement and a witness who is examined and is sought to be discredited by use of his prior statement. In the former case, an 23 2026:HHC:26030 admission by a party is substantive evidence if it fulfils the requirements of Section 21 of the Evidence Act; in the latter case, a prior statement is used to discredit the credibility of the witness and does not become substantive evidence. In the former, there is no requirement of the statement containing the admission having to be put to the party because it is evidence proprio vigore: in the latter case, the Court cannot be invited to disbelieve a witness on the strength of a prior contradictory statement unless it has been put to him, as required by Section 145 of the Evidence Act. This distinction has been clearly brought out in the ruling in the Bharat Singh case. [AIR 1966 SC 405: (1966) 1 SCR 606, 615-16: (1966) 2 SCJ 53] This Court disposed of a similar argument with the following observations: "Admissions are substantive evidence by themselves, in view of Sections 17 and 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, though they are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted. We are of the opinion that the admissions duly proved are admissible evidence irrespective of whether the party making them appeared in the witness box or not, and whether that party, when appearing as a witness, was confronted with those statements in case it made a statement contrary to those admissions. The purpose of contradicting the witness under S. 145 of the Evidence Act is very much different from the purpose of proving the admission. Admission is substantive evidence of the fact admitted, while a previous statement used to contradict a witness does not become substantive evidence and merely serves the purpose of throwing doubt on the veracity of the witness. What weight is to be attached to an admission made by a party is a matter different from its use as admissible evidence." (Emphasis supplied) 24 2026:HHC:26030 24. This position was reiterated in Union of India v. Moksh Builders and Financiers Ltd., (1977) 1 SCC 60: 1976 SCC OnLine SC 377, wherein it was observed at page 67: 21….There is, however, no force in the other argument that they are not admissible in evidence against Defendant 3, as he was not confronted with them in the trial court, and they were not adverse to the interest of their maker at the time when they were made. It has been held by this Court in Bharat Singh v. Bhagirath [AIR 1966 SC 405 : (1966) 1 SCR 606] that an admission is substantive evidence of the fact admitted, and that admissions duly proved are “admissible evidence irrespective of whether the party making them appeared in the witness box or not and whether that party, when appearing as witness, was confronted with those statements in case it made a statement contrary to those admissions.” In taking this view, this Court has noticed the decision in Ajodhya Prasad Bhargava v. Bhawani Shanker Bhargava [AIR 1957 All 1: ILR (1956) 2 All 399] also. The point has been considered and answered as follows in Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. IV, §1048 (at p. 3): “The theory of the hearsay rule is that an extra-judicial assertion is excluded unless there has been sufficient opportunity to test the grounds of assertion and the credit of the witness, by cross-examination by the party against whom it is offered (post, §1362); e.g. if Jones had said out of court ‘The party-opponent Smith borrowed this fifty dollars’, Smith is entitled to an opportunity to cross-examine Jones upon that assertion. But if it is Smith himself who said out of court, ‘I borrowed this fifty dollars’, certain Smith cannot complain of lack of opportunity to cross- examine himself before his assertion is admitted against him. Such a request would be absurd. Hence, the objection of the hearsay rule falls away, because the 25 2026:HHC:26030 very basis of the rule is lacking, viz., the need and prudence of affording an opportunity of cross- examination.” Moreover, Defendant 3 had a full opportunity to appear and defend himself, but he did not do so, and the case proceeded against him ex parte. The plaintiff even tried to examine him as his own witness, but his appearance could not be secured in spite of the prayer for the issue of summonses and a warrant. There is therefore no force in the argument to the contrary. 22. So also, there is no force in the argument that the aforesaid admissions or statements of Defendant 3 could not be read against him, as they were not averse to his interest when made. There is no such requirement of the Evidence Act, and the argument is untenable as it unreasonably restricts the opportunity to prove the true state of affairs on the party's own showing and to demolish his subsequent claim as self-contradictory. This point has also been dealt with in Wigmore on Evidence, §1048 (at p. 4) in this way: “It follows that the subject of an admission is not limited to facts against the party-opponent's interest at the time of making it. No doubt the weight of credit to be given to such statements is increased when the fact stated is against the person's interest at the time, but that circumstance has no bearing upon their admissibility. On principle, it is plain that the probative reason why a party-opponent's utterance is sought to be used against him is ordinarily the reason noted above, in para 1(b), viz. that it exhibits an inconsistency with his present claim, thus tending to throw doubt upon it, whether he was at the time speaking apparently in his own favour or against his own interest.” The contrary view has been characterised by Wigmore as “a fallacy, in the fullest sense”. 23. Another argument which has been advanced against the admissibility of the aforesaid admissions of Defendant 3 is 26 2026:HHC:26030 that they could be evidence only in terms of Section 33 of the Evidence Act. That argument is also quite untenable because Section 33 deals with statements of persons who cannot be called as witnesses, and does not restrict or override the provisions relating to admissions in the Evidence Act. The High Court also committed a similar error of law in its impugned judgment. The aforesaid admissions of Defendant 3 are therefore satisfactory evidence to prove that he himself was the owner of the house, and his son, Defendant 2, was merely a “benamidar” for him. 25. It was held in Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam, (1974) 1 SCC 242: 1973 SCC OnLine SC 378, that the admissions are the best proof of the facts admitted. It was observed at page 251: “27. From a conspectus of the cases cited at the bar, the principle that emerges is, that if at the time of the passing of the decree, there was some material before the Court, on the basis of which, the Court could be prima facie satisfied, about the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it will be presumed that the Court was so satisfied and the decree for eviction though apparently passed on the basis of a compromise, would be valid. Such material may take the shape either of evidence recorded or produced in the case, or it may partly or wholly be in the shape of an express or implied admission made in the compromise agreement itself. Admissions, if true and clear, are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible under Section 58 of the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitutes a waiver of proof. They can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties. On the other hand, evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as 27 2026:HHC:26030 evidence are, by themselves, not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong.” 26. It was held in S.R. Srinivasa v. S. Padmavathamma, (2010) 5 SCC 274: 2010 SCC OnLine SC 507 that an admission is the best proof of the facts admitted. It was observed at page 289: “44. It is undoubtedly correct that a true and clear admission would provide the best proof of the facts admitted. It may prove to be decisive unless successfully withdrawn or proved to be erroneous. The legal position with regard to admissions and their evidentiary value has been discussed by this Court in many cases. We may notice some of them. 45. In Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale v. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi [AIR 1960 SC 100], it was observed as follows: (AIR p. 105, para 11) “11. … An admission is the best evidence that an opposing party can rely upon, and though not conclusive, is decisive of the matter, unless successfully withdrawn or proved erroneous.” 46. In Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam [(1974) 1 SCC 242: AIR 1974 SC 471], it has been observed: (SCC p. 252, para 27) “27. … Admissions, if true and clear, are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible under Section 58 of the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitutes a waiver of proof. They by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties by themselves. On the other hand, evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial 28 2026:HHC:26030 as evidence are, by themselves, not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong.” 47. The aforesaid two judgments, along with some other earlier judgments of this Court, were considered by this Court in Gautam Sarup v. Leela Jetly [(2008) 7 SCC 85], wherein it was observed as follows: (SCC pp. 90 & 94, paras 16 & 28) “16. A thing admitted in view of Section 58 of the Evidence Act need not be proved. Order 8 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that even a vague or evasive denial may be treated as an admission, in which event the court may pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff. Relying on or on the basis thereof, a suit, having regard to the provisions of Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, may also be decreed on admission. It is one thing to say that, without resiling from an admission, it would be permissible to explain under what circumstances the same had been made, or it was made under a mistaken belief, or to clarify one's stand inter alia in regard to the extent or effect of such admission, but it is another thing to say that a person can be permitted to totally resile therefrom. … *** 28. What, therefore, emerges from the discussions made hereinbefore is that a categorical admission cannot be resiled from, but, in a given case, it may be explained or clarified. Offering an explanation in regard to an admission or explaining away the same, however, would depend upon the nature and character thereof. It may be that a defendant is entitled to take an alternative plea. Such alternative pleas, however, cannot be mutually destructive of each other.” 27. This position was reiterated in Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 148: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 528, wherein it was observed at page 166: 29 2026:HHC:26030 29. Admission is the best piece of substantive evidence that an opposite party can rely upon, though not conclusive, and is decisive of the matter, unless successfully withdrawn or proved erroneous. Admission may, in certain circumstances, operate as an estoppel. The question which is needed to be considered is what weight is to be attached to an admission, and for that purpose, it is necessary to find out as to whether it is clear, unambiguous and a relevant piece of evidence, and further, it is proved in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act. It would be appropriate that an opportunity be given to the person under cross-examination to tender his explanation and clear the point on the question of admission. (Vide Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale v. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi [AIR 1960 SC 100], Basant Singh v. Janki Singh [AIR 1967 SC 341], Sita Ram Bhau Patil v. Ramchandra Nago Patil [(1977) 2 SCC 49: AIR 1977 SC 1712], Sushil Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar [(2003) 8 SCC 673: AIR 2004 SC 230], United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Samir Chandra Chaudhary [(2005) 5 SCC 784], Charanjit Lal Mehra v. Kamal Saroj Mahajan [(2005) 11 SCC 279: AIR 2005 SC 2765] and Udham Singh v. Ram Singh [(2007) 15 SCC 529] .) 30. In Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao [AIR 1956 SC 593], this Court held that an admission made by a party is admissible and the best evidence, unless it is proved that it had been made under a mistaken belief. While deciding the said case, reliance has been placed upon the judgment in Slatterie v. Pooley [(1840) 6 M&W 664: 151 ER 579], wherein it had been observed, “What a party himself admits to be true, may reasonably be presumed to be so.” 31. In LIC v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen [(2010) 4 SCC 491 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 1072: (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 191] this Court held that: (SCC p. 496, para 23) “23. … failure to prove the defence does not amount to an admission, nor does it reverse or discharge the burden of proof of the plaintiff….” 30 2026:HHC:26030 32. In view of the above, the law on admissions can be summarised to the effect that an admission made by a party, though not conclusive, is a decisive factor in a case unless the other party successfully withdraws the same or proves it to be erroneous. Even if the admission is not conclusive, it may operate as an estoppel. Law requires that an opportunity be given to the person who has made an admission under cross-examination to tender his explanation and clarify the point on the question of admission. Failure of a party to prove its defence does not amount to admission, nor can it reverse or discharge the burden of proof of the plaintiff. 34. Section 58 provides that a fact may not need to be proved in any proceeding which the parties thereto agreed to admit at the hearing or which, before the hearing, they agreed to admit by any writing under their hands or which they admitted by their pleading, even in that case the court may, in its discretion, even if such an admission has been made by the party, require the fact admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission. In fact, admission by a party may be oral or in writing. “Admissions” are governed under Sections 17 to 31 of the Evidence Act, and such admissions can be tendered and accepted as substantive evidence. While admission for purposes of trial may dispense with proof of a particular fact. Section 58 deals with admissions during trial, i.e. at or before the hearing, which are known as judicial admissions or stipulations dispensed with proof. Admissions are not conclusive proof but may operate as an estoppel against its maker. Documents are necessarily either proved by a witness or marked on admission. 28. Learned Appellate Court held that Ghungar and his brother had not been in possession of the suit land or any portion thereof in their own right, and Herdev had been the owner in possession of the suit land. These findings overlook the 31 2026:HHC:26030 admission made by Ghungar and Faquir Chand that their father was not the owner of any land. Therefore, the findings recorded by the learned Appellate Court are based upon the misreading of the admission and are liable to be interfered with. 29. Section 35 of the Punjab Tenancy Act deals with the relinquishment of the tenancy by a tenant holding for a fixed term. Section 36 deals with the relinquishment by other tenants and provides that a tenant may relinquish his tenancy by giving a notice verbally or in writing to the landlord or his agent declaring his intention to relinquish the tenancy at the end of agriculture year. Section 38 of the Act provides for the abandonment of the tenancy and reads that if a tenant having a right of occupancy fails to cultivate the land in his tenancy for more than one year without sufficient cause, the right of occupancy shall be extinguished. Therefore, it is permissible to the tenant to relinquish the tenancy or abandon the tenancy. Bidhia categorically stated that Hardeo was unable to cultivate the land, and he (Bidhia) was inducted as a tenant by Bhagat Ram, who, as already stated, never disputed Bidhia’s status during the conferment of the proprietary rights. The defendant Ghungar and his brother stated that they were minors, and Bidhia was a major, 32 2026:HHC:26030 which shows that the defendants could not have cultivated the land. 30. Ghungar Ram (DW-1) stated that Hardeo was not aware of the change in the revenue entries. He separated his children, and he started cultivating the land separately. 31. Ramesh Chand (DW-4) stated in his cross- examination that land cultivated by Bidhia, Ghungar and Faqir, etc., was a different land and not the suit land. He admitted that he had not objected to the attestation of Bidhia. His statement that Bidhia, etc., were cultivating some other land is clearly not correct because his predecessor Bhagat Ram had not objected to the conferment of proprietary rights regarding the suit land. 32. Prithvi Ram (PW-2) stated that Hardeo used to cultivate the land whenever he was capable, and thereafter Bidhia cultivated the land. Hardeo remained active for 10 years before his death, and land was cultivated by Bidhia thereafter. Learned Appellate Court construed the statement to mean that Hardeo continued to cultivate the land till 1969, which is contrary to the plaintiff’s case. This inference could not have been drawn from his statement. This witness stated that he had seen Hardeo, but 33 2026:HHC:26030 he had left the area in connection with his job. He admitted that Hardeo used to cultivate the suit land. He was not aware that Bidhia was residing with Hardeo because he was serving in the Army. He had served for six years before the independence and thereafter for three years. He claimed himself to be aged 60, which means that he was born somewhere in the year 1940 and could not serve in the Army at the age of one year. He repeatedly stated that he was not aware of the fact because he had remained outside the area, which shows that his testimony regarding the possession was not trustworthy, and the same could not have been used to rebut the presumption of correctness attached to the revenue record. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Partap Singh v. Shiv Ram, (2020) 11 SCC 242: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 228 that an entry in the jamabandi carries with it a presumption of correctness u/s 45 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act, and the burden is upon the person who alleges to the contrary. The burden can be discharged by leading evidence of incapable integrity. Oral evidence is not sufficient to hold that the presumption stands rebutted. It was observed: 16. As per Section 32(2)(a) of the 1954 Act, record-of- rights, i.e. jamabandi, shall include the name of persons who are landowners, tenants or assignees of land revenue 34 2026:HHC:26030 and also the rent, land revenue, rates, cesses or other payments due from and to each of those persons and the Government. On the other hand, the periodical record, i.e. khasra girdawari, as mentioned in Section 34 of the 1954 Act, is to be prepared every year as proof of the statements, as mentioned in sub-section (2) clause (a) of Section 32, which includes the name of the landowners, tenants and the rent and land revenue payable. In terms of Section 45 of the 1954 Act, the record of rights as prepared in terms of Sections 32 and 34 of the 1954 Act carries a presumption of truth. Still further, any person who is aggrieved by any entry in the record of rights or a periodical record has a right to invoke the jurisdiction of the civil court for correction of the entries in terms of Section 46 of the 1954 Act. 17. The detailed procedure for recording periodical records of rights, as well as the record-of-rights, in terms of Sections 32 and 34 of the 1954 Act, has been prescribed. The record of rights contains entries of the revenue record for the four years. Such a record of rights carries the presumption of correctness in terms of Section 45 of the 1954 Act and also Section 35 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (for short “the Evidence Act”). Section 109 of the Evidence Act further contemplates whether there exists a relationship of landowner and tenant, and the burden of proving such a relationship is on the person who affirms it. 18. The relevant provisions of the Evidence Act read as follows: “35. Relevancy of entry in public record or an electronic record made in performance of duty.—An entry in any public or other official book, register or record or an electronic record, stating a fact in issue or relevant fact, and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which such book, register, or record or an electronic record is kept, is itself a relevant fact. 35 2026:HHC:26030 *** 109. Burden of proof as to relationship in the cases of partners, landlord and tenant, principal and agent.— When the question is whether persons are partners, landlord and tenant, or principal and agent, and it has been shown that they have been acting as such, the burden of proving that they do not stand, or have ceased to stand, to each other in those relationships respectively, is on the person who affirms it.” 19. In the State of Himachal Pradesh, jamabandi, under Section 32 of the 1954 Act, as well as Khasra Girdawari, under Section 34 of the 1954 Act, both are record-of-rights in terms of Section 32 of the 1954 Act and have a statutory presumption of truth. How that presumption can be inferred has come up for consideration before this Court in Harish Chander v. Ghisa Ram, (1981) 1 SCC 431. This Court held that the entries in the jamabandi carry a presumption of truth, but such presumption is rebuttable. Once that presumption is raised, still another comes to the aid of Respondent 1 [therein] [Ed.: The facts of Harish Chander, (1981) 1 SCC 431, are that the name of Respondent 1 therein was recorded as a tenant in the jamabandi for the year 1959-60 (Ext. P-1) and consistently thereafter till the year 1968 (Khasra-girdawaris Exts. P-2 to P-7). Thus, it was held that the statutory presumption of truth of these entries was attracted to the benefit of Respondent 1 tenant, and so also the reversal of the burden of proof under Section 109 of the Evidence Act, 1872, was held to be to his benefit. The facts of the present case are exactly the opposite—see para 20 below—there is no entry at all in the record of rights of the tenancy claimed by the respondent- defendant herein. Thus, the presumption of the truth of the record-of-rights has been held to enure to the benefit of the appellants whose names were found to be recorded in the record-of-rights.] by reason of the rule contained in Section 109 of the Evidence Act, namely, that when two persons have been shown to stand to each other in the relationship of landlord and tenant, the burden of proving 36 2026:HHC:26030 that such relationship has ceased, is on the party who so asserts. It was held as under: (SCC pp. 431-433, paras 2 & 6) “2. … Apart from the oral evidence, there is no material on the record which may indicate the falsity of any of the entries in the revenue records, and we are of the opinion that the lower courts were fully justified in relying on them. *** 6. No suspicion can attach to the entries in the jamabandi for the year 1959-60, nor have the contents of that document been assailed before us. A presumption of truth attaches to those entries in view of the provisions of Section 44 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act. That presumption is no doubt rebuttable, but no attempt has been made to displace it. Further, once that presumption is raised, still another comes to the aid of Respondent 1 by reason of the rule contained in Section 109 of the Evidence Act, 1872, namely, that when two persons have been shown to stand to each other in the relationship of landlord and tenant, the burden of proving that such relationship has ceased is on the party who so asserts. It may therefore be legitimately presumed that the plaintiff continued to possess the land as a tenant till the institution of the suit.” 20. The present is a case where no relationship of landlord and tenant is mentioned in the revenue record, though required in terms of Section 32(2)(a) of the 1954 Act. In the absence of an entry in the revenue record, which is also expected to contain the entry of rent and possession, the tenancy cannot be treated as in existence only on the basis of oral evidence of the witnesses examined by the defendant. The burden of proving the relationship was on the defendant. Such a burden cannot be said to be rebutted only by oral evidence. The witnesses may lie, but the documents do not, is a golden rule. The presumption of truth attached to the revenue record can be rebutted only on the basis of evidence of impeccable integrity and 37 2026:HHC:26030 reliability. The oral evidence can always be adduced contrary to the revenue record, but such oral testimony will not be sufficient to hold that the statutory presumption stands rebutted. 21. This Court in Vishwa Vijay Bharati v. Fakhrul Hassan, (1976) 3 SCC 642, held that the entries in the revenue record ought to be generally accepted at their face value and courts should not embark upon an appellate inquiry into their correctness. But the presumption of correctness can apply only to genuine, not forged or fraudulent entries. This Court held as under: (Fakhrul Hassan case [Vishwa Vijay Bharati v. Fakhrul Hassan, (1976) 3 SCC 642], SCC p. 645, para 14) “14. It is true that the entries in the revenue record ought, generally, to be accepted at their face value, and courts should not embark upon an appellate inquiry into their correctness. But the presumption of correctness can apply only to genuine, not forged or fraudulent, entries. The distinction may be fine, but it is real. The distinction is that one cannot challenge the correctness of what the entry in the revenue record states, but the entry is open to the attack that it was made fraudulently or surreptitiously. Fraud and forgery rob a document of all its legal effect and cannot be found a claim to the possessory title.” 22. This Court in Guru Amarjit Singh v. Rattan Chand, (1993) 4 SCC 349: AIR 1994 SC 227 was examining a dispute of the relationship of landlord and tenant. A copy of a more than thirty-year-old lease deed was produced to prove the relationship between the landowner and tenant. However, the revenue record did not show any payment of rent, but only the existence of terms of the lease to pay rent. This Court held that non-production of the receipts of payment of rent clearly indicates that there was no relationship between the landlord and tenants. 23. In Sodhi Transport Co. v. State of U.P., (1986) 2 SCC 486: 1986 SCC (Tax) 410], this Court was considering Section 28- 38 2026:HHC:26030 B of the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948, which raises a presumption of sale of goods in a manner prescribed therein. This Court considered Section 4 of the Evidence Act and also the previous judgments and held as under: (SCC p. 496, para 14) “14. A presumption is not in itself evidence but only makes a prima facie case for a party in whose favour it exists. It is a rule concerning evidence. It indicates the person on whom the burden of proof lies. When the presumption is conclusive, it obviates the production of any other evidence to dislodge the conclusion to be drawn on proof of certain facts. But when it is rebuttable, it only points out the party on whom lies the duty of going forward with evidence on the fact presumed, and when that party has produced evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show that the real fact is not as presumed, the purpose of the presumption is over. Then the evidence will determine the true nature of the fact to be established. The rules of presumption are deduced from enlightened human knowledge and experience and are drawn from the connection, relation and coincidence of facts and circumstances.” 24. In another judgment in Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513 : (2009) 1 SCC (Civ) 629 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 823, this Court examined the presumption of fact in proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. It was held that bare denial of the passing of the consideration and existence of debt, apparently, would not serve the purpose of the accused. Something, which is probable, has to be brought on record for getting the burden of proof shifted to the complainant. It was held as under: (SCC p. 521, para 21) “21. The accused also has an option to prove the non-existence of consideration and debt or liability either by letting in evidence or, in some clear and exceptional cases, from the case set out by the complainant, that is, the averments in the complaint, the case set out in the statutory notice and evidence 39 2026:HHC:26030 adduced by the complainant during the trial. Once such rebuttal evidence is adduced and accepted by the court, having regard to all the circumstances of the case and the preponderance of probabilities, the evidential burden shifts back to the complainant and, thereafter, the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act will not again come to the complainant's rescue.” 25. The presumption of truth attached to the revenue record can be rebutted if such an entry was made fraudulently or surreptitiously (Vishwa Vijay Bharati v. Fakhrul Hassan, (1976) 3 SCC 642) or where such an entry has not been made by following the prescribed procedure (Bhimappa Channappa Kapali v. Bhimappa Satyappa Kamagouda, (2012) 13 SCC 759: (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 419). Even in Guru Amarjit Singh v. Rattan Chand, (1993) 4 SCC 349: AIR 1994 SC 227, where thirty years old lease deed was produced, this Court had not accepted the proof of the relationship between landowner and tenant in the absence of receipt of payment of rent. 26. Therefore, we find that the presumption of truth attached to the record of rights can be rebutted only if there is fraud in the entry or the entry was surreptitiously made, or the prescribed procedure was not followed. It will not be proper to rely on the oral evidence to rebut the statutory presumption, as the credibility of oral evidence vis-à-vis documentary evidence is at a much weaker level.” 33. It was submitted that Bidhia had not pleaded that Hardeo was the owner who had abandoned the tenancy, and the evidence to this effect was beyond pleading and could have been looked into. This submission will not help the respondents. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Des Raj v. Bhagat Ram, (2007) 9 SCC 641: 2007 SCC OnLine SC 221 that the pleadings in the 40 2026:HHC:26030 Mufassil have to be liberally construed as a whole. It was observed at page 647: - 17. It may be true that in his plaint, the plaintiff did not specifically plead ouster, but muffosil pleadings, as is well known, must be construed liberally. Pleadings must be construed as a whole. 18. In Devasahayam v. P. Savithramma [(2005) 7 SCC 653] this Court opined: (SCC p. 661, para 20) “20. The pleadings, as are well known, must be construed reasonably. The contention of the parties in their pleadings must be culled out from reading the same as a whole. Different considerations on the construction of pleadings may arise between pleadings in the mofussil court and pleadings in the original side of the High Court.” 19. Only because the parties did not use the terminology that they should have, ipso facto, would not mean that the ingredients for satisfying the requirements of the statute are absent. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that, having regard to the changes brought about by Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, vis-à-vis Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908, the onus to prove adverse possession would be on the person who raises such a plea. It is also not in dispute that the possession of a co- sharer is presumed to be the possession of the other co- sharers unless the contrary is proved. 34. Bidhia had specifically pleaded that he was inducted as a tenant, and the mere fact that he had not mentioned that Hardeo had abandoned the tenancy will not make his case doubtful. 41 2026:HHC:26030 35. Learned Appellate Court also relied upon the statement of Bidhia in his cross-examination that it was correct that Bhagat Ram had not inducted Bidhia, Ghungar and Khemdi as tenants. This is clearly a result of some mistake because Hardeo had four sons, namely, Khemdi, Ghungar, Faqir and Bidhia, whereas the names of only three sons have been mentioned. Further, a stray line in the cross-examination is not to be read in isolation, and the whole statement has to be read. He has repeatedly said that he was inducted as a tenant by Bhagat Ram, and this stray line in the cross-examination would not take away the effect of his repeated assertion that he was inducted as a tenant by Bhagat Ram. 36. It was submitted that the change in favour of Bidhia was unauthorised, and subsequent entries cannot be relied upon. There can be no dispute that if the change in favour of a person is unauthorised, the subsequent entries will have no effect; however, the burden to prove that the change was unauthorised is upon a person who asserts it to be so. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vishwa Vijay Bharati v. Fakhrul Hassan, (1976) 3 SCC 642: 1976 SCC OnLine SC 197 that the Civil Courts 42 2026:HHC:26030 should not embark upon an appellate enquiry into the correctness of the revenue entries. It was observed at page 645: 14. It is true that the entries in the revenue record ought, generally, to be accepted at their face value, and courts should not embark upon an appellate inquiry into their correctness. But the presumption of correctness can apply only to genuine, not forged or fraudulent, entries. The distinction may be fine, but it is real. The distinction is that one cannot challenge the correctness of what the entry in the revenue record states, but the entry is open to the attack that it was made fraudulently or surreptitiously. Fraud and forgery rob a document of all its legal effect, and cannot be found a claim to possessory title. 37. In the present case, no material was brought on record to rebut the presumption of correctness attached to the revenue entries. Bhagat Ram and Hardeo, who were interested in disputing the entries, never challenged them. Bhagat Ram was present at the time of attestation of the mutation, but he never claimed that the entries were incorrect. Ghungar and Faqir never claimed that they were in possession of any land, clearly supporting the revenue entries. Therefore, the entries cannot be ignored on the basis that the change was unauthorised and the jduemtns in Tulsa Singh (supra, Ajay Vij (supra), Chet Ram (supra) Sham Prasad (supra) and Paravati Devi (supra) do not apply to the present case. 43 2026:HHC:26030 38. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court erred in holding that revenue entries were incorrect. The learned Appellate Court did not consider the provisions of the Punjab Tenancy Act. The learned Appellate Court brushed aside the order of conferment of proprietary rights as if it had no value. It was an order passed by a competent officer in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred upon him in the presence of the owner and the tenant, and could not be ignored unless the same was set aside by taking recourse to the law. The learned Appellate Court also erred in holding that the admissions made by Ghungar and Faquir were of no consequence; hence, these substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. Substantial question of law No.5 in RSA No.29 of 2009. 39. No act or conduct of Ghungar etc. leading the plaintiff Bidhia to act to his advantage was brought on record in the absence of which the principle of estoppel could not have been applied; hence, this substantial question of law is answered accordingly. Final order: 44 2026:HHC:26030 40. In view of the above, the present appeals are allowed, and the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Appellate Court are set aside, whereas the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Trial Court are restored. 41. The present appeals stand disposed of, and so are the pending miscellaneous applications, if any. 42. The record of the learned Courts below be returned along with a copy of this judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 02nd July, 2026. (ravinder)