1 2026:HHC:26109 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA CR No. 81 of 2021 Reserved on: 20.5.2026 Decided on : 30.6.2026 Uploaded on: 02.7.2026 Sushil Kumar … Petitioner Versus Onkar Chand & ors. …Respondents ______________________________________________________ Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge Whether approved for reporting? Yes. ______________________________________________________ For the  Petitioner: Mr. Mohinder Verma and Mr. Sumit Sharma, Advocates. For the Respondents: Mr. Anshul Jairath, Advocate,   for   respondents No. 1 to 5. None for respondent No. 6. Mr. Balwant   Singh   Thakur, Advocate,   for   respondents No. 7(a) to 7(c). Virender Singh, Judge Petitioner   Sushil   Kumar   has   filed   the   present petition,   under   Section   115   of   the   Code   of   Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘the CPC’),  against the   order   dated   22.11.2021,   passed   by   the   Court   of 2 2026:HHC:26109 learned Civil Judge,  Jr. Divn. Court No. 2, Amb, District Una,   H.P.   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   ‘the   Executing Court’), in Execution Petition No. 1 of 2014. 2. By way of order dated 22.11.2021, the learned Executing Court has dismissed the objections, filed by the petitioner, and issued the warrant of possession, in pursuance of judgment and decree, dated 23.9.2010. 3. For the sake of convenience, the parties to the lis, are referred to, in the same manner, in which, they were referred to, by the learned Executing Court. 4. As per the factual position, as contained in the petition, Civil Suit No. 228 of 2001 was filed by Ved Prakash   and   Onkar   Chand,   against   defendants   Om Prakash and Rajinder Singh. By way of said suit, relief of possession   and   permanent   prohibitory   injunction   had been sought. The said suit was decided by the Court of learned   Executing   Court,   vide   judgment   and   decree, dated   23.9.2010. In   the   said   judgment   and   decree, following relief has been granted by the Court: “In view of my findings on the aforesaid issues, suit of the plaintiff is decreed for vacant possession of the suit land 3 2026:HHC:26109 by   removal   of   structure   over   portion   marked   by   letters HIJKL"   as   shown   in   green   colour   in   the   site   plan Ex.PW2/A   over   Khasra   No.1027   and   also   vacant possession of the suit land marked by letters "MBCDEF" as shown in red colour in the site plan over Khasra No. 1028. However, six months time is given to the defendants to remove their super­structure over Khasra No.1027 and construction material stacked over Khasra No. 1029. If the defendants   do   not   remove   the   super­structure   and construction material within six months, then the plaintiffs shall   have   right   to   remove   the   super   structure   and construction   material   over   Khasra   No.1027   and   1028 respectively on the cost of the defendants. Further, the plaintiffs are entitle for consequential relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants not to cause any sort of interference in the suit land in future once the suit land is   restored   to   its   original   position. However   decree   in favour of the plaintiffs shall become absolute on filing ad­ valorem court fees within 15 days of the order,  failing which suit of the plaintiffs shall be deemed dismissed. No order as to costs. Decree sheet be prepared accordingly. Case   file   be   consigned   to   record   room   after   its   due completion.” 5. The   said   judgment   and   decree   has unsuccessfully been assailed by the defendants, before the learned Additional District Judge, Una, which was dismissed, on 23.6.2012. Thereafter, the Regular Second Appeal was also dismissed, on 19.8.2013 by this Court. 4 2026:HHC:26109 6. Thereafter, plaintiff Onkar Chand and the legal representatives of Ved Prakash filed execution petition, before the Executing Court. 7. In   the   said   execution   petition,   the Objector/present petitioner has filed the objections, on 8.5.2018, in which, he has asserted that after passing of the decree, the Judgment Debtor approached him, as well   as,   the   Decree   Holder   to   hand   over   the   vacant possession of the encroached area (subject matter of the lis) to the Decree Holders,  but the Decree­Holders have denied   to   take     possession   of   the   said   land   and   the Judgment Debtor requested  the Objector that they are ready to give the building, as it is, which is the subject matter of the lis. Accordingly, they had handed over the possession of the encroached area, by way of written agreement,   dated   13.4.2018.   The   said   agreement   was executed   between     Objetor   Sushil   Kumar   and   the Judgment   Debtor,   in   the   presence   of   the   marginal witnesses, and the same was also attested by the Notary Public. 5 2026:HHC:26109 8. On   the   basis   of   above   facts,   the   objector   has asserted   his   possession   over   the   encroached   area, regarding   which,   judgment   and   decree   have   been passed, by asserting that now, he is in possession of the same, as co­sharer, and that he is in exclusive hissedari possession with judgment debtors and Daulat Ram and Ram Prakash, co­sharers. 9. On the basis of above facts, a prayer has been made to dismiss the execution petition. 10. These   objections   have   been   contested   by   the Decree­Holders, by filing their reply, in which, they have taken preliminary objections that the objections are not maintainable;   Objector   is   estopped   by   his   acts   and conduct to file objections; the objections have been filed, in connivance with the Judgment Debtors. 11. On merits, the factual position with regard to filing of the suit and passing of the decree by the learned Executing Court, has not been disputed. It is admitted that   Ved   Prakash,   Onkar   Chand,   Mela   Ram,   Ram Parkash   and   Daulat   Ram   were   five   members   and purchased the suit land. 6 2026:HHC:26109 12. The objections have further been contested on the ground that objector and his father Mela Ram are permanent residents of village Basal, Distt. Una, H.P. at the distance of about 30 k.m. from village Thathal, where the suit land is situated. 13. The very possession, as alleged by the Judgment Debtors   has   been   disputed   by   asserting   the   factual position, as recorded in the latest revenue record. Lastly, it has been asserted that the objector has never obtained the possession of the suit land, and the same is still in the illegal possession of the Judgment Debtor and his successors. 14. On the basis of above facts, a prayer has been made to dismiss the objections. 15. In this case, the  Judgment  Debtors have  also filed the objections by supporting the case of   Objector Sushil Kumar. 16. In the said execution petition, Judgment Debtor Devinder Singh has also   filed objections. He has put forward   the   plea   of   exchange   of   land,   vide   registered exchange deed, which had taken place on 22.10.2021, in 7 2026:HHC:26109 terms   of   which,   the   objector   has   given   the   land measuring 00.00.40 hectares of land to Devinder Singh, out of share of the objector in Khasra Nos. 1027 and 1028. 17. These objections were dismissed by the learned Executing Court, vide order dated 22.11.2021, which is being assailed by way of the present petition. 18. According to the petitioner­objector, the learned Executing Court has failed to appreciate the fact that the judgment   and   decree,   on   the   basis   of   which,   the Execution Petition was filed, is pertaining to the joint land and the petitioner/objector has not been arrayed as party in the said suit. Not only the petitioner/objector, but   other   recorded   owners   of   khasra   Nos.   1027   and 1028 have also not been impleaded as party. 19. The order passed by the learned Executing Court has also been assailed on the ground that although, the Decree Holders tried to set up their case, on the basis of the fact that they are in physical possession of the suit land, but the fact that the land is owned by other co­ sharers, has not been disputed. 8 2026:HHC:26109 20. According to the petitioner/objector, the learned Executing Court has fallen into an error by not treating the objections under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC. The learned Executing Court has not taken into consideration the subsequent events, as there was no legal bar for the petitioner/objector   to   enter   into   an   agreement,   dated 18.4.2018. 21. It   has   also   been   contended   on   behalf   of   the petitioner/objector   that   the   objections   filed   by   the petitioner/objector, who is admittedly   one of the co­ sharers,  could not be summarily dismissed. 22. The findings of the learned Executing Court have further been assailed on the ground that the learned Executing Court has fallen into an error by not framing the issues and not affording opportunities to the parties to lead evidence. As such, it has been pleaded that the learned   Executing   Court   has   not   exercised   the jurisdiction vested in it, properly. 23. It has been re­asserted that the petitioner/objector,   in   pursuance   of   agreement   dated 9 2026:HHC:26109 13.4.2018,   is   in   physical   possession   of   the   built   up structure and the land continuously since 13.4.2018. 24. The order passed by the learned Executing Court is stated to be self contradictory, as on one hand, it has been held that the Judgment Debtor Devinder Singh has become co­owner only in the land and not in the super structure, whereas, in the conclusion, the claim of the petitioner/objector   was   required   to   be   kept   into consideration,   especially   in   view   of   agreement   dated 13.4.2018. 25. According to the petitioner/objector, the learned Executing Court has wrongly held that without partition, the   petitioner/objector   cannot   take   possession   of   the specific portion of the land, whereas same principle has not been applied by the learned Executing Court in the case of Devinder Singh. 26. On the basis of above facts, Mr. Mohinder Verma and Mr. Sumit Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner have prayed that the present petition may be allowed. 10 2026:HHC:26109 27. In this case, it is not in dispute that when, the judgment   and   decree,   dated   23.9.2010   has   attained finality, then, the Decree Holders have filed execution petition, against JDs, namely Rajinder Singh and Om Prakash. In the said execution petition, Sushil Kumar (petitioner   herein)   has   filed   objections   as   third   party, whereas,   the   Judgment   Debtors   have   also   filed objections. Both,   objector   Sushil   Kumar   and   JDs Rajinder Singh and Om Prakash have taken the similar stand. 28. Objector Sushil Kumar has much relied upon the written agreement, dated 13.4.2018, by virtue of which, JDs have given the possession of the disputed area to the Objectors. The said document has not been placed on   record. Para­6   of   the   objections   is   reproduced   as under: “That   accordingly   judgment   debtor   has   given   the possessionof disputed area i.e. encroached upon area as well as building to the objector and in this regard a written agreement is duly executed between the objector as well as the judgment debtor on 13.4.2018. The agreement is written between the objector as well as judgment debtor in the presence of marginal witnesses and the same is also 11 2026:HHC:26109 attested   by   the   Notary   Public. Now   at   present   the encroached area/disputed portion is coming in possession of the objector who is also co­sharer and is and was in exclusive hissedari possession with judgment debtor and Daulat Ram and Ram Parkash co­sharers.” 29. The Judgment Debtors have placed on record the certified copy of the exchange deed, dated 22.10.2021, which was executed between Devinder Singh, S/o Om Prakash (S/o JD No. 2) and Objector Sushil Kumar. As per this document, after passing of the decree by the learned   Executing   Court   on   23.9.2010,   the   exchange deed had taken place between LRs of Judgment Debtor No. 2 with the Objector, qua the subject matter of the lis. As   per   the   exchange   deed,   Devinder   Kumar   has exchanged     1250/110160th  share   out   of   the   land, bearing khata No. 186, khatauni Nos. 385 to 387, total measuring 00­35­34 hect., situated in up­mohal Ram Nagar, Mauja Thathal, Tehsil Amb, District Una, H.P. This land was exchanged with the land measuring 00­ 07­08, being 40/708th  share, out of the land bearing khata No. 114 min. khatauni Numbers 249, 250 and Khasra Nos. 1027, 1028. 12 2026:HHC:26109 30. Admittedly, the petitioner­objector Sushil Kumar drives his title from the Judgment Debtors, as he has claimed   that   an   agreement   had   taken   place   between objector   and   Decree   Holder,   by   virtue   of   which   the possession of the subject matter of the lis was handed over to him. In this factual background, the bar as created by Rule 102 of Order 21 CPC comes into play. Relevant provisions of Order 21 Rule 102 of CPC, are reproduced, as under:­ “102. Rules   not   applicable   to   transferee   pendente lite. ­ Nothing in rules 98 and 100 shall apply to resistance or obstruction in execution of a decree for the possession of immovable property by a person to whom the judgment­ debtor has transferred the property after the institution of the   suit   in   which   the   decree   was   passed   or   to   the dispossession of any such person. Explanation. ­ In this rule, “transfer” includes a transfer by operation of law.” 31. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in a case “Tahir V. Isani Vs Madan Waman Chodankar (since deceased) now through his legal representatives & Ors., 2025 INSC 1044”, has elaborately discussed the provisions of Rule 102 of Order XXI CPC. Relevant paragraphs 9 to 13 of the judgment, are reproduced, as under:­ 13 2026:HHC:26109 “9. The whole scheme of Rule 102 of Order XXI intends to preserve   the   idea   of   achieving   finality   of   the   judicial decisions. The provision imbibes the principle of “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” i.e., it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation. In a suit pending between a plaintiff and a defendant as to the right to a particular estate, the decision of the court in that case shall be binding not only on the litigating parties, but also on   those   who   derive   title   under   them   by   alienations (transfer) made while the suit was pending, whether such alienees,   i.e.   transferees,   had   or   had   not   notice   of   the pending proceedings. In this regard, we are benefitted by the decision of this Court in Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram and others  (2008)   7   SCC   144,   where   this   Court   had   the occasion to deal with the scheme of Rule 102 of Order XXI, and held that: ­ “17. Rule 102 clarifies that Rules 98 and 100 of Order   21   of   the  Code  do   not  apply   to   transferee pendente lite. That Rule is relevant and material and may be quoted in extenso: “102. Rules not  applicable to  transferee  pendente lite.—Nothing in Rules 98 and 100 shall apply to resistance or obstruction in execution of a decree for the possession of immovable property by a person to whom   the   judgment­debtor   has   transferred   the property after the institution of the suit in which the decree was passed or to the dispossession of any such person.” Bare reading of the Rule makes it clear that it is based   on   justice,   equity   and   good   conscience. A transferee from a judgment­ debtor is presumed to be aware of the proceedings before a court of law. He   should   be   careful   before   he   purchases   the property which is the subject­matter of litigation. It recognises the doctrine of lis pendens recognised by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Rule 102 of Order 21 of the Code thus takes into account the   ground   reality   and   refuses   to   extend   helping hand to purchasers of property in respect of which litigation   is   pending. If   unfair,   inequitable   or undeserved   protection   is   afforded   to   a   transferee 14 2026:HHC:26109 pendente lite, a decree­holder will never be able to realise the fruits of his decree. Every time the decree­ holder seeks a direction from a court to execute the decree,   the  judgment­debtor   or   his  transferee   will transfer the property and the new transferee will offer resistance or cause obstruction. To avoid such a situation,the Rule has been enacted.” (emphasis supplied) Therefore, Rule 102 of Order XXI intends to protect the interests   of   the   decree­holder   against   the   attempts   of unscrupulous   judgment­debtors   and   their   subsequent transferees who indulge in activities and leave no stone unturned to deprive the decree­holders from reaping the benefits of the decree granted in their favour. The Rule being equitable in nature, therefore, estops further creation of rights as it explicitly states that nothing in Rules 98 and 100 shall apply to the resistance or obstruction being made by the transferee pendente lite of judgment­debtor. 10. Recently, this Court in the case of Jini Dhanrajgir and another v. Shibu Mathew  and another (2023) 20 SCC 76 noted the plight of the decree­holders in our country. The Court   quoted   a   Privy   Council   decision   in   1872   and concluded   that   the   observations   made   therein   still   hold true, where Privy Council had stated that the difficulties of litigants in India indeed begin when they have obtained a decree. For   the   ready   reference,   the   relevant   extract   is quoted hereinbelow: ­ “. . . More than a century and a half back, the Privy Council (speaking through the Right Hon. Sir James Colville, J.) in Raj Durbhunga v. Coomar Ramaput Sing [1872 SCC OnLine PC 16] lamented that the difficulties of litigants in India indeed begin when they   have   obtained   a   decree. A   reference   to   the above observation is also found in the decision of the Oudh Judicial Commissioner's Court in  Kuer Jang Bahadur   v.   Bank   of  Upper   India   Ltd.   [Kuer   Jang Bahadur  v.   Bank   of   Upper   India   Ltd.,   1925   SCC OnLine Oudh JC 217]  It was ruled there that the courts had to be careful to ensure that the process of 15 2026:HHC:26109 the court and the laws of procedure were not abused by judgment­debtors in such a way as to make the courts of law instrumental in defrauding creditors, who had obtained decrees in accordance with their rights. 2. Notwithstanding the enormous lapse of time, we are left awestruck at the observation [Raj Durbhunga v. Coomar Ramaput Sing, 1872 SCC OnLine PC 16] of the Privy Council which  seems to have proved prophetic. The observation still holds true in present times and this case is no different from cases of decree­holders’ woes commencing while they are in pursuit   of   enforcing   valid   and   binding   decrees passed by civil courts of competent jurisdiction. The situation   is   indeed   disquieting,   viewed   from   the perspective of the decree­holders, but the law, as it stands, has to be given effect whether the court likes the result or not. . .” (emphasis supplied) 11. While it is important to protect the interests of decree­ holders, who hold an enforceable decree in their favour, it cannot be gainsaid that such interests cannot be blanketly protected. Rule 102 of Order XXI expressly lays down the ingredients as to when it can be applied. For a case to fall under Rule 102, it is condition precedent that there exists a decree for the possession of immovable property. Secondly, there   must   be   a   resistance   or   an   obstruction   in   the execution of the said decree. Thirdly, such obstruction or resistance   must   be   made   by   a   person   to   whom   the judgment­debtor   has   transferred   the   property. Fourthly, such transfer must have occurred after the institution of the original suit, i.e. the one in which the decree was passed. If the aforesaid ingredients are made out, Rule 102 prohibits the   protection   of   Rules   98   and   101   to   such   errant transferee of judgment­debtor. (self emphasis supplied) 12. In Usha Sinha (supra), the Court also had the occasion to deal with the mischief of such transferees who engage in conveyance pendente lite. The Court quoted with approval 16 2026:HHC:26109 the locus classicus from English law on the doctrine of lis pendens  Bellamy v. Sabine, [(1857) 1 De G & J 566], wherein   the   English   Court   recognised   that   the   intent behind   such   provision   is   to   stop   the   vicious   cycle   of introducing subsequent new buyers (alienees) while a suit is already pending. If such principle is not applied, the Court   held   that   there   would   be   no   certainty   that   the litigation would ever come to an end. This Court noted with disapproval the mischief being created by such transferees and their vendors, being the judgment­debtor, who transfer the immovable property at any time after the institution of the suit and held as follows: ­ “18. Before one and a half century, in Bellamy v. Sabine [(1857) 1 De G & J 566 : 44 ER 842] , Lord Cranworth, L.C. proclaimed that where a litigation is pending between a plaintiff and a defendant as to the  right to  a particular  estate,  the necessities  of mankind require that the decision of the court in the suit   shall   be   binding   not   only   on   the   litigating parties,   but   also   on   those   who   derive   title   under them by alienations made pending the suit, whether such alienees had or had not notice of the pending proceedings. If this were not so, there could be no certainty that the litigation would ever come to an end. … 23. It is thus settled law that a purchaser of suit property   during   the  pendency   of  litigation   has  no right to resist or obstruct execution of decree passed by a competent court. The doctrine of “lis pendens” prohibits   a   party   from   dealing   with   the   property which is the subject­matter of suit. “Lis pendens” itself is treated as constructive notice to a purchaser that he is bound by a decree to be entered in the pending suit. Rule 102, therefore, clarifies that there should   not   be   resistance   or   obstruction   by   a transferee   pendente   lite. It   declares   that   if   the resistance is caused or obstruction is offered by a transferee pendente lite of the judgment­debtor, he cannot seek benefit of Rules 98 or 100 of Order 21. … 17 2026:HHC:26109 26. For   invoking   Rule   102,   it   is   enough   for   the decree­holder to show that the person resisting the possession or offering obstruction is claiming his title to  the  property   after   the  institution   of  the  suit  in which decree was passed and sought to be executed against the judgment­debtor. If the said condition is fulfilled, the case falls within the mischief of Rule 102 and such applicant cannot place reliance either on Rule 98 or Rule 100 of Order 21.” (emphasis supplied) Therefore, it is absolutely clear, that the transferee of a judgment­debtor   who   traces   his   title   to   the   immovable property, that is the subject matter of a pending suit, is not entitled to seek the remedy available under Rules 97 to 102 of Order XXI. At the cost of repetition, we state that the whole scheme of Rule 102 of Order XXI read with Section 52, Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is to protect the interest of a decree­holder who has successfully attained a decree of possession of an immovable property. 13. However,   Rule  102   of  Order   XXI   applies  only   to  a person to whom the judgment­debtor has transferred the immovable property which was subject matter of that suit pendente lite. If the person who is resisting or obstructing the execution of the decree for possession of such property, is not the transferee of judgment­ debtor, i.e. he does not trace his title from judgment­debtor, bar of Rule 102 does not apply to him. That is to say that if the person who is resisting   or   obstructing   the   decree   for   possession   has received the property from person other than the judgment­ debtor,  such  person  is  competent  to gain  the benefit  of Rules 97 to 101 of Order XXI. In fact, he is entitled to such benefit   even   if   he   had   been   transferred   the   immovable property pendente lite, i.e. during the pendency of the suit, in which the decree was passed.” 32. At the cost of repetition, the objector­petitioner has asserted his claim on the basis of the document 18 2026:HHC:26109 dated   13.04.2018. As   such,   the   learned   Executing Court has rightly considered the rival contentions of the parties and rightly dismissed the objections, so raised. 33. The   learned   counsel   for     petitioner­objector Sushil Kumar could not satisfy the judicial conscience of this   Court   as   to   how   the   possession   of   the   specific portion of the land was exchanged with the land, which has not been partitioned. Moreover, the super­structure, which is the subject matter of the lis, has already been declared unlawful and has been directed to be removed by the Court, thus, the subsequent events cannot render the   decree   inexecutable. The   Objector   has   miserably failed to prove his case within the purview of Order 21 Rule 101 CPC. 34. The Objector cannot establish his independent right for maintaining Order 21 Rule 99 of the CPC. Even otherwise, the Objector is not asserting the independent right, which has allegedly been transferred to him by the Judgment Debtor, during pendency of the execution. 35. In view of this, there is no occasion for this Court to interfere with the well­reasoned order, passed by the 19 2026:HHC:26109 learned   Executing   Court.   Consequently,   the   present petition is dismissed, so also the pending application(s), if any. 36. Record be returned back. (Virender Singh) Judge 30.6.2026 Kalpana/Pramod Kumar