Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
1 2026:HHC:26123 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA RSA No.
: 340 of 2017 Reserved on
: 07
th May, 2026
Decided on : 30
th June, 2026 Uploaded on : 02
nd July, 2026 The District Collector …..Appellant Versus Anbar Hussain & Another …..Respondents
Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes. For the appellant : Mr. Tejasvi Sharma, Additional Advocate General. For the respondents : Mr. Amit Singh Chandel, Advocate, for respondent No.1. Mr. Sanjay Jaswal, Advocate, for respondent No.2. Virender Singh, Judge The District Collector, Bilaspur, has filed the present Regular Second Appeal, under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘the CPC’), against the judgment and decree dated 29.07.2016, passed by the Court of learned Additional District Judge, 1 Whether the reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:26123 Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur H.P., (Camp at Bilaspur) (hereinafter referred to as the ‘First Appellate Court’), in Civil Appeal No.39/13 of 2015, titled as ‘The District Collector versus Anbar Hussain & Another’. 2. By way of judgment and decree dated 29.07.2016, the learned First Appellate Court has dismissed the appeal filed by the present appellant, against the judgment and decree dated 30.06.2015, passed by learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bilaspur, (hereinafter referred to as the ‘trial Court’) in Civil Suit No.25/1 of 2009/2007, titled as ‘Anbar Hussain versus The District Collector, Bilaspur & Another’. 3. Vide judgment and decree dated 30.06.2015, the learned trial Court has decreed the suit, filed by the respondent, by granting the following relief:
“56. The suit of the plaintiff is decreed with costs and also compensatory costs of Rs.3,000/ for damages to be paid as compensation to the sum of Rs.1,00,000/ with interest @ 6% per annum simple pendente lite and future till realization by both the defendants jointly and severally. Defendant No.1 is further directed to release the relief of Rs.50,000/ to the plaintiff along with interest @ 6% per annum from the date of suit, which interest portion the defendant No.1 if so chooses may subsequently recover from the concerned official responsible to bring the matter to the notice at appropriate deciding level/Deputy Commissioner. 57.
Since the plaintiff has been allowed to sue as indigent person, the suit is decreed with costs, the
3 2026:HHC:26123 payment of Court fee shall be the responsibility of defendant No.1.”
4. For the sake of convenience, the parties to the present lis are hereinafter referred to, in the same manner, as were, referred to, by the learned trial Court. 5.
Brief facts, leading to filing of the present appeal, before this Court, as per record, may be summed up, as under:
5.1. PlaintiffAnbar Hussain has filed the suit, as an indigent person, against the defendants, seeking decree for damages of Rs.8,00,000/, on the ground that on 12.08.2005, at about 7.307.45 p.m., his mother was attacked by a stray bull, due to which, she sustained injuries. Thereafter, she was taken to Zonal Hospital, Bilaspur, however, during her treatment, she succumbed to the injuries. 5.2. Elaborating his stand, it has been pleaded that a dustbin has been placed near the house of the plaintiff at a distance of about 20 meters at Roura Sector Bilaspur, by the Municipal Council, Bilaspur. The said dustbin has not properly been managed and supervised. Consequently, the crew of stray cattle used to wander near the said dustbin. Due to their presence near the dustbin, human life always
4 2026:HHC:26123 remain in danger. Not only the stray cattle, but stray dogs also used to gather there. 5.3. According to the plaintiff, it was the duty of the Municipal Council to protect the life of the citizens and their property from stray cattle, cow, bulls and dogs etc. 5.4. In a nut shell, it is the case of the plaintiff, the defendants have not performed their duty, resulting into the death of his mother, due to the attack of stray bulls. As such, he has served the legal notice for damages against the defendants. The said notice was neither replied nor damages, as claimed in the notice, were given to him. 6. On the basis of the above facts, the plaintiff has sought the relief of decree for recovery of Rs.8,00,000/, as damages, from the date of accident till its realization. 7. The plaintiff was permitted to sue, as indigent person, vide order dated 18.02.2009. 8. When put to notice, the suit has been contested and resisted by the defendants. 8.1. Defendant No.1 has filed separate written statement, by taking the preliminary objections that the suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable; the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the present suit; the plaintiff is estopped by his own act and conduct; the suit is bad for nonjoinder and
5 2026:HHC:26123 misjoinder of necessary parties; the suit is barred by limitation; and the suit is not properly valued for the purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction.
8.2. On merits, the contents of the suit has been contested and resisted on the ground that the plaintiff has not reported the matter to the field revenue staff about the attack on his mother by the stray bull, nor, has he filed any claim for relief/compensation, in the office of Tehsildar Sadar. So far as the legal notice is concerned, it has been pleaded that no notice has ever been received by defendant No.1. 9. Defendant No.2, has filed its separate written statement, by taking the preliminary objections that the suit is not legally constituted; the plaintiff has no enforceable cause of action; the plaintiff has wrongly filed the suit as indigent person, as, he is having the sufficient means to pay the Court fee; that defendant No.1 is not liable to take care or look after the stray cattle/animals; the plaintiff has no cause of action; and the plaintiff has not approached the Court with clean hands. 9.1. On merits, the suit has been contested on the ground that the defendants have no control over stray cattle or dogs, as, they never remain stationary at one place. According to them, they are not bound to supervise the
6 2026:HHC:26123 movement of stray animals/cattle. However, service of notice has been admitted by defendant No.2. Thus, the defendants have prayed for dismissal of the suit. 10. The plaintiff has filed the replications to the written statements, filed by defendants, by denying the preliminary objections, as well as, the contents of written statements, by virtue of which, the suit has been contested, by reasserting that of the plaint. 11. From the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed, by the learned trial Court, vide order dated 21.12.2009:
1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for recovery of `8,00,000/, on account of damages, as alleged? OPP
2. Whether the plaintiff has cause of action to file the present suit? OPP
3.
Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his own act and conduct from filing of present suit? OPD
4. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is barred by limitation as alleged? OPD. 5. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable? OPD. 6. Relief. 12. Thereafter, the parties to the lis were directed to adduce evidence. 7 2026:HHC:26123
13. After the closure of the evidence, upon hearing the
learned counsel for the plaintiff, learned ADA, as well as,
learned counsel for defendant No.2, the learned trial Court has decreed the suit, as referred to above.
14. Against the said judgment and decree, the plaintiff has filed appeal before the learned First Appellate Court. The said appeal has also been dismissed by the learned First Appellate Court, vide judgment and decree dated 29.07.2016.
15. Feeling aggrieved from the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, as affirmed by the learned First Appellate Court, the plaintiff is before this Court, by way of the present Regular Second Appeal.
16. The judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, as affirmed by the learned First Appellate Court, has been assailed, on the ground that both the Courts below have failed to appreciate the fact that the State has not been arrayed as party to the suit and no decree can be passed against the Department, without impleading the State, as party. The learned trial Court has wrongly interpreted the provisions of Section 79 of CPC.
17. The findings have further been assailed on the ground that the learned trial Court has committed grave error
8 2026:HHC:26123 of law, while deciding the issues No.1 to 5, without appreciating the evidence on record.
18. The findings have further been assailed on the ground that the learned trial Court has failed to consider the fact that the plaintiff has no cause to file the present suit. Elaborating its stand, the judgment and decree has been assailed on the ground that in the crossexamination, the plaintiff has admitted that he has not reported the matter to Patwari Halqua and also admitted that he has received Rs.25,000/, as, relief from the Government, through Tehsildar Sadar Bilaspur. The matter was also not reported by him to the Police.
19. Relying upon the statement of Dr. D.R. Sehgal, the
judgment and decree has been assailed on the ground that the said doctor has admitted that there was no mark of injury on the body of Sakina, caused by the horns of bull. The appellant has also made attempts to shift the burden to pay the damages on the Municipal Council, by taking the grounds that the Municipal Council is duty bound to provide proper sheds for stray cattle.
20. The findings have further been assailed on the ground that defendant No.1, is not liable to pay the amount of damages, as, the negligence has been alleged against
9 2026:HHC:26123 defendant No.2. According to defendant No.1, the plaintiff has not produced any documentary proof to demonstrate that Sakina has died due to attack by stray bulls. The evidence of PW1 is stated to have wrongly been relied upon, as, he was not present on the spot, when the alleged incident had taken place.
21. On the basis of the above facts, Shri Tejasvi Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, has prayed that the appeal may kindly be allowed, by setting aside the
judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, as, upheld by the learned First Appellate Court and prayed that the suit of the plaintiff may kindly be dismissed. 22. Per contra, Shri Amit Singh Chandel, Advocate has supported the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, as affirmed by the learned First Appellate Court, on the ground that the learned trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence so adduced and thus, the findings of the learned trial Court, as affirmed by the learned First Appellate Court, do not require any interference, in the present case. 23. The present appeal has been admitted by this Court on 16.08.2017, on the following substantial questions of law:
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1. Whether the Court of Civil Judge (Sr. Division) and first appellate Court had bye passed the mandatory provisions of Section 79 of CPC, while passing the impugned judgment and decree as affirmed by learned first appellate Court, if so its effect? 2. Whether the suit against the public servant can lie without impleading the State as party to the suit, when such public servant has been arrayed as party in his official capacity
3. Whether the courts below have misread and misinterpreted the oral as well as documentary evidence on record? 24. Admittedly, in the present case, the plaintiff has not impleaded the State as a party, however, District Collector, Bilaspur and Executive Officer, Municipal Council, Bilaspur, have been impleaded as partydefendants. Notice, under Section 80 of the CPC, was served upon both the defendants. Copy of the said notice is available on record, as Ex.PW1/A. Admittedly, the said notice has not been responded by the defendants. 25. In this admitted backdrop, the above substantial questions of law are now required to be answered. In the plaint, the relief has been sought against the defendants jointly and severally and as per the provisions of Section 262 of the Himachal Pradesh Municipal Act, 1994, which is reproduced as under:
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“262.
Control by Deputy Commissioner. (1) The Deputy Commissioner or any Officer authorised in writing by him or any person empowered by the State Government in this behalf by a general or special order, may (a) enter on, inspect and survey, or cause to be entered on, inspected and surveyed, any immoveable property occupied by any municipality or any work in progress under its direction; 130 THE HIMACHAL PRADESH MUNICIPAL ACT, 1994 (b) by order in writing addressed to the Executive Officer/ Secretary call for and inspect or cause to be inspected any book or document in the possession or under the control of any municipality and the member or the employee of the municipality in possession of such book or document shall immediately place such book or document shall immediately place such book or document at the disposal of the Executive Officer/ Secretary, who shall immediately comply with such
order and shall immediately inform the President of the requisition. He shall also bring the matter to the notice of the municipality at its meeting next following; (c) by order in writing addressed to the Executive Officer/ Secretary require any such municipality to furnish within a specified period such statements, accounts, reports and copies of documents relating to the proceedings or duties of the municipalities as he may think fit to call for; (d) inquire generally into the affairs of a municipality or with a view to ascertaining whether a municipal area is being satisfactorily administered, and for the purposes of such enquiry make use of any property of the municipality, and of the powers mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c), and the members and employees of the municipality shall render such assistance in the inquiry as may be deemed necessary. Explanation. Any person so empowered shall be deemed to be a public servant within the meaning
12 2026:HHC:26123 of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860). (2) The Deputy Commissioner may record in writing for the consideration of any such municipality any observations that he may think proper in regard to the proceedings or duties of municipality. (3) Every municipality shall submit such periodical reports to the Deputy Commissioner or other authority as the State Government may direct.”
26. The supervisory powers are with the Deputy Commissioner/District Collector. As such, the District Collector has been impleaded as partydefendant No.1 and Municipal Council Bilaspur has been sued through its Executive Officer, as defendant No.2. 27. It has rightly been pointed out by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that mere nonimpleadment of the State, as party, would not permit the authorities to escape from their accountability. When, the notice has been served upon the District Collector, it is the compliance of Section 80 of the CPC, as the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.2431 of 2019, titled as Varun Pahwa versus Renu Chaudhary, has held that procedural defects should not defeat substantive justice, especially where the authority concerned had notice and opportunity to contest the same. 13 2026:HHC:26123 Relevant paragraph 10 of the judgment, is reproduced, as under:
“10. In Uday Shankar Triyar v. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh and Another, this Court held that procedural defects and irregularities which are curable should not be allowed to defeat substantive rights or to cause injustice.
Procedure should never be made a tool to deny justice or perpetuate injustice by any oppressive or punitive use. The Court held as under:
“17. Noncompliance with any procedural requirement relating to a pleading, memorandum of appeal or application or petition for relief should not entail automatic dismissal or rejection, unless the relevant statute or rule so mandates. Procedural defects and irregularities which are curable should not be allowed to defeat substantive rights or to cause injustice. Procedure, a handmaiden to justice, should never be made a tool to deny justice or perpetuate injustice, by any oppressive or punitive use. The wellrecognised exceptions to this principle are: (i) where the statute prescribing the procedure, also prescribes specifically the consequence of non compliance; (ii) where the procedural defect is not rectified, even after it is pointed out and due opportunity is given for rectifying it; (iii) where the noncompliance or violation is proved to be deliberate or mischievous; (iv) where the rectification of defect would affect the case on merits or will affect the jurisdiction of the court; (v) in case of memorandum of appeal, there is complete absence of authority and the appeal is presented without the knowledge, consent and authority of the appellant.”
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28. The District Collector has filed separate reply by taking preliminary objections with regard to the maintainability; the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the suit; the plaintiff is estopped, by his own act and conduct; the suit is barred by limitation; the suit is not properly valued for the purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction. In addition to this, a vague preliminary objection that the suit is bad for nonjoinder and misjoinder of necessary parties, has been taken by defendant No.1. 29. In this case, issues were framed by the learned trial Court on 21.12.2009, in the presence of the learned ADA. Thereafter, no efforts have been made by defendant No.1 to move appropriate application, under Order 14 Rule 5 of the CPC for framing of additional issue with regard to non joinder of necessary parties.
When the parties are aware about the stand taken by them, in the pleadings, it was their duty to point out about the nonframing of the issues. Failure of defendant No.1 to point out or to move appropriate application is sufficient to conclude that the suit is not bad for nonimpleading the State as party. 30. Moreover, defendant No.1/appellant is before this Court, in Regular Second Appeal, against the concurrent findings and the concurrent findings can only be interfered
15 2026:HHC:26123 with, if the findings, so recorded, by the learned trial Court and affirmed by the learned First Appellate Court, are suffering from perversity. 31. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Govindaraju Versus Mariamman, (2005) 2 Supreme Court Cases 500, has elaborately discussed the term ‘perverse’. Relevant paragraphs 16 to 19 of the judgment, are reproduced, as under:
“16. As per settled law, the scope of exercise of the jurisdiction by the High Court in Second Appeal under Section 100 is limited to the substantial questions of law framed at the time of admission of the appeal or additional substantial questions of law framed at a later date after recording reasons for the same. It was observed in Santosh Hazari's case (supra) that a point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be a 'substantial' question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent and answer to the same will have a material bearing as to the rights of the parties before the Court. As to what would be the question of law "involving in the case", it was observed that to be a question of law 'involving in the case' there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by the court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision between the parties.
17. After perusal of the findings recorded by the courts below and the High Court, we are of the opinion that the questions of law framed at the time of admission of the appeal were not questions of substance arising from the findings record\ed by the courts of fact. The court of fact recorded the finding that the title in the suit property did not pass
16 2026:HHC:26123 to Veeramuthu Moopanar and the sale deed dated 1.7.1940 executed by him in favour of his two daughters was a nominal and a sham transaction. The court of fact had also come to the conclusion that there was a divorce between Thayarammal and Sengamalai Moopanar under custom and the respondent herein had failed to prove that Ganapathy Moopanar was the son of Sengamalai Moopanar from his first wife. After recording this finding of fact, the court of fact held that since Ganapathy Moopanar was not proved to be the son of Sengamalai Moopanar and that a divorce had taken place between Thayarammal and Sengamalai Moopanar, Ganapathy Moopanar could not succeed to the estate of Thayarammal being the heir of her husband under Section 15(1)(b) of the Act. That in the absence of any direct heir, the property of Thayarammal reverted back to the heirs of her father i.e. the family members of the brother of her father. The sale effected by Ganapathy Moopanar in favour of the respondent did not convey any title as Ganapathy Moopanar was not proved to be the owner of the property. 18. The High Court on reappreciation of evidence recorded a finding to the contrary and held that the marriage between Thayarammal and Sengamalai Moopanar had not been dissolved. It further held that Ganapathy Moopanar was the son of Sengamalai Moopanar from his previous wife. That the sale executed by Veeramuthu Moopanar dated 1.7.1940 in favour of his two daughters was not a nominal and sham transaction.
That it conveyed a valid title of the suit property to his two daughters. As the daughters had not inherited the property but purchased the same from their father, they became the absolute owners of the same. Thayarammal had inherited the share of her sister after her death. As Thayarammal had died issueless and had a step son Ganapathy Moopanar from her husband, Ganapathy Moopanar inherited the suit property being the heir of her husband under Section 15(1)(b) of the Act and succeeded to the estate of Thayarammal. That Ganapathy Moopanar had a conveyable title in the suit property and the sale made by him in favour of the respondent was valid and decreed the suit. This was done on re appreciation of evidence present on record. Questions of law which had been framed at the time
17 2026:HHC:26123 of admission and were referred and reproduced in the judgment were not adverted to while deciding the appeal. No finding was recorded on those questions. After reproducing the questions of law, the learned Single Judge did not advert to either of them or record findings on them. The learned Single Judge proceeded to decide the appeal thereafter as if after framing the questions of law the High Court gets the jurisdiction to re appreciate the evidence and come to a conclusion other than the one recorded by the courts of fact. As observed by this Court in Santosh Hazari's case (supra) for the question of law to be involved in the case, first a foundation for it has to be laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of facts arrived at by the court of fact and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. In the present case, the learned Single Judge proceeded to reappreciate the evidence and on reappreciating the same, set aside the findings referred to above on facts.
On reversal of the findings referred to above on facts, the High Court came to the conclusion that Ganapathy Moopanar would inherit the property under Section 15(1)(b) being the heir of the husband of Thayarammal and not under Section 15(2)(a) under which property was to revert back to the heirs of her father. The questions of law which were framed at the time of admission of the appeal were not decided by the High Court. 19. Even if the High Court was of the view that the findings of fact recorded by the courts below were wrong, in our opinion, these findings of fact could not be disturbed without coming to the conclusion that the findings recorded were perverse i.e. based on misreading of evidence or based on no evidence. The High Court did not come to such a conclusion. The learned Singh Judge also did not come to the conclusion that the appeal involved other substantial questions of law or formulate the same. 32. Hon’ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Another versus State represented by the Public Prosecutor &
18 2026:HHC:26123 Another, (2009) 10 Supreme Court Cases 206, has again elaborately discussed the term ‘perverse findings’. Relevant paragraphs 24 to 30 of the judgment, are reproduced, as under:
“24. The expression `perverse' has been dealt with in number of cases. In Gaya Din (Dead) through LRs. & Others v. Hanuman Prasad (Dead) through LRs. & Others (2001) 1 SCC 501 this Court observed that the expression `perverse' means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity. 25. In Parry's (Calcutta ) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. & Others AIR 1966 Cal. 31, the Court observed that `perverse finding' means a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE, the Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings. 26.
In M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another AIR 1977 Kar. 58, the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough, the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey, the Court defined `perverse' as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct etc. 27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner:
1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition
“Perverse – Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable.”
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2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English – International Edition
“Perverse – Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable.”
3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English 1998 Edition
“Perverse – Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law.”
4. New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition)
“Perverse – Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant.”
5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition
“Perverse – A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence.”
28. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P. (2003) 1 SCC 761, the Court observed thus:
"We are of the opinion that the trial court was quite justified in acquitting the appellants of the charges as the view taken by it was reasonable one and the order of acquittal cannot be said to be perverse.
It is well settled that appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal unless the same is found to be perverse. In the present case, the High Court has committed an error in interfering with the
order of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity."
29. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police & Others (1999) 2 SCC 10, the Court while dealing with the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as under:
"9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it
20 2026:HHC:26123 would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny.
10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the
order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with."
30. The meaning of `perverse' has been examined in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officercum Assessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, this Court observed as under:
"7. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court reappreciate the primary or perceptive facts which were otherwise within the domain of the factfinding authority under the statute. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. But what was assailed in review was, in substance, the correctness – as distinguished from the legal permissibility – of the primary or perceptive
facts themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into
consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to
21 2026:HHC:26123 suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law."
33. Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajasthan State Transport Corporation & Another Versus Bajrang Lal, 2014(3) Shim.LC 1472, has held that the High Court may entertain second appeal even, on the question of facts, where, the factual findings are found to be perverse. Meaning thereby, if this Court comes to the conclusion that the findings are perverse, then, the concurrent findings, recorded by both the Courts below, can be interfered with.
34. From the stand as taken by the parties, as considered by the learned trial Court, as well as, affirmed by the learned First Appellate Court, the findings so recorded by the learned trial Court cannot be said to be suffering from perversity.
35.
Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff has rightly pointed out that the Municipal Council, respondent No.2, had a statutory duty, under Sections 149 and 196 of the Himachal Pradesh Municipal Act, 1994 to regulate stray cattle and maintain public health. Relevant provisions of the Act, are reproduced, as under:
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149. Keeping of animals injurious to health.– [(1) Whoever keeps any swine or other animals in disregard of any orders which the municipality may give to prevent them from becoming a nuisance, or so as to be injurious to the health of the inhabitants or of animals shall be punishable with a fine of [five hundred and of one thousand rupees] for every such subsequent offence.] [(2) No person shall (a) feed the monkeys, langoors and other stray animals in any public place, or (b) spit on public place, public road, public street or walls, or (c) throw any type of garbage/refuse etc. on any public place, road, street or in open hill side except in a container provided by the municipality for this purpose. Explanation. For the purpose of clause (a), the expression “public place” shall not include temple. (3) Whoever contravenes the provisions of sub section (2), he shall be punishable with fine which may extend to [one thousand rupee.], in addition to other charges incurred for cleaning or removal of such garbage/refuse etc. from such public place, road, street or open hill side by the municipality.. 196. Picketing animals and collecting carts. (1) Whoever, without the permission of the municipality, pickets animals or collects carts on any street, or uses any street as a halting place, for vehicles or animals of any description or as a place of encampment or causes or permits animals to stray shall be punishable with a fine which shall not be less than [five hundred rupees and more than two thousand rupees.] (2) Any animal found picketed, tethered or straying on any public street without the permission of the municipality may be removed to a pound by any employee of the municipality or by a police officer. 23 2026:HHC:26123
36. Considering the limited scope of this Court, under Section 100 CPC, this Court is of the view that the findings, so recorded, by both the Courts below, do not fall within the definition of perverse findings, as such, the same do not require any interference by this Court.
Hence, the substantial questions of law, as framed, are decided against the appellants. 32. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed and the
judgment and decree passed by the learned trail Court, as, affirmed by learned First Appellate Court, is upheld.
33. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand
disposed of.
34. Decree sheet be prepared accordingly.
35. Record be sent back.
(Virender Singh) June 30, 2026(ps)
Judge