1 2026:HHC:26005 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 650 of 2026 Reserved on: 24.6.2026 Date of Decision: 2.7.2026. Aryan …. Petitioner Versus State of HP & ors. …. Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes. For the Petitioner : Mr Abhimanyu Rathore, Advocate. For Respondent-State : Mr Tarun Pathak, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner had earlier filed a Criminal Writ Petition No. 25 of 2026 titled Aryan versus State of H.P. before this Court to quash the FIR and the consequential proceedings arising out of it, which was listed before the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner, under instructions, sought permission to withdraw the petition with liberty to raise the contentions which had been raised in the petition at the stage of framing of the charges. The permission was granted, and the writ 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:26005 petition was dismissed as withdrawn. Instead of raising the contentions at the time of the framing of the charges as undertaken, the petitioner filed another petition before this Court, which was registered as Cr.MMO No. 402 of 2026, and was withdrawn on 13.05.2026. 2. Again, instead of taking the pleas before the learned Trial Court, the petitioner has approached this Court to quash the FIR and the consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR. The maintainability of the present petition was seriously doubtful; therefore, learned counsel for the petitioner was heard on the question of maintainability. 3. Mr Abhimanyu Rathore, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that a second petition lies to quash the FIR after the dismissal of the first petition, if there is a change in the circumstances. In the present case, a complaint was filed before the Police Station, Sadar, for the registration of the FIR against Meena Rani and Manoj for offences of extortion, blackmailing and criminal intimidation, which constitutes a change in the circumstance. Therefore, he submitted that the present petition is fully maintainable. He relied upon the judgments of Hon'ble 3 2026:HHC:26005 Supreme Court in Bhisham Lal Verma v. State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1399, M.C. Ravikumar v. D.S. Velmurugan, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1498 and Muskan Enterprises v. State of Punjab, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4107 in support of his submission. 4. Mr Tarun Pathak, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that there is no change in the circumstances, and mere filing of the complaint cannot constitute any change. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 5. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the time and have gone through the records carefully. 6. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhisham Lal Verma v. State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1399, that a person approaching the High Court under section 482 of Cr.P.C. should take all the pleas, and it is impermissible to file the petitions in piecemeal. It was observed: 10. In S. Madan Kumar v. K. Arjunan 2006 SCC OnLine Mad 94, the Madras High Court observed that a person who invokes Section 482 Cr. P.C. should honestly come before the Court raising all the pleas available to him at that point of time, and he is not supposed to approach the Court with instalment pleas. It was further observed that there may be a change of circumstances during the course of criminal 4 2026:HHC:26005 proceedings which would give scope for the person aggrieved to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, but when he is posted with all the facts and circumstances of a case, he cannot withhold part of it for the purpose of filing yet another petition seeking the same relief. 11. We are in complete agreement with these observations of the Madras High Court. Though it is clear that there can be no blanket rule that a second petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. would not lie in any situation, and it would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the individual case, it is not open to a person aggrieved to raise one plea after the other, by invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr. P.C., though all such pleas were very much available even at the first instance. Permitting the filing of successive petitions under Section 482 Cr. P.C., ignoring this principle would enable an ingenious accused to effectively stall the proceedings against him to suit his own interest and convenience, by filing one petition after another under Section 482 Cr. P.C., irrespective of when the cause therefor arose. Such abuse of process cannot be permitted. 7. It was held in R. Annapurna v. Ramadugu Anantha Krishna Sastry, (2002) 10 SCC 401: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1135: 2000 SCC OnLine SC 1143, that where no development had taken place after the rejection of the earlier petition. The second petition is not maintainable. It was observed: 6. There can be no two opinions that the order dated 28-1- 1995 has become final. Learned counsel for the respondents made an endeavour to show that it is open to the same parties to move the High Court once again on causes which developed subsequent to 28-1-1995. We are not considering that contention in the present case, for the second petition for quashing was not made on the strength of anything 5 2026:HHC:26005 which developed subsequent to 28-1-1995 but only on the facts which subsisted before that date. If that be so, the High Court had no power to upset the order dated 28-1- 1995 with the help of any subsequent order, though in this case the High Court did so without being informed of the prior order. 8. A similar view was taken in Naushad Ahmad Ansari vs. State of Uttarakhand SLP (Crl) No. 9111 of 2022, decided on 12.12.2024, wherein it was observed: “8. It is a matter of record that a previous petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. stood dismissed, and an appeal against such dismissal to this Court was also dismissed. The law on this point is well-settled. The dismissal of a previous petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. does not bar a subsequent petition, under the said Section, from being entertained, if the facts so justify. (see Vinod Kumar v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 559 and Supdt. and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Mohan Singh, (1975) 3 SCC 706) The record is silent as to which facts persuaded the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction for a second time when one such petition already stood dismissed and such order, confirmed by this Court. It has been treated like an application coming up at the first instance. Such an approach is not justified.” 9. Similar is the judgment in Muskan Enterprises v. State of Punjab, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4107, wherein it was observed: “18. Recently, this Court in Bhisham Lal Verma v. State of U.P. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1399 has again held that there is no blanket rule against the filing of successive petitions under section 482, Cr. P.C. before the high court. It was also held that if such a petition is filed, it must be seen whether there was any change in facts or circumstances necessitating the filing of such a petition.” 6 2026:HHC:26005 10. This position was reiterated in M.C. Ravikumar v. D.S. Velmurugan, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1498, wherein it was observed: 11. The short question that arises for our consideration is “Whether a second quashing petition under Section 482 CrPC would be maintainable on the grounds/pleas that were available to be raised even at the time of filing/decision of the first quashing petition?” 12. At the outset, we may like to note that the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the accused- respondents that the second quashing petition came to be filed based on new grounds/pleas is not tenable on the face of it. From the bare perusal of the record, it is evident that the second quashing petition raised no such grounds/pleas that were unavailable to the accused-respondents at the time of adjudication of the first quashing petition. The failure of the accused-respondents to raise a pertinent ground/plea which was tangibly available to them at the time of adjudication of the first quashing petition can in no circumstance grant a right to the said accused persons to file a subsequent quashing petition, as it would amount to seeking review on pre-existing material. 13. This Court, in a catena of judgments, has held that it is not open to an accused person to raise one plea after the other, by repeatedly invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, though all such pleas were very much available to him even at the first instance. We may hasten to add that there is no sweeping rule to the effect that a second quashing petition under Section 482 CrPC is not maintainable, and its maintainability will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. However, the onus to show that there arose a change in circumstances warranting the entertainment of a subsequent quashing petition would be on the person filing the said petition. In this regard, we may gainfully refer to the observations made by this Court in the case of Bhisham 7 2026:HHC:26005 Lal Verma v. State of UP 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1399, which are extracted below for ready reference: — “11. …… Though it is clear that there can be no blanket rule that a second petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. would not lie in any situation, and it would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the individual case, it is not open to a person aggrieved to raise one plea after the other, by invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr. P.C., though all such pleas were very much available even at the first instance. Permitting the filing of successive petitions under Section 482 Cr. P.C., ignoring this principle would enable an ingenious accused to effectively stall the proceedings against him to suit his own interest and convenience, by filing one petition after another under Section 482 Cr. P.C., irrespective of when the cause therefor arose. Such abuse of process cannot be permitted.” (Emphasis Supplied) 14. Furthermore, we are of the opinion that the order passed by the High Court in the second quashing petition amounted to review (plain and simple) of the earlier order passed by the co-ordinate bench of the High Court in the first quashing petition, since there was admittedly no change in circumstances and no new grounds/pleas became available to the accused-respondents, after passing of the order of dismissal in the first quashing petition. The order passed by the High Court is in gross disregard of all tenets of law, as Section 362 CrPC expressly bars review of a judgment or final order disposing of a case except to correct some clerical or arithmetical error. 15. This Court has time and again held that the High Courts, while exercising their inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, cannot override a specific bar laid down by other provisions of CrPC, i.e., to say that the High Court is not empowered to review its own decision under the purported exercise of its inherent powers. To fortify the aforesaid conclusion, we may gainfully refer to the observations made by this Court in the case of Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee and Chhabi Mukherjee (1990) 2 SCC 437, the 8 2026:HHC:26005 relevant portions whereof are quoted below for ease of reference: “6. In Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Mohan Singh, (1975) 3 SCC 706, this Court held that Section 561A preserves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as it deems fit to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice and the High Court must therefore exercise its inherent powers having regard to the situation prevailing at the particular point of time when its inherent jurisdiction is sought to be invoked. In that case, the facts and circumstances obtaining at the time of the subsequent application were clearly different from what they were at the time of the earlier application. The question as to the scope and ambit of the inherent power of the High Court vis-à-vis an earlier order made by it was, therefore, not concluded by this decision. 7. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked to override the bar of review u/s 362. It is clearly stated in Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal, (1981) 1 SCC 500, that the inherent power of the Court cannot be exercised for doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code. The law is therefore clear that the inherent power cannot be exercised for doing that which cannot be done on account of the bar under other provisions of the Code. The court is not empowered to review its own decision under the purported exercise of inherent power. We find that the impugned order in this case is in effect one reviewing the earlier order on a reconsideration of the same materials. The High Court has grievously erred in doing so. Even on merits, we do not find any compelling reasons to quash the proceedings at that stage.” (Emphasis supplied) 11. It was submitted that the complaint dated 19.5.2026 and the copy of the supplementary charge sheet dated 5.6.2026 constitute a change in the circumstances. This submission is not 9 2026:HHC:26005 acceptable. The complaint dated 19.5.2026 is a reiteration of the earlier complaints made by the petitioner's relatives for lodging the false FIR against the victim’s family members. This complaint mentions the facts which were mentioned in the earlier complaints, except that the documents and videos of the exchange of money were submitted to the office of the Additional Superintendent of Police vide letter dated 15.5.2026. It is difficult to see how filing a complaint by the petitioner's relatives reiterating the contents of the earlier complaints after the withdrawal of the earlier petitions would constitute a subsequent fact having a material bearing on the matter. The supplementary charge sheet was filed by the police with the averments that the result of the analysis had been received, which was being annexed to the supplementary charge sheet. It merely provides the report of the analysis which was awaited at the time of filing of the original charge sheet and does not constitute any fresh evidence. It merely supplements the existing evidence and cannot be called a subsequent event, justifying the filing of the subsequent petition before this Court. 12. Therefore, there is no subsequent event that would confer the jurisdiction upon this Court to entertain the present 10 2026:HHC:26005 petition. Further, the petitioner had sought liberty before the Hon'ble Division Bench to approach the learned Trial Court and raise the pleas which were available to him, and instead of doing so, he is resorting to multiple petitions for quashing of the FIR, which is impermissible, being contrary to the liberty granted by the Hon'ble Division Bench. 13. No other point was urged. 14. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 15. The observations made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 2nd July, 2026 (Chander)