2026:HHC:25723 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 234 of 2013 Reserved on: 20.06.2026 Date of Decision: 01.07.2026 State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Divya Negi ...Respondent _______________________________________ Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Appellant : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. For the Respondents : Mr Aashish Kumar, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 13.12.2012 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Rampur Bushahr, District Shimla, HP (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 380 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:25723 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police filed a charge sheet against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 380 of the IPC. It was asserted that the accused was known to Pingla Thakur (PW2), the younger sister of the informant Ganga Thakur (PW1). The accused visited the informant's house on 04.12.2009 and stayed during the night. The informant opened the almirah in the presence of the accused at about 7-7.30 p.m. and took out her jewellery. She locked the almirah and kept the keys in the briefcase kept on the shelf. Everybody slept. The accused left the next morning. The informant checked her jewellery on 06.12.2009 and found one chaak, one nose ring (nath), one ring and one chain missing. She also found one earring lying on the floor. The informant contacted the accused and asked about her location. The accused gave different locations. When the informant enquired about the stolen jewellery, the accused assured to return the jewellery or pay the money to the informant. However, the accused failed to honour her promise. Hence, the informant complained to the police. The police recorded the informant's statement (Ext.PW1/A) and sent it to the Police 3 2026:HHC:25723 Station, where FIR (Ext.PW6/A) was registered. ASI Om Parkash (PW8) investigated the matter. He visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW8/A). He arrested the accused. The accused made a disclosure statement (Ext.PW3/A) that she had handed over the jewellery to Jai Jagdamba Jewellers for exchange, and she could get it recovered. She led the police to Jai Jagdamba Jeweller, from where the jewellery was recovered. The police seized the jewellery vide memo (Ext.PW1/B). It was put in a cloth parcel, and the parcel was sealed with seal ‘X’. Seal impression (Ext.DA) was taken on a separate piece of cloth. The site plan of the place of recovery (Ext.PW8/A) was prepared. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, she was charged with a commission of offences punishable under Section 380 of the IPC, to which she pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined eight witnesses to prove its case. Informant, Ganga Thakur (PW1), owned the jewellery. Pingla 4 2026:HHC:25723 Thakur (PW2) was known to the accused. Sohan Singh (PW3) is the informant's husband. Sanjeev Kumar (PW4) is the owner of Jai Jagdamba Jeweller, where the jewellery was handed for exchange. Prakash Chand (PW5) witnessed the recovery. HC Nek Ram (PW6) signed the FIR. Radha Devi (PW7) is the owner of the shop where the accused had visited to exchange the jewellery. ASI Om Prakash (PW8) investigated the matter. 5. The accused in her statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C) denied the prosecution's case in its entirety. She claimed that the jewellery belonged to her and she was falsely implicated in this case. She did not produce any evidence in her defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that Pingla Thakur (PW2) denied that she knew the accused. This made the prosecution's case highly suspect. There was a discrepancy regarding the place where the disclosure statement was made and the memos were prepared, which made the prosecution's case highly suspect. The informant had not produced any document to show that she owned the jewellery. The statements of the informant and her husband contradicted each other regarding the acquisition of the jewellery. 5 2026:HHC:25723 All these circumstances made the prosecution's case suspect. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the material on record. The testimonies of the witnesses corroborated each other. The recovery of the jewellery was properly proved, and the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr Aashish Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 9. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the prosecution had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt and the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The recovery of the jewellery was duly proved by the statements of the witnesses, and the accused also asserted in her statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. that the jewellery belonged to her. The informant had properly 6 2026:HHC:25723 identified the jewellery, and the chain of circumstances showing that the accused had stolen the jewellery was duly proved. Learned Trial court erred in acquitting the accused. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial court be set aside. 10. Mr Aashish Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the prosecution's case that the accused knew Pingla Thakur (PW2) and had visited the informant's house with her was made doubtful by the statement of Pingla Thakur (PW2) that she did not know the accused. The jewellery was not properly identified, and the statements of the informant and her husband were discrepant regarding the manner of acquisition of the jewellery. Learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court. Hence, he prayed that the appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 7 2026:HHC:25723 Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed at page 438: “24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 13. This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, wherein it was observed: 21. We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event, should the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the 8 2026:HHC:25723 judgments of this Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudarv. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471. 14. A similar view was taken in Tulasareddi v. State of Karnataka, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 89, wherein it was observed: “29. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court, it can be said that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the findings of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court. Further, if the view taken is a possible view, the Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible. The following principles have to be kept in mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the appeals against an order of acquittal: (a) whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; (b) whether the judgment is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence on record; (c) an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a compelling reason for interference.’ (d) the appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; (e) if the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 9 2026:HHC:25723 (f) the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 15. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 16. It was a specific case of the informant that the accused was known to Pingla Thakur (PW2). She asserted in the statement (Ext.PW1/A) that the accused had visited her house with Pingla Thakur (PW2) on 19.11.2009, and thereafter she had again visited her house on 04.12.2009. Pingla Thakur (PW2) specifically stated in her cross-examination that she did not know the accused, who was present in the Court. Thus, the very basis of the prosecution's case that the accused knew Pingla Thakur (PW2) and she had visited the informant's house has been falsified by the testimony of Pingla Thakur (PW2). The prosecution did not re-examine Pingla Thakur (PW2) to clarify this aspect, and this part of the statement has gone un-rebutted. In similar circumstances, when a witness had supported the case of the defence, but was not re-examined by the prosecution to clarify his testimony, it was held in Ramsewak v. State of M.P., (2004) 11 SCC 259: 2004 SCC OnLine SC 477 that the 10 2026:HHC:25723 benefit of the discrepancy would go to the defence. It was observed at page 265: “14…. Even assuming that there is some doubt as to the interpretation of this part of his evidence since the same is not clarified by the prosecution by way of re-examination, the benefit of doubt should go to the defence which has, in specific terms, taken a stand that the FIR came into being only after the dead body was recovered….” 17. It was held in Javed Masood v. State of Rajasthan, (2010) 3 SCC 538: (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1176: 2010 SCC OnLine SC 347 that the defence can take advantage of any statement made in the cross- examination. It was observed at page 543: “20. In the present case, the prosecution never declared PWs 6, 18, 29 and 30 “hostile”. Their evidence did not support the prosecution. Instead, it supported the defence. There is nothing in law that precludes the defence from relying on their evidence. 21. This Court in Mukhtiar Ahmed Ansari v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2005) 5 SCC 258: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1037] observed: (SCC pp. 270-71, paras 30-31) “30. A similar question came up for consideration before this Court in Raja Ram v. State of Rajasthan[(2005) 5 SCC 272: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1050]. In that case, the evidence of the doctor who was examined as a prosecution witness showed that the deceased was being told by one K that she should implicate the accused or else she might have to face prosecution. The doctor was not declared ‘hostile’. The High Court, however, convicted the accused. This Court held that it was open to the defence to rely on the 11 2026:HHC:25723 evidence of the doctor, and it was binding on the prosecution. 31. In the present case, evidence of PW 1 Ved Prakash Goel destroyed the genesis of the prosecution that he had given his Maruti car to the police, in which the police had gone to the Bahai Temple and apprehended the accused. When Goel did not support that case, the accused could rely on that evidence.” The proposition of law stated in the said judgment is equally applicable to the facts in hand.” 18. Therefore, the learned Trial Court was justified in holding that the prosecution's case that the accused had visited the informant's house on 04.12.2009 and had committed the theft was not proved. 19. The informant Ganga Thakur (PW1) admitted in her cross-examination that jewellery (Ext.P1 to Ext.P4) was commonly available in the market. She also admitted that this jewellery did not have any identification mark. Her husband, Sohan Singh (PW3), admitted in his cross-examination that the ornaments (Ext.P1 to Ext.P4) are commonly available, and they did not have any particular identification mark. Sanjeev Kumar (PW-4) admitted in his cross-examination that the jewellery (Ext.P1 to Ext.P4) is commonly available in the shops of the jewellers and could be manufactured by any person. The jewellery did not have 12 2026:HHC:25723 any identifying marks to distinguish it from the other jewellery. Thus, all the prosecution’s witnesses admitted that the jewellery did not have any identification mark and was commonly available. These admissions made it doubtful that the jewellery belonged to the informant. 20. The informant, Ganga Thakur (PW1), claimed that the jewellery was given to her by her parents-in-law. Her husband, Sohan Singh (PW3), stated that his parents had purchased some of the jewellery, and some jewellery was purchased by the informant herself. He stated in his cross-examination that ornaments (Ext.P1 to Ext.P4) were purchased from Rampur and Shimla, and he could not say from where these were purchased. Thus, the informant and her husband had made different statements regarding the acquisition of the jewellery, and the learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that the statements of the informant and her husband were not satisfactory to prove that the jewellery (Ext.P1 to Ex.P4) belonged to the informant. 21. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused and no interference is 13 2026:HHC:25723 required with a reasonable view of the learned Trial Court while deciding an appeal against the acquittal. 22. No other point was urged. 23. Consequently, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. 24. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 25. Records be sent back to the learned Trial Court forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 1st July, 2026 (Nikita)