Page No.# 1/6 GAHC030003292026 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : I.A.(Civil)/102/2026 The State of Mizoram and 4 Ors. through the Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Mizoram, Aizawl, Mizoram - 796001 VERSUS Mr. C. Rohlua and 129 Ors. R/o North Hlimen, Kolasib District, Advocate for the Petitioner : Ms Lalnunhlui Advocate for the Respondent : Mr. Lalsawirema BEFORE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE KAUSHIK GOSWAMI ORDER 08.09.2026 Heard Ms. Lalnunhlui, learned counsel appearing for the applicants. Also heard Mr. Lalsawirema, learned counsel appearing for the respondents through video conferencing mode. 2. By way of the present application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, read with Order XLI Rule 3-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the applicants seeks condonation of 170 days’ delay in filing the cross-objection against the judgment and order dated 17.12.2024 Page No.# 2/6 passed by the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Kolasib, in L.A. Case No. 39/2015. 3. The aforesaid land acquisition case arose out of proceedings relating to acquisition of land for widening of the Serkhan-Bagha Road. Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 17.12.2024, the respondents have preferred a land appeal before this Court, registered as LA.App./17/2025. 4. Upon receipt of notice in the aforesaid appeal, the applicants sought to prefer a cross-objection under Order XLI Rule 22 of the CPC. However, the cross-objection came to be filed with a delay of 170 days, necessitating the filing of the present application. 5. Ms. Lalnunhlui, learned counsel appearing for the applicants, submits that the delay was neither intentional nor deliberate. It is submitted that the matter involved verification of voluminous records concerning 283 landowners, including scrutiny of the Actual Payee Receipts and the Revised Award, in order to ascertain the claims which had subsequently been found invalid pursuant to the re-verification exercise undertaken in compliance with the directions passed in WP(C) No. 167 of 2017. It is further submitted that the requisite information had to be obtained from the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Kolasib, followed by inter-departmental consultation and legal vetting by the Law & Judicial Department. Learned counsel also submits that the cross-objection, after its initial presentation, was returned by the Registry for correction and compliance, which occasioned some further delay. 6. Per contra, Mr. Lalsawirema, learned counsel appearing for the respondents through video conferencing, opposes the prayer for condonation. He submits that the explanation furnished is vague and does Page No.# 3/6 not account for the entire period of 170 days with reference to specific dates or particulars. According to learned counsel, the grounds relating to verification of records, inter-departmental correspondence, legal vetting and Registry objections, without a date-wise explanation of the movement of the file, cannot constitute sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 8. The explanation furnished by the applicants, broadly stated, is that the delay occurred on account of the necessity to undertake verification of the records relating to a large number of landowners and to ascertain the effect of the subsequent revision/re-verification of the award, including claims in respect of which compensation had already been paid. The applicants have also referred to the correspondence undertaken with the Deputy Commissioner, Kolasib, for obtaining the requisite particulars, followed by legal scrutiny and vetting at the departmental level. It is further stated that the cross-objection, after being initially presented, was returned by the Registry for compliance and had thereafter to be corrected and re- filed. 9. It is true that the explanation does not furnish a meticulous, day-to- day account of the entire period of delay. Ordinarily, administrative correspondence or the movement of files from one office to another cannot, by itself, furnish an automatic justification for condonation of delay. The State is not entitled to any special exemption from the law of limitation merely by reason of its status as a litigant. 10. At the same time, the Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the expression “sufficient cause” occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act is Page No.# 4/6 required to receive a liberal and justice-oriented construction. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123, the Apex Court held that the length of delay is not decisive and that the acceptability of the explanation is the relevant consideration. The Court also observed that there is no presumption that delay is always deliberate and that, where the explanation does not smack of mala fides or form part of a dilatory strategy, the Court ought to adopt a liberal approach so as to advance substantial justice. 11. Likewise, in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani & Ors., reported in (1996) 3 SCC 132, the Apex Court recognized that, having regard to the impersonal nature of governmental functioning and the procedural process involved in decision-making, a certain amount of latitude may, in appropriate cases, be permissible while considering an application for condonation of delay by the State. At the same time, such latitude does not dispense with the requirement of establishing sufficient cause. 12. The said principle was reiterated and qualified by the Apex Court in State of Bihar & Ors. v. Deo Kumar Singh & Ors., reported in (2022) 16 SCC 483, wherein it was emphasized that governmental authorities cannot approach the Court at their convenience and that administrative inefficiency or gross incompetence cannot, by itself, constitute sufficient cause for condoning delay. 13. The principles emerging from the aforesaid decisions, therefore, are clear: while the State cannot claim an automatic indulgence on account of bureaucratic or administrative delay, the explanation furnished is required to be considered pragmatically and in the context of the facts and circumstances of each case. The ultimate consideration is whether the applicants have demonstrated sufficient cause and whether the delay Page No.# 5/6 appears to be deliberate, mala fide or part of a dilatory strategy. 14. In the present case, the subject matter of the proposed cross- objection concerns compensation payable in respect of 283 landowners and involves examination of the original and revised award records, Actual Payee Receipts and the subsequent re-verification of claims. The applicants have also demonstrated that information was sought from the concerned district authorities and that the matter was thereafter subjected to departmental and legal scrutiny. The explanation regarding the subsequent return of the cross-objection by the Registry for correction and compliance also provides a further circumstance contributing to the delay. 15. Though the explanation could certainly have been more precise and supported by a date-wise account of the movement of the matter, the absence of such minute particulars, in the facts of the present case, does not persuade this Court to conclude that the delay was deliberate or mala fide. The explanation, when considered cumulatively and in the context of the nature of the dispute and the volume of records involved, appears plausible and constitutes sufficient cause for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 16. It may, however, be observed that governmental authorities cannot treat administrative processing and movement of files as a routine justification for delay. Appropriate care and expedition are expected in matters involving statutory periods of limitation. The latitude recognized in the aforesaid decisions is a pragmatic consideration and not a licence for administrative inaction. 17. Having regard to the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court is satisfied that the applicants have made out sufficient cause for condonation of the delay of 170 days. The delay does not appear to be Page No.# 6/6 deliberate or mala fide, and refusal to condone the same would result in the applicants being deprived of an opportunity to have its cross-objection considered on merits. 18. Accordingly, the delay of 170 days in filing the cross-objection is hereby condoned. 19. The application stands allowed and disposed of. JUDGE Comparing Assistant