2026:HHC:25726 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 237 of 2013 Reserved on: 20.06.2026 Date of Decision: 01.07.2026 State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Pawan Kumar ...Respondent _______________________________________ Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Appellant : Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. For the Respondent : Mr Deepak Kaushal, Senior Advocate, with Mr Aditya Chauhan, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 22.02.2013 passed by the Learned Sessions Judge, Sirmaur, District at Nahan (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction dated 23.12.2010 and order of sentence dated 04.01.2011 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. 1, Paonta Sahib, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were partly set aside. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before they learned Trial Court for convenience) 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:25726 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 304A and 201 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 181 and 192 of the Motor Vehicle Act (MV Act). It was asserted that the accused was driving a tractor bearing mark AF on 12.11.2006 at about 06.30 p.m. Nand Lal (since deceased) and his daughter Sakshi (not examined) were sitting on the tractor. The accused was driving the tractor at a high speed. The road had potholes. Nand Lal and Sakshi fell from the tractor because of the jolts caused by the potholes. They sustained injuries. Nand Lal was taken to the hospital but succumbed to his injuries. The matter was reported to the police. The police recorded an entry in the daily diary (Ext.PW6/G) and sent HC Yashpal (PW6), Constable Inder Singh and Constable Vinesh Kumar to verify the correctness of the information. HC Yashpal visited the spot and recorded the statement (Ext.PW1/A) of the informant Sanjeev Kumar and sent it to the Police Station, where FIR (Ext.PW6/B) was registered. HC Yashpal investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW6/D). He filed an application (Ext.PW6/F) for the medical examination of Sakshi. Dr R. K. Dhiman (PW2) examined 3 2026:HHC:25726 Sakshi and found that she had sustained multiple injuries. He advised X-ray and X-ray (Ext.PW2/B) was taken, and no fracture was detected. Hence, the nature of the injury was stated to be simple, and MLC (Ext.PW2/B) was issued. HC Yashpal conducted an inquest on the dead body of Nand Lal and prepared a report. He filed an application (Ext.PW-6/A) for the post-mortem examination of Nand Lal and obtained the post-mortem report (Ext.PW2/A). As per the report, the deceased died due to a shock caused by internal haemorrhage and direct injury to the left lung and spleen, leading to cardiac arrest. HC Yashpal seized the tractor vide memo (Ext.PW4/A). Constable Suresh Chand (PW7) examined the tractor and did not find any defect in it that could have led to the accident. He issued the report (Ext.PW7/A). The photographs (Ext.P1 to Ext.P8) whose negatives are Ext.P9 to Ext.P16 were taken. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences 4 2026:HHC:25726 punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 201 of the IPC and Sections 181 and 192 of the MV Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 9 witnesses to prove its case. Sanjeev Kumar (PW1) is the informant. Dr R. K. Dhiman (PW2) conducted the medical examination of Sakshi and the post-mortem examination of Nand Lal. Ram Singh (PW3), Rattan Chand (PW4) and HC Dinesh Kumar (PW9) witnessed the recoveries. Mam Chand (PW5) is the father of the deceased, who was told about the accident. HC Yashpal (PW6) investigated the matter. Constable Suresh Chand (PW7) mechanically examined the tractor. Inder Singh (PW8) carried the rukka to the Police Station. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C), asserted that Nand Lal had consumed liquor and boarded the tractor forcibly. He (the accused) could not say how Nand Lal had fallen from the tractor. He admitted that the tractor and documents were taken into possession. He admitted that Nand Lal had succumbed to his injuries. He claimed that he was innocent. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 5 2026:HHC:25726 6. Learned Trial Court held that the statements of prosecution witnesses proved that the accused was driving the tractor at a high speed. The tractor suffered jolts from the potholes because of the High Speed. Nand Lal and Sakshi fell. Nand Lal died, and Sakshi sustained injuries. The negligence of the accused led to the accident. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as follows: Sections Sentences 279 of the Indian Penal Code The accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months, pay a fine of ₹1000/-, and, in default of payment of fine to undergo further simple imprisonment for two months. 337 of Indian Penal Code The accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months, pay a fine of ₹500/-, and, in default of payment of fine to undergo further simple imprisonment for two months. 304-A of the Indian Penal Code The accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years, pay a fine of ₹2000/-, and, in default of payment of fine to undergo further simple imprisonment for two months. 6 2026:HHC:25726 201 of Indian Penal Code The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for three months, pay a fine of ₹500/-, and, in default of payment of fine to undergo further simple imprisonment for two months. 181 of Motor Vehicle Act The accused was sentenced to pay a fine of ₹500/-and, in default of payment of the fine to undergo simple imprisonment for two months. 192 of the Motor Vehicle Act The accused was sentenced to pay a fine of ₹2000/-, and, in default of payment of the fine to undergo simple imprisonment for two months. All the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Sessions Judge, Sirmaur (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court held that the speed alone is not a decisive criterion to determine negligence. The tractor had only one seat, which is meant for the driver, and if any other person boards the tractor, he has to sit on its bumper. The possibility of the person sitting on the bumper and losing his balance could not be ruled out. 7 2026:HHC:25726 The prosecution had not alleged anything except the high speed to prove the negligence of the accused, which is not sufficient to convict the accused. The accused had failed to produce the driving license and the registration certificate. Hence, the learned Appellate Court partly allowed the appeal and acquitted the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 201 and 304A of the IPC, but maintained the conviction for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 181 and 192 of the MV Act. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Appellate Court erred in acquitting the accused. The Appellate Court based the finding on conjectures and surmises. The prosecution's version that the accused was driving the tractor at a high speed was brushed aside. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr Deepak Kaushal, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr Aditya Chauhan, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 8 2026:HHC:25726 10. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Appellate Court erred in reversing the well-reasoned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court. It was wrongly held that the possibility of the deceased losing his balance and falling could not be ruled out. The accused should not have allowed any person to sit on the bumper when he was aware of the fact that the tractor was not meant to carry a passenger. He drove the tractor at a high speed on the ground full of potholes, which led to the jolts, causing the deceased to lose his balance. The proximate cause of the accident was permitting the deceased to board the bumper of the tractor, and not the loss of balance by the deceased. Learned Appellate Court had taken a view that could not have been taken by any reasonable person. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 11. Mr Deepak Kaushal, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the learned Appellate Court had rightly held that the prosecution was required to prove the rash or negligent driving by the accused. Permitting a person to board the bumper of the tractor cannot amount to rash or negligent driving. 9 2026:HHC:25726 Learned Appellate Court had rightly held that speed alone is not a criterion for holding a person negligent. This was a reasonable view that could have been taken based on the material placed before the Learned Appellate Court, and no interference is required with the reasonable view of the Learned Appellate Court. He relied upon the judgment of this court in State of HP vs. Firoz Khan 2024: HHC:6013 in support of his submission. 12. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed at page 438: “24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only 10 2026:HHC:25726 if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 14. This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, wherein it was observed: 21. We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event, should the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudarv. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471. 15. A similar view was taken in Tulasareddi v. State of Karnataka, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 89, wherein it was observed: “29. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court, it can be said that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the findings of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court. Further, if the view taken is a possible view, the Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible. The following principles have to be kept in mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the appeals against an order of acquittal: 11 2026:HHC:25726 (a) whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; (b) whether the judgment is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence on record; (c) an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a compelling reason for interference.’ (d) the appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; (e) if the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and (f) the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 16. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 17. The accused stated in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. that Nand Lal had consumed liquor and boarded the tractor forcibly. He did not know how Nand Lal had sustained injuries. This statement shows that the accused was driving the tractor at the time of the accident, and that Nand Lal had 12 2026:HHC:25726 boarded the tractor are not in dispute. The statement of Sanjeev Kumar (PW1) that the accused was driving the tractor at the time of the accident was not challenged in the cross-examination; rather, it was suggested that the tractor was going uphill and its speed was not high, which suggests that the accused was present on the spot, and that is how he found out about the speed and the incline on the spot. 18. The accused was convicted by the learned Trial Court for driving the tractor without a driving licence, and this conviction was maintained by the learned Appellate Court. The accused did not challenge the judgment of the learned Appellate Court, maintaining his conviction, and it has attained finality. Thus, it is duly proved that the accused was driving the tractor on 12.11.2016. 19. The statement of the informant Sanjeev Kumar (PW1) that Nand Lal and his daughter were travelling in the tractor and they fell was also not disputed in the cross-examination. The accused also admitted in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C that Nand Lal had boarded the tractor, but claimed that he had boarded the tractor forcibly. 13 2026:HHC:25726 20. Rule 28 of the Rules of the Road regulations 1989, deals with the duty of driving tractors and goods vehicles and reads as follows: 28. Driving of tractors and goods vehicles.—A driver, when driving a tractor, shall not carry or allow any person to be carried on the tractor. A driver of goods carriage shall not carry in the driver’s cabin more number of persons than that is mentioned in the registration certificate and shall not carry passengers for hire or reward. 21. A perusal of the above rule clearly shows that a tractor driver is not allowed to carry any person on the tractor. The accused was in breach of this rule because he had permitted Nand Lal and his daughter to sit on the mud guard of the tractor, and the prosecution’s version that the accused was negligently driving the tractor has to be accepted as correct. 22. It was submitted that permitting Nand Lal to board the tractor was not the proximate cause of the accident, and the prosecution was required to prove that the accused was negligently driving the tractor. This submission will not help the accused. The accused was under an obligation to follow the Rules of Road Regulations while driving a vehicle, and if he was in breach of the rules, he was violating the statutory duty imposed upon him. The accident would not have occurred but for Nand Lal sitting on the 14 2026:HHC:25726 mudguard of the tractor. Therefore, the proximate cause of the accident was that the accused had permitted Nand Lal to board the vehicle in violation of the Rules of Road Regulation, 1989. 23. Learned Appellate Court did not advert to Rule 28 of the Rules of the Road Regulation and held that the possibility of Nand Lal losing the balance could not be ruled out. This was an irrelevant consideration because Nand Lal would not have lost the balance had he not been travelling on the mud guard. Thus, the learned Appellate Court erred in recording the acquittal. 24. The accused did not dispute in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. that post-mortem examination of Nand Lal and medical examination of Sakshi were conducted. Dr R.K. Dhiman (PW2) also stated that he had conducted the post-mortem examination of Nand Lal and found that he had died due to the injuries sustained by a fall from a moving vehicle. Similarly, he examined Sakshi and found that she had sustained simple injuries that could have been caused by a fall. There is nothing in his cross- examination to show that he was making a false statement. He is a Medical Officer having no interest in the prosecution or the accused, and his statement has to be accepted as correct. Therefore, his 15 2026:HHC:25726 testimony establishes the prosecution's case that Nand Lal had died due to the injuries sustained by him in a Motor Vehicle accident and Sakshi had sustained simple injuries in a Motor Vehicle accident. 25. The negligence of the accused in permitting Nand Lal and Sakshi to travel on the tractor led to the accident. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly held the accused guilty of the commission of an offence punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 304-A of the IPC. Learned Appellate Court erred in holding that the negligence of the accused and the offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 304A of the IPC were not proved. 26. Learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 2 years for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 304-A of the IPC. However, no reason was assigned as to why the maximum sentence prescribed by the legislature was imposed by the learned Trial Court. The incident occurred in the year 2006; 20 years have elapsed since then. The accused faced the agony of trial before the learned Trial Court, an appeal before the learned Session Court and this Court. Therefore, the imposition of the maximum sentence is not justified. Consequently, the sentence is reduced to 1 year from 2 years. 16 2026:HHC:25726 27. Learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 months each for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC. This cannot be said to be excessive, considering that the accused had blatantly violated the provisions of the Rule of the Road Regulation and permitted Nand Lal and his minor daughter to board the tractor. Therefore, no interference is required with the sentences imposed under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC. 28. The judgment in Firoz Khan (supra) will not help the accused because it deals with high speed, which is not in question in the present case. The precise negligence against the accused is that he had violated Rule 28 of the Road Regulation Act, which was not even considered by this Court in Firoz Khan (supra). Therefore, not much assistance can be derived from the cited judgment. 29. No other point was raised. 30. In view of the above, the present appeal is allowed, and the judgment of the learned Appellate court is ordered to be set aside and the judgment of the learned Trial Court is ordered to be restored subject to the modification that sentence of 2 years imposed by Learned Trial Court for the commission of an offence punishable 17 2026:HHC:25726 under Section 304-A of the IPC is reduced to 1 year imprisonment. The modified warrant be prepared. 31. A copy of this judgment, along with the record of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 1st July, 2026 (Nikita)