1 2026:CGHC:6738 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 523 of 2015 1 - Smt. Jaibati @ Jagbati And Others W/o Late Ramsingh Aged About 60 Years Caste - Dhakad R/o Vill. - Parapur, Tahsil - Lohandiguda, District Bastar Chhattisgarh Civil And Revenue Distt. Bastar Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh 2 - Vijay Singh S/o Late Ramsingh Aged About 40 Years Caste - Dhakad R/o Vill. - Parapur, Tahsil - Lohandiguda, District Bastar Chhattisgarh Civil And Revenue Distt. Bastar Chhattisgarh, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 3 - Narsingh S/o Late Ramsingh Aged About 35 Years Caste - Dhakad R/o Vill. - Parapur, Tahsil - Lohandiguda, District Bastar Chhattisgarh Civil And Revenue Distt. Bastar Chhattisgarh, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 4 - Om Prakash S/o Late Ramsingh Aged About 30 Years Caste - Dhakad R/o Vill. - Parapur, Tahsil - Lohandiguda, District Bastar Chhattisgarh Civil And Revenue Distt. Bastar Chhattisgarh, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh SHOAIB ANWAR Digitally signed by SHOAIB ANWAR Date: 2026.02.06 16:54:42 +0530 2 5 - Smt. Usha W/o Vijay Singh Aged About 35 Years Caste - Dhakad R/o Vill. - Parapur, Tahsil - Lohandiguda, District Bastar Chhattisgarh Civil And Revenue Distt. Bastar Chhattisgarh, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 6 - Smt. Ganubati W/o Narsingh Aged About 65 Years Caste - Dhakad R/o Vill. - Parapur, Tahsil - Lohandiguda, District Bastar Chhattisgarh Civil And Revenue Distt. Bastar Chhattisgarh, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 7 - Smt. Raimati W/o Om Prakash Aged About 25 Years Caste - Dhakad R/o Vill. - Parapur, Tahsil - Lohandiguda, District Bastar Chhattisgarh Civil And Revenue Distt. Bastar Chhattisgarh, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh ...Appellants versus 1 - Virsingh And Others S/o Late Chakkar Singh Aged About 70 Years Caste - Dhakad R/o Vill. - Parapur, Tahsil - Lohandiguda, District Bastar Chhattisgarh Civil And Revenue District Bastar Chhattisgarh , Chhattisgarh 2 - Smt. Kala Bai @ Kamalbati W/o Virsingh Aged About 65 Years Caste - Dhakad R/o Vill. - Parapur, Tahsil - Lohandiguda, District Bastar Chhattisgarh Civil And Revenue Distt. Bastar Chhattisgarh , District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 3 3 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Collector Jagdalpur Distt. Bastar Chhattisgarh Civil And Revenue Distt. Bastar Chhattisgarh , District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) (Cause title taken from CIS) For Appellants :Shri Vikash A. Shrivastava, Advocate. For Respondent No. 3 :Shri Anand Gupta, Dy. Govt. Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru Judgment on Board 06/02/2026 1. The present Second Appeal has been filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, assailing the impugned judgment and decree dated 04.08.2015 passed by the learned Second Additional District Judge, Jagdalpur, District Bastar (C.G.) in Civil Appeal No.11-A/2014 (Ram Singh & Others vs. Veer Singh & Others), afÏrming the judgment and decree dated10.09.2013 passed by the learned III Civil Judge, Class-I, Jagdalpur, District Bastar (C.G.), in Civil Suit No. 88-A/12, whereby the civil appeal filed by the appellants/defendants was dismissed. The present appeal has been preferred by the appellants/defendants. For the sake of convenience, the 4 parties shall hereinafter be referred to as per their status before the Trial Court. 2. (a) The present suit was instituted by the plaintiffs against the defendants in respect of the land situated at Village Parapur, Tahsil Lohandiguda, R.N.M. Chitrakot, District Bastar, bearing Khasra Nos. 57, 237, 241, 245, 251 and 719, admeasuring respectively 1.60, 0.21, 0.07, 0.85, 0.52 and 0.69 hectares, total Khasra Nos. 6, as described in Schedule “A”. The suit was filed for declaration of title over half share, recovery of possession, and in the alternative, for deletion of the names of Defendant No. 1 and Defendant No. 2 from Schedule “B” and for delivery of possession of the entire suit land by decree. It is an admitted fact on record that Plaintiff No. 1, Beersingh, and Defendant No. 1, Ramsingh, are real brothers and their father was Late Chakkar Singh. It is further admitted that Plaintiff No. 2 is the wife of Plaintiff No. 1, and Defendant No. 2 is the wife of Defendant No. 1. Defendants No. 3 to 5 are the sons of Defendant No. 1 and Defendants No. 6 to 8 are the daughters-in-law of Defendant No. 1. Thus, the genealogy of both the parties is admitted and undisputed. It is also not in dispute that the grandfather of Plaintiff No. 1 5 and Defendant No. 1, namely Budhram, had a total land holding of 75.53 acres in Village Parapur, as described in paragraph 3 of the plaint with reference to the concerned Khasra numbers. It is further an admitted position that in the revenue records, the names of the defendants are recorded over the land described in Schedule “A” and the names of both parties are recorded over the land described in Schedule “B”. (b) The further case of the plaintiffs is that Plaintiff No. 1, Beersingh, and Defendant No. 1, Ramsingh, are real brothers and sons of Late Chakkar Singh. Plaintiff No. 2 is the wife of Plaintiff No. 1 and Defendant No. 2 is the wife of Defendant No. 1. Defendants No. 3 to 5 are the sons of Defendant No. 1 and Defendants No. 6 to 8 are the daughters-in-law of Defendant No. 1. The plaintiffs have thus set out the admitted genealogy of the parties and pleaded that the grandfather of Plaintiff No. 1 and Defendant No. 1, namely Budhram, had a total land holding of 75.53 acres in Village Parapur, as described in paragraph 3 of the plaint. The said land was divided into four shares, out of which one share fell to the share of Late Chakkar Singh and the remaining three shares fell to the shares of his brothers, namely Gulab, Samnath and 6 Rainu. The plaintiffs have pleaded that since no proper partition of the share of Late Chakkar Singh took place, the lands described in Schedule “A” and Schedule “B” have been shown separately and are to be treated as part of the plaint. (c) The plaintiffs have further pleaded that the partition of the lands described in Schedule “A” and Schedule “B” ought to have taken place about 35 years ago, after the death of Late Chakkar Singh, and at that time it was mutually decided between Plaintiff No. 1 and Defendant No. 1 that Defendant No. 1 would cultivate the land described in Schedule “A”, whereas Plaintiff No. 1 would cultivate the land described in Schedule “B”. However, in May/June 2009, Defendant No. 1, on the basis of his name being recorded and claiming co- ownership, along with his sons, attempted to plough and cultivate the land described in Schedule “B”. Upon making inquiries, the plaintiffs came to know that despite the plaintiffs having half share in the ancestral land described in Schedule “A”, the defendants had got their names mutated therein. (d) The plaintiff further pleaded that on 01.07.2009, an 7 application for partition of the lands described in Schedule “A” and Schedule “B” was filed before the Tahsildar, Lohandiguda, which came to be rejected on 30.11.2010 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the revenue court. It was also pleaded that a complaint was made to the police on 30.10.2009 against Defendant No. 1 and that Defendant No. 1, without the consent of Plaintiff No. 1, had fraudulently got the names of himself and his family members recorded over Schedule “A” land. It was further pleaded that while the Tahsildar granted half share to the plaintiffs in respect of the land described in Schedule “B”, the application relating to Schedule “A” was rejected. Hence, on the basis of the cause of action so arisen, the plaintiffs filed the suit seeking declaration of title over half share in Schedule “A” land and possession thereof, or in the alternative, for deletion of the names of Defendant No. 1 and Defendant No. 2 from Schedule “B” land and for declaration of exclusive title and possession in favour of the plaintiffs. 3. (i) The Defendants No. 1 to 8, while admitting the admitted facts, denied the averments made by the plaintiffs in the plaint and refused to accept the same. It was specifically pleaded that the plaintiffs never cultivated the land described 8 in Schedule “A”. The defendants asserted that they are in possession of the Schedule “A” land. It was further pleaded that the land described in Schedule “B” was the self-acquired property of Late Chakkar Singh and, therefore, Beersingh and Ramsingh are equal co-sharers therein. With respect to Schedule “A” land, the defendants pleaded that the said land forms part of the ancestral property of their grandfather and that Ramsingh acquired the said land as his share out of the share of Late Chakkar Singh. (ii) The defendants further pleaded that since no lawful partition of the land of Late Budhram (grandfather) had taken place and the entire land stood recorded in the name of Gulab Singh (the eldest son), after the death of Gulab Singh, his son Raghunath, in accordance with the wishes of Late Gulab Singh, gave the ancestral land described in Schedule “A” to Ramsingh. It was pleaded that at the time of such partition, Beersingh was called by Raghunath but he did not attend and, therefore, did not receive any land towards his share. The defendants further contended that if the plaintiffs wanted any share in the land of Budhram, they ought to have claimed the same from the recorded tenure-holder, as Defendant No. 1 9 had received only his own share from Raghunath. It was thus pleaded that the plaintiffs have no right, title or interest in the suit land. 4. After framing the issues and upon due appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record, the learned Trial Court allowed the suit of the plaintiff, holding that there is no dispute between the parties regarding the ancestral nature of the suit property described in Schedule ‘A’. It has been held that the said property was received by defendant Ramsingh as his share from his father, late Chakkar Singh, and consequently, Chansingh, being the son of late Chakkar Singh, was equally entitled thereto. The Trial Court has thus concluded that the Schedule ‘A’ property is ancestral in nature and that the plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration of title and to possession over half share therein. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 10.09.2013, the defendants preferred a First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the learned First Appellate Court. The learned First Appellate Court, on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, afÏrmed the findings recorded by the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal by the impugned 10 judgment. Hence, the present appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the findings recorded by both the Courts are perverse, contrary to law, and based on misappreciation of the evidence on record. It is contended that both the Courts have gravely erred in holding that the land described in Schedule ‘A’ constitutes the equal share of Budhram, without there being any cogent legal evidence to support such a conclusion. It is further submitted that both the Courts have failed to apply the well-settled principles of estoppel, which squarely arise from the conduct and admissions of the parties, thereby vitiating the impugned judgments. The learned counsel further submits that the finding regarding equal partition is wholly unsustainable in law, as the same has been recorded in the absence of any lawful proof of a valid and equal partition. Hence, the impugned judgments suffer from substantial errors of law and give rise to the substantial questions of law as framed above, warranting interference by this Court. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the appellants on the question of admission, and the impugned judgments and 11 decrees passed by the learned trial Court as also the learned First Appellate Court have been carefully examined. 7. Upon due consideration of the pleadings, evidence and the concurrent judgments of both the Courts, this Court finds that the suit property described in Schedule ‘A’ is ancestral in nature and that the plaintiffs are entitled to half share therein. The Trial Court, in paragraph 13, has recorded a clear and reasoned finding that the said property devolved upon defendant Ramsingh from his father, late Chakkar Singh, and that the plaintiffs’ predecessor, being a co-sharer, had an equal and subsisting right therein. The said finding stands fully corroborated by the admissions of Ramsingh (defendant witness No. 1) in his cross-examination, wherein he has admitted that at the time of mutation his name alone was entered as Beer Singh was not present, and further that even at the time of the alleged partition, Beer Singh had a share in the ancestral property, though his name was not recorded. He has also admitted that no registered document of relinquishment was executed by Beer Singh. In view of the settled legal position that rights in immovable property of such nature cannot be divested except by a registered 12 instrument, the plea of oral relinquishment or exclusion is wholly untenable. The First Appellate Court has rightly re- appreciated the evidence and afÏrmed the findings of the Trial Court. The findings so recorded are pure findings of fact, based on evidence and correct application of law, and suffer from no perversity or illegality. No substantial question of law arises for consideration. 8. Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law. 9. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellants/ defendants failed to establish his case by placing cogent and sufÏcient material. The appellant failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so 13 recorded. 10. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 11. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding. 12. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. 13. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellants and the proposed question of law cannot 14 be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellant failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellant herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as as well as by the learned First Appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all. 14. Having heard learned counsel for the appellant and on perusal of the record of the case and in view of the above settled legal proposition, I find absolutely no merit in this appeal, involving no question of law much less substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the CPC. In my view, the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts appear to be just, proper and legal. The findings recorded are based on proper appreciation of evidence available on record and there is no illegality or perversity in the same and they does not call for any interference. 15 15. Accordingly, the Second Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed in limine resulting in upholding of the judgment and decree of the trial Court as well as the Appellate Court. Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Shoaib/Gowri