2026:JHHC:14521 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(S) No. 2957 of 2022 …… Seema Sarkar, aged about 61 years, W/o Late B.B.Sarkar, R/o-C.D. Singh Colony, First Gate, near C.M.R.I. Gate, Barwa Road, P.O. Dhanbad, P.S. Dhanbad, District- Dhanbad, Jharkhand. …. Petitioner(s) -VERSUS- 1. The State of Jharkhand, through the Secretary, School Education and Literacy Development Department, having its office at Project Bhawan, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand. 2. Director, Primary Education (In the Department of School Education and Literacy Development), having its office at Project Bhawan, Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District-Ranchi, Jharkhand. 3. Commissioner, North Chotanagpur Division, Hazaribagh, P.O. & P.S. Sadar, District-Hazaribagh. 4. Deputy Commissioner, Dhanbad, P.O. & P.S. Sadar, District-Dhanbad, Jharkhand. 5. District Education Superintendent, Dhanbad, P.O. & P.S. Sadar, District-Dhanbad, Jharkhand. …..Respondent (s) …… CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. Saurabh Shekhar, Adv For the Respondent (s) : Mr. Harsh Preet Singh, A.C. to G.P.-V …… 20/27.04.2026 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The instant writ application has been preferred by the petitioner for the following reliefs; i. For issuance of appropriate writ(s)/ order(s)/direction(s), particularly a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing of the entire departmental proceeding, initiated vide order dated 23rd September, 2017 (Annexure-3), whereby 'Ůपũ-क' was handed over to the petitioner; as also for quashing of the order of punishment, dated 22.09.2018 (Annexure-9), issued by Respondent No. 5, whereby the punishment of stoppage of three annual increments with cumulative effect, recovery of the amount of embezzlement at monthly rate of 40 per cent and further for 2026:JHHC:14521 2 the period of suspension she shall be paid nothing more than the subsistence allowance and the said period will be counted as in service, for purpose of pension, was passed against the Petitioner. ii. For issuance of appropriate writ(s)/ order(s)/direction(s), particularly a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing of order dated 17.11.2021, Annexure-11 passed by Respondent No. 3, whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner, being Appeal No. 51/2019, was rejected and the order of punishment was confirmed by the respondent authority. iii. For issuance of appropriate writ(s)/ order(s)/direction(s), particularly a writ in the nature of mandamus, commanding upon the Respondents to release the arrears of salary withheld in consequence to the order of punishment, as also for grant of other consequential benefits, withheld as a result of punishment order. 3. Briefly stated, the petitioner, who was serving as Headmistress in K.C. Girls’ Middle School, was initially issued Memo No. 363 dated 21.09.2016 by the Regional Education Authority, Dhanbad, seeking an explanation for the delay in construction of the school building and directing completion within two months. The petitioner submitted a detailed explanation, which was accepted, and additional time was granted. Subsequently, on 24.08.2017, the District Education Extension Superintendent directed the petitioner to hand over charge to Shri Kamalvas Kumar. Being aggrieved, the petitioner filed W.P.(S) No. 5458 of 2017 seeking quashing of the said order and restoration to her post. During the pendency of the writ petition, she was placed under suspension and a departmental proceeding was initiated against her vide order dated 23.09.2017. 2026:JHHC:14521 3 A charge-sheet (‘Ůपũ क’) containing nine allegations was served upon the petitioner. The Court directed that the departmental proceeding be concluded within three months, failing which the suspension would stand automatically revoked. The petitioner submitted a detailed reply on 25.07.2018 denying all charges and providing explanations, including that the construction work was on the verge of completion; i.e. facilities like toilets and kitchen shed were functional, defective uniforms had been returned, and delays in book supply were due to the department. She also clarified her role in the Mid-Day Meal scheme and justified the delay in handing over charge. However, no proper enquiry was conducted—no witnesses were examined, no evidence was adduced, and the petitioner was not given any opportunity to participate. A second show cause notice dated 31.08.2018 was issued along with findings of the Inquiry Officer, but the enquiry report was not supplied. The petitioner submitted a detailed reply on 19.09.2018. Despite this, the disciplinary authority passed an order dated 22.09.2018 imposing the following penalties: (i) Stoppage of three annual increments with cumulative effect, (ii) Recovery of 40% of monthly salary, (iii) Payment of only subsistence allowance for the suspension period. The petitioner filed Service Appeal No. 51 of 2019, challenging the order of punishment on the grounds of procedural irregularities and lack of evidence, alleging that the enquiry was a mere formality. 2026:JHHC:14521 4 The appellate authority dismissed the appeal and upheld the punishment by order dated 17.11.2021. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the issue has been decided right from the judgment of Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank1 followed by State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Saroj Kumar Sinha2 and then in the case of Satyendra Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another3 deciding the same principle that any charge is to be proved by oral evidence. Recently, also in the case of Jai Prakash Saini vs. Managing Director, U.P. Cooperative Federation Ltd.4 the same issue has been deliberated. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents tried to defend the order by submitting that those documents were kept in the office. He further relied that there was a bank account of the school so the petitioner must be knowing about the bank account and it is kept in the ordinary course of business. Admittedly; learned counsel for the respondent could not dispute the fact that witnesses were not examined in order to prove the charge. 6. This Court fails to understand that when by series of judgments the law has been well settled with regard to examination of oral witness in order to prove the charge; why the departmental proceedings are being conducted in a manner which ultimately vitiate at this stage. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent further submits that this Court under article 226 could not reappreciate the evidence. 1 (2009) 2 SCC 570 2 (2010) 2 SCC 772 3 2024 SCC Online SC 3325 4 2026 SCC Online SC 505 2026:JHHC:14521 5 8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after going through the documents available on record and also the enquiry report, it is evident that there is no reference of list of witnesses. 9. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the catena of judgments right from the celebrated judgment of Roop Singh Negi (supra) then in the case of Saroj Kumar Sinha (supra) has dealt the importance of Inquiry Officer and oral evidence. 10. Recently also, in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh through the Principal Secretary, Department of Panchayati Raj Lucknow versus Ram Prakash Singh5 and also in the case of Jai Prakash Saini (supra), the same issue has been re-deliberated. 11. In the case of Ram Prakash Singh (supra) there is an observation of the Hon’ble Apex Court that since the judgment of Saroj Kumar Sinha (supra), still the departments are committing the same mistake which is observed at para 16 of the said judgment. For brevity the relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court is extracted hereinbelow: “13. In Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, it was held that an officer conducting an enquiry has a duty to arrive at findings in respect of the charges upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. It has also been held therein that any evidence collected during investigation by an investigating officer against the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceedings. 14. What follows from a conjoint reading of the above two decisions is and what applies here is that, ‘materials brought on record by the parties' (to which consideration in the enquiry ought to be confined) mean only such materials can be considered which are brought on record in a manner known to law. Such materials can then be considered legal evidence, which can be acted upon. Though the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is not strictly applicable to departmental enquiries, which are not judicial proceedings, nevertheless, the principles flowing therefrom can be applied in specific cases. Evidence tendered by witnesses 5 2025 SCC Online SC 891 2026:JHHC:14521 6 must be recorded in the presence of the delinquent employee, he should be given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and no document should be relied on by the prosecution without giving copy thereof to the delinquent - all these basic principles of fair play have their root in such Act. In such light, the documents referred to in the list of documents forming part of the annexures to the chargesheet, on which the department seeks to rely in the enquiry, cannot be treated as legal evidence worthy of forming the basis for a finding of guilt if the contents of such documents are not spoken to by persons competent to speak about them. A document does not prove itself. In the enquiry, therefore, the contents of the relied-on documents have to be proved by examining a witness having knowledge of the contents of such document and who can depose as regards its authenticity. In the present case, no such exercise was undertaken by producing any witness. 15. We may further refer to the decision of this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Saroj Kumar Sinha17 where disciplinary proceedings were drawn up against the respondent, Saroj Kumar Sinha, under the 1999 Rules itself with which we are concerned. Paragraphs 26 to 30 and 33 of the said decision being relevant are quoted below: “26. The first inquiry report is vitiated also on the ground that the inquiry officers failed to fix any date for the appearance of the respondent to answer the charges. Rule 7(x) clearly provides as under: ‘7. (x) Where the charged government servant does not appear on the date fixed in the inquiry or at any stage of the proceeding in spite of the service of the notice on him or having knowledge of the date, the inquiry officer shall proceed with the inquiry ex parte. In such a case the inquiry officer shall record the statement of witnesses mentioned in the charge-sheet in absence of the charged government servant.’ 27. A bare perusal of the aforesaid sub-rule shows that when the respondent had failed to submit the explanation to the charge-sheet it was incumbent upon the inquiry officer to fix a date for his appearance in the inquiry. It is only in a case when the government servant despite notice of the date fixed failed to appear that the inquiry officer can proceed with the inquiry ex parte. Even in such circumstances it is incumbent on the inquiry officer to record the statement of witnesses mentioned in the charge-sheet. Since the government servant is absent, he would clearly lose the benefit of cross-examination of the witnesses. But nonetheless in order to establish the charges the Department is required to produce the necessary evidence before the inquiry officer. This is so as to avoid the charge that the inquiry officer has acted as a prosecutor as well as a judge. 28. An inquiry officer acting in a quasi-judicial authority is in the position of an independent adjudicator. He is not supposed to be a representative of the department/disciplinary authority/Government. His function is to examine the evidence presented by the Department, even in the absence of the delinquent official to see as 2026:JHHC:14521 7 to whether the unrebutted evidence is sufficient to hold that the charges are proved. In the present case the aforesaid procedure has not been observed. Since no oral evidence has been examined the documents have not been proved, and could not have been taken into consideration to conclude that the charges have been proved against the respondents. 29. Apart from the above, by virtue of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India the departmental enquiry had to be conducted in accordance with the rules of natural justice. It is a basic requirement of the rules of natural justice that an employee be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in any proceedings which may culminate in punishment being imposed on the employee. 30. When a departmental enquiry is conducted against the government servant it cannot be treated as a casual exercise. The enquiry proceedings also cannot be conducted with a closed mind. The inquiry officer has to be wholly unbiased. The rules of natural justice are required to be observed to ensure not only that justice is done but is manifestly seen to be done. The object of rules of natural justice is to ensure that a government servant is treated fairly in proceedings which may culminate in imposition of punishment including dismissal/removal from service. *** 33. As noticed earlier in the present case not only the respondent has been denied access to documents sought to be relied upon against him, but he has been condemned unheard as the inquiry officer failed to fix any date for conduct of the enquiry. In other words, not a single witness has been examined in support of the charges levelled against the respondent. The High Court, therefore, has rightly observed that the entire proceedings are vitiated having been conducted in complete violation of the principles of natural justice and total disregard of fair play. The respondent never had any opportunity at any stage of the proceedings to offer an explanation against the allegations made in the charge-sheet.” (emphasis ours) 16. It appears that the appellant is yet to take lessons despite the admonition in Saroj Kumar Sinha (supra). The same kind of omissions and commissions that led to setting aside of the order of punishment imposed being upheld by this Court were repeated in the present case.” (emphasis supplied) 12. Having regard to the aforesaid discussion, the entire departmental proceeding initiated vide order dated 23rd 2026:JHHC:14521 8 September, 2017 (Annexure-3), order of punishment dated 22.09.2018 (Annexure-9) and appellate order dated 17.11.2021 (Annexure-11), are hereby, quashed and set aside. 13. Since the petitioner has already retired in the year 2021 about 5 years ago; as such, giving liberty to the respondents to continue the proceeding from the initial stage will further distress the petitioner; as such, instead of remitting the case, this Court direct the respondents to calculate the amount which has not been paid to the petitioner pursuant to the impugned order, which has already been quashed, within a period of 12 weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. 14. Accordingly, the instant writ application stands allowed. Pending I.A., if any, also stands closed. (Deepak Roshan, J) 27.04.2026 Amardeep/ Uploaded on 15.05.2026