1 2026:CGHC:808-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 967 of 2025 Nagar Panchayat Pusour Through Its Chief Municipal Officer, Nagar Panchayat Pusour, District- Raigarh, (C.G.) ... Appellant(s) versus 1. Madhav Chouhan S/o Prem Singh Chouhan R/o Ward No. 14, Pusour Tah. Pusour, District- Raigarh, (C.G.) 2. State of Chhattisgarh Through Labour Commissioner, Block-3, 2nd Floor, Indravati Bhawan New Raipur, Chhattisgarh, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Vinod Kumar Deshmukh, Advocate. For Respondent No. 1 : Mr. S.P. Kale, Advocate. For Respondent/State : Mr. S.S. Baghel, Government Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Arvind Kumar Verma , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 07 .01.2026 1. Heard Mr. Vinod Kumar Deshmukh, learned counsel for the appellant as well as Mr. S.P. Kale, learned counsel, appearing for BRIJMOHAN MORLE Digitally signed by BRIJMOHAN MORLE Date: 2026.01.08 10:37:36 +0530 2 respondent No. 1 and Mr. S.S. Baghel, learned Government Advocate, appearing for the State/respondent No. 2 on I.A. No. 2 of 2025, which is an application for condonation of delay. 2. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and considering the reasons mentioned in the application, we are of the considered opinion that sufficient cause has been shown in the application. Accordingly, I.A. No. 2 of 2025 is allowed and delay of 46 days in filing the appeal is condoned. 3. The present intra-Court appeal has been filed by the appellant against the order dated 28.08.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPL No. 104 of 2018 (Nagar Panchayat Pusour vs. Madhav Chouhan & Another), whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant/writ petitioner was dismissed. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the respondent/workman initially worked under the appellant purely on a daily-wage basis as per the exigencies of work. Subsequently, pursuant to the decision of the Government, all works relating to maintenance, construction, water supply, revenue recovery, etc., of the appellant establishment were outsourced through contractors/placement agencies. Accordingly, respondent No. 1 worked under contractors, namely Tango Security Service Pvt. Ltd. (2013–14) and M/s Chandrabhal Sharma, Raigarh (2014–15), as a contractual employee till May, 2014. It is further submitted that when a regular vacancy for the post of Peon was advertised by Nagar Panchayat, Pusour, respondent 3 No.1 participated in the selection process but was not selected. Vide order dated 29.06.2013, Shri Deepak Kumar Yadav was appointed to the post of Peon. The list submitted by the contractor and the agreement clearly establish that respondent No.1 was an employee of the contractor. 5. Learned counsel further contended that respondent No.1 challenged the appointment of Shri Deepak Kumar Yadav before the Additional Collector, Raigarh, who vide order dated 12.12.2013 partly allowed the appeal, set aside the appointment, and directed issuance of a fresh advertisement. Consequently, a fresh advertisement was issued on 07.02.2014, in which respondent No.1 again participated but was not selected. Shri Yashwant Kumar Yadav was appointed to the post of Peon vide order dated 30.10.2014. The appeal filed by respondent No.1 under Rule 56 of the Chhattisgarh Municipalities Employees (Recruitment & Service Conditions) Rules, 1968 was dismissed by the Additional Collector vide order dated 15.06.2016, thereby confirming the appointment. 6. It is submitted that after repeatedly failing in the recruitment process, respondent No.1 raised an industrial dispute alleging discontinuation of service while deliberately suppressing material facts regarding his participation and failure in the recruitment process and his engagement through contractors. The dispute was raised on 30.01.2015 before the Assistant Labour Commissioner-cum-Conciliation Officer. Upon failure of conciliation, the dispute was referred to the 4 Labour Court, Raigarh, on 31.05.2016. In the statement of claim, respondent No.1 falsely pleaded that he was appointed on compassionate grounds and that his services were orally terminated in May, 2014, which is contrary to the record. Due to lack of proper communication and unavoidable circumstances, the appellant could not appear, and the Labour Court proceeded ex-parte on 30.11.2016 and passed the award dated 05.01.2017 directing reinstatement with 25% back wages. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that upon gaining knowledge of the ex-parte award, the appellant promptly filed applications under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, Order IX Rule 9 CPC, and Section 151 CPC; however, the said applications were dismissed for want of prosecution. It is contended that respondent No.1 was working under contractors, and his services, if discontinued, were discontinued by the contractor and not by the appellant. There was no employer- employee relationship between the appellant and respondent No.1 at the time of alleged termination, and the contractor was not impleaded as a party, rendering the award unsustainable. It is also submitted that the Labour Court failed to record a finding as to whether the discontinuation amounted to “retrenchment” under Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and erred in applying Section 25-F. The learned Single Judge failed to appreciate these aspects and ought to have set aside the ex-parte award and remanded the matter for fresh adjudication. Hence, this appeal. 5 8. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.1 and learned State counsel opposed the submissions and contended that the learned Single Judge, after due consideration of the material on record, has rightly dismissed the writ petition, warranting no interference. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and carefully examined the pleadings and documents placed on record. 10. Upon careful consideration of the rival submissions and the material available on record, this Court is of the considered opinion that no case for interference is made out. The record clearly demonstrates that respondent No.1 was engaged on a daily-wage basis and continued to discharge duties for a considerable length of time. The documentary evidence produced before the Labour Court, including experience certificates and attendance registers, sufficiently establishes that respondent No.1 worked continuously under the appellant till May, 2014. 11. It is also undisputed that the appellant was proceeded ex-parte before the Labour Court vide order dated 30.11.2016 and that the award dated 05.01.2017 was passed thereafter. Though the appellant sought to challenge the ex-parte award by filing applications under Order IX Rule 13 CPC and other allied provisions, the same were dismissed for want of prosecution. The appellant, having failed to diligently pursue the remedies available in law, cannot now seek to re-agitate the matter in appellate jurisdiction. 12. The Labour Court, on the basis of the unrebutted evidence placed 6 on record by respondent No.1, rightly came to the conclusion that the discontinuation of service was not in accordance with law and that the mandatory provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 were not complied with. The contention of the appellant regarding absence of employer-employee relationship and engagement through contractors does not merit acceptance in the facts of the present case, particularly in view of the documentary evidence demonstrating continuous engagement of respondent No.1 under the appellant’s establishment. 13. The learned Single Judge has meticulously examined the factual and legal aspects of the matter and has rightly declined to interfere with the award passed by the Labour Court. No perversity, illegality, or jurisdictional error has been pointed out warranting interference by this Court. It is well settled that the scope of interference in writ appellate jurisdiction is limited, and unless the findings are shown to be manifestly erroneous or perverse, interference is not called for. 14. Accordingly, this Court finds no merit in the writ appeal. The writ appeal is, therefore, dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Arvind Kumar Verma) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Brijmohan