1 2026:CGHC:15116 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 4304 of 2023 1 - Khumesh Kumar Sahu S/o Jhanak Lal Aged About 22 Years R/o House No. 7, Ward No.1, Singarpur, Rajnandgaon, District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Panchayat, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Collector, Rajnandgaon Rajnandgaon, District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Chief Executive Officer, Zila Panchayat Rajnandgaon Rajnandgaon, District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh. 4 - Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat Dongargaon Rajnandgaon, District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Vivek Kumar Shrivastava, Advocate. RAGHVENDRA JAT Digitally signed by RAGHVENDRA JAT 2 For Respondent(s)/ State : Mr. Ashutosh Shukla, Panel Lawyer. For Respondent No. 4 : Mr. Jitendra Pali, Advocate. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad Order on Board 01/04/2026 1. By way of this petition, the petitioner has prayed for following reliefs:- “i. That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the impugned order dated 23/06/2023 (ANNEXURE P/1) passed by the Respondent No.4. ii. That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow the petitioner to render his services without any interruption. iii. That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the authorities concerned to release all the outstanding dues/salary to the petitioner. iv. Any other relief, which this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper, may also kindly be granted to the petitioner, in the interest of justice.” 2. Brief facts of the case, is that, the petitioner was initially appointed as a Computer Operator on Collector Rate vide order dated 23/02/2013. Thereafter, in view of the application submitted by the petitioner and considering his sincerity and performance, respondent No. 4 vide order dated 31/03/2017 appointed the petitioner as a Computer Operator on contractual basis. Subsequently, in a meeting of the General Administration Committee held on 23/08/2019, the petitioner’s application for appointment to the post of Assistant Grade-III was duly considered, a resolution was passed, and proceedings for his 3 regularization were initiated, pursuant to which respondent No. 3, by letter dated 18/11/2020, directed respondent No. 4 to take necessary steps for regularization. Consequently, the petitioner was appointed on the post of Assistant Grade-III on probation for two years vide order dated 25/01/2021, and he duly joined his services on 27/01/2021. However, on the basis of an alleged complaint by one Ritesh Soni, Advocate, which was never supplied to the petitioner, respondent No. 3 issued a letter dated 02/03/2023 directing cancellation of the petitioner’s regularization followed by a show-cause notice dated 13/03/2023 issued by respondent No. 4 seeking explanation within five days without furnishing the said complaint. The petitioner submitted his reply on 16/03/2023 requesting relevant documents and opportunity of hearing, which were never provided, and also submitted a representation dated 20/04/2023 regarding completion of regularization and payment of salary. Thereafter, respondent No. 3 directed the petitioner to appear personally on 04/05/2023, whereupon the petitioner appeared and reiterated that his regularization was lawful and duly recommended by the competent authority, and prayed for withdrawal of proceedings. Further, respondent No. 4 forwarded proceedings dated 20/04/2023 regarding salary for March 2023 vide letter dated 16/05/2023, however, neither the salary has been paid nor relevant documents have been supplied to the petitioner. Thereafter, an impugned order dated 23/06/2023 was issued, 4 which, from the postal records, appears to have been dispatched from a place other than the office of respondent No. 4, thereby indicating non-application of mind and mala fide intent. It is further submitted that by the said impugned order, the petitioner’s regularization dated 25/01/2021 has been arbitrarily cancelled without following due process of law, without placing the matter before the competent General Administration Committee, and by an authority not empowered to do so, rendering the impugned action illegal, arbitrary, and liable to be quashed. Hence, this petition. 3. Learned counsel for the State submits that the impugned order and action of the respondents are wholly arbitrary, illegal and contrary to the settled principles of law applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. It is contended that, considering the exigencies of service and in exercise of powers under Rule 7(4) of the C.G. Panchayat Service (Recruitment and General Conditions of Service) Rules, 1999, the General Administration Committee of the Janpad Panchayat had duly recommended the petitioner’s candidature for regularization on the post of Assistant Grade-III, and therefore, the petitioner’s appointment cannot be termed as illegal or irregular. It is further submitted that respondent No.4 lacked the competence to pass the impugned order, as under Section 70(1) of the C.G. Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993, the Collector is the prescribed competent authority in respect of Janpad Panchayat employees, 5 and the impugned order has been passed without obtaining the requisite approval, rendering it unsustainable in law. Additionally, as per the C.G. Panchayat (Powers and Functions of the Chief Executive Officer) Rules, 1995, the Chief Executive Officer is not vested with the authority to remove an employee, and thus, the impugned action is without jurisdiction. It is a settled proposition that an order passed by an incompetent authority is nullity in the eyes of law. Moreover, the respondent failed to place the matter before the appropriate authority and acted in violation of statutory provisions. The petitioner further submits that the impugned order dated 23/06/2023 appears to suffer from mala fide, as discrepancies in its dispatch indicate that it was not duly prepared by the office of respondent No.4 after proper application of mind. It is also contended that the petitioner was regularized by the competent authority following due process, yet the impugned order has been passed without conducting any proper departmental enquiry, without furnishing the statement of allegations, list of documents, or witnesses, and without affording any reasonable opportunity of hearing. The petitioner was denied the right to cross-examine witnesses and was not supplied with a copy of the complaint or relevant documents, thereby severely prejudicing his defense. Despite submitting a reply to the show cause notice and repeatedly requesting for necessary documents, the same were not provided to him. It is well settled by a catena of judicial pronouncements that any disciplinary action taken without 6 adherence to the principles of natural justice, including supply of documents and fair opportunity of defense, stands vitiated. In the present case, the respondents have acted in complete disregard of these principles, causing grave prejudice and irreparable loss to the petitioner. Hence, it is prayed that this Hon’ble Court may graciously be pleased to quash and set aside the impugned order dated 23/06/2023 passed by respondent No. 4. He has placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh in the matter of Dhaluram Kesaria vs. State of Chhattisgarh & others passed in WP No. 2859/2003 on 7.7.2006, in the matter of Hem Ram Patel vs. State of Chhattisgarh & others passed in WPS No. 7401/2007 on 15.2.2010 and in the matter of Ku. Kavit Pandey vs. The State of Chhattisgarh & others passed in WPS No. 3874/2010 along with other connected matters on 3.8.2021. 4. Learned counsel for respondent No. 4 as well as State jointly submits that the Zila Panchayat has acted strictly in accordance with law in issuing communication to the Janpad Panchayat, clearly stipulating that appointment to the post of Assistant Grade- III can be made only in consonance with Rule 7 of the Rules, 1999. Consequently, the resolution passed by the Janpad Panchayat and the subsequent regularization of the petitioner are ex facie illegal, being in violation of statutory provisions, and are therefore unsustainable in law. It is further submitted that the complaint regarding the petitioner’s regularization was duly 7 inquired into and the same revealed clear contravention of statutory rules, which stands substantiated. The petitioner was afforded adequate and reasonable opportunity of hearing prior to the issuance of the cancellation order, including service of show cause notice and consideration of his detailed reply, as well as personal hearing wherein he appeared and submitted his explanation. It is further submitted that, upon due consideration and after granting full opportunity of hearing, it was found that the petitioner’s regularization was contrary to the binding judgment of the Supreme Court of India and in clear violation of the Rules, 1999, and accordingly, a lawful and justified order of cancellation dated 23.06.2023 was issued from the office of Janpad Panchayat, Dongargaon. The contention of the petitioner regarding dispatch of the order from the post office situated at the High Court premises is misconceived and does not invalidate the fact that the order was duly prepared and issued by the competent authority. The subsequent filing of a caveat application at Bilaspur was done in due course and in accordance with legal procedure. The submissions advanced by the petitioner are thus erroneous, misconceived and liable to be rejected. It is also submitted that, in the present case, not only was full opportunity of hearing afforded, but even otherwise, in exceptional circumstances where no plausible explanation exists, strict adherence to procedural formalities may not be necessary. Lastly, the petitioner has failed to raise any sustainable legal ground in support of the writ petition, 8 and therefore, the same deserves to be dismissed. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 6. Rule 7 of the Rules, 1999, which is reproduced herein below:- “7. Procedure for imposing major penalties. (1) No order, imposing on a member of the Panchayat Service, any of the penalties specified in clause (iv) to (via) of rule 5 shall be passed except after a formal inquiry is held as far as may be, in the manner hereinafter provided. (2) When an order for formal inquiry has been made, the disciplinary authority shall frame Definite charges on the basis of allegations and shall communicate such charges, alongwith the statement of the allegations, to the member of the Panchayat Service and also require him to submit, within such time as may be specified a written statement of defence and also to state whether he desires to be heard in person. (3) The person against whom inquiry is to be held shall, for the purpose of preparing toe defence, be permitted to inspect and take extracts from such records as he may specify: Provided that such permission may be refused if, for reasons to be recorded in 9 writing, in the opinion of the Enquiry Officer such records are not relevant for the purpose or it is against the public interest to allow his access thereto. (4) On receipt of the written statement of defence or if any such statement is not received within the time specified, the disciplinary authority may himself enquire into such of the charges as are not admitted or appoint an Enquiry Officer to hold the inquiry and forward to him his report and, if advised, his recommendation alongwith all the inquiry papers. (5) The disciplinary authority may nominate any person to present the case in support of the charges before the Enquiry Officer. The member of the Panchayat Service may present his case with the assistance of any other Panchayat Servant of State Government Servant approved by the Enquiry Offiger but may not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose, unless the person nominated by the disciplinary authority as aforesaid is a legal practitioner or unless the disciplinary authority having regard to the circumstances of the case so permits. (6) If the servant of the Panchayat Service desires 10 to be heard in person, fie shall be so heard. If he so desires or if the disciplinary authority so directs, an oral enquiry shall be held by the Enquiry Officer. At such inquiry evidence shall be heard as to such of the allegations as are not admitted and the person charged shall be entitled to cross examine the witness, to give evidence in, person, to produce documentary evidence, if any, and to have such witness called as he may wish: Provided that the Enquiry Officer may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, refuse to call a witness. (7) At the conclusion of the inquiry, the Enquiry Officer shall prepare a report of the inquiry, recording his findings on each of the charges together with reasons therefore. (8) The proceedings conducted against the persons charged shall contain a sufficient record of (i) the charges framed against such person and the statement of allegations, (ii) the written statement of defence if any; (iii) the oral evidence taken in the course of the inquiry, (iv) the documentary evidence considered in the course of the inquiry, 11 (v) the orders, if any, made by the Enquiry Officer or the disciplinary authority as the case may be with regard to the inquiry, (vi) a report setting out the findings on each charge and the reasons therefore. (9) the Enquiry Officer, if he is other than the disciplinary authority, shall submit the records of the proceedings mentioned in clause (8) above to the disciplinary authority without recommendation relating to the penalty to be imposed. disciplinary authority shall consider the record of the enquiry and its findings on each charge, having regard to the findings on the charges and the record (if the proceedings) if he is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in clauses (iv) to (vii) of rule 5 should be imposed, it shall furnish to the person charged a copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer, and where the disciplinary authority is not the Enquiry Officer a statement of its findings together with brief reasons for disagreement, if any, with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. (10) The disciplinary authority shall consider the representation, if any, made by the person charged in response to the notice and determine the penalty, if any, should be imposed and shall pass 12 appropriate order on the case. (11) The orders passed by the disciplinary authority shall be communicated to the member of the Panchayat Service, who shall also be supplied with a copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer an where, disciplinary authority is not the Enquiry Officer, a statement of its findings together with the brief reasons for disagreement, if any, with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, unless they have already been supplied to the person charged.” 7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Anoop Jaiswal Vs. Government of India and another, 1984 2 SCC 369 has observed in para 12, as under:- "12. It is, therefore, now well settled that where the form of the order is merely a camouflage for an order of dismissal for misconduct it is always open to the court before which the order is challenged to go behind the form and ascertain the true character of the order. If the court holds that the order though in the form is merely a determination of employment is in reality a cloak for an order of punishment, the court would not be debarred, merely because of the form of the order, in giving effect to the rights conferred by law upon the employee." 8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Indra Pal Gupta Vs. Managing Committee, Model Inter College, Thora (1984) 3 13 SCC 384) has observed in paragraphs 10 and 11, as under- "10. It is seen from the letter dated June 30, 1969 by which the services of the appellant were terminated that the resolution of the Managing Committee dated April 27, 1969 is made a part of it by treating it as an enclosure to that letter. The resolution actually begins with a reference to the report of the Manager, and states that the facts contained in the report were 'serious' and "not in the interests of the institution". It further refers to the fact that the appellant was asked to give his explanation to the allegations made in the said report. That report stated: It is also evident that the seriousness of the lapses is enough to justify dismissal but no educational institution should take that botheration. 11. The above report was the real foundation on which the decision of the Managing Committee was based. This is a case where the order of termination issued is merely a camouflage for an order imposing the penalty of termination of service on the ground of misconduct.” 9. The Supreme Court in the case of Radhey Shyam Gupta Vs. U. P. State Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. and another, 1999 2 SCC 21 has observed in para 34, as under:- “34. But in cases where the termination is preceded by an enquiry and evidence is received and findings as to 14 misconduct of a definitive nature are arrived at behind the back of the officer and where on the basis of such a report, the termination order is issued, such an order will be violative of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as the purpose of the enquiry is to find out the truth of the allegations with a view to punish him and not merely to gather evidence for a future regular departmental enquiry. In such cases, the termination is to be treated as based or founded upon misconduct and will be punitive." 10. The Supreme Court in the case of Dipti Prakash Banerjee Vs. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta and others, 1999 3 SCC 60 has observed in para 35, as under:- “35 The above decision is, in our view, a clear authority for the proposition that the material which amounts to stigma need not be contained in the order of termination of the probationer but might be contained in any document referred to in the termination order or in its annexures. Obviously, such a document could be asked for or called for by any future employer of the probationer. In such a case, the order of termination would stand vitiated on the ground that no regular enquiry was conducted......." 11. The Supreme Court in the case of Nar Bingh Pal Vs. Union of India and others, 2000 3 SCC 588 has held as under:- 15 "The appellant, although a casual labour, had acquired temporary status. Once an employee attains the "temporary" status, he becomes entitled to certain benefits one of which is that he becomes entitled to the constitutional protection envisaged by Article 311 of the Constitution and other articles dealing with services under the Union of India. The services were terminated on account of the allegation of assault made against the appellant. The order of termination in the instant case, cannot be treated to be a simple order of retrenchment. It was an order passed by way of punishment and, therefore, was an order of dismissal which, having been passed on the basis of preliminary inquiry and without holding a regular departmental inquiry, cannot be sustained." 12. From a perusal of the aforesaid judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Court, it is evident that the impugned order has been passed by the Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Dongargaon, in complete violation of the due process of law, as the petitioner was not afforded any proper or reasonable opportunity of hearing prior to the passing of the said order; it is further apparent that the petitioner was initially appointed on the basis of the recommendation of the General Administration Committee of the concerned Janpad Panchayat and was subsequently regularized on the post of A.G.-III on the 16 same recommendation, and therefore, respondent No. 4 was not the competent authority to pass any order affecting the petitioner’s service, as such power vests only with the concerned Collector under Section 70(1) of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993; it is also evident that no prior approval of the prescribed authority was obtained, and the impugned order cancelling the petitioner’s regularization dated 25.01.2021 and removing him from service has been passed solely on the basis of a complaint, without adherence to the mandatory procedure; further, the impugned order was not duly served upon the petitioner and appears to have been dispatched in an irregular manner, thereby raising serious doubts about the bona fides of respondent No. 4; moreover, no show-cause notice was issued, nor was the procedure contemplated under Sections 5 and 7 of the Rules of 1999 followed, and the petitioner has been removed from the regular post of A.G.-III without being granted any opportunity of hearing; accordingly, in view of these glaring legal infirmities, the impugned order is unsustainable in the eyes of law and is hereby quashed. 13. In light of aforesaid observation, the writ petition is allowed and the concerned respondents authorities are directed to reinstate the petitioner forthwith on the post of A.G.-III. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Raghu Jat