2026:HHC:25727 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 246 of 2014 Reserved on: 17.6.2026 Date of Decision: 01.7.2026. Negi Ram ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes. For the Petitioner : M/s H.K.S. Thakkur and Dinesh Chauhan, Advocates. For the Respondent : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 8.8.2014, passed by Learned Additional Session Judge-2, Shimla, Camp at Rohru, District Shimla, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction dated 5.12.2011 and order of sentence dated 21.12.2011, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. 2, Rohru, H.P. (learned Trial Court) 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:25727 were upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323, 324, 326 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant Jager Nath (PW2) was sitting in his verandah on 21.10.2009 at about 09.30 A.M. Shiv Dei (PW3) was working in the threshing floor located adjacent to the informant’s house. She was cleaning the floor when the accused came to the spot with a bundle of grass. He put the bundle on the threshing floor, took out one sickle and inflicted injuries on Shiv Dei without any reason. Shiv Dei shouted for help. Pawan Kumar (PW5) reached the spot and rescued Shiv Dei from the accused. The accused threatened to kill Shiv Dei and Pawan Kumar. The victim sustained bleeding injuries. She was taken to the hospital, and an intimation was given to the police. The police visited the hospital and filed an application for the victim’s medical examination. Dr Neel Prabha (PW8) examined the victim and found that she had sustained multiple injuries. She referred the victim to Civil Hospital, Rohru, for 3 2026:HHC:25727 obtaining the opinion of the Surgical Expert and issued the MLC (Ex.PW8/A). Dr R.S. Kanwar (PW9) treated the injured at IGMC, Shimla and issued the treatment summary (Ex.PW9/A). The police registered the FIR (Ex.PW7/A) after the receipt of the medical opinion. ASI Om Prakash (PW11) investigated the matter. He recorded the informant's statement (Ex.PW2/A) and sent it to the Police Station, where FIR (Ex.PW7/A) was registered. ASI Om Prakash investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ex.PW11/A). He seized the blood-stained clothes of the injured vide memo (Ex.PW3/A). These were put in a cloth parcel, and the parcel was sealed with seal ‘H’. Seal impression (Ex.PW4/A) was taken on a separate piece of cloth, and the seal was handed over to Vikramjeet after use. ASI Om Prakash also seized the sickle vide memo (Ex.PW1/A). The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the Learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, he was charged with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 324, 326 and 506 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tied. 4 2026:HHC:25727 4. The prosecution examined 11 witnesses to prove its case. Constable Tek Singh (PW1) and Ami Chand (PW6) witnessed the recovery. Jager Nath (PW2) witnessed the incident. Shiv Dei (PW3) is the victim. Vikram Jeeth (PW4) is the victim's husband to whom the incident was narrated. Pawan Kumar (PW5) rescued the informant from the accused. HC Balbir Singh (PW7) proved the FIR. Dr Neel Prabha (PW8) examined the victim. Dr R.S. Kanwar (PW9) treated the victim at IGMC, Shimla, and Rajinder Singh Guleria (PW10) prepared the challan. ASI Om Prakash (PW11) investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC), denied the prosecution's case in its entirety. He stated that witnesses were interested and they deposed falsely against him. He claimed that a false case was made due to the enmity. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the testimony of the informant was credible. It was duly corroborated by the medical evidence and the testimony of Pawan Kumar. The prosecution’s case could not be discarded because of the enmity, as the enmity can 5 2026:HHC:25727 furnish a motive for the commission of the crime as well. The non- examination of the independent witnesses was not material. The prosecution had not proved the ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 506 of the IPC. Hence, the Learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as under:- Conviction Sentence Section 324 of IPC To undergo simple imprisonment for six months. Section 326 of IPC To undergo simple imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of ₹500/- and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the Learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Shimla, Camp at Rohru, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). The Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the Learned Trial Court that the incident had taken place in a manner suggested by the prosecution witnesses. The medical evidence also corroborated the prosecution's version. The enmity between the parties was not sufficient to discard the prosecution's case. There was no evidence that some independent person had witnessed the incident. Minor 6 2026:HHC:25727 contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses were not sufficient to discard them. Learned Trial Court had properly appreciated the evidence on record, and no interference was required with the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the Learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that the learned Courts below erred in holding that the accused had committed the offences alleged against him. There was no direct evidence of the incident. The prosecution had failed to prove the incident in a manner suggested by it. There were major contradictions in the statements of witnesses, which were ignored by treating them as minor. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard M/s HKS Thakur and Dinesh Chauhan, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 10. Mr HKS Thakur, Learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the prosecution's case was full of 7 2026:HHC:25727 infirmities. Learned Trial Court had not noticed the evidence of Dr. R.S. Kanwar (PW9). As per the prosecution's case, the accused was carrying a bundle of grass, which he had kept on the threshing floor. However, no bundle of grass was recovered from the spot, which made the prosecution's case highly suspect. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Court below be set aside. 11. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the learned Courts below have properly appreciated the evidence. The testimony of the informant was duly corroborated by the testimony of the injured and the medical evidence. Minor contradictions are not sufficient to discard the prosecution's version. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent 8 2026:HHC:25727 defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207- “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error that is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. DilipsinhKishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: “14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. 9 2026:HHC:25727 15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing 10 2026:HHC:25727 of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.” 15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169: “12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) 5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise amount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the 11 2026:HHC:25727 aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in SanjaysinhRamrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non- consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non- consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not 12 2026:HHC:25727 interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” 16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205: “16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.” 17. A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed: “27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir Singh(supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. 13 2026:HHC:25727 28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court. 18. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 19. The victim Shiv Dei (PW3) stated that she was working in her threshing floor. Her husband was not present at home. The accused came to the spot. He kept the grass on the threshing floor and inflicted injuries to her on her chest and arm with a sickle. She shouted for help, and Pawan Kumar came to the spot. She stated in her cross-examination that the village Sol had a population of about 200-300 people. She admitted that the temple of Devta was located adjacent to her house. She admitted that a public tap was installed near the temple. She admitted that the place of the incident was near the public path, which was being used by the people. She became unconscious after sustaining the injuries. She admitted that she, Vikramjeet, Pawan, Mithar, and Krishan Kumar had quarrelled with the accused, and a criminal case was pending regarding this incident. She admitted that she had a dispute with the accused for 10-12 years, and they were not on visiting terms with each other. 14 2026:HHC:25727 She admitted that a sickle is commonly available. She denied that a false case was made due to the enmity. 20. Informant Jager Nath (PW2) stated that the victim Shiv Dei was working in the threshing floor. The accused came to the threshing floor. He kept the bundle of grass on the floor and inflicted injuries on Shiv Dei without any reason. Shiv Dei shouted for help, and her son arrived on the spot. He stated in his cross- examination that the village had 100 houses. About 4-10 people resided in each house. Pawan Kumar is the informant’s son. Shiv Dei was his sister-in-law. He admitted that the temple is located adjacent to his house, and the villagers visit the temple and take the water from the public tap. He stated that usually 20-30 people are present near the temple. He could not say whether the people were present near the public tap or not. He was not aware of the dispute between the informant and the accused. He admitted that he was not on visiting terms with the accused. He denied that he was making a false statement because of the enmity between the parties. 21. Pawan Kumar (PW5) stated that he and his sister heard the noise at about 9.30 P.M on 21.10.2009. He came out and saw that the accused had inflicted injuries on Shiv Dei with a sickle. He 15 2026:HHC:25727 intervened and rescued his mother from the accused. He admitted in his cross-examination that the abadi of the village consisted of 400-500 people. He admitted that a temple is located adjacent to their house, where the people gather to pay obeisance and collect the water. He admitted that the threshing floor was jointly owned by 8-10 people. He admitted that the houses were located adjacent to each other in the village. The victim had shouted 2-3 times; however, no one came to the spot. He admitted that a criminal case was pending against him, his sister and younger brother, which was filed by the accused. 22. The testimonies of these witnesses corroborate each other on material particulars. There is nothing in their cross- examination to show that they were making a false statement, and the learned Courts below had rightly relied upon these testimonies. 23. It was submitted that the witnesses were related to each other and that they were interested. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Laltu Ghosh v. State of W.B., (2019) 15 SCC 344: (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 275: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 2 that a related witness is not an interested witness 16 2026:HHC:25727 and his testimony cannot be rejected on the ground of interestedness. It was observed: “12. As regards the contention that the eyewitnesses are close relatives of the deceased, it is by now well-settled that a related witness cannot be said to be an “interested” witness merely by virtue of being a relative of the victim. This Court has elucidated the difference between “interested” and “related” witnesses in a plethora of cases, stating that a witness may be called interested only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of litigation, which in the context of a criminal case would mean that the witness has a direct or indirect interest in seeing the accused punished due to prior enmity or other reasons, and thus has a motive to falsely implicate the accused (for instance, see State of Rajasthan v. Kalki, (1981) 2 SCC 752: 1981 SCC (Cri) 593; Amit v. State of U.P., (2012) 4 SCC 107 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 590 and Gangabhavani v. Rayapati Venkat Reddy, (2013) 15 SCC 298 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 182). 13. Recently, this difference was reiterated in Ganapathi v. State of T.N., (2018) 5 SCC 549 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 793, in the following terms, by referring to the three-Judge Bench decision in State of Rajasthan v. Kalki, (1981) 2 SCC 752: 1981 SCC (Cri) 593 : (Ganapathi v. State of T.N., (2018) 5 SCC 549 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 793), SCC p. 555, para 14) “14. “Related” is not equivalent to “interested”. A witness may be called “interested” only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of a litigation; in the decree in a civil case, or in seeing an accused person punished. A witness who is a natural one and is the only possible eyewitness in the circumstances of a case cannot be said to be “interested”.… 14. In criminal cases, it is often the case that the offence is witnessed by a close relative of the victim, whose presence on the scene of the offence would be natural. 17 2026:HHC:25727 The evidence of such a witness cannot automatically be discarded by labelling the witness as interested. Indeed, one of the earliest statements with respect to interested witnesses in criminal cases was made by this Court in Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, 1954 SCR 145: AIR 1953 SC 364: 1953 Cri LJ 1465, wherein this Court observed: (AIR p. 366, para 26) “26. A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted, and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person.” 15. In the case of a related witness, the Court may not treat his or her testimony as inherently tainted and needs to ensure only that the evidence is inherently reliable, probable, cogent and consistent. We may refer to the observations of this Court in Jayabalan v. State (UT of Pondicherry), (2010) 1 SCC 199: (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 966): (SCC p. 213, para 23) “23. We are of the considered view that in cases where the court is called upon to deal with the evidence of the interested witnesses, the approach of the court, while appreciating the evidence of such witnesses, must not be pedantic. The court must be cautious in appreciating and accepting the evidence given by the interested witnesses, but the court must not be suspicious of such evidence. The primary endeavour of the court must be to look for consistency. The evidence of a witness cannot be ignored or thrown out solely because it comes from the mouth of a person who is closely related to the victim.” 18 2026:HHC:25727 24. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Thoti Manohar vs State of Andhra Pradesh (2012) 7 SCC 723 that the court cannot discard the testimony of a witness on the ground of a relationship. It was observed: “31. In this context, we may refer with profit to the decision of this Court in Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1953 SC 364, wherein Vivian Bose, J., speaking for the Court, observed as follows: - “We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that the testimony of the two eye- witnesses requires corroboration. If the foundation for such an observation is based on the fact that the witnesses are women and that the fate of seven men hangs on their testimony, we know of no such rule. If it is grounded on the reason that they are closely related to the deceased, we are unable to concur. This is a fallacy common to many criminal cases and one which another Bench of this Court endeavoured to dispel in Rameshwar v. The State of Rajasthan (1952) SCR 377 at p. 390 = (AIR 1952 SC 54 at page 59).” 32. In the said case, it was further observed that: “A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted, and that usually means unless the witness has a cause, such as an enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true that when feelings run high, and there is a personal cause for enmity, there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but the foundation must be laid for such criticism, 19 2026:HHC:25727 and the mere fact of relationship, far from being a foundation, is often a sure guarantee of truth.” 33. In Masalti v. State of U.P. AIR 1965 SC 202, it has been ruled that normally close relatives of the deceased would not be considered to be interested witnesses who would also mention the names of the other persons as responsible for causing injuries to the deceased. 34. In Hari Obula Reddi and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1981 SC 82, a three-judge Bench has held that evidence of interested witnesses is not necessarily unreliable evidence. Even partisanship by itself is not a valid ground for discrediting or rejecting sworn testimony. It can be laid down as an invariable rule that interested evidence can never form the basis of conviction unless corroborated to a material extent in material particulars by independent evidence. All that is necessary is that the evidence of interested witnesses should be subjected to scrutiny and accepted with caution. If, on such scrutiny, the interested testimony is found to be intrinsically reliable or inherently probable, it may, by itself, be sufficient, in the circumstances of the particular case, to base a conviction thereon. 35. In Kartik Malhar v. State of Bihar (1996) 1 SCC 614, it has been opined that a close relative who is a natural witness cannot be regarded as an interested witness, for the term ‘interested’ postulates that the witness must have some interest in having the accused, somehow or other, convicted for some animus or some other reason. 36. In Pulicherla Nagaraju alias Nagaraja Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 2006 SC 3010, while dealing with the liability of interested witnesses who are relatives, a two- judge Bench observed that: “It is well settled that evidence of a witness cannot be discarded merely on the ground that he is either partisan or interested or close relative to the deceased if it is otherwise found to be trustworthy and credible.” 20 2026:HHC:25727 The said evidence only requires scrutiny with more care and caution, so that neither the guilty escapes nor the innocent is wrongly convicted. If, on such scrutiny, the evidence is found to be reliable and probable, then it can be acted upon. “If it is found to be improbable or suspicious, it ought to be rejected. Where the witness has a motive to falsely implicate the accused, his testimony should have corroboration in regard to material particulars before it is accepted.” 25. This position was reiterated in Rajesh Yadav vs. State of Bihar 2022 Cr.L.J. 2986 (SC) as under: “28. A related witness cannot be termed as an interested witness per se. One has to see the place of occurrence along with other circumstances. A related witness can also be a natural witness. If an offence is committed within the precincts of the deceased, the presence of his family members cannot be ruled out, as they assume the position of natural witnesses. When their evidence is clear, cogent and withstands the rigour of cross- examination, it becomes sterling, not requiring further corroboration. A related witness would become an interested witness only when he is desirous of implicating the accused in rendering a conviction, on purpose. 29. When the court is convinced of the quality of the evidence produced, notwithstanding the classification as quoted above, it becomes the best evidence. Such testimony being natural, adding to the degree of probability, the court has to rely upon it in proving a fact. The aforesaid position of law has been well laid down in Bhaskarrao v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 6 SCC 591: “32. Coming back to the appreciation of the evidence at hand, at the outset, our attention is drawn to the fact that the witnesses were interrelated, and this Court should be cautious in accepting their statements. It would be beneficial to recapitulate the law concerning the 21 2026:HHC:25727 appreciation of evidence of a related witness. In Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, 1954 SCR 145: AIR 1953 SC 364: 1953 Cri LJ 1465, Vivian Bose, J. for the Bench, observed the law as under (AIR p. 366, para 26) “26. A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted, and that usually means unless the witness has a cause, such as an enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true when feelings run high, and there is a personal cause for enmity, that there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but the foundation must be laid for such a criticism, and the mere fact of relationship, far from being a foundation, is often a sure guarantee of truth. However, we are not attempting any sweeping generalisation. Each case must be judged on its own facts. Our observations are only made to combat what is so often put forward in cases before us as a general rule of prudence. There is no such general rule. Each case must be limited to and be governed by its own facts.” 33. In Masalti v. State of U.P., (1964) 8 SCR 133: AIR 1965 SC 202: (1965) 1 Cri LJ 226], a five-judge Bench of this Court has categorically observed as under (AIR pp. 209-210, para 14) “14. … There is no doubt that when a criminal court has to appreciate evidence given by witnesses who are partisan or interested, it has to be very careful in weighing such evidence. Whether or not there are discrepancies in the evidence, whether or not the evidence strikes the court as genuine, whether or not the story disclosed by the evidence is probable, are all matters that must be taken into account. But it would, we think, be unreasonable to contend that 22 2026:HHC:25727 evidence given by witnesses should be discarded only on the ground that it is evidence of partisan or interested witnesses. Often enough, where factions prevail in villages and murders are committed as a result of enmity between such factions, criminal courts have to deal with evidence of a partisan type. The mechanical rejection of such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan would invariably lead to the failure of justice. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to how much evidence should be appreciated. The judicial approach has to be cautious in dealing with such evidence, but the plea that such evidence should be rejected because it is partisan cannot be accepted as correct.” 34. In Darya Singh v. State of Punjab [(1964) 3 SCR 397: AIR 1965 SC 328: (1965) 1 Cri LJ 350], this Court held that evidence of an eyewitness who is a near relative of the victim should be closely scrutinised, but no corroboration is necessary for acceptance of his evidence. In Harbans Kaur v. State of Haryana [(2005) 9 SCC 195: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1213: 2005 Cri LJ 2199], this Court observed that: (SCC p. 227, para 6) “6. There is no proposition in law that relatives are to be treated as untruthful witnesses. On the contrary, reason has to be shown when a plea of partiality is raised to show that the witnesses had reason to shield the actual culprit and falsely implicate the accused.” 35. The last case we need to concern ourselves with is Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 14 SCC 150: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 773, wherein this Court, after observing previous precedents, has summarised the law in the following manner: (SCC p. 164, para 38) “38. … It is clear that a close relative cannot be characterised as an “interested” witness. He is a “natural” witness. His evidence, however, must be scrutinised carefully. If, on such scrutiny, his 23 2026:HHC:25727 evidence is found to be intrinsically reliable, inherently probable and wholly trustworthy, a conviction can be based on the “sole” testimony of such a witness. A close relationship of the witness with the deceased or the victim is no grounds to reject his evidence. On the contrary, a close relative of the deceased would normally be most reluctant to spare the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent one.” 36. From the study of the aforesaid precedents of this Court, we may note that whoever has been a witness before the court of law, having a strong interest in the result, if allowed to be weighed in the same scales with those who do not have any interest in the result, would be to open the doors of the court for perverted truth. This sound rule, which remains the bulwark of this system and which determines the value of evidence derived from such sources, needs to be cautiously and carefully observed and enforced. There is no dispute about the fact that the interest of the witness must affect his testimony is a universal truth. Moreover, under the influence of bias, a man may not be in a position to judge correctly, even if they earnestly desires to do so. Similarly, he may not be in a position to provide evidence in an impartial manner when it involves his interests. Under such influences, man will, even though not consciously, suppress some facts, soften or modify others, and provide favourable colour. These are the most controlling considerations in respect to the credibility of human testimony, and should never be overlooked in applying the rules of evidence and determining its weight in the scale of truth under the facts and circumstances of each case.” 30. Once again, we reiterate with a word of caution that the trial court is the best court to decide on the aforesaid aspect, as no mathematical calculation or straightjacket formula can be made on the assessment of a witness, as the journey towards the truth can be seen better through 24 2026:HHC:25727 the eyes of the trial judge. In fact, this is the real objective behind the enactment itself, which extends the maximum discretion to the court.” 26. Similar is the judgment in M Nageswara Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 2022 (5) SCC 791, wherein it was observed: “10. Having gone through the deposition of the relevant witnesses -eye-witnesses/injured eye-witnesses, we are of the opinion that there are no major/material contradictions in the deposition of the eye-witnesses and injured eye-witnesses. All are consistent insofar as accused Nos. 1 to 3 are concerned. As observed hereinabove, PW6 has identified Accused Nos. 1 to 3. The High Court has observed that PW1, PW3 & PW5 were planted witnesses merely on the ground that they were all interested witnesses, being relatives of the deceased. Merely because the witnesses were the relatives of the deceased, their evidence cannot be discarded solely on the aforesaid ground. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court has materially erred in discarding the deposition/evidence of PW1, PW3, PW5 & PW6 and even PW7.” 27. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Jabbar Ali v. State of Assam, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1440, that relationship is no reason to discard the witnesses’ testimonies. The Court is required to see their testimonies with due care and caution. It was observed: 55. It is noted that great weight has been attached to the testimonies of the witnesses in the instant case. Having regard to the aforesaid fact that this Court has examined 25 2026:HHC:25727 the credibility of the witnesses to rule out any tainted evidence given in the court of Law. It was contended by learned counsel for the appellant that the prosecution failed to examine any independent witnesses in the present case and that the witnesses were related to each other. This Court, in a number of cases, has had the opportunity to consider the said aspect of related/interested/partisan witnesses and the credibility of such witnesses. This Court is conscious of the well- settled principle that just because the witnesses are related/interested/partisan witnesses, their testimonies cannot be disregarded; however, it is also true that when the witnesses are related/interested, their testimonies have to be scrutinised with greater care and circumspection. In the case of Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa, (2002) 8 SCC 381, this Court held that the testimony of such related witnesses should be analysed with caution for its credibility. 56. In Raju alias Balachandran v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2012) 12 SCC 701, this Court observed: “29. The sum and substance is that the evidence of a related or interested witness should be meticulously and carefully examined. In a case where the related and interested witness may have some enmity with the assailant, the bar would need to be raised, and the evidence of the witness would have to be examined by applying a standard of discerning scrutiny. However, this is only a rule of prudence and not one of law, as held in Dalip Singh [AIR 1953 SC 364] and pithily reiterated in Sarwan Singh [(1976) 4 SCC 369] in the following words: (Sarwan Singh case [(1976) 4 SCC 369, p. 376, para 10) “10. … The evidence of an interested witness does not suffer from any infirmity as such, but the courts require, as a rule of prudence, not as a rule of law, that the evidence of such 26 2026:HHC:25727 witnesses should be scrutinised with a little care. Once that approach is made and the court is satisfied that the evidence of interested witnesses has a ring of truth, such evidence could be relied upon even without corroboration.” 57. Further delving into the same issue, it is noted that in the case of Ganapathi v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2018) 5 SCC 549, this Court held that in several cases when only family members are present at the time of the incident and the case of the prosecution is based only on their evidence, Courts have to be cautious and meticulously evaluate the evidence in the process of trial. 28. This position was reiterated in Baban Shankar Daphal v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 137, wherein it was observed: “27. One of the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the eyewitnesses to the incident were all closely related to the deceased, and for prudence, the prosecution ought to have examined some other independent eyewitnesses as well who were present at the time of the unfortunate incident. This was also the view taken by the Trial Court, but the High Court has correctly rejected such an approach and held that merely because there were some more independent witnesses, who had also reached the place of the incident, the evidence of the relatives cannot be disbelieved. The law nowhere states that the evidence of the interested witness should be discarded altogether. The law only warrants that their evidence should be scrutinised with care and caution. It has been held by this Court in the catena of judgments that merely if a witness is a relative, their testimony cannot be discarded on that ground alone. 27 2026:HHC:25727 28. In criminal cases, the credibility of witnesses, particularly those who are close relatives of the victim, is often scrutinised. However, being a relative does not automatically render a witness “interested” or biased. The term “interested” refers to witnesses who have a personal stake in the outcome, such as a desire for revenge or to falsely implicate the accused due to enmity or personal gain. A “related” witness, on the other hand, is someone who may be naturally present at the scene of the crime, and their testimony should not be dismissed simply because of their relationship to the victim. Courts must assess the reliability, consistency, and coherence of their statements rather than labelling them as untrustworthy. 29. The distinction between “interested” and “related” witnesses has been clarified in Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab 1954 SCR 145: AIR 1953 SC 364: 1953 Cri LJ 1465, where this Court emphasised that a close relative is usually the last person to falsely implicate an innocent person. Therefore, in evaluating the evidence of a related witness, the court should focus on the consistency and credibility of their testimony. This approach ensures that the evidence is not discarded merely due to familial ties, but is instead assessed based on its inherent reliability and consistency with other evidence in the case. This position has been reiterated by this Court in: i. Md. Rojali Ali v. The State of Assam, Ministry of Home Affairs through secretary (2019) 19 SCC 567; ii. Ganapathi v. State of T.N. (2018) 5 SCC 549; iii. Jayabalan v. Union Territory of Pondicherry (2010) 1 SCC 199. 30. Though the eyewitnesses who have been examined in the present case were closely related to the deceased, namely his wife, daughter and son, their testimonies are consistent with respect to the accused persons being the assailants who inflicted wounds on the deceased. As is revealed from the sequence of events that transpired, one 28 2026:HHC:25727 of the family members was subjected to an assault. It was thus quite natural for the other family members to rush on the spot to intervene. The presence of the family members on the spot and thus being eyewitnesses has been well established. In such circumstances, merely because the eyewitnesses are family members, their testimonies cannot be discarded solely on that ground. 29. Therefore, the testimonies of these witnesses could not have been rejected because of the relationship between them. 30. Dr Neel Prabha (PW8) examined the victim and found that she had sustained incised wounds on the back and the left ear and a lacerated wound on the wrist. The injuries were grievous and were caused by means of a sharp-edged weapon. She stated in her cross-examination that injuries could be self-inflicted or caused by a fall. 31. It was submitted that the admission in the cross- examination by the Medical Officer that the injuries can be caused by way of a fall or self-infliction will make the prosecution's case highly suspect. This submission cannot be accepted. The statement of the Medical Officer is an alternative hypothesis, which is not sufficient to doubt the prosecution's case. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai, (2003) 12 SCC 395: 2003 SCC OnLine SC 1086, that when the testimonies of the 29 2026:HHC:25727 witnesses are found credible, the medical evidence pointing to alternative possibilities is not sufficient to discard the prosecution’s case. It was observed at page 404: “22. It is trite that where the eyewitnesses' account is found credible and trustworthy, medical opinion pointing to alternative possibilities is not accepted as conclusive. Witnesses, as Bentham said, are the eyes and ears of justice. Hence, the importance and primacy of the quality of the trial process. Eyewitnesses' accounts would require a careful independent assessment and evaluation for their credibility, which should not be adversely prejudged, making any other evidence, including the medical evidence, the sole touchstone for the test of such credibility. The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witnesses held to be creditworthy; consistency with the undisputed facts; the “credit” of the witnesses; their performance in the witness box; their power of observation, etc. Then the probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation.” 32. Therefore, the prosecution's case cannot be doubted because of the alternative hypothesis. 33. It was submitted that the sickle was not shown to the Medical Officer, and there is no medical opinion that the injuries could have been caused by means of the sickle recovered by the police. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sudha Renukaiah v. State of A.P., (2017) 13 SCC 81 : (2017) 4 SCC (Cri) 558: 2017 SCC OnLine SC 403 that the 30 2026:HHC:25727 prosecution’s case cannot be doubted because the weapon of the offence is not shown to the doctor. It was observed at page 94: 37. Looking to the injuries as noticed by PW 17, it is clear that the cut injuries as noticed above could be by axe and knife, as well as by battle axe, as opined by the doctor. The fact that the weapon was neither shown to the doctor nor in the cross-examination, the attention of the doctor was invited towards the weapon, is not of much consequence in the facts of the present case, where there was clear medical evidence that injuries could be caused by a knife, an axe and a battle axe. It is not the contention before us that the injuries as noted by the doctors in the post-mortem of Deceased 1 and 2 could not have been caused by knives and axes. The submission has also been raised that it was put to the doctor that injuries by a battle axe could be half-moon, the doctor himself admitted in his report that he has not reported the depth of the injury, the middle of the injury, nor the margins of the injuries have been noted. He has not described any injury as a half moon. The doctor himself has admitted that he has not described the shapes of the injuries, the depth and the middle of the injuries. The above medical evidence does not lead to the conclusion that injuries as noticed by the doctors could not have been caused by axes, knives and battle axes. The eyewitnesses, PWs 1, 2, 3 and 5, have clearly mentioned the weapons used by the accused, which eyewitnesses accounts are in accordance with the medical evidence. Thus, mere non-showing of the weapons to the doctors at the time of their depositions in the court is inconsequential and in no manner weakens the prosecution's case. 34. In the present case, the witnesses consistently stated that the injuries sustained by the victim could have been caused by a sickle. The medical officer also noticed that the injuries could have 31 2026:HHC:25727 been caused by a sharp-edged weapon. Hence, the prosecution's case cannot be doubted because the weapon of offence was not shown to the doctor. 35. Dr R.S. Kanwar (PW9) treated the victim and issued the treatment summary (Ex.PW9/A), mentioning that the patient was admitted with an alleged history of stab injury to the right chest on the back. 36. It was submitted that his testimony falsifies the prosecution's version because the injury was noticed on the right chest, whereas the Medical Officer Neel Prabha had noticed the injury on the back. This submission is only stated to be rejected because the history mentions the injury on the back. There is a description of hemopneumothorax of the right pleural cavity, clearly showing the injured lungs. Therefore, the treatment summary issued by this witness does not make the prosecution's case suspect. 37. It was submitted that the learned Trial Court had not referred to the testimony of Dr R. S. Kanwar, which would vitiate the judgment of the learned Trial Court. This submission will not help the prosecution. The mere omission to refer to the testimony of Dr 32 2026:HHC:25727 R. S. Kanwar will not vitiate the judgment of the learned Trial Court because there would be no difference in the outcome. 38. The testimony of the victim is duly corroborated by the medical evidence. The victim had sustained injuries, and her testimony was entitled to a great weight. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Neeraj Sharma v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2024) 3 SCC 125: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 13 that the testimony of the injured witness has to be accepted as correct unless there are compelling circumstances to doubt his testimony. It was observed: “22. The importance of an injured witness in a criminal trial cannot be overstated. Unless there are compelling circumstances or evidence placed by the defence to doubt such a witness, this has to be accepted as extremely valuable evidence in a criminal trial. 23. In Balu Sudam Khaldev.State of Maharashtra [Balu Sudam Khalde v.State of Maharashtra, (2023) 13 SCC 365: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 355], this Court summed up the principles which are to be kept in mind when appreciating the evidence of an injured eyewitness. This Court held as follows: (SCC para 26) “26. When the evidence of an injured eyewitness is to be appreciated, the under-noted legal principles enunciated by the Courts are required to be kept in mind: 26.1. The presence of an injured eyewitness at the time and place of the occurrence cannot be doubted unless there are material contradictions in his deposition. 33 2026:HHC:25727 26.2. Unless it is otherwise established by the evidence, it must be believed that an injured witness would not allow the real culprits to escape and falsely implicate the accused. 26.3. The evidence of the injured witness has greater evidentiary value, and unless compelling reasons exist, their statements are not to be discarded lightly. 26.4. The evidence of the injured witness cannot be doubted on account of some embellishment in natural conduct or minor contradictions. 26.5. If there be any exaggeration or immaterial embellishment in the evidence of an injured witness, then such contradiction, exaggeration or embellishment should be discarded from the evidence of the injured, but not the whole evidence. 26.6. The broad substratum of the prosecution version must be taken into consideration, and discrepancies which normally creep due to loss of memory with the passage of time should be discarded.” (emphasis supplied) 39. This position was reiterated in Rajan v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952, wherein it was observed: “33. When the evidence of an injured eye-witness is to be appreciated, the undernoted legal principles enunciated by the Courts are required to be kept in mind: “(a) The presence of an injured eye-witness at the time and place of the occurrence cannot be doubted unless there are material contradictions in his deposition. (b) Unless it is otherwise established by the evidence, it must be believed that an injured witness would not 34 2026:HHC:25727 allow the real culprits to escape and falsely implicate the accused. (c) The evidence of an injured witness has greater evidentiary value, and unless compelling reasons exist, their statements are not to be discarded lightly. (d) The evidence of an injured witness cannot be doubted on account of some embellishment in natural conduct or minor contradictions. (e) If there be any exaggeration or immaterial embellishments in the evidence of an injured witness, then such contradiction, exaggeration or embellishment should be discarded from the evidence of the injured, but not the whole evidence. (f) The broad substratum of the prosecution version must be taken into consideration, and discrepancies which normally creep due to loss of memory with passage of time should be discarded.” 34. In assessing the value of the evidence of the eyewitnesses, two principal considerations are whether, in the circumstances of the case, it is possible to believe their presence at the scene of occurrence or in such situations as would make it possible for them to witness the facts deposed to by them and secondly, whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable in their evidence. In respect of both these considerations, circumstances either elicited from those witnesses themselves or established by other evidence tending to improbabilise their presence or to discredit the veracity of their statements, will have a bearing upon the value which a Court would attach to their evidence. Although in cases where the plea of the accused is a mere denial yet the evidence of the prosecution witnesses has to be examined on its own merits, where the accused raise a definite plea or put forward a positive case which is inconsistent with that of the prosecution, the nature of such plea or case and the probabilities in respect of it will also have to be taken into account while assessing the 35 2026:HHC:25727 value of the prosecution evidence. (See: Balu Sudam Khaldev.State of Maharashtra:(2023) 13 SCC 365). 40. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab vs. Hari Singh 1974 (3) SCR 725 that a person speaking on oath should be presumed to be a truthful witness unless there is something inherently improbable in his testimony. It was observed: “The ordinary presumption is that a witness speaking under an oath is truthful unless and until he is shown to be untruthful or unreliable in any particular respect. The High Court, reversing this approach, seems to us to have assumed that witnesses are untruthful unless it is proved that they are telling the truth. Witnesses, solemnly deposing on oath in the witness box during a trial upon a grave charge of murder, must be presumed to act with a full sense of responsibility for the consequences of what they state. It may be that what they say is so very unlikely or unnatural or unreasonable that it is safer not to act upon it or even to disbelieve them.” 41. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. Versus Smt. Noorie Alias Noor Jahan and Others, (1996) 9 SCC 104, that while assessing the evidence of an eyewitness, the Court must adhere to two principles, namely, whether, in the circumstances of the case, the eyewitness could be present and whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable. It was observed: - 36 2026:HHC:25727 “7. The High Court having acquitted the accused persons on appreciation of the evidence, we have ourselves scrutinised the evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 3. The conclusion is irresistible that their evidence on material particulars has been brushed aside by the High Court by entering into the realm of conjecture and fanciful speculation without even discussing the evidence, more particularly the evidence relating to the basic prosecution case. While assessing and evaluating the evidence of eyewitnesses, the Court must adhere to two principles, namely, whether, in the circumstances of the case, it was possible for the eyewitness to be present at the scene and whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable. The High Court, in our opinion, has failed to observe the aforesaid principles and, in fact, has misappreciated the evidence, which has caused a gross miscarriage of justice. The credibility of a witness has to be decided by referring to his evidence and finding out how he has fared in cross-examination and what impression is created by his evidence, taken insofar as the context of the case, and not by entering into the realm of conjecture and speculation. On scrutinising the evidence of PWs. 1, 2 and 3, we find they are consistent with one another so far as the place of occurrence, the manner of assault, the weapon of assault used by the accused persons, the fact of dragging of the dead body of the deceased from the place to the grove and nothing has been brought out in their cross-examination to impeach their testimony. The aforesaid oral evidence fully corroborates the medical evidence. In that view of the matter, we unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that the prosecution has been able to establish the charge against the accused persons and the High Court committed an error in acquitting the three respondents, namely Inder Dutt, Raghu Raj and Bikram.” (emphasis supplied). 42. In the present case, the presence of the victim was established by her injuries, and the learned Courts below had rightly accepted her testimony. 37 2026:HHC:25727 43. It was submitted that the accused was carrying a bundle of grass which he had kept on the threshing floor, but no bundle of grass was found by the Investigating Officer on the spot, which made the prosecution’s case doubtful. This submission will not help the petitioner. No person deposed that the accused had not taken the bundle of grass after the incident. Therefore, there is a possibility that the bundle of grass was taken by the accused with him. Further, the failure to collect evidence is a case of defective investigation, which will not make the prosecution's case suspect. Therefore, the testimony of the victim cannot be doubted because the Investigating Officer had failed to collect the bundle of grass. 44. It was admitted that the prosecution had not examined any independent witness, which would make the prosecution's case highly suspect. This submission will also not help the petitioner. There is no evidence that any person was present at the time of the incident. This is also likely because the accused would not have inflicted an injury upon the victim in the presence of the independent persons. Therefore, the prosecution's case cannot be doubted because no independent witness was examined by the prosecution. 38 2026:HHC:25727 45. It was submitted that there is an enmity between the parties. The witnesses admitted that they were not on visiting terms with the accused. A criminal case was pending against the informant party. Thus, the possibility of false implication cannot be ruled out. This submission will not help the petitioner. The enmity is a double- edged weapon. While it furnishes a motive for false implication, it also furnishes a motive for the commission of the crime. Therefore, the enmity by itself cannot make the prosecution case suspect. In the present case, the testimonies of the witnesses and the medical evidence show that the enmity was a motive for the commission of the crime rather than the false implication. Hence, the enmity cannot be used to discard the prosecution's case. 46. The statements of the witnesses corroborated each other. They were corroborated by the medical evidence, and learned Courts below had rightly accepted these testimonies to hold that the accused had inflicted injuries to the victim with a sickle, a sharp- edged weapon. 47. Learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 324 and 326 of the IPC. Section 326 is an aggravated form of Section 39 2026:HHC:25727 324 of the IPC because a grievous hurt by a sharp-edged weapon is required under Section 326, whereas a simple hurt by a sharp-edged weapon is required under Section 324 of the IPC. In the present case, the injuries were caused to the victim Shiv Dei, therefore, the accused could not have been sentenced of the lesser offence when he was convicted of the commission of the graver offence in view of Section 71 of the IPC and the sentence imposed by the Trial Court, as affirmed by learned Appellate Court for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 324 of the IPC is liable to be set aside. 48. Learned Trial court had imposed a sentence of 6 months for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 326 of IPC, which cannot be said to be excessive considering that a sickle, a deadly weapon, was used for causing injury to the victim. Thus, no interference is required with the sentence of 6 months imposed by the learned Trial Court. 49. Therefore, in view of the above, the present appeal is partly allowed, and the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court, as affirmed by the Learned Appellate Court for the commission of an 40 2026:HHC:25727 offence punishable under Section 324 of the IPC, is set aside. Subject to his modification, the rest of the judgment and order are upheld. 50. The record of the learned Courts below be returned with a copy of the judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 1st July, 2026 (Chander)