Page No.# 1/16 GAHC040012302023 2026:GAU-AP:891-DB THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : WA/27/2023 Miss Lek Megu D/o Late Akut Megu, Resident of Tebo Village, Pasighat, P.O/P.S Pasighat, East Siang District, Arunachal Pradesh. VERSUS THE UNION OF INDIA and 3 Ors. represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Ayush, Govt. of India, Ayush, Bhawan, B Block, GPO Complex, INA, New Delhi-110023 2:The North Eastern Institute of Ayurveda and Homeopathy (NEIAH) Age: 0 Occupation : represented by the Director NEIAH Mawdiangdiang Shillong Meghalaya 793018 Ph. No. 0363-253813. 3:The North Eastern Institute of Folk Medicine (NEIFM) Age: 0 Occupation : now renamed as North Eastern Institute of Ayurveda and Folk Medicine Research (NEIAFMR) represented by the Director (NEIAFMR) Pasighat Arunachal Pradesh. 4:The Director Age: 0 Occupation : North Eastern Institute of Folk Medicine (NEIFM) now renamed as North Eastern Institute of Ayurveda and Folk Medicine Research (NEIAFMR) Pasighat Page No.# 2/16 District East Siang Arunachal Pradesh Ph no. 0368222218 Advocate for the Petitioner : Nikita Danggen, K Chotton,Honi Tana Tara,P Siga,Oken Duggong Advocate for the Respondent : Marto Kato, DSGI :::BEFORE::: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE KARDAK ETE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BUDI HABUNG Date on which Judgment was reserved : 27.08.2026 Date of pronouncement of Judgment : 07.09.2026 Whether the pronouncement is of the operative part of the Judgment ? : NA Whether the full Judgment has been pronounced ? : Yes JUDGMENT & ORDER (CAV) (Kardak Ete, J.) Heard Ms. N. Danggen, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. M. Kato, learned Dy.S.G.I. for the Union of India, representing the respondents. 2. This intra-court appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 25.08.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge in WP(C) No. 07(AP)/2023, whereby the writ petition preferred by the appellant/writ petitioner has been dismissed. Page No.# 3/16 3. The brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the North Eastern Institute of Folk Medicine (NEIFM), Pasighat, issued Advertisement No. NEIFM/211/ADVT/2016 dated 08.03.2018 inviting applications for filling up 2 (two) posts of Upper Division Clerk (UDC) through deputation/direct recruitment. The appellant applied for the post of UDC and, pursuant to the Calling Letter-cum-Admit Card issued by the North Eastern Institute of Ayurveda and Homeopathy (NEIAH), Shillong, participated in the written examination conducted on 19.02.2020. 4. Thereafter, the result of the written examination was forwarded by the NEIAH, Shillong to the NEIFM, Pasighat, vide communication dated 24.03.2020. The said communication contained the marks of the candidates as well as the list of selected and wait-listed candidates for the various Group ‘B’ and Group ‘C’ posts, including the two posts of UDC. The name of the appellant appeared in the selected list for the post of UDC. The result, however, was not published and no appointment was made. 5. In the meantime, the Ministry of AYUSH, Government of India, vide communication dated 01.04.2021, informed the Institute that a proposal for change in the mandate and nomenclature of the Institute was under consideration and that it had been decided not to proceed with the process of direct recruitment at that stage. The matter thereafter remained pending. Subsequently, after further communications from the Ministry, the Ministry of AYUSH, vide letter dated 02.08.2022, approved cancellation of the recruitment process initiated by the Institute, referring to the change in nomenclature and mandate of the Institute and certain procedural infirmities in the recruitment process. Pursuant thereto, the respondent Institute issued the cancellation notice dated 03.08.2022, cancelling, inter alia, the recruitment process for the Page No.# 4/16 two posts of UDC. 6. The appellant thereafter sought information and reasons for cancellation of the recruitment process and also questioned the basis on which the earlier recruitment had been cancelled despite the fact that the result of the examination had already been prepared and her name appeared in the select list. The respondents, however, stated that the recruitment process had been cancelled for administrative reasons. Thereafter, the respondents issued a fresh advertisement dated 07.12.2022 for various posts, including 1 (one) post of UDC. The appellant also applied pursuant to the said fresh advertisement. However, the appellant was subsequently found to be over-aged and her candidature in the fresh recruitment process was rejected. 7. Aggrieved by the cancellation of the earlier recruitment process and the subsequent fresh advertisement, the appellant approached this Court by filing WP(C) No. 07(AP)/2023, seeking, inter alia, quashing of the cancellation notice dated 03.08.2022, quashing of the fresh advertisement dated 07.12.2022 insofar as the post of UDC was concerned, and a direction to the respondents to act upon the select list dated 24.03.2020 and consider her for appointment to the post of UDC. 8. The learned Single Judge, after considering the rival submissions and the materials on record, dismissed the writ petition. While doing so, the learned Single Judge noticed that the communication dated 24.03.2020 contained the marks as well as the list of selected and wait-listed candidates and that the appellant's name appeared as a selected candidate for the post of UDC. The learned Single Judge further noticed that the respondent authorities had not proceeded with the recruitment on account of the proposal for change in the Page No.# 5/16 mandate and nomenclature of the Institute. 9. The learned Single Judge also took note of a communication dated 04.03.2021 issued by the Director, NEIFM, to the Ministry of AYUSH, which was produced before the Court during the hearing. The said communication related to the manner in which the result forwarded by e-mail had been dealt with. The learned Single Judge observed that the result had been sent by e-mail to the Director of the Institute and, since the communication and attachment were addressed to the Director, the same had been opened. On that basis, the learned Single Judge observed: “Therefore, it appears that as the communication was sent by e-mail, the same lost confidentiality, which was one reason amongst others which prompted the issuance of the instruction not to proceed with the process of direct recruitment.” 10. The learned Single Judge thereafter proceeded on the settled principle that mere inclusion of a candidate's name in a select list does not, by itself, confer an indefeasible right to appointment. Referring to the Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 47, the learned Single Judge, however, also noticed the corresponding limitation upon the State, namely, that the power not to fill vacancies cannot be exercised arbitrarily. The learned Single Judge recorded: “However, it does not mean that the State has the license of acting in an arbitrary manner. The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken for bona fide and appropriate reasons.” 11. Applying the aforesaid principle, the learned Single Judge held that the decision of the respondents could not be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable, particularly having regard to the proposed change in the mandate and nomenclature of the Institute and the procedural infirmity referred to by the Page No.# 6/16 respondents. The learned Single Judge further observed that the recruitment process had not only been cancelled in respect of the two posts of UDC but also in respect of the other posts advertised. The learned Single Judge accordingly held that there was no ground to interfere with the cancellation notice dated 03.08.2022. Insofar as the subsequent advertisement was concerned, the learned Single Judge observed: “After the cancellation of the recruitment process on 03.08.2022, the respondents have initiated fresh process for filling up of various posts under the establishment of the respondent No. 4, including one (1) post of UDC vide the advertisement dated 07.12.2022.” 12. The learned Single Judge, having found the cancellation of the earlier recruitment process to be neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, declined to interfere with the fresh advertisement and directed the respondents to proceed with the selection process. The writ petition was accordingly dismissed by order dated 25.08.2023. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order, the appellant has preferred the present intra-court appeal. 13. Ms. N. Danggen, submits that the learned Single Judge, while noticing that mere inclusion of a candidate's name in a select list does not confer an indefeasible right to appointment, failed to appreciate that the respondents could not exercise an unfettered power to cancel the recruitment process. She submits that, such power has to be exercised fairly, reasonably and for valid reasons. 14. Learned counsel relies upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Asha Kaul (Mrs.) and another v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and others, (1993) 2 SCC 573, and submits that the absence of an indefeasible right to appointment does not give the Government an absolute discretion to Page No.# 7/16 nullify a selection process. It is contended that the State is required to act fairly and cannot, without good and valid reasons, render the entire recruitment exercise futile. 15. Learned counsel also places reliance upon the judgment in State of U.P. and others v. Vindhyavasini Tiwari and others, 2014 SCC OnLine All 16434, and submits that the decision to cancel a recruitment process cannot be sustained merely on the basis of an administrative decision without proper consideration of the relevant circumstances. Learned counsel submits that, in the said case, the Court found the decision to cancel the selection to be not an informed and reasoned decision and ultimately held the exercise to be arbitrary and unreasonable. 16. Learned counsel submits that, in the present case, the recruitment process had substantially progressed and the result of the written examination had already been prepared and forwarded by NEIAH, Shillong to NEIFM, Pasighat vide communication dated 24.03.2020. The communication contained the marks of the candidates and the list of selected and wait-listed candidates, and the appellant's name appeared in the selected list for the post of UDC. 17. It is submitted that there was no finding that the written examination conducted on 19.02.2020 was illegal or that the preparation of the result was affected by any malpractice, favouritism or manipulation. The respondents also did not identify any specific defect in the appellant's selection. Learned counsel submits that the cancellation of the entire recruitment process, therefore, could not be sustained merely by making a general reference to administrative reasons. Page No.# 8/16 18. Learned counsel submits that the communication dated 01.04.2021 relied upon by the respondents only stated that a proposal for change in the mandate and nomenclature of the Institute was under consideration and that the direct recruitment process was not to be proceeded with at that stage. It did not record that the recruitment already conducted was illegal or that the result prepared by NEIAH was liable to be discarded. 19. Learned counsel submits that the subsequent approval dated 02.08.2022 and the cancellation notice dated 03.08.2022 referred to the change in nomenclature and mandate of the Institute as well as certain procedural infirmities. However, she submits that no specific procedural infirmity affecting the selection has been disclosed. The respondents have not demonstrated how the alleged infirmities rendered the entire recruitment process invalid. 20. Learned counsel submits that the subsequent conduct of the respondents also does not support the reasons assigned for cancellation. After cancelling the earlier recruitment process, the respondents issued a fresh advertisement dated 07.12.2022 for various posts, including one post of UDC. Learned counsel submits that if the change in mandate and nomenclature constituted a complete impediment to recruitment to the post of UDC, there was no justification for advertising the same post afresh. 21. Learned counsel submits that the appellant had participated in the earlier recruitment pursuant to the advertisement dated 08.03.2018 and had been placed in the selected list for the post of UDC. When the fresh recruitment was initiated pursuant to the advertisement dated 07.12.2022, the appellant again applied, but her candidature was rejected on the ground of age. She submits that the appellant has thereby suffered serious prejudice on account of the Page No.# 9/16 respondents' decision to cancel the earlier recruitment process and initiate a fresh selection. 22. Learned counsel further submits that the learned Single Judge erred in treating the communication dated 04.03.2021 concerning the e-mail transmission of the result as a circumstance justifying cancellation of the recruitment process. She submits that the mere fact that the result was forwarded by e-mail to the Director and was opened by him did not, by itself, establish any breach of confidentiality or compromise of the selection process. There is no material to show that the result was manipulated, altered or misused, or that any candidate obtained an unfair advantage on that account. Learned counsel therefore submits that such a circumstance, without anything further demonstrating an infirmity affecting the selection, could not constitute a valid ground for cancelling the entire recruitment process. 23. Learned counsel accordingly submits that the learned Single Judge ought to have examined whether the respondents had furnished bona fide and legally sustainable reasons for cancelling the recruitment process, instead of proceeding merely on the premise that the appellant had no indefeasible right to appointment. It is contended that the impugned judgment and order, as well as the cancellation notice dated 03.08.2022, therefore, call for interference in the present appeal. 24. On the other hand, Mr. M. Kato, learned Dy.S.G.I. appearing for the respondents, supports the judgment of the learned Single Judge and submits that the appellant acquired no indefeasible right to appointment merely by virtue of her name appearing in the select list. He submits that the recruitment process had not culminated into publication of result and was proceeded with Page No.# 10/16 pursuant to the communication dated 01.04.2021 issued by the Ministry of AYUSH in view of the proposed change in the mandate and nomenclature of the Institute. 25. Learned Dy.S.G.I. submits that the result forwarded by NEIAH, Shillong vide communication dated 24.03.2020 contained the marks of the candidates and the list of selected and wait-listed candidates, but was never acted upon by publication of select list. He submits that respondent No. 4 had forwarded the said result to the Ministry of AYUSH vide letter dated 25.03.2020 seeking further directions, pursuant to which the Ministry advised that the direct recruitment process should not be proceeded with at that stage. Thus, the appellant's inclusion in the list could not by itself confer any right of appointment. 26. Learned Dy.S.G.I. submits that the settled position is that mere inclusion of a candidate's name in a select list does not confer an indefeasible right to appointment and that the State is not bound to fill up every vacancy merely because a selection process has been undertaken. In support of his submission, reliance has been placed upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Punjab State Electricity Board & Ors. v. Malkiat Singh, (2005) 9 SCC 22; Kulwinder Pal Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab & Ors., (2016) 6 SCC 532; Dinesh Kumar Kashyap & Ors. v. South East Central Railway & Ors., (2019) 12 SCC 798; and Commissioner of Police & Anr. v. Umesh Kumar, Civil Appeal No. 3334 of 2020, decided on 07.10.2020. 27. Learned Dy.S.G.I. further submits that the decision to cancel the earlier recruitment was not confined to the post of UDC but extended to the recruitment process for various Group 'B' and Group 'C' posts initiated pursuant to the same advertisement. He submits that the cancellation was undertaken Page No.# 11/16 pursuant to the decision of the Ministry of AYUSH dated 02.08.2022, having regard to the change in the mandate and nomenclature of the Institute and the procedural infirmities noticed in the recruitment process. He submits that the decision was therefore taken by the competent authority for administrative reasons and cannot be characterised as arbitrary merely because the appellant had been included in the select list. 28. Learned Dy.S.G.I. also submits that the earlier advertisement itself reserved the right of the Institute to amend or cancel the advertisement, wholly or partially, as may be required. He further points out that the appellant herself participated in the subsequent recruitment process pursuant to the fresh advertisement dated 07.12.2022. It is accordingly submitted that, having regard to the circumstances in which the earlier recruitment was cancelled and a fresh process was initiated, no case for interference with the cancellation notice dated 03.08.2022 or the subsequent advertisement is made out. 29. Learned Dy.S.G.I. accordingly submits that the learned Single Judge, after considering the result of the earlier examination, the communications exchanged between the Institute and the Ministry of AYUSH, the reasons for cancellation and the subsequent fresh recruitment, rightly concluded that the decision of the respondents was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. He therefore submits that the judgment and order dated 25.08.2023 calls for no interference in the present intra-court appeal. 30. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have carefully perused the judgment and order dated 25.08.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge, the pleadings and the materials available on record. 31. It is not in dispute that the appellant participated in the selection process Page No.# 12/16 pursuant to the advertisement dated 08.03.2018 for the two posts of UDC. The result forwarded by NEIAH, Shillong vide communication dated 24.03.2020 contained the marks of the candidates as well as the list of selected and wait- listed candidates, and the appellant's name figured in the selected list. It is equally undisputed that no select list was published and the respondent No. 4, vide communication dated 25.03.2020, forwarded the result to the Ministry of AYUSH seeking approval and further directions. 32. The learned Single Judge examined the above facts in the light of the settled legal position regarding the right of a candidate whose name finds place in a select list. Relying upon the Constitution Bench decision in Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 47, the learned Single Judge noticed that mere inclusion in a select list does not confer a vested right to appointment. At the same time, the learned Single Judge also noticed that this does not give the State an unrestricted power to act arbitrarily. The learned Single Judge observed: “[10.] It is now a settled principle of law that mere inclusion of a name of a candidate in the select list does not confer on such candidate any vested right to get an order of appointment. The Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shankarsan Dash -Vs- Union of India, reported in (1991) 3 SCC 47 in the given facts of that case held that unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has the license of acting in an arbitrary manner. The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken for bona fide and appropriate reasons. If the vacancies or any of them are filled up, the State is bound to respect the comparative merit of the candidates without discrimination. This decision of the Constitution Bench was referred to by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punjab State Electricity Board &Ors(supra).” 33. We are in agreement with the above statement of law. The fact that the appellant had no indefeasible right to appointment does not, by itself, answer the challenge to the cancellation of the recruitment process. The respondents Page No.# 13/16 were required to show that the decision not to proceed with the recruitment was taken bona fide and for legally sustainable reasons. We have, therefore, examined the circumstances in which the decision to cancel the recruitment was taken. 34. The record shows that after the result was forwarded by NEIAH, Shillong on 24.03.2020, respondent No. 4, vide communication dated 25.03.2020, forwarded the matter to the Ministry of AYUSH seeking approval and further directions. The Ministry, however, vide communication dated 01.04.2021, advised that the direct recruitment process should not be proceeded with at that stage in view of the proposal for change in the mandate and nomenclature of the Institute. Thus, the recruitment was not cancelled immediately after the result was prepared. The matter remained under consideration and was thereafter placed before the competent authority. 35. The learned Single Judge also considered the communication dated 04.03.2021 relating to the manner in which the result had been transmitted. It was noticed that the result of the written examination/skill test had been sent by NEIAH to the Director of the Institute through e-mail and that the communication and its attachment had consequently been opened. The learned Single Judge treated this as a circumstance affecting the confidentiality of the result before it was considered by the Selection Committee. 36. The proposed change in the mandate and nomenclature of the Institute was also under consideration by the Government. In addition, the respondents referred to certain procedural infirmities in the recruitment process. Thereafter, the Ministry of AYUSH, vide communication dated 02.08.2022, approved cancellation of the recruitment process, referring to the change in the mandate Page No.# 14/16 and nomenclature of the Institute as well as the procedural infirmities. Pursuant thereto, the cancellation notice dated 03.08.2022 was issued. 37. It is also relevant that the cancellation was not confined to the appellant or to the two posts of UDC. The recruitment process for the various Group 'B' and Group 'C' posts covered by the earlier advertisement was also cancelled. The material on record, therefore, does not indicate that the decision was directed against the appellant or that the recruitment was cancelled merely because the respondents did not intend to appoint her. 38. The appellant's name appearing in the selected list undoubtedly shows that she had successfully gone through the selection process conducted by NEIAH. However, the result did not itself result in an appointment. Respondent No. 4 had forwarded the result to the Ministry seeking approval and further directions, and select list was published. In these circumstances, the appellant could not claim appointment as a matter of right merely on the basis of her inclusion in the list forwarded to the competent authority. 39. At the same time, the respondents' reliance on the absence of an indefeasible right to appointment cannot by itself justify cancellation of the entire recruitment process. The decision must still be examined to see whether the reasons relied upon by the competent authority were bona fide and legally sustainable. On the materials before us, the decision was taken after the Ministry had advised, on 01.04.2021, that the recruitment should not be proceeded with at that stage, followed by consideration of the matter and approval for cancellation on 02.08.2022. The decision was thus not an immediate or unexplained withdrawal of the recruitment after the appellant's name included in the list. Page No.# 15/16 40. The appellant has relied upon Asha Kaul (Mrs.) (Supra) and Vindhyavasini Tiwari (Supra). The principle that the Government cannot act arbitrarily in deciding not to proceed with a selection is not in dispute. In Vindhyavasini Tiwari (Supra), the Court found the decision to cancel the recruitment to be arbitrary in the circumstances of that case, particularly where the decision-making process was not properly informed by the relevant considerations. The learned Single Judge distinguished that decision on facts. Having examined the material placed before us, we find no reason to take a different view in the present case, where the respondents have placed on record the circumstances which led to the cancellation and the decision extended to the entire recruitment process. 41. There is also a subsequent development which is relevant while considering the relief sought by the appellant. After the earlier recruitment process was cancelled on 03.08.2022, the respondents issued a fresh advertisement dated 07.12.2022, which also included one post of UDC. The appellant participated in the fresh recruitment process by submitting her application. Her candidature has been rejected on the ground of over-age. This subsequent development does not, by itself, determine the validity of the earlier cancellation, but it is relevant in considering whether any effective relief can now be granted to the appellant on the basis of the earlier selection. 42. Once the earlier recruitment process is found to have been validly cancelled, the appellant cannot claim appointment on the basis of the select list prepared in that process. More so, her subsequent participation in the fresh recruitment process also shows that the fresh advertisement was acted upon. Since her candidature in that process was rejected on the ground of over-age, no effective direction for appointment can now be issued on the strength of the Page No.# 16/16 earlier select list. 43. For the reasons stated above, we find no infirmity in the judgment and order dated 25.08.2023, passed by the learned Single Judge in WP(C) No. 7/ (AP)2023, warranting interference in the present intra-court appeal. The reasons recorded by the learned Single Judge are supported by the materials on record and the conclusion that the cancellation was not arbitrary or unreasonable does not call for interference. 44. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. JUDGE JUDGE Comparing Assistant