Page No.# 1/22 GAHC010255242025 2026:GAU-AS:12579 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : WP(C)/6671/2025 SRI BUDDHA KATAKY SON OF LATE ASWINI KATAKY, RESIDENT OF J.B. ROAD, AMOLAPATTY, P.O. NAGAON, P.S. NAGAON SADAR, DISTRICT NAGAON, ASSAM. PIN 782001 VERSUS THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 4 ORS. REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM, SCHOOL EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, DISPUR, GUWAHATI -781006 2:THE ADDITIONAL SECRETARY CUM INQUIRY OFFICER TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM DEPARTMENT OF SCHOOL EDUCATION ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI - 781006 3:THE ADDITIONAL SECRETARY CUM INQUIRY OFFICER TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM DEPARTMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI - 781006 4:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION ASSAM KAHILIPARA GUWAHATI -781019 5:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM Page No.# 2/22 RAJ BHAWAN UZANBAZAR P.O. UZANBAZAR P.S. LATASIL GUWAHATI-01 DIST- KAMRUP METRO ASSA Advocate for the Petitioner : M K BORAH, MS. P KASHYAP Advocate for the Respondent : , SC, ELEM. EDU BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE N. UNNI KRISHNAN NAIR ORDER Date : 31.08.2026 Heard Mr. M K Borah, Learned Counsel for the Petitioner. Also heard Mr. P N Sarma, Learned Standing Counsel, Dept. of Elementary Education, Assam. 2. The Petitioner, in the present Writ Petition, has presented a challenge to an order dated 22.07.2025, issued by his Disciplinary Authority, imposing a penalty of dismissal from service, on conclusion of the departmental proceeding instituted against him in the matter. 3. The facts in brief requisite for adjudication of the issues arising in the present Writ Petition, is noticed as under. 3.1 The Petitioner, while serving as a Deputy Inspector of Schools in Kamrup (M) district, was placed under arrest on 04.03.2023, in connection with Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB) P.S Case Page No.# 3/22 No. 10/2023, registered under Section 7(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, (as amended in 2018), on an allegation of having demanded and received illegal gratification. The Petitioner, having remained under detention for more than 48 (Forty-Eight) hours, the Disciplinary Authority of the Petitioner, vide an order dated 06.03.2023, proceeded to place the Petitioner under suspension. The Petitioner was enlarged on bail by the Court of the learned Special Judge, Assam, vide an order dated 06.04.2023. 3.2 Thereafter, a disciplinary proceeding was instituted against the Petitioner, vide issuance of a show-cause notice dated 07.07.2023. The allegation leveled against the Petitioner in the said show-cause notice, was to the effect that he had mentally tortured one Sri. Pranjit Chandra Saud, Head-Teacher of Dr. Maheshwar Neog Academic School, Guwahati and had demanded an amount of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand) from him. It was further alleged, therein, that basing on a complaint lodged by said Sri. Pranjit Chandra Saud, criminal proceedings came to be instituted against the Petitioner. Accordingly, the Petitioner was charged of having committed breach of trust and having acted in a manner unbecoming of a responsible Government Servant. 3.3 The Petitioner, after having inspected the relevant Page No.# 4/22 documents, had submitted his show-cause reply on 04.08.2023. The contentions raised by the Petitioner in his show-cause reply, not being found to be satisfactory, the Disciplinary Authority of the Petitioner directed for conduct of an enquiry in the matter and for the purpose, an Enquiry Officer and a Presenting Officer came to be appointed. 3.4 On conclusion of the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer submitted his Enquiry Report on 07.07.2023. A copy of the said Enquiry Report was forwarded to the Petitioner, vide a communication dated 20.11.2023. The Petitioner, in his representation against the said Enquiry Report, had raised a grievance, with regard to the denial to him of a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the departmental witnesses deposing in the enquiry held against him and also of being not permitted to adduce evidence on his part. Accordingly, the disciplinary authority of the Petitioner, noticing the said grievances raised by the Petitioner, vide order dated 30.10.2024, proceeded to direct for a de novo enquiry in the matter and to allow the Petitioner, an opportunity to cross-examine, as well as, adduce evidences in his defense. Accordingly, the de novo enquiry was initiated and the Petitioner is found to have participated, therein. 3.5 On conclusion of the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer submitted his Enquiry Report on 20.12.2024. A copy, thereof, was also Page No.# 5/22 forwarded to the Petitioner and he had submitted his representation, thereon. 3.6 The Disciplinary Authority of the Petitioner, thereafter, on considering the Enquiry Report, along with the materials coming on record in the enquiry, in the light of the representation submitted against the Enquiry Report by the Petitioner, proceeded, vide order dated 22.07.2025, to concur with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and accordingly, imposed upon the Petitioner, the penalty of dismissal from service. Further, the Petitioner, for the period of suspension undergone by him, was held to be entitled only to the subsistence allowance, already paid to him. 3.7 The Petitioner, being aggrieved by the penalty of dismissal from his service, as imposed upon him, had submitted an appeal in the matter on 18.09.2025. However, said appeal was not disposed of. Being aggrieved, the Petitioner has instituted the present Writ Petition. 4. Mr. M K Borah, Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, submits that the conclusions drawn by the Enquiry Officer in the Enquiry Report are not supported by admissible evidences coming on record. He submits that the conclusions drawn by the Enquiry Officer in his report towards holding the Petitioner guilty of the allegations leveled Page No.# 6/22 against him, have been so recorded, basing on surmises and conjectures, and without a due appreciation of the evidences coming on record. Accordingly, he submits that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer in the Enquiry Report, would mandate an interference from this Court. 4.1 By referring to the order dated 22.07.2025, issued by the Disciplinary Authority, towards imposing upon the Petitioner, the penalty of dismissal from service, Mr. M K Borah, Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, submits that the Disciplinary Authority, having only concurred with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, the findings of the Enquiry Officer, having been already highlighted to be not sustainable, the basis for the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from service upon the Petitioner, by the Disciplinary Authority, having been removed, the penalty of dismissal, as imposed upon the Petitioner, vide the order dated 22.07.2025, would mandate an interference from this Court. 4.2 Mr. M K Borah, Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, further submits that the Disciplinary Authority had not applied its mind, prior to imposing upon the Petitioner, the penalty of dismissal from service, inasmuch as, no reasons have been assigned by the Disciplinary Authority for imposition of the said penalty, upon the Petitioner. Page No.# 7/22 4.3 Mr. M K Borah, Learned Counsel for the Petitioner by reiterating the facts noticed, hereinabove, has submitted that penalty of dismissal from service, as imposed upon the Petitioner, is disproportionate to the charges established against him in the enquiry. Mr. M K Borah, Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, has submitted that for allegations of similar nature, persons serving in other departments of the Government of Assam, were imposed with much lesser penalty and accordingly, the Petitioner, would also be required to be imposed with a lower penalty by maintaining parity with that of the cases of other persons, orders in whose cases, issued by their disciplinary authorities, have been brought on record. 5. Mr. P N Sarma, Learned Standing Counsel, Dept. of Elementary Education, Assam, submits that the earlier Enquiry, held against the Petitioner, was held to be vitiated by the Disciplinary Authority, on the ground that the Petitioner was not afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the Departmental Witnesses, as well as, to place defence evidence. Mr. P N Sarma, Learned Standing Counsel, Dept. of Elementary Education, Assam submits that, in the de-novo enquiry held, the Petitioner was given all due opportunity to cross- examine the Departmental Witnesses and the Petitioner, accordingly, had cross-examined the Departmental Witnesses. Page No.# 8/22 5.1 Mr. P N Sarma, Learned Standing Counsel, Dept. of Elementary Education, Assam, submits that a perusal of the evidence coming on record during the cross-examination of the departmental witnesses, by the Petitioner, would go to reveal that the allegations leveled against the Petitioner, was established in the matter and the Petitioner could not dislodge the depositions made by the Departmental Witnesses, more particularly, Sri. Pranjit Chandra Saud, who was the complainant in the criminal proceedings, instituted against the Petitioner, herein. 5.2 Mr. P N Sarma, Learned Standing Counsel, Dept. of Elementary Education, Assam, submits that the conclusions drawn by the Enquiry Officer, being so based on admissible evidences coming on record, this Court would not sit, thereon, as an Appellate Authority and substitute the same. Mr. P N Sarma, Learned Standing Counsel, Dept. of Elementary Education, Assam submits that the Petitioner not having submitted that the conclusions drawn by the Enquiry Officer, to be perverse, this Court would not proceed further to shift the evidences coming on record, for the purpose of determining its sufficiency. 5.3 In the above premises, Mr. P N Sarma, Learned Standing Counsel, Dept. of Elementary Education, Assam submits that the Page No.# 9/22 conclusions drawn by the Enquiry Officer, would not mandate an interference from this Court. He further submits that the Disciplinary Authority, having concurred with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from service upon the Petitioner, being proportionate to the allegations established against him in the matter, the same would not mandate an interference from this Court. 6. I have heard the Learned Counsel for the Parties and perused the materials available on record. 7. The allegations leveled against the Petitioner and the charges framed against him, vide the said show-cause notice dated 07.07.2023, being relevant is extracted hereinbelow : “1. While you were serving as Deputy Inspector of Schools under Kamrup (M) District, you were arrested on 04/03/2023 in a trap laid by the officers and Men of Directorate of Vigilance and Anti Corruption, Assam in connection with ACB PS Case No.10/2023, U/S 7(a) of PC Act, 1988 (as amended in 2018). 2. It has been alleged that complainant Sri Pranjit Chandra Saud age about 51 years, son of Bholaram Saud, Mathgaharia, Guwahati, Head Teacher of Dr. Maheswar Neog Academic School, Guwahati has lodged an FIR stating that since few days back you mentally tortured him demanding to pay an amount of Rs.10,000/- from their school fund. You also contacted him with your Mobile Number 9957439469. Apart from this, when he met you Page No.# 10/22 physically on 03/03/2023 in your office you asked him to pay Rs.8000/- from the school fund. The conversation of demanding bribe was recorded by him. Since he was not willing to pay the demanded bribe to you so he approached the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti Corruption, Assam for taking lawful action by submitting FIR along with the recording of bribe demand conversation. On receipt of complaint Petition, vide GDE No. 89 dtd. 04/03/2023,the same was endorsed to Inspector of Police DV&AC, Assam to verify the content of the allegation petition. On receipt of verification report from Inspector Police. DVBAC, Assam, the officer in-charge, ACB PS cum Superintendent of Police, Directorate of Vigilance and Anti Corruption. Assam, registered the above case. During the investigation you were arrested on 04/03/2023 in a trap laid by the officers and Men of Directorate of Vigilance and Anti Corruption, Assam and subsequently you were forwarded to Judicial custody and the case is still under investigation. 3. Your act has lowered the credibility as a Government and it amounts to gross misconduct, breach of trust, and it is unbecoming on the part of a responsible Government servant. Therefore, you are charged with gross misconduct with ulterior motive, breach of trust and dereliction of duties, which is total violation of provision under Rule 3 of the Assam Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, 1965.” 8. A perusal of the said show-cause notice dated 07.07.2023 would reveal that the Petitioner was alleged to have mentally harassed one Sri. Pranjit Chandra Saud, and of demanding an amount of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand), from his School fund. It was further alleged that the Petitioner had contacted said Sri. Pranjit Page No.# 11/22 Chandra Saud over mobile and had also met him on 03.03.2023, in his office, wherein, Sri. Pranjit Chandra Saud was asked to pay Rs. 8000/- (Rupees Eight Thousand Only). It was further highlighted in the show-cause notice that Sri. Pranjit Chandra Saud, not willing to pay the bribe as demanded by the Petitioner, had approached the Director of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption for taking lawful action by submitting an FIR in the matter. It was further projected that the Petitioner, in terms of the trap laid in the matter, basing on the complaint lodged by Sri. Pranjit Chandra Saud, was arrested on 04.03.2023. 9. The show-cause reply submitted by the Petitioner, not being found to be satisfactory, an enquiry was held in the matter. The Enquiry Report as submitted by the Enquiry Officer was furnished to the Petitioner. The Petitioner, in his representation, against the said Enquiry Report, had raised a plea of prejudice being caused to him in not being permitted to cross-examine the departmental witnesses and also to adduce defence evidence. Accordingly, the disciplinary authority of the Petitioner, appreciating the said pleas raised by the Petitioner, proceeded to direct for holding of a de novo enquiry in the matter and to provide for the Petitioner, due opportunity to cross- examine the departmental witnesses, as well as to adduce, defence Page No.# 12/22 evidence. 10. In the de novo enquiry so held, this Court finds that the Petitioner had cross-examined the witnesses, including the said Sri. Pranjit Chandra Saud. From the cross-examination of the said witnesses, i.e. Sri. Pranjit Chandra Saud, as extracted by the Enquiry Officer in his Enquiry Report dated 20.12.2024, this Court finds that the allegations of the Petitioner, having caused mental harassment to the said person, stood established. Further, the demand made by the Petitioner for a bribe was also established. The Petitioner, during the cross-examination of the Departmental Witnesses, could not dislodge their statements, rather the cross-examination had the effect affirming the allegations leveled against the Petitioner, herein. 11. Basing on the said materials coming on record, the Enquiry Officer, in his report dated 20.12.2024, had proceeded to hold, that the allegations leveled against the Petitioner in the show case notice dated 07.07.2023, stood established. The allegations leveled against the Petitioner of having threatened said Sri. Pranjit Chandra Saud and also of having demanded bribe from him was also held to have been established. The disciplinary authority, thereafter, on a perusal of the findings of the Enquiry Officer, as well as, the materials coming on record in the enquiry, proceeded, vide order dated 22.07.2025, to Page No.# 13/22 concur with the findings of the Enquiry Officer recorded in his Enquiry Report and imposed the penalty of dismissal from service upon the Petitioner. 12. This Court, at the outset, would consider the submissions made by the Petitioner that the Disciplinary Authority having not given any reason for the purpose of imposition of the penalty of dismissal from service upon the Petitioner, and such penalty being so imposed, only by concurring with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, the penalty as imposed stood vitiated. This Court finds that the Disciplinary Authority had accepted the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and had imposed upon the Petitioner, the penalty of dismissal from service. 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Boloram Bordoloi v. Lakhimi Gaolia Bank & Others reported in (2021) 3 SCC 806, in this connection, had drawn the following conclusions : “11. … Further, it is well settled that if the disciplinary authority accepts the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and passes an order, no detailed reasons are required to be recorded in the order imposing punishment. The punishment is imposed based on the findings recorded in the enquiry report, as such, no further elaborate reasons are required to be given by the disciplinary authority. ...” 14. Accordingly, in the light of the decisions of the Hon’ble Page No.# 14/22 Supreme Court in the case of Boloram Bordoloi (Supra), this Court holds that the disciplinary authority, in drawing satisfaction from the findings of the Enquiry Officer in the Enquiry Report, for the purpose of imposing the penalty of dismissal from service upon the Petitioner, had not committed any error. Accordingly, the contention raised by the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, that the order of disciplinary authority not having assigned any reason for imposing upon the Petitioner, the penalty of dismissal from service, would not be maintainable, stands rejected. 15. The scope of examination and interference, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in a case like the present nature, was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v. S. Sree Rama Rao reported in AIR (1963) SC 1723 and had drawn the following conclusions : “7. … The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a Page No.# 15/22 writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.” 16. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v. Chitra Venkata Rao reported in (1975) 2 SCC 557, had drawn the following conclusions : “21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with departmental inquiries has come up before this Court. Two propositions were laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [AIR 1963 SC 1723 (1964) 3 SCR 25 (1964) 2 LLD 150). First, there is no warrant for the view that in considering whether a public officer, is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If that rule be not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a Page No.# 16/22 petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Second, where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226. XXX 23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an appellate court. The Page No.# 17/22 findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan [AIR 1964 SC 477: (1964) 5 SCR 64]. 24. The High Court in the present case assessed the entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The High Court was not justified to do so. Apart from the aspect that the High Court does not correct a finding of fact on the ground that the evidence is not sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the present case which was considered by the Tribunal cannot be scanned by the High Court to justify the conclusion that there is no evidence which would justify the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent did not make the journey. The Tribunal gave reasons for its conclusions. It is not possible for the High Court to say that no reasonable person could have arrived at these conclusions. The High Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed the evidence and then rejected the evidence as no evidence. That is precisely what the Page No.# 18/22 High Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari should not do. XXX 26. For these reasons we are of opinion that the High Court was wrong in setting aside the dismissal order by reviewing and Teassessing the evidence. The appeal is accepted. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. Parties will pay and bear their own costs. 17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India v. S.K. Sharma reported in (1996) 3 SCC 364 had drawn the following conclusions : 28. The decisions cited above make one thing clear, viz., principles of natural justice cannot be reduced to any hard and fast formulae. As said in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk [[1949] 1 All ER 109: 65 TLR 225] way back in 1949, these principles cannot be put in a strait-jacket. Their applicability depends upon the context and the facts and circumstances of each case. (See Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr. [(1978) 1 SCC 405: (1978) 2 SCR 272]) The objective is to ensure a fair hearing, a fair deal, to the person whose rights are going to be affected. (See A.K. Roy v. Union of India [(1982) 1 SCC 271: 1982 SCC (Cri) 152] and Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India [(1981) 1 SCC 664].) As pointed out by this Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 262], the dividing line between quasi-judicial function and administrative function (affecting the rights of a party) has become quite thin and almost indistinguishable a fact also emphasised by House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [[1984] 3 All ER 935: [1984] 3 WLR 1174: [1985] A.C. 374, HL] where the principles of natural justice and a fair hearing were treated as synonymous. Whichever the case, it is from the standpoint of fair hearing applying the test of prejudice, as it may Page No.# 19/22 be called that any and every complaint of violation of the rule of audi alteram partem should be examined. Indeed, there may be situations where observance of the requirement of prior notice/hearing may defeat the very proceeding which may result in grave prejudice to public interest. It is for this reason that the rule of post-decisional hearing as a sufficient compliance with natural justice was evolved in some of the cases, e.g., Liberty Oil Mills v. Union of India [(1984) 3 SCC 465]. There may also be cases where the public interest or the interests of the security of State or other similar considerations may make it inadvisable to observe the rule of audi alteram partem altogether [as in the case of situations contemplated by clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to Article 311(2)] or to disclose the material on which a particular action is being taken. There may indeed be any number of varying situations which it is not possible for anyone to foresee. In our respectful opinion, the principles emerging from the decided cases can be stated in the following terms in relation to the disciplinary orders and enquiries a distinction ought to be made between violation of the principle of natural justice, audi alteram partem, as such and violation of a facet of the said principle. In other words, distinction is between "no notice"/"no hearing" and "no adequate hearing" or to put it in different words, "no opportunity" and "no adequate opportunity". To illustrate take a case where the person is dismissed from service without hearing him altogether (as in Ridge v. Baldwin [[1964] A.C. 40: [1963] 2 All ER 66: [1963] 2 WLR 935]). It would be a case falling under the first category and the order of dismissal would be invalid or void, if one chooses to use that expression (Calvin v. Carr [[1980] A.C. 574: [1979] 2 All ER 440 [1979] 2 WLR 755, PC]). But where the person is dismissed from service, say, without supplying him a copy of the enquiry officer's report (Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727: 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184: (1993) 25 ATC 704]) or without affording him a due opportunity of cross-examining a witness Page No.# 20/22 (K.L. Tripathi [(1984) 1 SCC 43: 1984 SCC (L&S) 62]) it would be a case falling in the latter category violation of a facet of the said rule of natural justice in which case, the validity of the order has to be tested on the touchstone of prejudice, i.e., whether, all in all, the person concerned did or did not have a fair hearing. It would not be correct in the light of the above decisions to say that for any and every violation of a facet of natural justice or of a rule incorporating such facet, the order passed is altogether void and ought to be set aside without further enquiry. In our opinion, the approach and test adopted in B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727: 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184: (1993) 25 ATC 704] should govern all cases where the complaint is not that there was no hearing (no notice, no opportunity and no hearing) but one of not affording a proper hearing (i.e., adequate or a full hearing) or of violation of a procedural rule or requirement governing the enquiry; the complaint should be examined on the touchstone of prejudice as aforesaid." 18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s Bharti Airtel Limited v. A.S. Raghavendra reported in (2024) 6 SCC 418 had drawn the following conclusions : “29. As regards the power of the High Court to reappraise the facts, it cannot be said that the same is completely impermissible under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. However, there must be a level of infirmity greater than ordinary in a tribunal's order, which is facing judicial scrutiny before the High Court, to justify interference. We do not think such a situation prevailed in the present facts. Further, the ratio of the judgments relied upon by the respondent in support of his contentions, would not apply in the facts at hand.” 19. A perusal of the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, Page No.# 21/22 would bring to the forefront that the legal position is well settled that the power of judicial review is not directed against the decision but is confined to the decision making process. This Court does not sit in judgment on the merits of the decision. Further it is not open to this Court to re-appreciate and re-appraise the evidences laid before the Enquiry Officer and examine the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, as a Court of appeal and reach its own conclusions. The scope of the judicial review, is limited to the deficiency in the decision making process and not the decision itself. 20. In the light of the settled position, with regard to the power of this Court, while examining the penalty imposed upon a delinquent, this Court would now examine the findings of the Enquiry Officer, as recorded in the Enquiry Report. 21. This Court on a consideration of the Enquiry Report dated 20.12.2024, finds that the Petitioner, during the de-novo enquiry, was granted all due opportunity to cross-examine the departmental witnesses and also to adduce evidence. The Petitioner is found to have cross-examined the witnesses and as noticed, hereinabove, during such cross-examination, the allegations forming the basis of the show-cause notice dated 07.07.2023, stood affirmed against the Petitioner. This Court further finds that the conclusions, drawn by the Page No.# 22/22 Enquiry Officer, were so drawn basing on admissible evidences coming on record. The Petitioner, in the present proceedings, has not been able to demonstrate that the conclusions, drawn by the Enquiry Officer, were perverse and or not based on any evidences coming on record. The allegations leveled against the Petitioner, being found to have been established in the enquiry, this Court is of the view that the penalty, as imposed upon the Petitioner, is commensurating to the charges established against him in the enquiry. Accordingly, the order dated 22.07.2025, passed by the disciplinary authority of the Petitioner, would not warrant an interference from this Court. 22. In view of the above discussions, the present Writ Petition is found to be devoid of any merit and accordingly, the same stands dismissed. However, there would be no order as to costs. JUDGE Comparing Assistant