2026:HHC:25694 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Civil Revision No.68 of 2021 Reserved on: 15.06.2026 Decided on: 30.06.2026 Uploaded on: 30.06.2026 ____________________________________________________________ Naresh Kumar ...Petitioner Versus Rubi Verma ...Respondent ____________________________________________________________ Coram Hon'ble Mr. Justice Jiya Lal Bhardwaj, Judge Whether approved for reporting? 1 Yes For the petitioner: Mr. Aditya Thakur, Advocate. For the respondent: Mr. P.S. Goverdhan, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Rakesh Thakur, Advocate. Jiya Lal Bhardwaj, Judge By way of present petition, the petitioner-tenant has laid challenge to the judgment dated 31.10.2019, passed by Learned Appellate Authority-II, Solan, District Solan, H.P., whereby the Rent Appeal No.15-S/14 of 2018, titled, Naresh Kumar vs. Ms. Rubi Verma, has been dismissed and the order dated 07.09.2018, passed by the Rent Controller-II, Solan, Distt. Solan (HP), in Rent Petition No.14/2 of 2010, titled, Ruby Verma vs. Naresh Kumar, has been affirmed. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 2026:HHC:25694 2. The respondent-landlady had filed a petition under Section 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (in short “the Act”) for eviction of the petitioner-tenant from the tenanted premises on the grounds that the tenanted shop is required for her own use and occupation, as she wants to run her own business in the tenanted shop, as neither she nor her family members are occupying and having any other premises/shop owned by her/them in the urban area concerned, except the premises in dispute and further she had got vacated such a shop without sufficient cause within 5 years of the filing of the petition. The premises is a shop bearing Shop No.6 and as such the same is required bonafide by the respondent- landlady for her personal use and occupation i.e. for doing own business. It was stated in the petition that she is a widow and has two children. She has no other source of income, except the rent, which is paid by the petitioner- tenant. Her children are growing day by day and she wants to increase her income. 3. The petitioner-tenant filed reply to the petition and took preliminary objections that the petition is neither maintainable in law nor on facts. The respondent-landlady 3 2026:HHC:25694 has no cause of action and further she has not approached the Court with clean hands. Further the respondent-landlady is neither the owner of the shop in question under tenancy of the respondent-landlady nor is land lady and as such, she has nothing to do with the shop in question in any manner whatsoever. The owner-cum-landlord of the shop namely Sh. Satpal is well alive and the petitioner-tenant has been paying him rent regularly and as such the petition, under reply, deserves dismissal. The Rent Controller, on the basis of the pleadings framed the issues in the petition, which are reproduced hereinunder:- “1. Whether the petitioner bonafidely requires the premises for her personal use and occupation as alleged? OPP 2. Whether the petition is not maintainable in the present form? OPD 3. Whether there is no cause of action? OPD 4. Whether the petitioner has not come to this court with clean hands? OPD 5. Whether the petitioner has no locus standi to file the present petition? OPD 6. Whether the petition is bad for non joinder of necessary parties? OPD 7. Whether the petitioner is estopped to file present petition for her own acts, conducts and acquiescences? OPD 7A. Whether the respondent is tenant under Sh. Satpal with respect to the tenanted premises i.e. shop No.6, if so, its effect? OPR 8. Relief?” 4. The parties to the lis led their evidence and after recording the evidence, the learned Rent Controller returned 4 2026:HHC:25694 the findings on issue No.1 that the respondent-landlady bonafidely requires the premises for her personal use and occupation. In support of Issue No.7A, which was to the effect that the petitioner is a tenant under Sh. Sat Pal with respect to the tenanted premises i.e. Shop No.6, it was answered in negative and thus, the Rent Controller allowed the petition and the petitioner-tenant was ordered to be evicted from the tenanted shop on the ground of personal use and occupation, vide order dated 07.09.2018. 5. The petitioner-tenant feeling aggrieved by the said order passed by the learned Rent Controller preferred appeal before the learned Appellate Authority, who vide judgment dated 31.10.2019, dismissed the same and affirmed the findings returned by the learned Rent Controller. 6. The petitioner-tenant feeling aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Rent Controller, which has been affirmed by the learned Appellate Authority, has assailed the same before this Court on the grounds that the petition filed by the respondent-landlady was not maintainable, since there was no relationship between the petitioner and the respondent. Further the learned Rent Controller has 5 2026:HHC:25694 returned the findings beyond pleading and has wrongly placed reliance upon the receipts Ex.PA and Ex.PB. Since the petitioner-tenant had not put the signatures on the receipts, the same were inadmissible in law and thus sought acceptance of the revision petition preferred by him. 7. On the other hand, the learned senior counsel representing the respondent-landlady supported the order passed by the learned Rent Controller, which had been affirmed by the learned Appellate Authority. He contended that since the learned Rent Controller had returned the positive findings with respect to the relationship of the petitioner with the respondent as a tenant and landlady, which findings have been affirmed by the learned Appellate Authority, this Court while exercising the revisional powers may not like to disturb the same. He further argued that the evidence led by the parties was as per the pleadings and since the petitioner-tenant had failed to prove that he had been paying rent to Sh. Sat Pal, the findings of fact recorded by the learned Rent Controller cannot be disturbed while deciding the Revision Petition. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the record carefully. 6 2026:HHC:25694 9. The first plea taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant that the respondent-landlady had failed to prove the relationship of landlady and tenant is concerned, it is relevant to mention that the petition was instituted by the respondent-landlady for eviction on 20.07.2010, clearly stating that she requires the same for her use and occupation and in reply dated 28.10.2010, filed to the said petition, the petitioner-tenant had stated that the tenanted premises was rented out to him by Sh. Sat Pal, being owner of the same and he is paying the rent of the shop to him in question regularly against proper receipts. The respondent-landlady had led the evidence to the effect that earlier the premises was given on rent by her father-in- law to the petitioner-tenant, vide agreement dated 28.06.2005, however, later on through the family settlement, the tenanted shop was allotted to her husband namely Sh. Rajeev Kumar and on his death on 23.10.2008, the tenanted shop was inherited by her along with her children and mother-in-law. She is the landlady of the tenanted shop after the death of her husband Rajeev Kumar. It is worth mentioning here that the petitioner-tenant had moved an application under Section 21 of the Act to 7 2026:HHC:25694 deposit the rent in the Court and in the application, PW-2 Sat Pal, father-in-law of the respondent-landlady had made a statement Ex.PZ that the respondent is the landlady of the tenanted premises and he has no objection, if the rent is released to her. From this, it is crystal clear that the respondent is the landlady of the tenanted premises and the plea taken by the petitioner-tenant that the respondent is not the landlady cannot be accepted and the learned Rent Controller has returned positive findings that the respondent is the landlady of the premises and said findings have been affirmed by the learned Appellate Authority. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant has taken this Court to the receipts pertaining to the period November 1997, March 1998, 30.06.2005, December 2005 etc. No doubt in these receipts, PW-2 Sh. Sat Pal had been shown as owner of the tenanted premises, but since the respondent-landlady had placed on record rent receipts Ex. PA and Ex. PB, for the months of July 2010 and August 2010, which were issued by her though not signed by the petitioner-tenant, it clearly suggests that she is the landlady of the premises, especially when her father-in-law had deposed before the Court that he had no objection, in case 8 2026:HHC:25694 the rent is released in favour of the respondent being landlady of the premises. Once the petitioner-tenant had pleaded in the reply that he was paying rent regularly to Sh. Sat Pal, with whom, the rent agreement dated 28.06.2005 was executed against proper receipts, withholding the receipts shows that he was not the tenant of Sat Pal, but of the respondent-landlady. The reply to the petition was filed on 28.10.2010. The petitioner-tenant had placed on record the receipts pertaining to other periods. He could place on record the receipts for the months of July and August 2010, but since he did not place on record the said receipts though specifically pleaded in the reply, the only inference can be drawn is that Sh. Sat Pal was not the landlord at the relevant time and he did not issue any receipts. The receipts, which had been placed on record i.e. Ex.PA and Ex.PB, were the receipts of rent for the months of July and August 2010. From the above, it is clear that the petitioner was the tenant under Sat Pal till June 2010 only and thereafter, the premises was owned by the respondent and she was the land lady of the tenanted shop and the petitioner was her tenant. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant 9 2026:HHC:25694 vehemently argued that the evidence beyond pleading could not have been looked into by the Rent Controller. However, he could not substantiate the said plea especially when no evidence has been shown that the same was contrary to the pleadings. Once the petitioner-tenant himself had pleaded in the reply that Sh. Sat Pal was issuing the receipts to him regularly till October 2010, when he filed reply to the petition, the withholding of such evidence by him clearly draws an adverse inference that he was the tenant of the respondent-landlady. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant placed much reliance upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Narbada Devi Gupta versus Birendra Kumar Jaiswal and another, (2003) 8 SCC 745 and Life Insurance Corporation of India and another versus Ram Pal Singh Bisaen, (2010) 4 SCC 491, to contend that mere production and marking as exhibit does not dispense proof in accordance with law. It is settled law that the document has to be proved in accordance with law. But in the present case, the petitioner-tenant had taken a specific plea that he had been paying the rent to Shri Sat Pal owner- cum-landlord of the shop in question regularly against 10 2026:HHC:25694 proper receipts, but he did not produce the receipts for the months of July, 2010 and August, 2010, which clearly shows that Sh. Sat Pal was not the landlord of the premises after June, 2010, and the respondent-landlady is the owner of the premises. Shri Sat Pal had made the statement before the Rent Controller on 15.01.2013, Ex. P-2 that the respondent is the landlady of the premises and he has no objection, in case the rent is paid to her which was deposited by the petitioner-tenant, therefore, it has been proved that the respondent was the landlady of the tenanted premises and the findings returned by the Rent Controller, which have been affirmed, being findings of fact cannot be disturbed by this Court while exercising the revisional powers. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant also placed reliance upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.P Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs versus Jagannath (dead) by LRs and others, (1994) 1 SCC 1 and Dalip Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2010) 2 SCC 114 to contend that fraud vitiates everything. However, he is unable to make his submission good that on what count, the fraud has been committed by the respondent-landlady. 11 2026:HHC:25694 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant also placed reliance upon the judgment passed by a coordinate Bench of this Court in Civil Revision No.213 of 2015, titled, Sunil Mehta versus Sh. A.D. Kashyap and another, to contend that since the respondent-landlady has failed to prove that she is the owner of the tenanted premises, this Court can interfere with the findings recorded by the authorities below. However, in the present case, both the authorities below have given findings that the respondent is the landlady of the tenanted premises and this Court cannot reappreciate the evidence to take a contrary view as per the various pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. Learned senior counsel for the respondent- landlady vehemently argued that the evidence with respect to the fact that the respondent is the landlady was led and the learned Rent Controller has given positive findings that the respondent is the landlady of the premises after considering the evidence which findings have been affirmed by the learned Appellate Authority and this Court while exercising the revisional jurisdiction cannot interfere with such findings of facts. He placed reliance on the judgment 12 2026:HHC:25694 of the Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited Versus Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78. He also relied upon the judgment in Abid-ul-Islam versus Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30 and recent judgment in Civil Appeal No.4353 of 2026, titled, Sri M.V. Ramachandrasa Since Deceased Represented by Legal heirs versus M/s Mahendra Watch Company & Ors. 16. It is relevant to mention here that the Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corp. Ltd. Versus Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78 has succinctly dealt with the issue of revisional powers of the Court and held that the revisional Court will not be entitled to reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion. Further the High Court while exercising the revisional jurisdiction cannot act as an appellate court/authority and reassess the evidence. The High Court can interfere if the findings are perverse and not germane from record. 17. In a recent judgment by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sri M.V. Ramachandrasa’s case (supra) it has been held that analysis of the evidence, including 13 2026:HHC:25694 depositions of witnesses, documents and rent receipts, and arriving at independent factual conclusion clearly amounts to reappreciation of evidence, which is impermissible in revision jurisdiction. The relevant sub-paras 12.6 to 12.9 of para 12 of the judgment are reproduced as under: 12.6. However, the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 46, undertook a fresh analysis of the evidence, including depositions of PW-1 (M.R.Goverdhan) and RW-1 (Mohanlal), partnership documents, and rent receipts, and arrived at independent factual conclusions. Such an exercise clearly amounts to reappreciation of evidence, which is impermissible in revisional jurisdiction. 12.7. It is also significant that the statutory scheme provides for an appeal under Section 26 of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999. Where the legislature has consciously created a separate appellate remedy, the revisional jurisdiction cannot be expanded so as to substitute or bypass the appellate mechanism. 12.8. In view of the above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the findings recorded by the trial Court were pure findings of fact based on proper appreciation of evidence. No perversity, illegality, or jurisdictional error has been demonstrated. 12.9. Accordingly, the High Court transgressed the limits of its revisional jurisdiction by reassessing the evidence and substituting its own conclusions. The impugned interference under Section 46 of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 is therefore unsustainable in law as it effectively converts revisional jurisdiction into appellate jurisdiction. 18. From the above pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is crystal clear that this Court while 14 2026:HHC:25694 exercising the revisional jurisdiction cannot analysis the evidence and such exercise will clearly amount to reappreciation of evidence, which is impermissible. In the present case, the Rent Controller had returned the affirmative findings that the respondent is the landlady and the petitioner is the tenant, thus this Court is not interfering with such findings of facts especially when the same have been affirmed by the learned Appellate Authority. 19. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not urged any other points, except the aforesaid points and since the respondent had proved that she requires the tenanted premises for her personal use, the said findings recorded by the Rent Controller and affirmed by the learned Appellate Authority, do not warrant any interference by this Court while exercising the revisional jurisdiction. The findings returned by the learned Rent Controller and affirmed by the learned Appellate Authority with respect to the fact that the respondent is the landlady and further she requires the tenanted premises for her personal use are based on pleadings and evidence. There is neither any perversity in the said findings nor both the authorities have committed any error of law and the revision petition bereft 15 2026:HHC:25694 of substance deserves dismissal. 20. Consequently, I do not find any merit in the petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Pending application(s) if any, also stand disposed of. 30 th June, 2026 ( Jiya Lal Bhardwaj ) (Anurag) Judge