1  2026:HHC:25425 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CMPMO No. : 190 of 2026 a/w CMPMOs No. 193 to 196 of 2026 Reserved on : 24.06. 2026 Decided on : 30 .06.2026 Uploaded on : 30 .06.2026 1. CMPMO No. 190 of 2026 Seema Devi …Petitioner Versus Subramnium …Respondent ……………………………………………………………………………. 2. CMPMO No. 193 of 2026 Puran Chand …Petitioner Versus Subramnium …Respondent ……………………………………………………………………………. 3. CMPMO No. 194 of 2026 Harish Kumar and another …Petitioners Versus Subramnium …Respondent ……………………………………………………………………………. 4. CMPMO No. 195 of 2026 Ram Sumaran …Petitioner Versus Subramnium …Respondent ……………………………………………………………………………. 2  2026:HHC:25425 5. CMPMO No. 196 of 2026 Kishori Lal …Petitioner Versus Subramnium …Respondent Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the petitioner(s) : Mr. Anuj Nag, Advocate. For the respondent(s) : Mr. Ganesh Barowalia, Advocate. Virender Singh, Judge. The above-titled five CMPMOs are being decided by this common order, as, common question of facts and law, is required to be adjudicated upon, in all the petitions. 2. By way of the above-titled petitions, filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have assailed the order, dated 6th April, 2026, passed by the Court of learned Rent Controller, Shimla (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rent Controller’), by virtue of which, the application, under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’), filed in all the Rent Petitions, have been dismissed. 1 Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 3  2026:HHC:25425 3. For the sake of convenience, the parties to the present lis, are hereinafter, referred to as, in the same manner, in which, they were referred to, by the learned Rent Controller. 4. Brief facts, leading to the filing of the present petitions, before this Court, may be summed up, as under: 4.1. Landlord-Subramnium filed five petitions, under Section 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rent Control Act’) for eviction, against the tenants, namely Seema Devi, Harish Kumar, Puran Chand, Ram Sumaran and Kishori Lal. 4.2. The eviction of the tenants has been sought on the ground of bonafide requirement by the landlord for his own personal use, as well as, for his son, Jai Kumar, who, at the relevant time, was studying in B.Com IInd year. 5. These petitions were contested by the tenants by filing replies. 6. During the pendency of the lis, the tenants moved applications, under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC, on the ground that during the pendency of the eviction 4  2026:HHC:25425 petitions, subsequent events have taken place, which are stated to be very essential to be brought on record, so that, the real controversy between the parties, could be adjudicated upon. 6.1. On the basis of the above facts, the indulgence of the learned Rent Controller has been sought to amend the reply, filed by the tenants, by amending para 19 (c) thereof. As per the applications, after the words ‘day to day earning from the shop in question’, the following lines have been proposed to be added in para 19 (c) of the reply: “That the son of the petitioner Mr. Jai Kumar is not his own son but petitioner has adopted Mr. Jai Kumar and Smt. Sushila is real mother of petitioner who was also residing with petitioner and his son in the ground floor of Subramanium building, whereas during the pendency of present petition petitioner has purchased the ground floor situated in type B, Plot No. 3, Lane 3, Sec 1 BCS New Shimla in the name of Smt. Sushila mother of Jai Kumar S/o Sh. Subramnium which is very close to the Subramnium building and the said newly purchased ground floor is now being used as a residence purpose by the petitioner, Smt. Sushila and their son Mr. Jai Kumar, meaning thereby that presently petitioner and his family is having the ample vacant space in the entire ground floor of the Subramanium building in question where they were residing earlier at the time of filing of present petition, which can now also be utilized for the business purpose by the petitioner and his son Mr. Jai Kumar.” 5  2026:HHC:25425 6.2. The said amendment is stated to be necessary, bonafide and essential, for the proper and effective adjudication of the case. 6.3. Lastly, it has been pleaded, in the applications, that if the proposed amendment is allowed, the same would not cause any prejudice to the landlord. 6.4. Thus, a prayer has been made to allow the applications. 7. The applications have been contested by the landlord, by filing reply, taking preliminary objections that the applications are not maintainable; the applicants (tenants) are estopped from filing the present applications, on account of their own act and conduct; and that the applications are gross abuse of the process of law, as devised by the tenants to delay the eviction proceedings. 7.1. Elaborating his stand, the landlord has pleaded that his evidence was closed on 11th March, 2024. Thereafter, the cases were listed for tenants’ evidence, firstly on 8th May, 2024 and thereafter, seven more effective opportunities were given to the tenants to lead their evidence on 21st June, 2024; 7th August, 2024; 8th 6  2026:HHC:25425 November, 2024; 18th December, 2024; 21st June, 2025; 26th August, 2025; and 10th November, 2025, which shows the malafide intention of the tenants to delay the litigation. 7.2. On merits, the applications have been contested, on similar ground. 8. The applicants-tenants have filed the rejoinder(s) to the reply(ies), denying the contents of the reply(ies), on the basis of which, the applications for amendment have been contested, by the landlord. 9. The learned Rent Controller, after hearing learned counsel for the parties, has dismissed the applications, vide separate orders, dated 6th April, 2026. The said orders have been assailed by way of the above- titled CMPMOs. 10. The orders, impugned herein, have been assailed, by the petitioners-tenants, before this Court, on the ground that the learned Rent Controller has not taken into consideration the principle governing the provisions of Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC, as, the amendment can be allowed, at any stage, on the application of the either of the parties. 7  2026:HHC:25425 11. According to the petitioners-tenants, the learned Rent Controller has also not taken into consideration the fact that the amendment is necessary for the final determination of the dispute, involved, in the present case. 12. On the basis of the grounds, as taken in the respective petitions, Mr. Anuj Nag, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners-tenants, has prayed that the present petitions may kindly be allowed, by setting aside the orders, passed by the learned Rent Controller and applications, filed under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC may kindly be allowed, as prayed for. 13. The prayer, so made by the learned counsel for the petitioners-tenants, has been opposed by Mr. Ganesh Barowalia, learned counsel appearing for the respondent- landlord on the ground that the applications, under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC have rightly been dismissed by the learned Rent Controller, as, these applications are nothing, but, tactics to delay the trial of the eviction petitions. 14. Highlighting the fact that the tenants are in the habit of making false and frivolous applications, so that, 8  2026:HHC:25425 the trial court not conclude, the learned counsel appearing for the landlord has drawn the attention of this Court to para-5 of the order, impugned herein, in which, the history of the earlier applications, moved by the tenants, has been given. 15. On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has also been made that the provisions of Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC are not applicable to rent proceedings. As such, a prayer has been made to dismiss the petitions. 16. This Court, while deciding CMPMO No. 53 of 2025, titled as Jatinder Singh Kukreja versus Narinder Singh Sood and another, vide judgment, dated 30th May, 2026, has held that the Rent Controller does not fall within the definition of ‘Court of civil jurisdiction’. While holding so, reliance has been placed by this Court upon the decision of a Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court, in Pitman’s Shorthand Academy versus B. Lila Ram & Sons, reported in AIR 1950 P&H 181. Relevant paras-17 to 21, of the judgment in Pitman’s Shorthand Academy’s case (supra), are reproduced, as under: “17. The fact that there are decisions on both sides only goes to show that Judges, when 9  2026:HHC:25425 confronted with the question whether a certain functionary is or is not a Court, consider it necessary to enquire into the matter and are not disposed to give a clear-cut answer immediately. It follows that they have universally recognised the proposition that a judicial officer, e. g., a Senior Subordinate Judge, a District Magistrate or a District Judge may be entrusted with duties of a judicial or quasi-judicial-nature and yet while performing these duties he does not act as a Court. Whether this is so or not will depend on the circumstances of each particular case, namely, what was the intention of the Legislature, to create a Court or appoint a persona designata: what is the nature of the duties entrusted to him: what are his powers and what procedure does he follow : does he, when discharging these special duties, act in every way as a Court of law would act : does he satisfy all the tests usually applied to Courts of law ? 18. Once it is conceded that the Senior Subordinate Judge when acting as a Rent Controller or the District Judge when acting as the "Appellate authority" may or may not be acting as a civil Court an enquiry into the matter may be undertaken with complete freedom from bias and untrammelled by the prepossession that a judicial officer always acts as a civil Court, no matter what duties he performs. 19. We may first attempt to formulate a definition of a civil Court, As far as I am aware no exhaustive definition of the term has been given in any judicial pronouncement-English or Indian, though various tests have been laid down whereby the true nature of a tribunal or authority may be determined. Broadly speaking, a Court is a place where justice is judicially administered. It is, however, clear that to say this much is not enough. Further analysis of the authorities shows that there are certain ingredients or essential attributes of a Court of law without any of which the 10  2026:HHC:25425 tribunal or the authority ceases to enjoy the dignity or character of a Court. It is necessary, for instance, that judicial duties be entrusted to the tribunal by operation of law and not by voluntary submission by the parties to a dispute. An arbitrator, therefore, cannot be considered as a Court of law. Again, the tribunal must adjudicate upon civil disputes. To adjudicate means to give a definitive decision which is final until it is set aside or modified by an "Appellate Authority." It is not enough that the tribunal should give an opinion or act in an advisory capacity. Therefore, a Collector acting under S. 18, Land Acquisition Act who acts merely in an advisory capacity cannot be looked upon as a Court. Civil disputes again mean disputes whose nature is justiciable i.e., where the law of the land recognises the wrong and provide a remedy. The decision of non-judicial disputes cannot be treated as the administration of justice. Again, it is not enough that a Court of law should conduct its proceedings with fairness and impartiality. It must decide them according to the law of the land. It must not be affected by ulterior considerations or matters of executive policy. The Privy Council in Shell Co., Australia Ltd. v. Federal Commr. of Taxation, 1931 A. C. 275: (100 L. J. P. C. 55), held that a Board of Revenue was not a Court because it has to take into consideration matters of executive policy. In Manavala Goundan v. Kumarappa Reddy, 30 Mad. 326 (17 M. L. J. 313), a District Registrar was held not to be a Court because he did not administer justice judicially. Again, the rules of procedure which the Court of law must follow cannot be arbitrary. The procedure must be defined by statute or recognised by law. In the Municipal Corporation, Rangoon v. M. A. Shakur, 3 Rang. 560; (A. I. R. 1926 Rang. 25), a Full Bench of the Rengoon High Court held that the Chief Justice of the Rangoon Small Cause Court acting under S. 14, Rangoon Municipal Act could not be said to act as a Court because he was free to disregard the 11  2026:HHC:25425 procedure laid down by the Civil Procedure Code. The Judge was entitled under S. 14, Rangoon Municipal Act to make such enquiry as he deemed necessary, and this departure from the ordinary rules of procedure as laid down by the Civil Procedure Code was considered sufficient to take him out of the category of a Court of law. In Manager, Spring Mills v. Ambekar, MANU/MH/0099/1947 : A.I.R. 1949 Bom. 188: (I.L.R (1948) Bom. 863), the authority acting under the Payment of Wages Act was held not to be a Court of law because (1) the procedure followed was not the procedure prescribed for a civil Court, and (2) the authority was treated as a special body set up to adjudicate upon civil rights and a distinction had been made between an application to the authority and a suit filed in a civil Court. Similarly, in Sudagar Choudhury v. Radha Raman, MANU/BH/0171/1948: A.I.R. 1949 Pat. 333, it was held that the District Judge when exercising jurisdiction under S. 78, Bihar and Orissa Village Administration Act was not a Court because (1) the District. Judge acted as a revisional Court although ordinarily it had no such power in respect of the Panchayat, and (2) the procedure which he could follow was unfettered. For instance, he could dispense with the rules of evidence and legal practitioners were not allowed to appear before him. In many cases it has been held that where the Presiding Officer of the Court rather than the Court is entrusted with special powers the Presiding Officer is to be looked upon as a persona, designata. 20. A Court of law may, therefore, be defined as a tribunal dealing with and adjudicating upon civil disputes by operation of law in a judicial manner untroubled by ulterior considerations or matters of executive policy and observing certain definite rules of procedure which are either defined by statute or recognised by practice. It may be that a tribunal falling under this definition may yet 12  2026:HHC:25425 not be a Court of law, but from the above discussion it will be clear that if any of these attributes are missing the tribunal certainly falls short of being a Court of law. 21. Applying this test to the Controller and the "Appellate Authority" appointed under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act we find that in the first place that Act does not entrust the functions of a Controller to the Senior Subordinate Judge as such, nor does it appoint the District Judge as the "Appellate Authority". The Act reserves to the Provincial Government the power of appointing Controllers and "Appellate Authorities." Non- judicial officers or indeed non-officials could easily have been appointed to function as Controllers and "Appellate Authorities" under the Act and in that case it could not have been said that the persons so appointed were civil Courts. It was by a subsequent notification that the Government appointed Senior Sub Judges as Rent Controllers and the District Judges as Appellate Authorities." In the second place, the procedure laid down is not the procedure laid down in the Civil Procedure Code except in two or three respects e. g., power has been given to the Rent Controller and the "Appellate Authority" to summon and examine witnesses. The orders made by the Controller or the 'Appellate Authority" can be enforced by a civil Court as if they were decrees of that Court. A modification of the principle of res judicata has also been introduced by the provisions of S. 14. None of the other incidents of a Court of law, however, obtain. The "Appellate Authority" in hearing an appeal from the decision of the Controller can make any further enquiry as it thinks fit either personally or through the Collector, and this contemplates even a private enquiry, should the "Appellate Authority" consider it necessary. Such a course would be wholly foreign to the duties of a Court of law. Again, it is to be noted that S. 15, sub-s. (4) makes a distinction between a Court of law and the Controller, for 13  2026:HHC:25425 it says that the order of the Controller cannot be called in question in any Court of law. It is by itself sufficient to indicate that it was not the intention of the Legislature to create a Court of law but to appoint a persona designata who would be entrusted with certain specific functions. We thus find that many of the attributes of a Court of law are not to be found in the Controller or the "Appellate Authority". (self emphasis supplied) 17. Similar view has also been taken by a co- ordinate Bench of this Court in Civil Revision No. 69 of 2022, titled as Dev Raj Duggal versus Harish Kumar, decided on 14th October, 2022. Relevant paras-20 to 26, of the said judgment, are reproduced, as under: “20. Rent Act is a special enactment framed and made applicable to all urban areas of Himachal Pradesh. Rent Rules provide procedure for conducting the proceedings by Rent Controller under this Act. Civil Procedure Code is a general enactment prescribing procedure in civil litigations. No doubt proceedings under the Rent Act are also civil in nature but such proceedings are governed and regulated by Rent Act and Rules made thereunder. 21. Rent Control Act is a complete Code in itself dealing with filing, adjudication and disposal of rent petitions under it. It provides determination of fair rent, revision of fair rent in certain cases, increase in fair rent, complaint against cutting off or withholding essential supply or services, eviction of tenants, recovery of immediate possession of premises, also recovery of possession for limited period and deposit of rent by tenant 14  2026:HHC:25425 with the Controller as provided under Sections 4, 5, 6, 11, 14, 15, 17 and 21 of the Act. 22. Section 24 provides an appeal against order passed by Rent Controller and Section 24(5) empowers the High Court to entertain revision petition, on application of any aggrieved party or on its own motion or calling and examining the record related to any order or proceedings taken under the Rent Act. 23. In Rent Rules, Rule 3 prescribes that application under Sections 4, 5, 6, 11, 14 and 15 shall be made in Form “A”, Rule 4 provides procedure for permission and recovery of possession under Section 17 of the Act by filing an application in Form “B” and Rule 8 provides filing of an application under Section 21 for deposit/payment of rent with Rent Controller in Form “D”. The manner, in which an application is to be made and procedure to be followed by Controller in disposing of such application, has been provided in Rule 5 and Rule 12. Rule 14 provides procedure for filing appeal whereas Rule 15 provides manner in which application for revision is to be made under Section 24 of the Act. 24. Scheme of Rent Act and Rent Rules not only impliedly but explicitly prohibits the applicability of all provisions of Civil Procedure Code, except those mentioned in the Act and Rules itself, during adjudication of application(s) under the Rent Act. It also specifies the causes and issues regarding which applications can be filed under the Rent Act. Therefore, as already held by Coordinate Bench of this Court in CMPMO No. 290 of 2018 neither provisions under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC nor similar prayer otherwise is permissible to be made during adjudication of rent petition. 25. What cannot be done directly can also not be permitted to be done indirectly. Rule 12 explicitly provides the procedure to be followed by Rent Controller in disposing of an 15  2026:HHC:25425 application under the Rent Act. Rule 12(2) provides that the Controller shall give a reasonable opportunity to parties to state their case. Further that he shall record the evidence of parties and witnesses examined on either side, and while doing so, and also in fixing the date for hearing of parties and their witnesses, in adjourning the proceedings and dismissing the applications for default or for other sufficient reason, the Controller shall be guided by principles of procedure as laid down in CPC, meaning thereby that during adjudication of an application under the Rent Act, applicability of CPC is limited to the extent as provided under Rule 12(2) of Rent Rules. Applications which are permissible to be filed under the Rent Act have been enumerated in Sections 4 to 6, 11, 14, 15, 17, 21 and procedure and performa, i.e. Forms “A”, “B” and “D”, for filing them have also been provided in and with Rules i.e. Rules 3, 4, and 8. Procedure for filing appeal and revision has also been prescribed under Rules. Therefore, intention of Legislation is very clear that CPC or its principles have not been made applicable in entirety to the proceedings under the Rent Act and special Act has been enacted for disposing of applications made therein as expeditiously as possible without adhering to cumbersome and lengthy procedure provided under CPC for adjudication of a regular suit. Had the intention of Legislation to make all provision of CPC applicable, there would not have been any necessity to mention applicability of CPC, its certain provisions and principles contained therein with special reference as provided in Sections 16(9), Section 25 and Section 26 of Rent Act as well as Rule 5 and Rule 12 of Rent Rules. 26. Rent Act and Rules provide limited application of provisions of CPC or principles contained therein. Explanation in Section 9 provides that expression “legal representative” has the same meaning as assigned to it in the Code of Civil Procedure with further 16  2026:HHC:25425 qualification that it includes also, in the case of joint family property the joint family of which the deceased was a member. Section 16(9) provides that Rent Controller may exercise the power of review in accordance with provisions of Order XLVI of CPC where no application for revision has been made to the High Court. Section 25 empowers the Rent Controller to summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses and to compel the production of evidence as the Court is empowered under CPC; Section 66 provides that orders passed under the Rent Act by Controller or Appellate Authority shall be executable by Controller as a decree of Civil Suit and for this purpose, Controller shall have all powers of Civil Court. Rule 5 provides the manner in which applications are to be made under the Rent Act providing that every such application shall be signed and verified in the manner prescribed under Rules 14 and 15 of Order 6 of CPC. Rule 12 speaks about applicability of principles of procedure as laid down in CPC with respect to recording the evidence of parties, examination of witnesses of either side, fixing the dates for hearing of parties and their witnesses, adjourning the proceedings and dismissing the applications for default or for other sufficient reasons. There is no other provision either in Rent Act or Rent Rules making applicability of the provisions of CPC or principles contained therein as a whole in proceedings under Rent Act. Even Rules 14 and 15 provide a procedure for filing appeal and revision under Section 24 of Rent Act independently without referring procedure prescribed in CPC.” (self emphasis supplied) 18. It has rightly been pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the landlord that as per Rule 12 of the Himachal Pradesh Rent Control Rules, the provisions 17  2026:HHC:25425 of Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC have impliedly been excluded, as, the Legislature, in its wisdom, by way of Sections 25 and 26 of the Rent Control Act, has made applicable the provisions of the CPC, to the extent, as mentioned in Rule 12 of the Rent Control Rules, as well as, Sections 25 and 26 of the Rent Control Act. 19. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners- tenants could not point out as to how the provisions of Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC are applicable to the proceedings, under the Rent Control Act. 20. At the cost of repetition, the Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court, in Pitman’s Shorthand Academy’s case (supra), has held that the Rent Controller is persona designata and, as such, the same does not fall within the definition of Civil Court. 21. Even otherwise, the ingredients of Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC have not been pleaded by the tenants and the pleadings are totally silent about the essential ingredients, as to why, the applications for amendment, have not been moved prior to the commencement of the trial. The requisites, as per the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 18  2026:HHC:25425 of the CPC, have also not been pleaded, i.e. with regard to due diligence in moving the applications. 22. Considering the above facts, there is no occasion for this Court to interfere with the well reasoned orders, passed by the learned Rent Controller. 23. Consequently, all the five petitions are dismissed by upholding the impugned orders, passed by the learned Rent Controller. 24. Pending applications, if any, are also disposed of accordingly. ( Virender Singh ) Judge June 30, 2026 ( rajni )