- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:20177 MFA No. 1334 of 2026 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 10TH DAY OF APRIL, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO.1334 OF 2026 (CPC) BETWEEN: 1. SRI MUNIYAPPA HUSBAND OF LATE M. RATHNAMMA, AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS, DASALAGERE VILLAGE, NANDAGUDI HOBLI, HOSAKOTE TALUK, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT-562114. 2. SMT. MEENAKSHI @ MEENA, D/O SRI MUNIYAPPA, AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS, DASALAGERE VILLAGE, NANDAGUDI HOBLI, HOSAKOTE TALUK, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT-562114. 3. SRI VINAY, S/O SRI MUNIYAPPA, AGED ABOUT 28 YEARS, DASALAGERE VILLAGE, NANDAGUDI HOBLI, HOSAKOTE TALUK, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT-562114. 4. SRI M. MANJUNATHA, S/O LATE SRI K. MUNIYAPPA, AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS, A.K. COLONY, PILLAKAMMA TEMPLE ROAD, AMRUTHAHALLI, SHANKARANAGARA POST, BENGALURU-560092. 5. SMT. M. LAKSHMI, D/O LATE SRI K. MUNIYAPPA, Digitally signed by MAHALAKSHMI B M Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:20177 MFA No. 1334 of 2026 AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS, W/O SRI MANJUNATH, NO.02, JNATHA COLONY, AMRUTHAHALLI, SHANKARANAGARA POST, BENGALURU-560092. 6. SMT. M. RAJESHWARI, D/O LATE K. MUNIYAPPA, AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS, W/O SRI DEVARAJU, NO.03, JNATHA COLONY, AMRUTHAHALLI, SHANKARANAGARA POST, BENGALURU-560092. …APPELLANTS (BY SRI VIGNESHWAR S. SHASTRI, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI HEGDE S. RAMAKRISHNA, ADVOCATE) AND: SRI A. FIROZ AHMED S/O LATE AZEEZ AHMED, AGED ABOUT 69 YEARS, SY. NO.7 & 8, LINGADHEERAGOLLAHALLI VILLAGE, KUNDANA HOLBLI & CIRCLE, DEVANAHALLI TALUK, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT-562110. …RESPONDENT (BY SRI VENKATESH P. DALWAI, ADVOCATE) THIS MFA IS FILED UNDER ORDER 43 RULE 1(r) OF THE CPC, AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 03.01.2026 PASSED ON I.A.NOS.I TO III IN O.S.NO.702/2025 ON THE FILE OF THE PRL SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC, DEVANAHALLI, ALLOWING THE I.A.NOS.I TO III FILED UNDER ORDER 39 RULE 1 AND 2 R/W SECTION 151 OF CPC., 1908. THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR ORDER, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:20177 MFA No. 1334 of 2026 ORAL JUDGMENT This Miscellaneous First Appeal is filed by the defendants calling in question the order dated 03.01.2026, passed on I.A.Nos.1 to 3 in O.S.No.702/2025 on the file of the Principal Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Devanahalli (‘Trial Court’ for short), whereby the Trial Court has allowed the applications filed under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC and directed the parties to maintain status quo in respect of the suit schedule property till disposal of the suit. Brief facts: 2. The plaintiff instituted suit O.S.No.702/2025 seeking specific performance of an agreement dated 24.09.2019 contending that the defendants agreed to sell the suit property for a total consideration of `3,78,00,000/- and received an advance of amount of `10,00,000/-. It is alleged that despite repeated demands and issuance of legal notice, the defendants failed to - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:20177 MFA No. 1334 of 2026 execute the sale deed and are attempting to alienate the property and alter its nature. 3. The defendants on the other hand have denied the execution of any agreement of sale and have contended that the transaction relied upon by the plaintiff is in the nature of a loan transaction and the document is only a security document. It is further contended that there were prior transactions with respect to suit property and the suit is not maintainable. 4. Sri Vighneshwar S. Shastri, learned Senior counsel for the appellants submits that the impugned order suffers from a fundamental error, inasmuch as the Trial Court has proceeded on the premise that the agreement dated 24.09.2019 is a registered agreement of sale, whereas, admittedly the said document is not a registered document in the eye of law. It is contended that this erroneous assumption is not mere irregularity, but goes to the root of the finding on prima facie case since - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:20177 MFA No. 1334 of 2026 the Trial Court has relied upon such characterization to conclude that the plaintiff has established a legal enforceable right. Therefore, the entire exercise of discretion stands vitiated by misreading of a material document warranting interference. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent would submit that even assuming that the Trial court has erred in describing the document as a registered document, such an observation would have little or no consequence at the stage of consideration under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC. It is urged that the Trial Court at the stage of interlocutory stage, is only concerned with the existence of a prima facie case and not the final enforceability of the agreement. 6. It is contended that the plaintiff has produced the agreement proof of payment of advance and issuance of notice thereby establishing a bona fide triable issue and the Trial Court has exercised its discretion in accordance - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:20177 MFA No. 1334 of 2026 with the settled principles. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ramakant Ambalal Choksi Vs. Harish Ambalal Choksi and Others1 (Ramakant) to contend that in an appeal against an order granting temporary injunction, the Appellate Court ought not to interfere with the discretion exercised by the Trial Court unless such exercise is shown to be perverse, arbitrary or in disregard to the settled principles of law. 7. It is further submitted that even if two views are possible, the Appellate Court cannot substitute its own view in place of that of the Trial Court merely because it may have arrived at a different conclusion on the same material. 8. This Court has carefully considered the rival submissions and perused the material on record. The point that arises for consideration is: 1 Civil Appeal No.13001/2024 reported in 2024 INSC 913 - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:20177 MFA No. 1334 of 2026 “Whether the appellants have made out a case to interfere with the discretionary power and order of the temporary injunction granted by the Trial Court? 9. At the outset, it is noted that the scope of interference in an appeal against an order passed under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 is limited and as held by the Apex Court in Ramakant, wherein at paragraph Nos.32 to 37 as under: “32. The appellate court in an appeal from an interlocutory order granting or declining to grant interim injunction is only required to adjudicate the validity of such order applying the well settled principles governing the scope of jurisdiction of appellate court under Order 43 of the CPC which have been reiterated in various other decisions of this Court. The appellate court should not assume unlimited jurisdiction and should guide its powers within the contours laid down in Wander (supra) case. - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:20177 MFA No. 1334 of 2026 PRINCIPLES GOVERNING GRANT OF TEMPORARY INJUNCTION 33. In the case of Anand Prasad Agarwalla v. Tarkeshwar Prasad reported in (2001) 5 SCC 568, it was held by this Court that it would not be appropriate for any court to hold a mini-trial at the stage of grant of temporary injunction. 34. The burden is on the plaintiff, by evidence aliunde by affidavit or otherwise, to prove that there is “a prima facie case” in his favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition precedent for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy that non- interference by the court would result in “irreparable injury” to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:20177 MFA No. 1334 of 2026 consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition also is that “the balance of convenience” must be in favour of granting injunction. The Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that which is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Court considers that pending the suit, the subject-matter should be maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus, the Court has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit. (See Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh reported in (1992) 1 SCC 719.) MEANING OF THE EXPRESSION “PERVERSE” 35. Any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough reported in (1878) 1 LR Ir 331, the Court - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:20177 MFA No. 1334 of 2026 observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey reported in 106 NW 814, the Court defined “perverse” as “turned the wrong way”; not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct, etc. 36. The expression “perverse” has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: (a) Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, 6th Ed. Perverse — Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable. (b) Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English — International Edition Perverse — Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. (c) The New Oxford Dictionary of English — 1998 Edition Perverse — Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the Judge on a point of law. (d) New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:20177 MFA No. 1334 of 2026 Perverse — Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant. (e) Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Ed. Perverse — A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. 37. The wrong finding should stem out on a complete misreading of evidence or it should be based only on conjectures and surmises. Safest approach on perversity is the classic approach on the reasonable man's inference on the facts. To him, if the conclusion on the facts in evidence made by the court below is possible, there is no perversity. If not, the finding is perverse. Inadequacy of evidence or a different reading of evidence is not perversity. (See Damodar Lal v. Sohan Devi and others reported in (2016) 3 SCC 78” 10. The Apex Court held that the Appellate Court would not interfere with the discretion exercised by the Trial Court unless such exercise is shown to be perverse, arbitrary or contrary to the settled principles of law. In the - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:20177 MFA No. 1334 of 2026 present case, the Trial Court has considered the existence of an agreement dated 24.09.2019, the payment of advance consideration and the apprehension of alienation of the property and recorded a finding on all the three ingredients governing grant of injunction. 11. The contention of the learned Senior counsel for the appellants that the Trial Court has erroneously treated the agreement as a registered document does not merit consideration. Since such an error by itself, cannot be held to be vitiate the entire order, inasmuch as at the interrogatory stage, the Court is only required to examine whether a prima facie case exists and not to conclusively determine the validity or enforceability of the document. 12. The existence of the agreement and dispute between the parties is a triable issue arises for consideration in a suit. The defence of the appellants that the transaction is a loan transaction is a matter requiring evidence and cannot be accepted in the absence of - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:20177 MFA No. 1334 of 2026 supporting material at this stage. Thus, the view taken by the Trial Court that the plaintiff has established prima facie case and the suit property requires protection pending adjudication is a possible and a reasonable view and cannot be said to be perverse. 13. This Court is of the view that the status quo granted by the Trial Court is intended to preserve the subject matter of the suit and does not call for interference in the absence of demonstrable prejudice. Accordingly, this Court finds no ground to interfere with the impugned order, the point framed for consideration is answered and this Court pass the following; ORDER i. The Miscellaneous First Appeal is hereby dismissed. ii. The order dated 03.01.2026 passed on I.A.Nos.1 to 3 in O.S.No.702/2025 on the file of the Principal Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Devanahalli is hereby confirmed. - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:20177 MFA No. 1334 of 2026 iii. It is made clear that any observations made during the course of the consideration of the said applications are only for the purpose of disposal of those applications and shall not influence the trial of the suit. Sd/- _____________________ JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA AT List No.: 1 Sl No.: 53