2026:HHC:25666 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Civil Revision No.130 of 2018 Decided on: 25.06.2026 Mast Ram ….Petitioner Versus Kishori Lal & others ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge Whether approved for reporting? For the petitioner: Mr. K.B. Khajuria, Advocate. For the respondents: Mr. Ajay Thakur, Advocate, for respondent No.1. Mr. Himanshu Kapila, Advocate, vice Mr. Manohar Lal Sharma, Advocate, for respondents No.2(a), 2(c) and 2(d). Respondents No.3 and 4 are ex parte. Romesh Verma, Judge (Oral) The instant petition arises out of order as passed by learned Additional District Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, dated 09.03.2018, whereby application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay as filed by the present petitioner was ordered to be dismissed. 2. The facts as emerge in the present case are that present respondent No.1/plaintiff filed a suit before the learned trial Court. The said suit came to be decreed on 30.06.2009. 2 2026:HHC:25666 3. Feeling aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, as passed by the learned trial Court, the present petitioner preferred appeal under Section 96 of CPC along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay before the learned first appellate Court. 4. In the application, it was averred by the petitioner/applicant that he is a simple, illiterate and rustic villager and that he did not know the intricacies of law. He was not aware of the passing of the impugned judgment passed by learned trial Court. In paragraph-6 of the application, it has been stated that he was told by his counsel that the case has been decided in his favour. Thereafter, the petitioner remained under the bona fide belief that since the suit had been decided in his favour, neither had he got the copy of the judgment and decree from the counsel nor did he know about the decision of the case until 30.03.2013, when the defendant threatened to dispossess him from the suit land. It was prayed that the delay in filing the appeal is neither intentional nor willful and that the same can be condoned. 5. The said application was resisted by the respondents/defendants by raising various objections. It was averred in the reply that the judgment and decree was passed by learned trial Court on 30.06.2009. It was averred that the story as 3 2026:HHC:25666 projected by the applicant/petitioner is false and incorrect and he was very much aware about the decision of the case in hand. It has further been averred that the suit was rightly decided and thereafter mutation was also sanctioned as per the judgment passed by the learned trial Court. After the decision of civil suit, the present petitioner started talking and used to conduct all family dealings between the brothers amicably. The present petitioner, after an elapse of more than four years, was instigated to file the application, which is hopelessly time barred and deserves to be rejected. 6. Learned Additional District Judge, Ghumarwin, vide its order dated 09.03.2018, dismissed the application preferred by the present petitioner, holding the appeal to be hopelessly time barred by almost more than three years and nine months. 7. Feeling dissatisfied, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing the instant petition. 8. It is contended by Mr. K.B. Khajuria, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the impugned order as passed by learned first appellate Court is erroneous and liable to be quashed and set aside. It is further contended that the learned first appellate Court has not properly appreciated the point in controversy and has wrongly dismissed the application, which ought to have been 4 2026:HHC:25666 allowed in favour of the present petitioner. He submits that after accepting the present petition, the application, as filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, deserves to be allowed. 9. On the the hand, Mr.Ajay Thakur and Mr. Himanshu Kapila, learned counsel for respondent No.1 and respondents No.2(a), 2(c) & 2(d), have defended the impugned order as passed by learned first appellate Court dated 09.03.2018. They submit that the appeal which was preferred against the judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court was hopelessly time barred, and the same has rightly been rejected by learned first appellate Court. They further submit that while exercising powers under Section 115 of CPC, the scope of interference by this Court is very limited, and while exercising such powers, no interference is required in the instant case. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the case file. 11. In the present case, respondent No.1 Kishori Lal, plaintiff, filed a suit for declaration and permanent prohibitory injunction in the Court of learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Court No.1, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur on 09.02.2000. As per the case set up by respondent No.1 Kishori Lal, it was averred that he and defendants No.1 and 2, namely, Mast Ram and 5 2026:HHC:25666 Suresh Kumar, are co-owners in joint possession over the suit land. It was further averred that the suit land is ancestral, coparcenary and undivided joint Hindu Family property of late Shri Krishanu Ram and that Will dated 19.04.1993, alleged to have been executed by the father of plaintiff/respondent No.1 Kishori Lal, and mutation No.872 sanctioned on 24.08.1994, is illegal, null and void. Further, respondent No.1/plaintiff sought decree for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from changing the nature of the suit land. 12. The said suit was contested by the present petitioner/defendant, Mast Ram, and proforma respondents, namely, Mast Ram, Suresh Kumar and Bimla Devi. The suit was contested on various grounds, such as locus standi, maintainability, estoppel etc.. On merits, all the averments as made in the plaint were specifically refuted and denied. 13. Learned trial Court framed the issues and, vide its judgment and decree dated 30.06.2009, decreed the suit filed by respondent No.1/plaintiff. Learned trial Court decreed the suit by holding the plaintiff to be entitled to the relief of declaration to the effect that he and defendants No.1 to 3 are co-owners in joint possession over the suit land, situated in village Changer-Talai, Pargna Bachhretu, Teshil Jhandutta, District Bilaspur. The plaintiff 6 2026:HHC:25666 was held entitled to decree of declaration that Will dated 19.04.1993, executed by the father of the plaintiff, and mutation No.872, sanctioned on 24.08.1994, is illegal, null and void. Further, decree for permanent prohibitory injunction was granted in favour of the plaintiff. 14. Against the judgment and decree as passed by learned trial Court, defendant No.1 preferred an appeal before the learned first appellate court. Since the appeal was time barred, application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was accompanied with the appeal. 15. In the application filed for condonation of delay, it has been averred that the he was told by his counsel that the decision of the case has taken place and that the said case had been decided in his favour. It has been stated in the application that thereafter, the applicant/defendant No.1 remained under the bonafide belief that since the suit had been decided in his favour, nothing further was required to be done by him. It was only on 30.03.2013, when the plaintiff/respondent No.1 threatened to dispossess the present petitioner, he came to know about the passing of the impugned judgment and decree passed by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Court No.1, Ghumarwin. 7 2026:HHC:25666 16. While entering into the witness box to corroborate his case, defendant No.1, Mast Ram, stated that he did not go to the Court on each and every date of hearing. He used to attend the Court proceedings whenever his counsel used to call him to Court. He stated that he was never informed by the learned counsel about the decision of the case. He stated that when he asked his counsel, Mr.Dinesh Sharma, about the fate of the case, he told him that the case had been decided in his favour. He stated that he went to the office of his counsel and was told that the decision had been passed in his favour and that he should pay his legal fees. But surprisingly, he chose not to examine his counsel, Shri Dinesh Sharma, in order to corroborate and substantiate his contentions. 17. On the contrary, respondent No1, Kishori Lal, examined Mr.Dinesh Sharma, Advocate, who in his deposition stated that the judgment was passed by learned Civil Judge on 30.06.2009. He stated that on the said date, Mast Ram was present in the Court. He stated that he had informed the present petitioner about the outcome of the case and had told him to obtain the certified copy of impugned judgment. The present petitioner gave a call to the said witness, RW-2, Shri Dinesh Sharma, and he was told that the judgment had been passed in 8 2026:HHC:25666 the case. He told Mast Ram that the judgment was passed on 30.06.2009, which had been passed against him. He has specifically denied that Mast Ram did not appear before the Court on each and every date of hearing. Nothing favourable could be extracted by the present petitioner in the cross-examination of the said witness. 18. RW-1 Kishori Lal, has entered into the witness box. He has reiterated the averments as made in the reply. He stated in his deposition that the decision of the case was heard by the present petitioner himself in the Court. He stated that the mutation was attested after the passing of judgment by trial Court. He had informed his brother, the present petitioner, about this fact. He stated that the petitioner was well aware about the passing of the judgment, and that the present application and the appeal, as instituted, are time barred. 19. The fact remains that in the present case, there is a huge delay of three years and nine months in approaching the learned first appellate Court by fling the appeal under Section 96 of the CPC and application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The story, as projected by the petitioner, is contradictory and does not inspire confidence. On the one hand, he stated in the application that though he was informed by his learned counsel 9 2026:HHC:25666 that the case had been decided in his favour, he did not take any steps to obtain the certified copy of the impugned judgment and he came to know about the passing of judgment only in 2013. On the other hand, while appearing as AW-1, he stated that he was not aware about the passing of the judgment dated 30.06.2009. He stated that his counsel told him that the case had been decided in his favour. He has taken contradictory pleas in the application and while appearing in the witness box as AW-1. Though, the petitioner has not examined Mr.Dinesh Sharma, Advocate, however, respondent No.1 examined the said counsel, who categorically stated that the petitioner was very much aware about the passing of the judgment by learned trial Court. In his deposition, Mr. Dinesh Sharma, Advocate, stated that the petitioner was told that a certified copy of judgment and decree was required to be obtained for the purpose of filing an appeal. It is the case of the parties that, after the passing of the judgment, necessary mutation was attested by the revenue authorities. Therefore, the present petitioner has failed to establish that the passing of the judgment was not within his knowledge or that he came to know about it only in 2013. The story as projected in the application and the evidence as led are mutually destructive and do not inspire confidence. The petitioner has failed to show due 10 2026:HHC:25666 diligence in filing the appeal. Therefore, the learned first appellate Court, while appreciating the real point in controversy, rightly came to the conclusion that the appeal under Section 96 of CPC is hopelessly time barred. The petitioner has failed to make out sufficient cause for condonation of delay. There is huge and unexplained delay of three years and nine months which cannot be condoned in the absence of plausible and reasonable explanation. The case as set up by the petitioner lack material ingredient and in the absence of sufficient cause the application has rightly been dismissed. 20. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in RAJNEESH KUMAR & ANR. vs. VED PRAKASH, S.L.P. (CIVIL) Nos. 935-936 of 2021, whereby Hon’ble Apex Court has held that it has been noticed over a period of time that a tendency on the part of the litigants to blame their lawyers of negligence and carelessness in attending the proceedings before the court is coming forward. It has been observed that even if, we assume for a moment that the concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the court 11 2026:HHC:25666 initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the Advocate and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief. 21. It is well settled that advocate is the agent of the party. His acts and statements, made within the limits of authority given to him, are the acts and statements of the principal i.e. the party who engages him. It is true that in certain situations, the court may, in the interest of justice, set aside a dismissal order or an ex parte decree notwithstanding the negligence and/or misdemeanour of the Advocate, where it finds that the client was an innocent litigant but there is no such absolute rule that a party can disown its Advocate at any time and seek relief. No such absolute immunity can be recognized. Such an absolute rule would make the working of the system extremely difficult. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the said judgment has held as follows: “10. It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the head of the advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in the trial court. We have noticed over a period of time a tendency on the part of the litigants to blame their lawyers of negligence and carelessness in attending the proceedings before the court. Even if we assume for a moment that the concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial 12 2026:HHC:25666 proceedings pending in the court initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the advocate and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief. S.L.P. (CIVIL) NOS. 935-936 OF 2021 11. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to a decision of this Court in the case of Salil Dutta v. T.M. & M.C. Private Ltd. reported in (1993) 2 SCC 185, wherein this Court observed as under:- “8. The advocate is the agent of the party. His acts and statements, made within the limits of authority given to him, are the acts and statements of the principal i.e. the party who engage him. It is true that in certain situations, the court may, in the interest of justice, set aside a dismissal order or an ex parte decree notwithstanding the negligence and/or misdemeanour of the advocate where it finds that the client was an innocent litigant but there is no such absolute rule that a party can disown its advocate at any time and seek relief. No such absolute immunity can be recognized. Such an absolute rule would make the working of the system extremely difficult. The observations made in Rafiq [AIR 1981 SC 1400] must not be understood as an absolute proposition. As we have mentioned hereinabove, this was an ongoing suit posted for final hearing after a lapse of seven years of its institution. It was not a second appeal filed by a villager residing away from the city, where the court is located. The defendant is also not a rustic ignorant villager but a private limited company with its head office at Calcutta itself and managed by educated businessmen who know where their interest lies. It is evident that when their applications were not deposed of before taking up 13 2026:HHC:25666 the suit for final hearing they felt piqued and refused to appear before the court. May be, it was part of their delaying tactics as alleged by the plaintiff. May be not. But one thing is clear they chose to noncooperate with the court. Having adopted such a stand towards the court, the defendant has no right to ask its indulgence. Putting the entire blame upon the advocate and trying to make it out as if they S.L.P. (CIVIL) NOS. 935-936 OF 2021 were totally unaware of the nature or significance of the proceedings is a theory which cannot be accepted and ought not to have been accepted.” (Emphasis supplied) 12. As regards the law of limitation, we may refer to the decision of this Court in Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG Go. v. The Employees State Insurance Corporation, (1971) 2 SCC 860, wherein this Court held as under:- “The necessity for enacting periods of limitation is to ensure that actions are commenced within a particular period, firstly to assure the availability of evidence documentary as well as oral to enable the defendant to contest the claim against him; secondly to give effect to the principle that law does not assist a person who is inactive and sleeps over his rights by allowing them when challenged or disputed to remain dormant without asserting them in a Court of law. The principle which forms the basis of this rule is expressed in the maximum vigilantibus, non dermientibus, jura sub- veniunt (the laws give help to those who are watchful and not to those who sleep). Therefore, the object of the statutes of limitations is to compel a person to exercise his right of action within a reasonable time as also to discourage and 14 2026:HHC:25666 suppress stale, fake or fraudulent claims.” (Emphasis supplied)” 22. Similarly, learned counsel for the respondents has also relied upon a judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Sanjay Singh and another vs. Central Himalayan land development Company Ltd., (2019) 12 SCC 218, wherein parameters for condonation of delay have been laid down in following manner: “15. But, what is more striking is that the delay to the tune of 721 days was condoned by the High Court when there was no satisfactory explanation. In CIVIL APPEAL No. 1928 OF 2019 (@ SLP(C) NO.24690 OF 2018) SANJAY SINGH AND ANR. VS. CENTRAL HIMALAYAN LAND DEVELOPMENT CO. LTD. our view, there was gross negligence on part of the respondent and the explanation offered in support of the prayer for condonation does not appear to be correct. This is evident from the fact that no effective steps were taken to pursue the complaint which was lodged against the then advocate. In the petition for special leave, it was asserted that the complaint against the Advocate was not being proceeded with and the respondent had remained absent on the relevant date. Said assertion was not answered satisfactorily in the affidavit in reply filed in this Court. Taking totality of the circumstances, in our view the delay ought not to have been condoned by the High Court. We, therefore, accept the submission of the appellants and set aside the order condoning delay. Consequently, the First Appeal also stands dismissed.” 15 2026:HHC:25666 23. Generally, the courts have adopted a very liberal approach in construing the phrase ‘sufficient cause’ used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act in order to condone the delay to enable the courts to do substantial justice and to apply law in a meaningful manner, which subserves the ends of justice. Notwithstanding the above, howsoever, liberal approach is adopted in condoning the delay, existence of ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing the appeal in time, is a condition precedent for exercising the discretionary power to condone the delay. 24. The Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that even after sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not filing an appeal within time, the said party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as excusing the delay is the discretionary jurisdiction vested with the court. The Court, despite establishment of a ‘sufficient cause’ for various reasons, may refuse to condone the delay depending upon the bona fides of the party. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The concept of ‘liberal approach’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. It is a well settled principle of law that the limitation may harshly affect a particular 16 2026:HHC:25666 party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. 25. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. Where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. 26. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy (died) by LRs. & others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA), Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.31248 of 2018, has held as under: “12. In view of the above provision, the appeal which is preferred after the expiry of the limitation is liable to be dismissed. The use of the word ‘shall’ in the aforesaid provision connotes that the dismissal is mandatory subject to the exceptions. Section 3 of the Act is peremptory and had to be given effect to even though no objection regarding limitation is taken by the other side or referred to in the pleadings. In other words, it casts an obligation upon the court to dismiss an appeal which is presented beyond limitation. This is the general law of limitation. The exceptions are carved out under Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act but we are concerned only with the 17 2026:HHC:25666 exception contained in Section 5 which empowers the courts to admit an appeal even if it is preferred after the prescribed period provided the proposed appellant gives ‘sufficient cause’ for not preferring the appeal within the period prescribed. In other words, the courts are conferred with discretionary powers to admit an appeal even after the expiry of the prescribed period provided the proposed appellant is able to establish ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing it within time. The said power to condone the delay or to admit the appeal preferred after the expiry of time is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is shown based upon host of other factors such as negligence, failure to exercise due diligence etc. 13. It is very elementary and well understood that courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in dealing with the applications for condonation of the delay in filing appeals and rather follow a pragmatic line to advance substantial justice. 14 to 20 xx xx xx xx 21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.6, where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. 18 2026:HHC:25666 22. xx xx xx 23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer8, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds. 24. It would be beneficial to quote paragraph 12 of the aforesaid decision which clinches the issue of the manner in which equilibrium has to be maintained between adopting liberal approach and in implementing the statute as it stands, Paragraph 12 reads as under: “12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has 19 2026:HHC:25666 consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.” 27. In the present case, the explanation assigned for the condonation of delay does not make out sufficient cause for condoning the delay. The petitioner has failed to make out the case and establish that the passing of the judgment by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Court No.1, Ghumarwin, was not within his knowledge. The petitioner was afforded an opportunity to lead evidence in support of his contentions, however, the counsel to whom the delay was being attributed was examined by the opposite side and has categorically stated that the judgment of the learned Civil Judge was very much within the knowledge of the petitioner. Therefore, the story as projected by the petitioner is false and incorrect. 28. Before delving into merits of the case, it is apposite to explain the nature and scope conferred upon this Court under Section 115 of the CPC and analyze whether this Court is empowered to deal with the issues raised by the petitioner in the instant case. The said provision reads as under: “Section 115. Revision- [(1)] The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court 20 2026:HHC:25666 subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate court appears-- (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit: [Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings.] [(2) The High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto.] [(3) A revision shall not operate as a stay of suit or other proceeding before the Court except where such suit or other proceeding is stayed by the High Court.] [Explanation.--In this section, the expression "any case which has been decided" includes any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding.]” 29. On bare perusal of the above provision, it is clear that the High Court can only interfere with the orders of the Subordinate Court if the court has committed illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction. It is imperative to note that under the revisional powers, this Court cannot attack the 21 2026:HHC:25666 findings on the facts by the Subordinate Court and can only interfere if any infirmities are found with the exercise of jurisdiction of the Court and not when the courts erroneously decide the cases. 30. The primary object of the revision powers conferred to the High Courts is to prevent subordinate courts from acting arbitrarily, capriciously and illegally while they exercise their jurisdiction. The aspect related to the revision powers given to the High Court has been extensively dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of judgments, whereby the Hon'ble Court discussed the meaning and scope of the said provision. 31. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s D.L.F. Housing and Construction Company (P) Ltd., New Delhi vs. Sarup Singh and others, 1969(3) SCC 807, has considered the provisions of Section 115 of CPC as follows: “5. The position thus seems to be firmly established that while exercising the jurisdiction u/s 115, it is not competent to the High Court to correct errors of fact however gross or even errors of law unless the said errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the dispute itself. Clauses (a) and (b) of this section on their plain reading quite clearly do not cover the present case. It was not contended, as indeed it was not possible to contend, that the learned Additional District Judge had either exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law or had failed to exercise a 22 2026:HHC:25666 jurisdiction so vested in him, in recording the order that the proceedings under reference be stayed till the decision of the appeal by the High Court in the proceedings for specific performance of the agreement in question. Clause (c) also does not seem to apply to the case in hand. The words "illegally" and "with material irregularity" as used in this Clause do not cover either errors of fact or of law; they do not refer to the decision arrived at but merely to the manner in which it is reached. The errors contemplated by this Clause may, in our view, relate either to breach of some provision of law or to material defects of procedure affecting the ultimate decision, and not to errors either of fact or of law, after the prescribed formalities have been complied with. The High Court does not seem to have adverted to the limitation imposed on its power u/s 115 of the Code. Merely because the High Court would have felt inclined, had it dealt with the matter initially, to come to a different conclusion on the question of continuing stay of the reference proceedings pending decision of the appeal, could hardly justify interference on revision u/s 115 of the Code when there was no illegality or material irregularity committed by the learned Additional District Judge in his manner of dealing with this question. It seems to us that in this matter the High Court treated the revision virtually as if it was an appeal. 32. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.5622 of 2025, titled as P. Kumarakurubaran vs, P. Narayanan & others, held as under:- 23 2026:HHC:25666 14. It is also to be noted that the appellant has categorically averred in the plaint that he executed the registered power of attorney in favour of his father solely for the limited purpose of constructing a house and carrying out related activities. There is no express clause authorizing his father to sell the suit property to any person without the appellant’s consent and knowledge. Yet, the appellant’s father executed a sale deed in favour of his granddaughter, going beyond the scope of the power of attorney, which raises serious doubt about misuse of authority and potential fraud. Such assertions cannot be rejected in the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Accordingly, we are of the view that the plaint discloses a cause of action which cannot be shut out at the threshold. Thus, the trial Court acted within its jurisdiction in refusing to reject the plaint and in holding that the matter ought to proceed to trial. The High Court, while exercising its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, ought not to have interfered in the absence of any jurisdictional error or perversity in the trial court’s order. Rejecting the plaint where substantial factual disputes exist concerning limitation and the scope of authority under the Power of Attorney, is legally unsustainable.” 33. In Ajit Singh & others vs. Krishan Kumar, decided on 18th October, 2023, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court, held as under: “11. The same view is reiterated in a later decision of this Court in the case of Managing Director (Mig) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Ajit Prasad Tarway 24 2026:HHC:25666 [(1972) 3 SCC 195] wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court speaking through Hegde, J. clearly stated that the High Court under Section 115 CPC had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the first appellate court based on facts or even involving any error of law. It was next observed that it was not the conclusion of the High Court that the first appellate court had no jurisdiction to make the order that it made. The order of the first appellate court may be right or wrong; may be in accordance with law or may not be in accordance with law; but one thing is clear, that it had jurisdiction to make that order. It was not the case that the first appellate court exercised its jurisdiction either illegally or with material irregularity. That being so, the High Court could not have invoked its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code." 34. In view of aforesaid discussions and for the reasons stated hereinabove, the instant petition being devoid of any merit is dismissed, so also the pending application (s), if any, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. ( Romesh Verma ) Judge June 25, 2026 (vt)