HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No. - 1174 of 2026 Court No. - 39 HON'BLE ABDUL SHAHID, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the appellants/defendants. 2. The present appeal has been filed by the appellants/defendants against the order dated 31.03.2026 passed by the Court of learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), District Jhansi, in Original Suit No. 385 of 2025 (M/s Sanfran Developer Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Kamla Sonker and others). 3. Learned counsel for the appellants/defendants has submitted that the impugned order dated 31.03.2026 has been passed by ignoring the existing arbitration agreement executed between the parties, which forms part of the consortium agreement dated 01.10.2015. According to him, this is the primary bone of contention in the present proceedings. He has further submitted that the plaintiff/respondent is virtually seeking specific performance through the suit. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants has further submitted that the learned trial court has ignored Clause 5.5 of the agreement dated 01.10.2015, wherein the mechanism for settlement of disputes has been provided, which essentially constitutes an arbitration clause. He has submitted that the said clause clearly states that all disputes arising out of the consortium agreement dated 01.10.2015 shall first be settled amicably and, in case of failure to amicably resolve the dispute, the same shall be referred to an Arbitrator to be decided between the parties, whose decision shall be final and binding upon them. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants/defendants has further submitted that the agreement dated 01.10.2015 was executed in contravention of the Versus Counsel for Appellant(s) : Ami Tandon Counsel for Respondent(s) : Smt Kamla Sonker And 5 Others .....Appellant(s) M/S Sanfran Developer Private Limited .....Respondent(s) provisions of Section 98 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 (corresponding to Section 157-A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950), which mandates that no bhumidhar belonging to the Scheduled Caste category shall have the right to transfer, by way of sale, gift, mortgage, or lease, any land to a person not belonging to the Scheduled Caste category except with the previous permission of the Collector in writing. Hence, in the absence of such permission, the said agreement is void under Section 104 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 and is subject to the consequences provided under Section 105 thereof. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants/defendants has further submitted that the plaintiff/respondent has an efficacious and alternative remedy available and, therefore, the suit is barred under Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. He has further submitted that the learned trial court ignored the fact that the suit was not maintainable, firstly, because there exists an arbitration clause in the agreement and, secondly, because the consortium agreement dated 01.10.2015 had already been terminated by the defendants/appellants through the registered declaratory deed dated 01.06.2023. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants/defendants has relied upon the judgment passed by this Court in Smt. Omwati Vs. Collector, District Pilibhit and others on 10.11.2022, 2022:AHC:187089. Paragraph 11 of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow: "11. Section 98 of the Code mandates that no bhumidhar belonging to a scheduled caste shall have the right to transfer, by way of sale, gift, mortgage or lease any land to a person not belonging to a scheduled caste except with the previous permission of the Collector in writing. The previous permission of the Collector is therefore, a condition precedent before any bhumidhar of scheduled caste can seek to transfer his land to a person not belonging to a scheduled caste. In the absence of such permission having been obtained, the transfer would be rendered void as per Section 104, and would be subject to the consequences provided under Section 105." 8. Learned counsel for the appellant/defendant has further relied on the judgment passed by the High Court of Delhi At New Delhi in Sharad P. Jagtiani Versus M/S. Edel Weiss Securities Ltd., 2014:DHC:3754-D and has relied on paras 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 which are reproduced below: FAFO No. 1174 of 2026 2 "14. We simply need to highlight the phrase 'not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute" in sub- Section (1) of Section 8. The requirement is to bring to the notice of the Court at a point not later than when submitting the first statement on the substance of the dispute that there exists an arbitration clause between the parties and that the subject matter of the action brought before the Court by way of the suit falls within the ambit of the arbitration clause. 15. Section 8 does not specify the manner in which the party has to submit its first statement on the substance of the dispute, and normally with respect to a suit, the first statement on the substance of the dispute by the defendant would be the written statement. Thus, if in the written statement filed it is brought to the notice of the Court that there exists an arbitration agreement between the parties which embraces the subject matter of the suit there would complete compliance with the mandate of the law and the Court would be obliged to refer the parties to arbitration if the plea in the written statement is made good. 16. On the facts of the instant case, it may be true that in the written statement filed a specific prayer has not been made to refer the parties to arbitration, but we have highlighted hereinabove that in the written statement filed a preliminary objection has been taken that the suit is barred in view of the arbitration agreement. The written statement filed is with strings attached by challenging the maintainability of the suit in view of the arbitration clause and therefore in such circumstance the said objection taken by Edelweiss contained in the written statement could be treated as an application under section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 17. It is trite that it is the substance of a matter contained in a document which matters and not the form thereof. 18. For three reasons, the appeal has to be dismissed. Firstly the arbitration agreement in the instant case being the result of a statute, there being no estoppel against the statute, required by law to be held; secondly the view taken by us hereinabove relating to the interpretation of Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; and thirdly Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which empowers a Court to refer the parties to arbitration if in the opinion of the Court it appears that there exists element of a settlement which may be acceptable to the parties. There cannot be a better case where such element exists than a case where the parties themselves have agreed for referring the matter to arbitration at the time of entering into the contract itself." 9. Learned counsel for the appellant has further relied on the judgment passed by High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh at Jammu in FAFO No. 1174 of 2026 3 S. Charanjeet Singh Versus UT of J & K and others, dated 13.03.2025 (RFA No. 52 of 2023, CM No. 7861/2023, 654/2024, CAV No. 1940/2023) and relied on para 10 which is reproduced below: "10. In terms of Section 8 of the Act of 1996, a judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter, which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall refer the parties to arbitration, if a party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming through or under him so applies not later than the date of submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, then, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of the Supreme Court or any court, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that prima facie no valid arbitration agreement exists. Sub- section (2) of Section 8 of the Act of 1996 provides that the application referred to in sub-section (1) shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof." 10. Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the plaintiff/respondent filed Original Suit No. 385 of 2025 seeking relief that the registered declaratory deed dated 01.06.2023 be declared void ab initio. The plaintiff/respondent has further sought a relief of mandatory injunction directing the appellants/defendants to execute the registered agreement dated 01.10.2015 between the parties. 11. It is pertinent to mention here that, despite having knowledge since the very inception that the appellants/defendants belonged to the Scheduled Caste community, the plaintiff/respondent entered into the bilateral registered agreement dated 01.10.2015 and was allegedly delivered possession after payment of consideration. It is also alleged that the plaintiff/respondent concealed the fact that litigation relating to the property was pending, which caused delay in execution of the agreement. However, the said bilateral registered agreement dated 01.10.2015 is still in existence. The mala fide conduct of the appellants/defendants also appears evident inasmuch as, in collusion with the other defendants and without informing or impleading the plaintiff/respondent, they executed the unilateral registered declaratory deed dated 01.06.2023 purporting to cancel the bilateral registered agreement dated 01.10.2015. 12. Since the registered agreement dated 01.10.2015 is a bilateral agreement executed between the appellants/defendants and the plaintiff/respondent, the same could only have been modified, set aside, or cancelled either by a FAFO No. 1174 of 2026 4 competent court of law or through a registered document executed after providing an opportunity of hearing to the plaintiff/respondent and impleading the plaintiff/respondent in such proceedings. The same has admittedly not been done by the appellants/defendants. Hence, mala fide concealment and bad intention on the part of the appellants/defendants are manifestly clear. 13. So far as the reliance placed by the appellants/defendants upon Clause 5.5 of the consortium agreement is concerned, it is noteworthy that the appellants themselves have stated in paragraph 'B' of the memo of appeal that all disputes arising out of the consortium agreement dated 01.10.2015 shall first be settled amicably and, in the event of failure to amicably resolve the dispute, the same shall be referred to an Arbitrator whose decision shall be final and binding upon the parties. However, the appellants/defendants themselves executed the declaratory deed dated 01.06.2023, which is in clear violation of the registered agreement dated 01.10.2015 and its terms and conditions. The agreement specifically contemplated amicable settlement of disputes and, upon failure thereof, reference to arbitration. None of these conditions were followed or complied with by the appellants/defendants themselves. 14. The learned trial court, while deciding Application 6-C under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C., specifically held that the elders of defendant nos. 1 and 2, with the consent of defendant nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6, in the presence of witnesses, executed the registered declaratory deed dated 19.05.2023 for cancellation of the registered agreement dated 01.10.2015 and that no information regarding the same was provided to Santosh Kumar Mishra, Director of the plaintiff-firm. 15. The defendants themselves have stated that information regarding the execution and registration of the declaratory deed dated 19.05.2023 was sent to the plaintiff only after the cancellation and registration of the unilateral deed. Hence, the trial court specifically held that, at the time of execution of the declaratory deed dated 19.05.2023, no prior information had been provided to the plaintiff-firm. 16. It is the case of the plaintiff that possession over the land in question had already been delivered to him and he had also constructed a boundary wall over the said premises on the basis of the registered agreement dated FAFO No. 1174 of 2026 5 01.10.2015. 17. In view of the aforesaid facts, reasons, circumstances, and provisions of law, there is neither any illegality nor perversity in the impugned order dated 31.03.2026. The prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss and injury lie exclusively in favour of the plaintiff/respondent. 18. Accordingly, the present First Appeal From Order lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed in limine. It is, accordingly, dismissed. May 8, 2026 K.K. Maurya FAFO No. 1174 of 2026 6 (Abdul Shahid,J.) Digitally signed by :- KAMLESH KUMAR MAURYA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad