2026:HHC:25422 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 128 of 2014 and Cr. Revision No. 28 of 2014 Reserved on: 16.06.2026 Date of Decision: 30.06.2026 1. Cr. Appeal No. 128 of 2014 Urmila Devi ...Appellant Versus Rajesh Kumar & Ors. ...Respondents _______________________________________ 2. Cr. Revision No. 28 of 2014 Rajesh Kumar and another ...Petitioners Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent _______________________________________ Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes. In Cr. Appeal No. 128 of 2014 For the Appellant : Ms Kamlesh Kumari, Advocate, vice Mr A.S. Rana, Advocate. For Respondents No.1 & 2 : Mr Divya Raj Singh, Advocate. For Respondent No.3/State : Mr Jitender Kumar Sharma, Additional Advocate General. In Cr. Revision No. 28 of 2014 For the Petitioner : Mr Divya Raj Singh, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr Jitender Kumar Sharma, Additional Advocate General. [ 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:25422 Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal and revision are directed against the judgment dated 18.12.2013 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, District Una, H.P. (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction dated 31.03.2012 and order of sentence dated 06.09.2012 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.1, Una, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were partly modified. Since both the appeal and revision have arisen out of the common judgment, they are being taken together for consideration and disposal. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal and revision are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323 and 325 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant, Urmila Devi (PW5), had visited her matrimonial home. Her brother Shiv Kumar (PW9) was going to the house of Sainies on 06.11.2001 at about 4:30 p.m. to bring the grains. When he reached near the field of Rakesh Kumar and Harish Kumar (the accused), he 3 2026:HHC:25422 found that Harish Kumar was plucking the Brinjal from his field. The accused saw Shiva Kumar (PW9) and had a scuffle with him. Shiv Kumar (PW9) moved ahead, but the accused Harish Kumar started abusing him. The informant ran to the spot after hearing the noise. Harish had a scuffle with the informant. Rakesh Kumar also reached the spot armed with a piece of flat wood and inflicted an injury on the informant’s face. Her teeth were broken, and her lip was injured. She shouted for help, and her mother, Ram Piari (PW1), reached the spot. Accused Harish also inflicted injuries on Ram Piari (PW1). Trilok Chand (PW7), Bhola Ram, Jeetu Devi and Shanti Devi rescued the informant party from the accused. The informant and the injured went to the Police Station and reported the matter to the police. The police recorded an entry number 31 (Ext.PW4/A) and filed an application (Ext.PW10/C) for the medical examination of the injured. Doctor Vipan Chaudhary (PW10) examined Urmila Devi and found that she had sustained simple and grievous injuries. He issued the MLC (Ext.PW10/A). Doctor VK Raizada (PW2) examined the informant and found that she had sustained injuries, and the corresponding teeth of the lower jaw were broken. He issued the MLC (Ext.PW2/A). Dr Vipan Chaudhary also examined Ram Piari and found that she had sustained simple injuries. He issued the MLC (Ext.PW10/B). An entry (Ext.PW12/A) 4 2026:HHC:25422 was recorded in the Police Station after the receipt of the opinion of the Medical Officer, and FIR (Ext.PW11/B) was registered. Mangat Ram (PW13) investigated the matter. He visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW13/A). Rakesh Kumar produced one piece of flat wood, which was seized vide memo (Ext.PW4/A). Harish produced one stick of bamboo, which was seized vide memo (Ext.PW4/B). Urmila Devi (PW5) produced one dupatta, one shirt and salwar, which were put in a cloth parcel and were seized vide memo (Ext.PW9/A). The parcel was sealed with seal “A” and seal impression (Ext.PW13/B) was taken on a separate piece of cloth. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, they were charged with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323 and 325 read with Section 34 of the IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 14 witnesses to prove its case. Ram Piari (PW1), Urmila Devi (PW5) and Shiv Kumar (PW9) are the eyewitnesses and the injured. Dr V.K. Raizada (PW2) 5 2026:HHC:25422 examined the injured. Rakesh Sharma (PW3) and Rakesh Kumar (PW8) took the X-ray. Darshan Lal (PW4), Balbir Singh (PW6) and Dilbag Singh (PW14) are the witnesses to the recovery. Trilok Chand (PW7) is an eyewitness but did not support the prosecution's case. Dr Vipan Chaudhary (PW10) was a dental Surgeon who had examined the injured. SI Des Raj (PW11) signed the FIR. ASI Ved Parkash (PW12) proved the entry in the daily diary. Mangat Ram (PW13) investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C), denied the prosecution's case in its entirety. They claimed that the witnesses made false statements against them. They did not produce any evidence in their defence. 6. The learned Trial Court held that the statements of prosecution witnesses corroborated each other. The medical evidence also proved that the informant had sustained injuries. The accused had also sustained injuries, but they were minor and not significant enough to doubt the prosecution's case. The relationship between the parties was not cordial, but that was not sufficient to acquit the accused. Therefore, the learned Trial Court 6 2026:HHC:25422 convicted the accused Rajesh and Harish and sentenced them as follows: Accused Sections Sentences Rajesh Section 325 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 34 of the IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of ₹10,000/-, and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for one month. Harish 323 of the Indian Penal Code The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one month, pay a fine of ₹1000/-, and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for one month. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Una (learned Appellate Court). The Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the statements of prosecution witnesses corroborated each other. The relationship between the parties was not sufficient to doubt the prosecution's 7 2026:HHC:25422 case. The mere fact that the independent witness had not supported the prosecution's case was not sufficient to record the acquittal. The injuries suffered by the accused were minor, and their non-explanation will not make the prosecution's case doubtful. Learned Trial Court had called for the report of the Probation Officer who had recommended the grant of probation. However, the learned Trial Court declined to grant the benefit of probation without assigning any reason. Hence, the learned Appellate Court extended the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to the accused and released them on probation for a period of three years on furnishing of bonds of ₹25,000/- with one surety to the like amount. The Appellate Court also ordered the accused Rajesh to pay compensation of ₹25,000/- to the informant Urmila, and the accused Harish to pay compensation of ₹5,000/- to the injured Ram Piari. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court, the accused have filed a revision, and the victims have filed an appeal before this Court. 9. The accused asserted in their revision that the learned Courts below failed to properly appreciate the material on record. The injury sustained by the informant could be self-inflicted. 8 2026:HHC:25422 There were various contradictions in the statements of prosecution witnesses, which made the prosecution's case highly suspect. Trilok Chand (PW7) had not supported the prosecution's case, which made the prosecution's case highly doubtful. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 10. The victims asserted in their appeal that the learned Appellate Court erred in granting the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to the accused. The accused had inflicted a grievous injury on the informant. They had criminal antecedents. The informant suffered permanent disfigurement, and the amount of compensation was grossly inadequate. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed, the accused be sentenced, or, in the alternative, the compensation amount be enhanced. 11. I have heard Ms Kamlesh Kumari, learned vice counsel representing the appellant, Mr Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel for respondents No.1 and 2/accused and Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for respondents No.3/State. 12. Ms Kamlesh Kumari, learned vice counsel representing the appellant/victims, submitted that the accused had deliberately caused hurt to the informant, her mother and brother without any 9 2026:HHC:25422 justification. The learned Trial Court had rightly sentenced the accused, and the learned Appellate Court erred in extending the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to them. Therefore, she prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court be restored. She prayed in the alternative that the amount of compensation awarded to the victims be enhanced. 13. Mr Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel for revisionists/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below had not properly appreciated the material placed before them. There were various contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses, and the learned Courts below erred in relying upon the statements. Two FIRs were recorded regarding the same incident. The accused had also sustained injuries, which were not explained. This made the prosecution’s case doubtful. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 14. Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for respondents/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court and learned Appellate Court had properly appreciated the material on record. This Court should not re-appreciate the 10 2026:HHC:25422 evidence while exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal and revision be dismissed. 15. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 16. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207: - “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error that is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 17. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: 11 2026:HHC:25422 14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. 15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well- founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a 12 2026:HHC:25422 given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.” 18. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169: “12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) “5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the 13 2026:HHC:25422 High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non- consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” 14. In the above case, also a conviction of the accused was recorded, and the High Court set aside [Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke v. Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan, 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 1753] the order of conviction by substituting its view. This Court set aside the High Court's order, holding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in substituting its views, and that too without any legal basis. 14 2026:HHC:25422 19. A similar view was taken in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205: “16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.” 20. This position was reiterated in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed: 27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir Singh (supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdic- tion, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. 28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the ab- sence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concur- rent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court. 21. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15 2026:HHC:25422 22. Shiv Kumar (PW9) stated that he was going to the house of Saini on 06.11.2001 to bring the grains. When he reached near the fields of Harish Kumar, he found that Harish Kumar was plucking the brinjals from his field. The accused Harish Kumar left plucking the brinjals after seeing him and had a scuffle with him. The accused also abused him. He objected to the hurling of the abuse, and the accused gave him beatings with kicks and fists. He shouted for help. Rakesh Kumar came to the spot armed with a flat wood. The informant also reached the spot. The accused Rakesh hit her with a piece of flat wood. She suffered an injury on her lips, and her teeth were broken. Ram Piari also reached the spot. Harish inflicted injuries on Ram Piari with the stick. Trilok Chand, Bhola, Jeeto and Shanti Devi came to the spot and rescued them from the accused. He identified the piece of flat wood and the stick as the weapons of the offence. 23. He stated in his cross-examination that the informant's statement was recorded in the hospital, and his statement was recorded at home. The incident continued for 15-20 minutes. He had sustained injuries to his leg and arms. He denied that he had gone to the field to Harish, armed with the cycle chain and inflicted injuries to Harish. He denied that Prakash came to the spot to rescue his brother. His mother and sister were sitting outside the 16 2026:HHC:25422 house at the time of the incident. The house was located at a distance of about 200 yards from the place of the incident. 24. Informant Urmila Devi (PW5) stated that her brother Shiv Kumar was going to the houses of Sainies on 06.11.2001, when Shiv Kumar reached near the field of Rakesh and Harish, Harish abused Shiv Kumar (PW9) and had a scuffle with him. The informant went to the spot. Harish gave her beatings. Rakesh came to the spot armed with a piece of flat wood and inflicted an injury on her face. Her lips were injured, and her teeth were broken. Jeetu, Trilok Chand, and Ram Piari came to the spot. Harish inflicted injuries on Ram Piari. She stated in her cross-examination that her house was located at a distance of 150-200 yards from the place of the incident. She was sitting on the door of her house at the time of the incident. Her mother was inside the house. The houses of Kashmiri, Bhola, etc., were located adjacent to the place of the incident. She denied that the place of the incident is not visible from her home because of the trees. She denied that Shiv Kumar (PW9) was swinging the cycle chain, and she sustained injury from the cycle chain. 25. Ram Piari (PW1) stated that her son Shiv Kumar (PW9) was going to bring the grains on 06.11.2001. Harish Kumar was 17 2026:HHC:25422 plucking the brinjals. He came out of the field after seeing Shiv Kumar and had a scuffle with Shiv Kumar. He also abused Shiv Kumar, and when Shiv Kumar made enquiries, the accused gave him beatings with kicks and fist blows. Urmila Devi (PW5) went to the spot to rescue her brother, but the accused also gave her a beating. Accused Rakesh Kumar came to the spot armed with a piece of flat wood and inflicted injury to the informant. She also went to the spot to rescue her children, and the accused gave her a beating. She stated in her cross-examination that the place of the incident is located at a distance of 50-100 yards from her house. She was inside the house and came out of the house after hearing the noise. She saw the informant bleeding. The informant had visited the spot after about 10-15 minutes, and she had gone to the spot after 10 minutes of hearing the noise. The hairpin bend was located at a distance of about 50 yards. The incident continued for about one hour. She admitted that there were many houses in the vicinity, but stated that no person came out of the house. 26. Doctor V.K Raizada (PW2) stated that the informant, Urmila Devi, had sustained a lacerated wound over the upper lip. Underlying incisors and canines were broken/dislocated. The lower jaw and corresponding teeth were also dislocated. The injuries 18 2026:HHC:25422 could have been caused by means of a piece of flat wood shown to him. 27. Doctor Vipan Chaudhary (PW10) examined the informant and found that the lower right canine and central and lateral incisors were missing and the socket was filled with blood. Both upper central incisors were fractured, and malocclusion was present on the upper lip. The nature of the injury was grievous and could have been caused by means of the piece of flat wood shown to him. 28. The statements of Medical Officers show that Urmila Devi (PW5) and Ram Piari (PW1) were injured in the incident. The learned courts below had rightly held that the testimonies of injured witnesses were entitled to a great weight. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Neeraj Sharma v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2024) 3 SCC 125: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 13 that the testimony of the injured witness has to be accepted as correct unless there are compelling circumstances to doubt his testimony. It was observed: “22. The importance of an injured witness in a criminal trial cannot be overstated. Unless there are compelling circumstances or evidence placed by the defence to doubt such a witness, this has to be accepted as extremely valuable evidence in a criminal trial. 23. In Balu Sudam Khaldev.State of Maharashtra [Balu Sudam Khalde v.State of Maharashtra, (2023) 13 SCC 365: 2023 SCC 19 2026:HHC:25422 OnLine SC 355], this Court summed up the principles which are to be kept in mind when appreciating the evidence of an injured eyewitness. This Court held as follows: (SCC para 26) “26. When the evidence of an injured eyewitness is to be appreciated, the under-noted legal principles enunciated by the Courts are required to be kept in mind: 26.1. The presence of an injured eyewitness at the time and place of the occurrence cannot be doubted unless there are material contradictions in his deposition. 26.2. Unless it is otherwise established by the evidence, it must be believed that an injured witness would not allow the real culprits to escape and falsely implicate the accused. 26.3. The evidence of the injured witness has greater evidentiary value, and unless compelling reasons exist, their statements are not to be discarded lightly. 26.4. The evidence of the injured witness cannot be doubted on account of some embellishment in natural conduct or minor contradictions. 26.5. If there be any exaggeration or immaterial embellishment in the evidence of an injured witness, then such contradiction, exaggeration or embellishment should be discarded from the evidence of the injured, but not the whole evidence. 26.6. The broad substratum of the prosecution version must be taken into consideration, and discrepancies which normally creep due to loss of memory with the passage of time should be discarded.” (emphasis supplied) 29. This position was reiterated in Rajan v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952, wherein it was observed: “33. When the evidence of an injured eye-witness is to be appreciated, the undernoted legal principles enunciated by the Courts are required to be kept in mind: 20 2026:HHC:25422 “(a) The presence of an injured eye-witness at the time and place of the occurrence cannot be doubted unless there are material contradictions in his deposition. (b) Unless it is otherwise established by the evidence, it must be believed that an injured witness would not allow the real culprits to escape and falsely implicate the accused. (c) The evidence of an injured witness has greater evidentiary value, and unless compelling reasons exist, their statements are not to be discarded lightly. (d) The evidence of an injured witness cannot be doubted on account of some embellishment in natural conduct or minor contradictions. (e) If there be any exaggeration or immaterial embellishments in the evidence of an injured witness, then such contradiction, exaggeration or embellishment should be discarded from the evidence of the injured, but not the whole evidence. (f) The broad substratum of the prosecution version must be taken into consideration, and discrepancies which normally creep due to loss of memory with passage of time should be discarded.” 34. In assessing the value of the evidence of the eyewitnesses, two principal considerations are whether, in the circumstances of the case, it is possible to believe their presence at the scene of occurrence or in such situations as would make it possible for them to witness the facts deposed to by them and secondly, whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable in their evidence. In respect of both these considerations, circumstances either elicited from those witnesses themselves or established by other evidence tending to improbabilise their presence or to discredit the veracity of their statements, will have a bearing upon the value which a Court would attach to their evidence. Although in cases where the plea of the accused is a mere denial yet the evidence of the prosecution witnesses has to be examined on its own merits, where the accused raise a definite plea or put forward a positive case which is inconsistent with that of the prosecution, the nature of such 21 2026:HHC:25422 plea or case and the probabilities in respect of it will also have to be taken into account while assessing the value of the prosecution evidence. (See: Balu Sudam Khaldev.State of Maharashtra:(2023) 13 SCC 365). 30. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab vs. Hari Singh 1974 (3) SCR 725 that a person speaking on oath should be presumed to be a truthful witness unless there is something inherently improbable in his testimony. It was observed: “The ordinary presumption is that a witness speaking under an oath is truthful unless and until he is shown to be untruthful or unreliable in any particular respect. The High Court, reversing this approach, seems to us to have assumed that witnesses are untruthful unless it is proved that they are telling the truth. Witnesses, solemnly deposing on oath in the witness box during a trial upon a grave charge of murder, must be presumed to act with a full sense of responsibility for the consequences of what they state. It may be that what they say is so very unlikely or unnatural or unreasonable that it is safer not to act upon it or even to disbelieve them.” 31. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. Versus Smt. Noorie Alias Noor Jahan and Others, (1996) 9 SCC 104, that while assessing the evidence of an eyewitness, the Court must adhere to two principles, namely, whether, in the circumstances of the case, the eyewitness could be present and whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable. It was observed: - 22 2026:HHC:25422 “7. The High Court having acquitted the accused persons on appreciation of the evidence, we have ourselves scrutinised the evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 3. The conclusion is irresistible that their evidence on material particulars has been brushed aside by the High Court by entering into the realm of conjecture and fanciful speculation without even discussing the evidence, more particularly the evidence relating to the basic prosecution case. While assessing and evaluating the evidence of eyewitnesses, the Court must adhere to two principles, namely, whether, in the circumstances of the case, it was possible for the eyewitness to be present at the scene and whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable. The High Court, in our opinion, has failed to observe the aforesaid principles and, in fact, has misappreciated the evidence, which has caused a gross miscarriage of justice. The credibility of a witness has to be decided by referring to his evidence and finding out how he has fared in cross- examination and what impression is created by his evidence, taken insofar as the context of the case, and not by entering into the realm of conjecture and speculation. On scrutinising the evidence of PWs. 1, 2 and 3, we find they are consistent with one another so far as the place of occurrence, the manner of assault, the weapon of assault used by the accused persons, the fact of dragging of the dead body of the deceased from the place to the grove and nothing has been brought out in their cross-examination to impeach their testimony. The aforesaid oral evidence fully corroborates the medical evidence. In that view of the matter, we unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that the prosecution has been able to establish the charge against the accused persons and the High Court committed an error in acquitting the three respondents, namely Inder Dutt, Raghu Raj and Bikram.” (emphasis supplied). 32. In the present case, the presence of the victims was established by the injuries sustained by them, and there is nothing inherently improbable in their testimonies. Therefore, learned Courts below had rightly accepted the statements of the victims. 23 2026:HHC:25422 33. Doctor V.K. Raizada (PW2) admitted in his cross- examination that injury to Urmila Devi (PW5) could be caused by a fall on a hard surface and by striking with any hard object. It was submitted that the testimony of the Medical Officer makes the prosecution's case highly suspect. This submission cannot be accepted. The Medical Officer only admitted the alternative hypothesis, which is not sufficient to doubt the prosecution's case. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai, (2003) 12 SCC 395: 2003 SCC OnLine SC 1086, that when the testimonies of the witnesses are found credible, the medical evidence pointing to alternative possibilities is not sufficient to discard the prosecution’s case. It was observed at page 404: “22. It is trite that where the eyewitnesses' account is found credible and trustworthy, medical opinion pointing to alternative possibilities is not accepted as conclusive. Witnesses, as Bentham said, are the eyes and ears of justice. Hence, the importance and primacy of the quality of the trial process. Eyewitnesses' accounts would require a careful independent assessment and evaluation for their credibility, which should not be adversely prejudged, making any other evidence, including the medical evidence, the sole touchstone for the test of such credibility. The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witnesses held to be creditworthy; consistency with the undisputed facts; the “credit” of the witnesses; their performance in the witness box; their power of observation, etc. Then the probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation.” 24 2026:HHC:25422 34. Thus, the prosecution's case cannot be discarded because the medical officer has accepted an alternate hypothesis. 35. It was submitted that there are material contradictions in the statements of the witnesses, which make the prosecution's case highly doubtful. The following contradictions were highlighted: 1. Ram Piari (PW1) stated that she was working inside her home, whereas Shiv Kumar (PW9) stated that Ram Piari (PW1) and Urmila Devi (PW5) were sitting outside their homes 2. Ram Piari (PW1) stated that the hairpin bend was located at a distance of 200 yards from the place of the incident. Shiv Kumar stated that the hairpin band was located at a distance of 200 yards from the place of the incident. 3. Shiv Kumar (PW9) stated that the house was located at a distance of 150-200 yards, whereas Ram Piari (PW1) stated that the house was located at a distance of 50-100 yards. 36. Learned Courts below had rightly pointed out that these contradictions were minor and bound to come with time. The incident had occurred on 06.11.2001, and the statements were recorded in the years 2005 and 2006, more than 4-5 years after the incident. The memories fail with time, and no person can be expected to remember an incident in a photographic manner. Therefore, the minor contradictions could not have been used to discard the prosecution's case. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Rajan v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952, that the 25 2026:HHC:25422 discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses are not sufficient to discard the prosecution case unless they shake the core of the testimonies. It was observed: - “32. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task. There is no fixed or straitjacket formula for the appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved principles for the appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal case can be enumerated as follows: “I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness, read as a whole, appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the Court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly, keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. II. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. III. When an eye-witness is examined at length, it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, a hyper-technical approach by taking 26 2026:HHC:25422 sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer, not going to the root of the matter, would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. V. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny. VI. By and large, a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a videotape is replayed on the mental screen. VII. Ordinarily, it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence, which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties, therefore, cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details. VIII. The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another. IX. By and large, people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder. X. In regard to the exact time of an incident, or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals, which varies from person to person. XI. Ordinarily, a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events that take place in rapid 27 2026:HHC:25422 succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused or mixed up when interrogated later on. XII. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross- examination by counsel and, out of nervousness, mix up facts, get confused regarding the sequence of events, or fill in details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness sometimes operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved, though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him. XIII. A former statement, though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence, need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to a contradiction. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the latter statement, even if the latter statement is at variance with the former to some extent, it would not be helpful to contradict that witness.” [See Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217: 1983 Cri LJ 1096: (AIR 1983 SC 753) Leela Ram v. State of Haryana (1999) 9 SCC 525: AIR 1999 SC 3717 and Tahsildar Singh v. State of UP (AIR 1959 SC 1012)” 37. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Karan Singh v. State of U.P., (2022) 6 SCC 52: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 479: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 253 that the Court has to examine the evidence of the witnesses to find out whether it has a ring of truth or not. The Court should not give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter. It was observed at page 60: - “38. From the evidence of Mahender Singh, PW 4, it appears that no specific question was put to him as to whether the appellant was present at the place of occurrence or not. This Court in Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v. 28 2026:HHC:25422 State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238] held: (SCC p. 446, para 24) “24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more, particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief. Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness.” 39. Referring to Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], Mr Tyagi argued that minor discrepancies caused by lapses in memory were acceptable, contradictions were not. In this case, there was no contradiction, only minor discrepancies. 40. In Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan [Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 10 SCC 433: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 202], this Court held: (SCC pp. 447-48, paras 30-32) “30. This Court has repeatedly taken the view that the discrepancies or improvements which do not materially affect the case of the prosecution and are insignificant cannot be made the basis for doubting the case of the prosecution. The courts may not concentrate too much on such discrepancies or improvements. The purpose is to primarily and clearly sift the chaff from the grain and find out the truth from the testimony of the witnesses. Where it does not affect the core of the prosecution case, such a discrepancy should not be attached undue significance. The normal course of human conduct would be that while narrating a particular incident, there may occur minor discrepancies. Such discrepancies may even, in law, render credentials to the depositions. The 29 2026:HHC:25422 improvements or variations must essentially relate to the material particulars of the prosecution case. The alleged improvements and variations must be shown with respect to the material particulars of the case and the occurrence. Every such improvement, not directly related to the occurrence, is not a ground to doubt the testimony of a witness. The credibility of a definite circumstance of the prosecution case cannot be weakened with reference to such minor or insignificant improvements. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgments of this Court in Kathi Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat [Kathi Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat, (2012) 5 SCC 724 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 740], Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan [Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 2 SCC 205: 2001 SCC (Cri) 323] and Sukhchain Singh v. State of Haryana [Sukhchain Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 5 SCC 100: 2002 SCC (Cri) 961]. 31. What is to be seen next is whether the version presented in the Court was substantially similar to what was said during the investigation. It is only when exaggeration fundamentally changes the nature of the case that the Court has to consider whether the witness was stating the truth or not. [Ref. Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2003) 11 SCC 367: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1055]]. 32. These are variations that would not amount to any serious consequences. The Court has to accept the normal conduct of a person. The witness who is watching the murder of a person being brutally beaten by 15 people can hardly be expected to state a minute-by-minute description of the event. Everybody, and more particularly a person who is known to or is related to the deceased, would give all his attention to take steps to prevent the assault on the victim and then to make every effort to provide them with medical aid and inform the police. The statements that are recorded immediately upon the incident would have to be given a little leeway with regard to the statements being made and recorded 30 2026:HHC:25422 with utmost exactitude. It is a settled principle of law that every improvement or variation cannot be treated as an attempt to falsely implicate the accused by the witness. The approach of the court has to be reasonable and practicable. Reference in this regard can be made to Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana [Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2010) 12 SCC 350: (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 266] and Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh [Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2011) 9 SCC 561: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 777].” 41. In Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B. [Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B., (2012) 7 SCC 646: (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 685], this Court held: (SCC pp. 666-67, paras 46 & 49) “46. Then, it was argued that there are certain discrepancies and contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses inasmuch as these witnesses have given different timings as to when they had seen the scuffling and strangulation of the deceased by the accused. … Undoubtedly, some minor discrepancies or variations are traceable in the statements of these witnesses. But what the Court has to see is whether these variations are material and affect the case of the prosecution substantially. Every variation may not be enough to adversely affect the case of the prosecution. *** 49. It is a settled principle of law that the court should examine the statement of a witness in its entirety and read the said statement along with the statements of other witnesses in order to arrive at a rational conclusion. No statement of a witness can be read in part and/or in isolation. We are unable to see any material or serious contradiction in the statement of these witnesses which may give any advantage to the accused.” 42. In Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238], this Court held: (SCC p. 446, para 24) “24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more, particularly 31 2026:HHC:25422 keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief. Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness.” 38. Similar is the judgment in Anuj Singh v. State of Bihar, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 497: AIR 2022 SC 2817, wherein it was observed: “17. It is not disputed that there are minor contradictions with respect to the time of the occurrence or injuries attributed on hand or foot, but the constant narrative of the witnesses is that the appellants were present at the place of occurrence, armed with guns, and they caused the injury on informant PW-6. However, the testimony of a witness in a criminal trial cannot be discarded merely because of minor contradictions or omissions, as observed by this court in Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2000 8 SCC 457. This Court, while considering the issue of contradictions in the testimony while appreciating the evidence in a criminal trial, held that only contradictions in material particulars and not minor contradictions can be grounds to discredit the testimony of the witnesses. The relevant portion of para 42 of the judgment reads as follows: "42. Only such omissions that amount to a contradiction in material particulars can be used to discredit the testimony of the witness. The omission in the police statement by itself would not necessarily render the testimony of the witness unreliable. When the version given by the witness in the court is different in material particulars from that disclosed in his earlier statements, the case of the prosecution becomes doubtful and not otherwise. Minor contradictions are bound to appear in the statements 32 2026:HHC:25422 of truthful witnesses as memory sometimes plays false, and the sense of observation differs from person to person. The omissions in the earlier statement, if found to be of trivial details, as in the present case, the same would not cause any dent in the testimony of PW 2. Even if there is a contradiction of a statement of a witness on any material point, that is no ground to reject the whole of the testimony of such witness." 39. Therefore, in view of the binding precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the statements of the witnesses cannot be discarded due to omissions, contradictions, or discrepancies. The Court must consider whether the discrepancies negatively affect the prosecution's case and whether they pertain to the core of the case rather than the details. 40. In the present case, the contradiction regarding the place where the informant and her mother were present is a contradiction related to the detail and does not affect the core of the prosecution case. Further, no person measures the distance with the help of a measuring tape, and when a question is asked about the distance, a person provides an estimate, which may or may not be correct and would vary with the sense of distance of different people. Therefore, the discrepancy regarding the distance will not be sufficient to doubt the prosecution's case. 41. It was submitted that Shiv Kumar (PW9) had materially improved upon his version, and he was duly confronted with his 33 2026:HHC:25422 previous statement. This submission will not help the accused because the Investigating Officer was not asked about the confrontation, and the contradiction was not properly proved. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court about a century ago in Emperor vs. Vithu Balu Kharat (1924) 26 Bom. L.R. 965 that the previous statement has to be proved before it can be used. It was observed: “The words "if duly proved" in my opinion, clearly show that the record of the statement cannot be admitted in evidence straightaway but that the officer before whom the statement was made should ordinarily be examined as to any alleged statement or omitted statement that is relied upon by the accused for the purpose of contradicting the witness; and the provisions of Section 67 of the Indian Evidence Act apply to this case, as well as to any other similar ease. Of course, I do not mean to say that, if the particular police officer who recorded the statement is not available, other means of proving the statement may not be availed of, e.g., evidence that the statement is in the handwriting of that particular officer.” 42. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Muthu Naicker and Others, etc. Versus State of T.N. (1978) 4 SCC 385, that if the witness affirms the previous statement, no proof is necessary, but if the witness denies or says that he did not remember the previous statement, the investigating officer should be asked about the same. It was observed: - “52. This is the most objectionable manner of using the police statement, and we must record our emphatic 34 2026:HHC:25422 disapproval of the same. The question should have been framed in a manner to point out that, from amongst those accused mentioned in examination-in-chief, there were some whose names were not mentioned in the police statement and if the witness affirms this, no further proof is necessary and if the witness denies or says that she does not remember, the investigation officer should have been questioned about it.” 43. The Gauhati High Court held in Md. Badaruddin Ahmed v. State of Assam, 1989 SCC OnLine Gau 35: 1989 Cri LJ 1876, that if the witness denies having made the statement, the portion marked by the defence should be put to the investigating officer and his version should be elicited regarding the same. It was observed at page 1880: - “13. The learned defence counsel has drawn our attention to the above statement of the Investigating Officer and submits that P.W. 4 never made his above statement before the police and that the same, being his improved version, cannot be relied upon. With the utmost respect to the learned defence counsel, we are unable to accept his above contention. Because, unless the particular matter or point in the previous statement sought to be contradicted is placed before the witness for explanation, the previous statement cannot be used in evidence. In other words, drawing the attention of the witness to his previous statement sought to be contradicted and giving all opportunities to him for explanation are compulsory. If any authority is to be cited on this point, we may conveniently refer to the case of Pangi Jogi Naik v. State reported in AIR 1965 Orissa 205: (1965 (2) Cri LJ 661). Further, in the case of Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., reported in AIR 1959 SC 1012: (1959 Cri LJ 1231), it was also held that the statement not reduced to writing cannot be contradicted and, therefore, in order to show that the statement sought to be contradicted was recorded by the police, it should be marked and exhibited. However, in the 35 2026:HHC:25422 case at hand, there is nothing on the record to show that the previous statement of the witness was placed before him and that the witness was given the chance for explanation. Again, his previous statement was not marked and exhibited. Therefore, his previous statement before the police cannot be used. Hence, his evidence that when he turned back, he saw the accused Badaruddin lowering the gun from his chest is to be taken as his correct version. 14. The learned defence counsel has attempted to persuade us not to rely on the evidence of this witness on the ground that his evidence before the trial Court is contradicted by his previous statement made before the police. However, in view of the decisions made in the said cases we have been persuaded irresistibly to hold that the correct procedure to be followed which would be in conformity with S. 145 of the Evidence Act to contradict the evidence given by the prosecution witness at the trial with a statement made by him before the police during the investigation will be to draw the attention of the witness to that part of the contradictory statement which he made before the police, and questioned him whether he did, in fact, make that statement. If the witness admits having made the particular statement to the police, that admission will go into evidence and will be recorded as part of the evidence of the witness and can be relied on by the accused as establishing the contradiction. However, if, on the other hand, the witness denies to have made such a statement before the police, the particular portions of the statement recorded should be provisionally marked for identification as B-1 to B-1, B-2 to B-2 etc. (any identification mark) and when the investigating officer who had actually recorded the statements in question comes into the witness box, he should be questioned as to whether these particular statements had been made to him during the investigation by the particular witness, and obviously after refreshing his memory from the case diary the investigating officer would make his answer in the affirmative. The answer of the Investigating Officer would prove the statements B-1 to B-1, B-2 to B-2, which are then exhibited as Ext. D. 1, Ext. D. 2, etc. (exhibition mark) in the case and will go into evidence, 36 2026:HHC:25422 and may, thereafter, be relied on by the accused as contradictions. In the case in hand, as was discussed in above, the above procedure was not followed while cross- examining the witness to his previous statements, and, therefore, we have no alternative but to accept the statement given by this witness before the trial Court that he saw the accused Badaruddin lowering the gun from his chest to be his correct version.” 44. Andhra Pradesh High Court held in Shaik Subhani v. State of A.P., 1999 SCC OnLine AP 413: (1999) 5 ALD 284: 2000 Cri LJ 321: (1999) 2 ALT (Cri) 208 that putting a suggestion to the witness and the witness denying the same does not amount to putting the contradiction to the witness. The attention of the witness has to be drawn to the previous statement, and if he denies the same, the same is to be proved by the investigating officer. It was observed at page 290: - “24… As far as the contradictions put by the defence are concerned, we would like to say that the defence Counsel did not put the contradictions in the manner in which it ought to have been put. By putting suggestions to the witness and the witness denying the same will not amount to putting contradiction to the witness. The contradiction has to be put to the witness as contemplated under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. If a contradiction is put to the witness and it is denied by him, then his attention has to be drawn to the statement made by such witness before the Police or any other previous statement and he must be given a reasonable opportunity to explain as to why such contradiction appears and he may give any answer if the statement made by him is shown to him and if he confronted with such a statement and thereafter the said contradiction must be proved through the Investigation Officer. Then, it only amounts to 37 2026:HHC:25422 putting the contradiction to the witness and getting it proved through the Investigation Officer.” 45. The Calcutta High Court took a similar view in Anjan Ganguly v. State of West Bengal, 2013 SCC OnLine Cal 22948: (2013) 2 Cal LJ 144 and held at page 151: - “21. It was held in State of Karnataka v. Bhaskar Kushali Kothakar, reported as (2004) 7 SCC 487, that if any statement of the witness is contrary to the previous statement recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C. or suffers from omission of certain material particulars, then the previous statement can be proved by examining the Investigating Officer who had recorded the same. Thus, there is no doubt that to prove the previous statement, the Investigating Officer ought to be examined, and the statement of the witness recorded by him can only be proved by him, and he has to depose to the extent that he had correctly recorded the statement, without adding or omitting, as to what was stated by the witness. 23. Proviso to Section 162(1), Cr.P.C. states in clear terms that the statement of the witness ought to be duly proved. The words, if duly proved, cast a duty upon the accused who wants to highlight the contradictions by confronting the witness to prove the previous statement of a witness through the police officer who has recorded the same in the ordinary way. If the witness in the cross-examination admits contradictions, then there is no need to prove the statement. But if the witness denies a contradiction and the police officer who had recorded the statement is called by the prosecution, the previous statement of the witness on this point may be proved by the police officer. In case the prosecution fails to call the police officer in a given situation Court can call this witness, or the accused can call the police officer to give evidence in defence. There is no doubt that unless the statement as per proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 162, Cr.P.C. is duly proved, the contradiction in terms of Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act cannot be taken into consideration by the Court. 38 2026:HHC:25422 24. To elaborate on this further, it will be necessary to reproduce Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act. “S. 145. A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him, or being proved; but, if it intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him.” 25. Therefore, it is appropriate that before the previous statement or statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C. is proved, the attention of the witness must be drawn to the portion in the statement recorded by the Investigating Officer to bring to light the contradiction, a process called confrontation. 26. Let us first understand what the proper procedure is. A witness may have stated in the statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C. that ‘X murdered Y’. In the court, the witness state ‘Z murdered Y’. This is a contradiction. Defence Counsel or Court, and even prosecution if the witness is declared hostile, having resiled from a previous statement, is to be confronted to bring contradiction on record. The attention of the witness must be drawn to the previous statement or statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C., where it was stated that ‘X murdered Y’. Since Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act uses the word being proved, therefore, in the course of examination of the witness, a previous statement or a statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C. will not be exhibited but shall be assigned a mark, and the portion contradicted will be specified. The trial court, in the event of contradiction, has to record as under. 27. The attention of the witness has been drawn to portions A to A of the statement marked as 1, and confronted with the portion where it is recorded that ‘X murdered Y’. In this manner, by way of confrontation, contradiction is brought on record. Later, when the Investigating Officer is examined, the prosecution or defence may prove the statement, after the Investigating Officer testifies that the statement assigned mark was correctly recorded by him; at that stage, the statement will be exhibited by the Court. Then the 39 2026:HHC:25422 contradiction will be proved by the Investigating Officer by stating that the witness had informed or told him that ‘X murdered Y’ and he had correctly recorded this fact. 28. Now, a reference to the explanation to Section 162, Cr.P.C., which says that an omission to state a fact or circumstance may amount to contradiction. Say, for instance, if a witness omits to state in Court that ‘X murdered Y’, what he had stated in a statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C. will be materia? contradiction, for the Public Prosecutor, as the witness has resiled from the previous statement, or if he has been sent for trial for the charge of murder, omission to state ‘X murdered Y’ will be a material omission, and amount to contradiction so far as the defence of ‘W is concerned. At that stage also attention of the witness will also be drawn to a significant portion of the statement recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C., which the witness had omitted to state, and note shall be given that attention of the witness was drawn to the portion A to A wherein it is recorded that ‘X murdered Y’. In this way, the omission is brought on record. The rest of the procedure stated earlier, qua confrontation shall be followed to prove the statement of the witness and the fact stated by the witness. 29. Therefore, to prove the statement for the purpose of contradiction, it is necessary that the contradiction or omission must be brought to the notice of the witness. His or her attention must be drawn to the portion of the previous statement (in the present case statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C)” 46. A similar view was taken in Alauddin v. State of Assam, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 760, wherein it was observed: “7. When the two statements cannot stand together, they become contradictory statements. When a witness makes a statement in his evidence before the Court which is inconsistent with what he has stated in his statement recorded by the Police, there is a contradiction. When a prosecution witness whose statement under Section 161(1) or Section 164 of CrPC has been recorded states factual 40 2026:HHC:25422 aspects before the Court which he has not stated in his prior statement recorded under Section 161(1) or Section 164 of CrPC, it is said that there is an omission. There will be an omission if the witness has omitted to state a fact in his statement recorded by the Police, which he states before the Court in his evidence. The explanation to Section 162 CrPC indicates that an omission may amount to a contradiction when it is significant and relevant. Thus, every omission is not a contradiction. It becomes a contradiction provided it satisfies the test laid down in the explanation under Section 162. Therefore, when an omission becomes a contradiction, the procedure provided in the proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 162 must be followed for contradicting witnesses in the cross-examination. 8. As stated in the proviso to sub-Section (1) of section 162, the witness has to be contradicted in the manner provided under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Section 145 reads thus: “145. Cross-examination as to previous statements in writing.—A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him, or being proved; but, if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him.” The Section operates in two parts. The first part provides that a witness can be cross-examined as to his previous statements made in writing without such writing being shown to him. Thus, for example, a witness can be cross- examined by asking whether his prior statement exists. The second part is regarding contradicting a witness. While confronting the witness with his prior statement to prove contradictions, the witness must be shown his prior statement. If there is a contradiction between the statement made by the witness before the Court and what is recorded in the statement recorded by the police, the witness's attention must be drawn to specific parts of his prior statement, which are to be used to contradict him. Section 145 provides that 41 2026:HHC:25422 the relevant part can be put to the witness without the writing being proved. However, the previous statement used to contradict witnesses must be proved subsequently. Only if the contradictory part of his previous statement is proved can the contradictions be said to be proved. The usual practice is to mark the portion or part shown to the witness of his prior statement produced on record. Marking is done differently in different States. In some States, practice is to mark the beginning of the portion shown to the witness with an alphabet and the end by marking with the same alphabet. While recording the cross-examination, the Trial Court must record that a particular portion marked, for example, as AA was shown to the witness. Which part of the prior statement is shown to the witness for contradicting him has to be recorded in the cross-examination. If the witness admits to having made such a prior statement, that portion can be treated as proved. If the witness does not admit the portion of his prior statement with which he is confronted, it can be proved through the Investigating Officer by asking whether the witness made a statement that was shown to the witness. Therefore, if the witness is intended to be confronted with his prior statement reduced into writing, that particular part of the statement, even before it is proved, must be specifically shown to the witness. After that, the part of the prior statement used to contradict the witness has to be proved. As indicated earlier, it can be treated as proved if the witness admits to having made such a statement, or it can be proved in the cross-examination of the concerned police officer. The object of this requirement in Section 145 of the Evidence Act, of confronting the witness by showing him the relevant part of his prior statement, is to give the witness a chance to explain the contradiction. Therefore, this is a rule of fairness. 9. If a former statement of the witness is inconsistent with any part of his evidence given before the Court, it can be used to impeach the credit of the witness in accordance with clause (3) of Section 155 of the Evidence Act, which reads thus: “155. Impeaching credit of the witness. — The credit of a witness may be impeached in the following ways by 42 2026:HHC:25422 the adverse party, or, with the consent of the Court, by the party who calls him— (1) ….…………………………………… (2) ……………………………………… (3) by proof of former statements inconsistent with any part of his evidence which is liable to be contradicted.” It must be noted here that every contradiction or omission is not a ground to discredit the witness or to disbelieve his/her testimony. A minor or trifle omission or contradiction brought on record is not sufficient to disbelieve the witness's version. Only when there is a material contradiction or omission can the Court disbelieve the witness's version either fully or partially. What is a material contradiction or omission, depending upon the facts of each case? Whether an omission is a contradiction also depends on the facts of each individual case. 10. We are tempted to quote what is held in a landmark decision of this Court in the case of Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P.1959 Supp (2) SCR 875. Paragraph 13 of the said decision reads thus: “13. The learned counsel's first argument is based upon the words “in the manner provided by Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872” found in Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 145 of the Evidence Act, it is said, empowers the accused to put all relevant questions to a witness before his attention is called to those parts of the writing with a view to contradicting him. In support of this contention, reliance is placed upon the judgment of this Court in Shyam Singh v. State of Punjab [(1952) 1 SCC 514: 1952 SCR 812]. Bose, J. describes the procedure to be followed to contradict a witness under Section 145 of the Evidence Act, thus at p. 819: Resort to Section 145 would only be necessary if the witness denies that he made the former statement. In that event, it would be necessary to prove that he did, and if the former statement was reduced to writing, then 43 2026:HHC:25422 Section 145 requires that his attention must be drawn to these parts which are to be used for contradiction. But that position does not arise when the witness admits the former statement. In such a case, all that is necessary is to look to the former statement of which no further proof is necessary because of the admission that it was made.” It is unnecessary to refer to other cases wherein a similar procedure is suggested for putting questions under Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, for the said decision of this Court and similar decisions were not considering the procedure in a case where the statement in writing was intended to be used for contradiction under Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 145 of the Evidence Act is in two parts: the first part enables the accused to cross-examine a witness as to a previous statement made by him in writing or reduced to writing without such writing being shown to him; the second part deals with a situation where the cross-examination assumes the shape of contradiction: in other words, both parts deal with cross-examination; the first part with cross- examination other than by way of contradiction, and the second with cross-examination by way of contradiction only. The procedure prescribed is that, if it is intended to contradict a witness by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him. The proviso to Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure only enables the accused to make use of such a statement to contradict a witness in the manner provided by Section 145 of the Evidence Act. It would be doing violence to the language of the proviso if the said statement be allowed to be used for the purpose of cross-examining a witness within the meaning of the first part of Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Nor are we impressed by the argument that it would not be possible to invoke the second part of Section 145 of the Evidence Act without putting relevant questions under the first part thereof. The difficulty is more imaginary than real. The second part of Section 145 of the Evidence Act clearly indicates the simple procedure to be followed. To illustrate: A 44 2026:HHC:25422 says in the witness box that B stabbed C; before the police, he had stated that D stabbed C. His attention can be drawn to that part of the statement made before the police, which contradicts his statement in the witness box. If he admits his previous statement, no further proof is necessary; if he does not admit it, the practice generally followed is to admit it subject to proof by the police officer. On the other hand, the procedure suggested by the learned counsel may be illustrated thus: If the witness is asked, “Did you say before the police officer that you saw a gas light?” and he answers “yes”, then the statement which does not contain such recital is put to him as a contradiction. This procedure involves two fallacies: one is that it enables the accused to elicit by a process of cross-examination what the witness stated before the police officer. If a police officer did not make a record of a witness's statement, his entire statement could not be used for any purpose, whereas if a police officer recorded a few sentences, by this process of cross-examination, the witness's oral statement could be brought on record. This procedure, therefore, contravenes the express provision of Section 162 of the Code. The second fallacy is that by the illustration given by the learned counsel for the appellants, there is no self-contradiction of the primary statement made in the witness box, for the witness has not yet made on the stand any assertion at all which can serve as the basis. The contradiction, under the section, should be between what a witness asserted in the witness box and what he stated before the police officer, and not between what he said he had stated before the police officer and what he actually said before him. In such a case, the question could not be put at all: only questions to contradict can be put, and the question here posed does not contradict; it leads to an answer which is contradicted by the police statement. This argument of the learned counsel based upon Section 145 of the Evidence Act is, therefore, not of any relevance in considering the express provisions of Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” (emphasis added) 45 2026:HHC:25422 This decision is a locus classicus, which will continue to guide our Trial Courts. In the facts of the case, the learned Trial Judge has not marked those parts of the witnesses' prior statements based on which they were sought to be contradicted in the cross-examination.” 47. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Matadin v. State of U.P., 1980 Supp SCC 157, that the statement under Section 161 Cr.PC is not detailed and is meant to be brief. It does not contain all the details. It was observed at page 158: “3. The learned Sessions Judge had rejected the evidence of the eyewitnesses on wrong, unconvincing and unsound reasons. The Sessions Judge appears to have been swayed by some insignificant omissions made by some of the witnesses in their statements before the police, and on the basis of these omissions, dubbed the witnesses as liars. The Sessions Judge did not realise that the statements given by the witnesses before the police were meant to be brief statements and could not take the place of evidence in the Court. Where the omissions are vital, they merit consideration, but mere small omissions will not justify a finding by a court that the witnesses concerned are self- contained liars. We have carefully perused the judgment of the Sessions Judge, and we are unable to agree that the reasons that he has given for disbelieving the witnesses are good or sound reasons. The High Court was, therefore, fully justified in reversing the judgment passed by the trial court. We are satisfied that this is a case where the judgment of the Sessions Judge was manifestly wrong and perverse and was rightly set aside by the High Court. It was urged by Mr Mehta that, as other appellants except Matadin and Dulare do not appear to have assaulted the deceased, they should be acquitted of the charge under Section 149. We, however, find that all the appellants were members of the unlawful assembly. Their names find a place in the FIR. For these reasons, we are unable to find any ground to distinguish the case of those appellants from that of Matadin and Dulare. The argument of the learned counsel is overruled. The result 46 2026:HHC:25422 is that the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. The appellants who are on bail will now surrender to serve out the remaining portion of their sentence.” 48. Similar is the judgment in Esher Singh v. State of A.P., (2004) 11 SCC 585: 2004 SCC OnLine SC 320, wherein it was held at page 601: “23. So far as the appeal filed by accused Esher Singh is concerned, the basic question is that even if the confessional statement purported to have been made by A-5 is kept out of consideration, whether residuary material is sufficient to find him guilty. Though it is true, as contended by learned counsel for the accused-appellant Esher Singh, that some statements were made for the first time in court and not during the investigation, it has to be seen to what extent they diluted the testimony of Balbeer Singh and Dayal Singh (PWs 16 and 32) used to bring home the accusations. A mere elaboration cannot be termed a discrepancy. When the basic features are stated, unless the elaboration is of such a nature that it creates a different contour or colour of the evidence, the same cannot be said to have totally changed the complexion of the case. It is to be noted that in addition to the evidence of PWs 16 and 32, the evidence of S. Narayan Singh (PW 21) provides the necessary links and strengthens the prosecution’s version. We also find substance in the plea taken by learned counsel for the State that evidence of Amar Singh Bungai (PW 24) was not tainted in any way, and should not have been discarded and disbelieved only on surmises. Balbir Singh (PW 3), the son of the deceased, has also stated about the provocative statements in his evidence. Darshan Singh (PW 14) has spoken about the speeches of the accused Esher Singh, highlighting the Khalistan movement. We find that the trial court had not given importance to the evidence of some of the witnesses on the ground that they were relatives of the deceased. The approach is wrong. The mere relationship does not discredit the testimony of a witness. What is required is careful scrutiny of the evidence. If, after careful scrutiny, the evidence is found to be credible 47 2026:HHC:25422 and cogent, it can be acted upon. In the instant case, the trial court did not indicate any specific reason to cast doubt on the veracity of the evidence of the witnesses whom it had described as the relatives of the deceased. PW 24 has categorically stated about the provocative speeches by A-1. No definite cross-examination on the provocative nature of speech regarding the Khalistan movement was made, so far as this witness is concerned.” 49. This position was reiterated in Shamim v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 10 SCC 509: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1559, where it was held at page 513: “12. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness, read as a whole, inspires confidence. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly, keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, a hypertechnical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, and attaching importance to some technical error without going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. Minor omissions in the police statements are never considered to be fatal. The statements given by the witnesses before the police are meant to be brief statements and cannot take the place of evidence in court. Small/trivial omissions would not justify a finding by the court that the witnesses concerned are liars. The prosecution’s evidence may suffer from inconsistencies here and discrepancies there, but that is a shortcoming from which no criminal case is free. The main thing to be seen is whether those inconsistencies go to the root of the matter or pertain to insignificant aspects thereof. In the former case, the defence 48 2026:HHC:25422 may be justified in seeking advantage of incongruities obtained in the evidence. In the latter, however, no such benefit may be available to it.” 50. Similar is the judgment in Kalabhai Hamirbhai Kachhot v. State of Gujarat, (2021) 19 SCC 555: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 347, wherein it was observed at page 564: “22. We also do not find any substance in the argument of the learned counsel that there are major contradictions in the deposition of PWs 18 and 19. The contradictions that are sought to be projected are minor contradictions that cannot be the basis for discarding their evidence. The judgment of this Court in Mohar [Mohar v. State of U.P., (2002) 7 SCC 606: 2003 SCC (Cri) 121], relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent State, supports the case of the prosecution. In the aforesaid judgment, this Court has held that convincing evidence is required to discredit an injured witness. Para 11 of the judgment reads as follows: (SCC p. 611) “11. The testimony of an injured witness has its own efficacy and relevancy. The fact that the witness sustained injuries on his body would show that he was present at the place of occurrence and had seen the occurrence by himself. Convincing evidence would be required to discredit an injured witness. Similarly, every discrepancy in the statement of a witness cannot be treated as fatal. A discrepancy that does not affect the prosecution’s case materially cannot create any infirmity. In the instant case, the discrepancy in the name of PW 4 appearing in the FIR and the cross-examination of PW 1 has been amply clarified. In cross-examination, PW 1 clarified that his brother Ram Awadh had three sons: (1) Jagdish, PW 4, (2) Jagarnath, and (3) Suresh. This witness, however, stated that Jagarjit had only one name. PW 2 Vibhuti, however, stated that at the time of occurrence, the son of Ram Awadh, Jagjit alias Jagarjit, was milking a cow, and he was also called as Jagdish. Balli (PW 3) mentioned his name as Jagjit and Jagdish. PW 4 also gave his name as Jagdish.” 49 2026:HHC:25422 23. The learned counsel for the respondent State has also relied on the judgment of this Court in Naresh [State of U.P. v. Naresh, (2011) 4 SCC 324: (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 216]. In the aforesaid judgment, this Court has held that the evidence of injured witnesses cannot be brushed aside without assigning cogent reasons. Paras 27 and 30 of the judgment, which are relevant, read as under: (SCC pp. 333-34) “27. The evidence of an injured witness must be given due weight, being a stamped witness; thus, his presence cannot be doubted. His statement is generally considered to be very reliable, and it is unlikely that he has spared the actual assailant in order to falsely implicate someone else. The testimony of an injured witness has its own relevancy and efficacy as he has sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence, and this lends support to his testimony that he was present during the occurrence. Thus, the testimony of an injured witness is accorded a special status in law. The witness would not like or want to let his actual assailant go unpunished merely to implicate a third person falsely for the commission of the offence. Thus, the evidence of the injured witness should be relied upon unless there are grounds for the rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies therein. (Vide Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab [Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC 719: (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 107], Balraje v. State of Maharashtra [Balraje v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 6 SCC 673: (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 211] and Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P. [Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P., (2010) 10 SCC 259: (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1262]) *** 30. In all criminal cases, normal discrepancies are bound to occur in the depositions of witnesses due to normal errors of observation, namely, errors of memory due to lapse of time or due to mental dispositions such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence. Where the omissions amount to a contradiction, creating serious doubt about the truthfulness of the witness and other witnesses also make material improvement while deposing in the court, such evidence cannot be safe to rely upon. However, minor contradictions, 50 2026:HHC:25422 inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements on trivial matters which do not affect the core of the prosecution case, should not be made a ground on which the evidence can be rejected in its entirety. The court has to form its opinion about the credibility of the witness and record a finding as to whether his deposition inspires confidence. ‘9. Exaggerations, per se, do not render the evidence brittle. But it can be one of the factors to test the credibility of the prosecution version when the entire evidence is put in a crucible for being tested on the touchstone of credibility.’ [Ed.: As observed in Bihari Nath Goswami v. Shiv Kumar Singh, (2004) 9 SCC 186, p. 192, para 9: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1435] Therefore, mere marginal variations in the statements of a witness cannot be dubbed as improvements, as the same may be elaborations of the statement made by the witness earlier. The omissions which amount to contradictions in material particulars, i.e. go to the root of the case/materially affect the trial or core of the prosecution's case, render the testimony of the witness liable to be discredited. (Vide State v. Saravanan [State v. Saravanan, (2008) 17 SCC 587 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 580], Arumugam v. State [Arumugam v. State, (2008) 15 SCC 590 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], Mahendra Pratap Singh v. State of U.P. [Mahendra Pratap Singh v. State of U.P., (2009) 11 SCC 334 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1352] and Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta v. State of Maharashtra [Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 13 SCC 657 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 375]” 24. Further, in Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], this Court has considered the effect of the minor contradictions in the depositions of witnesses while appreciating the evidence in a criminal trial. In the aforesaid judgment, it is held that only contradictions in material particulars and not minor contradictions can be grounds to discredit the testimony of the witnesses. The relevant portion of para 42 of the judgment reads as under: (SCC p. 483) 51 2026:HHC:25422 “42. Only such omissions that amount to a contradiction in material particulars can be used to discredit the testimony of the witness. The omission in the police statement by itself would not necessarily render the testimony of the witness unreliable. When the version given by the witness in the court is different in material particulars from that disclosed in his earlier statements, the case of the prosecution becomes doubtful and not otherwise. Minor contradictions are bound to appear in the statements of truthful witnesses, as memory sometimes plays false, and the sense of observation differs from person to person. The omissions in the earlier statement, if found to be of trivial details, as in the present case, the same would not cause any dent in the testimony of PW 2. Even if there is a contradiction of a statement of a witness on any material point, that is no ground to reject the whole of the testimony of such witness.” 51. In any case, Shiv Kumar (PW9) was contradicted with the date in the previous statement, which is not material because a person can forget the date over time, and this improvement cannot be called significant. 52. Doctor V.K. Raizada (PW2) stated in his cross- examination that he had found bruises and a lacerated wound on the person of the accused. It was submitted that these injuries were not explained by the prosecution, which made the prosecution's case doubtful. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Takhaji Hiraji v. Thakore Kubersing Chamansing, (2001) 6 SCC 145: 2001 SCC (Cri) 1070: 2001 SCC OnLine SC 732 that the non-explanation of the injuries is not 52 2026:HHC:25422 fatal to the prosecution’s case when the evidence is clear, cogent and creditworthy. It was observed at page 154: 17. The first question that arises for consideration is what is the effect of the non-explanation of injuries sustained by the accused persons. In Rajender Singh v. State of Bihar [(2000) 4 SCC 298: 2000 SCC (Cri) 796], Ram Sunder Yadav v. State of Bihar [(1998) 7 SCC 365: 1998 SCC (Cri) 1630] and Vijayee Singh v. State of U.P. [(1990) 3 SCC 190: 1990 SCC (Cri) 378], all three- Judge Bench decisions, the view taken consistently is that it cannot be held as a matter of law or invariably a rule that whenever the accused sustained an injury in the same occurrence, the prosecution is obliged to explain the injury and on the failure of the prosecution to do so the prosecution case should be disbelieved. Before the non-explanation of the injuries on the persons of the accused persons by the prosecution witnesses may affect the prosecution's case, the court has to be satisfied of the existence of two conditions: (i) that the injury on the person of the accused was of a serious nature; and (ii) that such injuries must have been caused at the time of the occurrence in question. Non- explanation of injuries assumes greater significance when the evidence consists of interested or partisan witnesses or where the defence gives a version which competes in probability with that of the prosecution. Where the evidence is clear, cogent and creditworthy and where the court can distinguish the truth from falsehood, the mere fact that the injuries on the side of the accused persons are not explained by the prosecution cannot by itself be a sole basis to reject the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and consequently the whole of the prosecution case. 53. In the present case, the evidence is clear and cogent, which is corroborated by the medical evidence. Therefore, the prosecution's case cannot be discarded because of the lack of explanation of the injuries. 53 2026:HHC:25422 54. It was submitted that the incident had taken place in the field of the accused, which makes the defence version highly probable that the informant party was the aggressor. This submission cannot be accepted. The incident had taken place on a public path located near the field and not in the field. The victim Shiv Kumar (PW9) was going to the house of Saini on the path located adjacent to the field where he was beaten. The site plan (Ext.PW13/A) also shows a path adjacent to the field. Thus, the submission that the incident had occurred in the field, which justified the defence taken by the accused, cannot be accepted. 55. Therefore, the learned Courts below had rightly accepted the testimonies of the injured and had rightly convicted the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323 and 325 read with Section 34 of the IPC. 56. The learned Trial Court had called for the report of the Probationary Officer, who stated that the accused had a good moral character and conduct. The accused had small children, and the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act was recommended. Learned Appellate Court extended the benefit of probation to the accused. 54 2026:HHC:25422 57. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in MCD v. State of Delhi, (2005) 4 SCC 605: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1322: 2005 SCC OnLine SC 900 that the Probation of Offenders Act applies to all persons irrespective of their age. It was observed at page 611: “22. We have already reproduced Section 4 of the POB Act. It applied to all kinds of offenders, whether under or above 21 years of age. This section is intended to attempt possible reformation of an offender instead of inflicting on him the normal punishment for his crime. The only limitation imposed by Section 6 is that, in the first instance, an offender under twenty-one years of age will not be sentenced to imprisonment. While extending the benefit of this case, the discretion of the court has to be exercised having regard to the circumstances in which the crime was committed, the age, character and antecedents of the offender. Such exercise of discretion needs a sense of responsibility. The offender can only be released on probation of good conduct under this section when the court forms an opinion, having considered the circumstances of the case, the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, that in a particular case, the offender should be released on probation of good conduct. The section itself is clear that before applying the section, the Magistrate should carefully take into consideration the attendant circumstances…” 58. A similar view was taken in Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 13 SCC 1: (2014) 7 SCC (Cri) 1: 2013 SCC OnLine SC 257, wherein it was observed at page 1013: “2939. Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act applies to all kinds of offenders, whether under or above the age of 21 years. This section is intended to attempt the possible reformation of an offender instead of inflicting upon him the normal punishment for his crime. It is submitted that it is settled law that while extending the benefit of the said provision, this Court has to exercise its discretion having 55 2026:HHC:25422 regard to the circumstances in which the crime was committed, viz., the age, character and antecedents of the offender. It is also settled law that such exercise of discretion needs a sense of responsibility. The section itself is clear that before applying the same, this Court should carefully take into consideration the attendant circumstances.” 59. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nagarajan v. State of T.N., (2025) 7 SCC 479: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1126 that the purpose of probation is to afford a chance to the criminal to reform. It was observed at page 496: 41. Lastly, in Arvind Mohan Sinha v. Amulya Kumar Biswas, (1974) 4 SCC 222: 1974 SCC (Cri) 391, Y.V. Chandrachud, J. (as his Lordship then was) arising from a conviction under the Customs Act, 1962 succinctly delineated the purpose, purport and object of the Probation Act in the following words: (SCC pp. 225-26, paras 11 & 13) “11. The Probation of Offenders Act is a reformative measure, and its object is to reclaim amateur offenders who, if spared the indignity of incarceration, can be usefully rehabilitated in society. A jail term should normally be enough to wipe out the stain of guilt, but the sentence the society passes on convicts is relentless. The ignominy commonly associated with a jail term and the social stigma which attaches to convicts often render the remedy worse than the disease, and the very purpose of punishment stands in the danger of being frustrated. In recalcitrant cases, punishment has to be deterrent so that others similarly minded may warn themselves of the hazards of taking to a career of crime. But the novice who strays into the path of crime ought, in the interest of society, to be treated as being socially sick. Crimes are not always rooted in criminal tendencies, and their origin may lie in psychological factors induced by hunger, want and poverty. The Probation of Offenders Act recognises the importance of environmental influence in the commission of crimes and prescribes a remedy whereby the offender can be reformed and rehabilitated in society. An attitude of social 56 2026:HHC:25422 defiance and recklessness, which comes to a convict who, after a jail term, is apt to think that he has no more to lose or fear, may breed a litter of crime. The object of the Probation of Offenders Act is to nip that attitude in the bud. Winifred A. Elkin describes probation as a system which provides a means of re-education without the necessity of breaking up the offender's normal life and removing him from the natural surroundings of his home [English Juvenile Courts, (1938) p. 162]. Edwin H. Sutherland raises it to the status of a convicted offender. [ Principles of Criminology, 4th Edn. (1947) p. 383] *** 13. There is no foundation for the fear that offenders released on probation may hold society to ransom, and society may therefore look upon the release of offenders on probation as the triumph of criminals over the weaknesses of law. An offender released on probation is convicted but not forthwith sentenced in the sense of penal laws. Under the disposition made by the Court, the sentence is suspended during the period of probation. Section 4(1) of the Act provides that instead of sentencing the offender “at once”, the Court may direct his release on his entering into a bond to “receive sentence when called upon” during the probationary period and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour. Thus, it is only in a limited, though a socially significant, sense that the Act constitutes an exception to the broad and general principle of criminal law embodied, for example, in Sections 245(2), 258(2), 306(2) and Section 309(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that a sentence shall follow on a conviction.” 60. Learned Appellate Court noticed that the accused had not indulged in the commission of any offence since the incident, and it was a fit case where the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act could be granted to the accused. 57 2026:HHC:25422 61. It was submitted that the accused had criminal antecedents. Many people in the neighbourhood had stated that the accused were of a quarrelsome nature and the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act should not be extended to them. This submission cannot be accepted. The incident occurred in the year 2001. Nothing has been brought on record to show that the accused had indulged in the commission of any offence in the 25 years since the incident. The incident had occurred all of a sudden, and there was no premeditation. The weapon of offence was picked up from the spot and was commonly available. In these circumstances, the learned Appellate Court had rightly extended the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to the accused. 62. It was submitted that the learned Appellate Court had granted inadequate compensation. Major injuries were sustained by the informant, and her mother and the compensation should be enhanced. This submission cannot be accepted. The compensation of ₹25,000/- was granted to the informant. The informant had sustained grievous injuries, and the compensation of ₹25,000/- in the year 2013 was adequate. Further, no material has been brought on record to show that the informant was disfigured for life. Ram Piari (PW1) had only sustained minor injuries, and the compensation of ₹5000/- to her was also adequate. 58 2026:HHC:25422 63. No other point was urged. 64. In view of the above, the present appeal and revision fail and are dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. 65. Records be sent back to the learned Trial Court forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 30th June, 2026 (Chander)