[2026:RJ-JP:30532] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Criminal Misc. 2nd Suspension Of Sentence Application (Appeal) No. 488/2026 CNR: RJHC020058812026 | URN: SOSA / 941U / 2026 Kishan Lal Son Of Shri Ramnath, Aged About 40 Years, Resident Of Village Udaipuriya, Police Station Seeshwali, District Baran (Raj.) (At Present Confined In Central Jail Kota) ----Petitioner Versus State Of Rajasthan, Through P.p. ----Respondent For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Govind Prasad Rawat, Adv. For Respondent(s) : Mr. N.S. Dhakar, PP HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR UPMAN Order 04/08/2026 1. The applicant herein has been convicted for offences under Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(n), 376(3) of IPC and Section 5(L)/6 of POCSO Act, 2012 vide judgment dated 27.09.2021 passed by learned Special Judge, POCSO Act No.3, Kota in Special Sessions Case No.54/2019 and has been sentenced to maximum punishment of 20 years. 2. The first application for suspension of execution of sentence filed on behalf of the applicant was dismissed with liberty to renew the prayer for suspension of execution of sentence, if appeal is not heard finally within the period of one year. It is contended that appeal has not been placed for hearing thus, this second application for suspension of execution of sentence has been preferred. [2026:RJ-JP:30532] (2 of 8) [SOSA-488/2026] 3. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that learned trial Court has erred in convicting and sentencing the applicant as mentioned above. Learned trial Court has not appreciated the evidence in the right and correct perspective. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the applicant has suffered incarceration of more than seven years including remission. Counsel submits that applicant has been falsely implicated in the present case and that the FIR was filed with a delay of 5-6 days. He submits that looking at the large pendency of criminal appeals before this Court, there is no immediate prospect of hearing and disposal of the appeal in near future. He argues that possibility cannot be ruled out that by the time this appeal will be taken up for the final hearing, the appellant would have served the entire sentence. He contends that appeal against the conviction is statutory right and the same would be frustrated, if appeal presented against the conviction is not heard and decided within a reasonable period. It is contended that in view of the fact that the applicant has served incarceration of more than seven years, this second application for suspension of execution of sentence may be considered liberally. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the State opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the applicant. Learned counsel relies upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jamnalal vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr., 2025 INSC 935 wherein it has been observed that in any case of fair chance of acquittal, application for suspension of sentence can be considered. 5. At this juncture, it is apposite for this Court to refer to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of [2026:RJ-JP:30532] (3 of 8) [SOSA-488/2026] Jamnalal (supra), wherein, while setting aside the facility of suspension of execution of sentence, it has been observed as under:- “10. One would have expected the High Court hearing an application under Section 389 of Cr. P.C. for suspension of sentence to examine whether prima facie there was anything palpable on the record to indicate if the accused had a fair chance of overturning the conviction. In Omprakash Sahni v. Jai Shankar Chaudhary, (2023) 6 SCC 123, this Court had the following to say on the scope of Section 389 of the Cr. P.C. “23. The principle underlying the theory of criminal jurisprudence in our country is that an accused is presumed to be innocent till he is held guilty by a court of competent jurisdiction. Once the accused is held guilty, the presumption of innocence gets erased. In the same manner, if the accused is acquitted, then the presumption of innocence gets further fortified. 24. From perusal of Section 389 CrPC, it is evident that save and except the matter falling under the category of sub-section (3) neither any specific principle of law is laid down nor any criteria has been fixed for consideration of the prayer of the convict and further, having a judgment of conviction erasing the presumption leaning in favour of the accused regarding innocence till contrary recorded by the court of competent jurisdiction, and in the aforesaid background, there happens to be a fine distinction between the prayer for bail at the pre-conviction as well as the post- conviction stage viz. Sections 437, 438, 439 and 389(1) CrPC. 33. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles of law, the endeavour on the part of the court, therefore, should be to see as to whether the case presented by the prosecution and accepted by the trial court can be said to be a case in which, ultimately the [2026:RJ-JP:30532] (4 of 8) [SOSA-488/2026] convict stands for fair chances of acquittal. If the answer to the abovesaid question is to be in the affirmative, as a necessary corollary, we shall have to say that, if ultimately the convict appears to be entitled to have an acquittal at the hands of this Court, he should not be kept behind the bars for a pretty long time till the conclusion of the appeal, which usually takes very long for decision and disposal. However, while undertaking the exercise to ascertain whether the convict has fair chances of acquittal, what is to be looked into is something palpable. To put it in other words, something which is very apparent or gross on the face of the record, on the basis of which, the court can arrive at a prima facie satisfaction that the conviction may not be sustainable. The appellate court should not reappreciate the evidence at the stage of Section 389 CrPC and try to pick up a few lacunae or loopholes here or there in the case of the prosecution. Such would not be a correct approach.” 13. In the affidavit filed before us, Respondent No. 2 has contended that there is no allegation of post-bail misconduct or breach of conditions warranting the setting aside of the bail order. The submission is fallacious. There is clear distinction in law between setting aside of the bail by a higher Court and cancellation of the bail. While cancellation of bail is due to some supervening circumstances like breach of bail condition, setting aside of the bail is concerned not with the breach of condition but with the justifiability and soundness of the order granting bail (See Neeru Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 16 SCC 508). 14. It has been further contended that there was lack of corroborative medical and forensic evidence. The State, in its counter affidavit, averred that the FSL/DNA report could not be presented by the prosecution before the conclusion of trial and that the FSL report which has since been received does mention the presence of male DNA/semen of the accused on the private part and [2026:RJ-JP:30532] (5 of 8) [SOSA-488/2026] underwear of the victim. We are not inclined to comment one way or the other on the merits of the FSL report and we leave it to the prosecution if it so desires to resort to such legally permissible procedure as is available in law to bring the same on record. 15. Independent of the FSL and DNA report and considering the nature of the case and the antecedents of Respondent No. 2 and after carefully examining the judgment of conviction, we feel that the High Court was not justified in suspending the sentence. 16. The reasoning of the High Court, set out above, falls far short of the parameters required under Section 389 of Cr. P.C. for enlargement of a convict, punished for heinous offence, on bail after suspending the sentence. The finding that no sexual assault was found, without considering the overall nature of the evidence of the case, is completely untenable. According to the evidence of the prosecutrix, Respondent No. 2, at gunpoint, closed her mouth and forcibly took her to the house of Amro and committed rape on her. All that the medical evidence said was that no conclusive opinion about the crime could be given since FSL Report was awaited. That does not mean that the ocular evidence could be ignored. As far as non- availability of FSL Report is concerned, the prosecution has explained the situation and the Trial Court has also found that the non-availability of the DNA Report did not adversely affect the case of the prosecution. The reasoning that despite the availability of washrooms in the house it was difficult to believe that the prosecutrix could go out for the toilet, is conjectural in nature. 17. In Vijay Kumar v. Narendra, (2002) 9 SCC 364 this Court observed as follows: “10. On perusal of the record and on consideration of the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, we are of the view that in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case the High Court was in error in passing the [2026:RJ-JP:30532] (6 of 8) [SOSA-488/2026] order releasing the respondents on bail. The High Court has neither given any reason nor has indicated any exceptional circumstance for granting bail to the respondents. In the above circumstances, it is difficult for us to even surmise the circumstance which prompted the learned Single Judge to consider the accused persons to be entitled to the discretionary relief of bail pending the appeal. The principle is well settled that in considering the prayer for bail in a case involving a serious offence like murder punishable under Section 302 IPC, the court should consider the relevant factors like the nature of the accusation made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, and the desirability of releasing the accused on bail after they have been convicted for committing the serious offence of murder. Our attention has not been drawn to any material which would show that the learned Single Judge took into consideration the relevant factors while passing the bail order. We refrain ourselves from making any observation touching on merits of the case lest it may prejudice any of the parties. Suffice it to state that we do not consider this a fit case for grant of bail to the respondents during pendency of the appeal filed by them.” Though said in the context of Section 302 IPC, it applies with equal force to a case of the present nature under the POCSO Act, also.” 6. I have considered the submissions advanced at bar and scanned the material available on record including the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence. 7. The testimony of the victim would reveal that the appellant, who was aged about 35 years at the time of alleged incident, was [2026:RJ-JP:30532] (7 of 8) [SOSA-488/2026] already married and father of three children. The appellant was tenant in the house of the complainant. He induced the victim, who was minor at the time of alleged incident, aged about 15 years and developed physical relation with her. It is also alleged by the victim that she refused to go with the appellant for the reason that he is having three kids, but he took her forcefully and forced her to remain in his company and during this period, on so many occasions, the appellant developed physical relation with her. 8. Upon a consideration of the arguments advanced on behalf of the applicant and having regard to the facts and circumstances and considering the facts that the appellant was 35 years of age at the time of alleged incident and was married and father of three children, who induced the victim, who was only 15 years of age at the time of alleged incident and developed physical relation with her; so also the fact that the appellant forcefully kept the victim in his company and during this period, he developed physical relation with her on so many occasions and in view of observation made by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jamnalal (supra) and also considering the fact that no efforts have been made on behalf of the applicant to get the appeal listed for final hearing as neither any application for early hearing was filed on behalf of the applicant nor matter was mentioned before the concerned Bench and thus looking at the nature and gravity of the offence, this Court is not inclined to suspend the execution of sentence of the appellant merely on the ground of the period of incarceration. [2026:RJ-JP:30532] (8 of 8) [SOSA-488/2026] 9. Accordingly, this second application for suspension of execution of sentence stands dismissed. (ANIL KUMAR UPMAN),J 2/Manoj Solanki