Page No.# 1/6 GAHC010182162025 2026:GAU-AS:12606 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : Crl.Rev.P./322/2025 ABDUL KALAM ALIAS LADEN S/O- LATE ABDUL REJAK , R/O- KACHUA NP-2, P.O AND P.S- KACHUA, DIST-NAGAON, ASSAM VERSUS AJAY KUMAR GUPTA S/O- HARDEO PRASAD GUPTA, R/O- SWARUPA NANDA PATH, WARD NO- 06, HOJAI TOWN, P.O , P.S AND DIST-HOJAI, ASSAM Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. B HALDAR, MR B KARDONG,MS S. BASAK Advocate for the Respondent : MR. G K GUPTA, Page No.# 2/6 BEFORE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRANJAL DAS O R D E R 28.08.2026 Heard Mr. B. Haldar, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. G.K. Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. The instant criminal revision petition under Section 438 read with Section 442 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 [BNSS] is preferred to assail an Order dated 19.06.2025 passed by the Court of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hojai [‘the Trial Court’, for short], in NI Case no. 45/2023. By the order dated 19.06.2025, the Trial Court has directed the petitioner, who is the accused in NI Case no. 45/2023, to pay a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- as interim compensation to the complainant, i.e., the respondent herein, within a period of sixty days, as per the provisions of Section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments [NI] Act. 3. It is the contention on behalf of the petitioner that the respondent as the complainant filed a petition, being petition no. 2117/2024 seeking interim compensation at 20% of the total cheque amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- under Section 143A, NI Act before the Trial Court. In response, opposing the said application, the petitioner-accused submitted his objection stating inter-alia that the cheques which were stated to be dishonoured, were obtained by the respondent-complainant by exercising force and coercion on 21.04.2023. That, respect of the incident which occurred on 21.04.2023, the petitioner-accused Page No.# 3/6 had already instituted a complaint case, CR Case no. 314/2024 before the Court of Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Sadar at Nagaon and the said Court had already taken cognizance on the said complaint on 24.06.2024 and issued processes for appearance of the accused person for the offence under Section 506, Indian Penal Code [IPC]. But, the Trial Court while passing the impugned order dated 19.06.2025, has not taken into consideration the objections raised by the petitioner-accused and in fact, there is no discussion as regards the objection filed by the petitioner-accused in the order dated 19.06.2025. It is submitted that non-consideration of the objections raised by the petitioner- accused while granting interim compensation, has made the impugned order arbitrary. 4. The Section 143A of the N.I. Act, 1881, incorporated by amendment in 2018 empowers the Court trying the offence under Section 138 of the Act to direct payment of interim compensation to the claimant, subject to the condition that the amount shall not exceed 20% of the cheque amount and once directed, the amount has to be paid within 60(sixty) days of the order, which can be extended for an maximum further period of 30(thirty) days. The aforesaid provision may be reproduced herein below:- [143A. Power to direct interim compensation. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), the Court trying an offence under section 138 may order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant- (a) in a summary trial or a summons case, where he pleads not guilty to the accusation made in the complaint; and (b) in any other case, upon framing of charge. (2) The interim compensation under sub-section (1) shall not exceed twenty per cent Page No.# 4/6 of the amount of the cheque. (3) The interim compensation shall be paid within sixty days from the date of the order under sub-section (1), or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the drawer of the cheque. (4) If the drawer of the cheque is acquitted, the Court shall direct the complainant to repay to the drawer the amount of interim compensation, with interest at the bank rate as published by the Reserve Bank of India, prevalent at the beginning of the relevant financial years, within sixty days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the complainant. (5) The interim compensation payable under this section may be recovered as if it were a fine under section 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). (6) The amount of fine imposed under section 138 or the amount of compensation awarded under section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), shall be reduced by the amount paid or recovered as interim compensation under this section.] 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner as referred to the decision of Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava Vs. State of Jharkhand, (2024) 4 SCC 419. The said decision is considered to be a leading authority on the subject, in which the Hon’ble Apex Court, discussing the issue, laid down the principles, which should govern exercise of such powers under 143A of the Act to grant interim compensation. The relevant para-27 may be reproduced herein below:- “27. Subject to what is held earlier, the main conclusions can be summarised as follows: 27.1. The exercise of power under sub-section (1) of Section 143-A is discretionary. The provision is directory and not mandatory. The word “may” used in the provision cannot be construed as “shall”. Page No.# 5/6 27.2. While deciding the prayer made under Section 143-A, the court must record brief reasons indicating consideration of all relevant factors. 27.3. The broad parameters for exercising the discretion under Section 143-A are as follows: 27.3.1. The court will have to prima facie evaluate the merits of the case made out by the complainant and the merits of the defence pleaded by the accused in the reply to the application. The financial distress of the accused can also be a consideration. 27.3.2. A direction to pay interim compensation can be issued, only if the complainant makes out a prima facie case. 27.3.3. If the defence of the accused is found to be prima facie plausible, the court may exercise discretion in refusing to grant interim compensation. 27.3.4. If the court concludes that a case is made out to grant interim compensation, it will also have to apply its mind to the quantum of interim compensation to be granted. While doing so, the court will have to consider several factors such as the nature of the transaction, the relationship, if any, between the accused and the complainant, etc. 27.3.5. There could be several other relevant factors in the peculiar facts of a given case, which cannot be exhaustively stated. The parameters stated above are not exhaustive.” 6. The gist of the law laid down in the aforesaid decision is that interim compensation can be granted only after the court prima-facie evaluates the merits of the complainant's case and the case of the accused; that to justify grant of interim compensation, the complainant has to make out a prima facie case; finding the defence plea to be plausible prima facie would justify refusal to grant interim compensation. 7. Now going back to the impugned order dated 19.06.2025, I find that the learned trial Court has mentioned the basic defence of the accused - that the accused has never taken the said amount from the complainant. Thereafter, the learned trial Court has proceeded to mention that - after taking into Page No.# 6/6 consideration, the various documents put forward by the complainant side, it is of the opinion that this is a fit case for interim compensation. 8. Upon examining the impugned order in the context of the principles laid down in Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava (supra), as noticed above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order had failed to comply with the principles laid down in the said decision to justify grant of interim compensation. The said principles have already been summed up in the preceding paragraphs. 9. Accordingly, the impugned order is required to be interfered with in this criminal revision petition. Considering the nature of consequences that would follow by an order granting interim compensation, it cannot be considered an interlocutory order for the purpose of entertaining a criminal revision. 10. In the facts and circumstances, the impugned order dated 19.06.2025 is hereby set aside. The complainant, however, is at liberty to file a fresh application before the learned trial Court for interim compensation and in the event of its doing so, the learned trial Court, may pass necessary orders on the same, keeping in mind the parameters laid down in Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava (supra). 11. The criminal revision petition stands allowed and disposed of. JUDGE Comparing Assistant