1 ( 2026:HHC:25164 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA OMPs No. 294 & 295 of 2025 in Civil Suit No. 58 of 2023 Reserved on: 14.05.2026 Decided on: 29.06.2026 Date of Uploading on Website: 29.06.2026 ________________________________________________ D.N. Lakhanpal ....Plaintiff Versus Chief Secretary & Ors. ….Defendants _ Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sushil Kukreja, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes. For the non-applicant/plaintiff: Mr. Rahul Thakur, Advocate. For the non-applicants/ defendants: Mr. Manoj Chauhan, Additional Advocate General, for defendants No. 1 to 3. Mr. Ankush Dass Sood, Senior Advocate with Mr. Ankit Dhiman, Advocate, for defendants No. 4 to 6. Sushil Kukreja, Judge This order shall dispose of both these applications filed by applicants/defendants No. 4 & 6 under Order 1, Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure for 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 ( 2026:HHC:25164 ) deletion of their names from the array of parties on the ground that there is no cause of action against them and their involvement in the present suit is without legal basis. According to the applicants they acted with humility and good faith, always adhering to the principles of public interest and the rule of law in the discharge of their official responsibilities. The applicants’ actions were in compliance with the R&P Rules, 1993 of the Director, Technical Education and its subsequent amendments dated 24.10.2000. The plaintiff was ineligible for promotion to the post of Director due to non-fulfillment of the prescribed qualifying service criteria and non-completion of the probation period of two years after his promotion to the feeder post of Joint Director on 06.04.1999. The promotion matter of the plaintiff has been under litigation for over two decades and successive authorities have reviewed the case and upheld the decision, confirming that the plaintiff’s non- selection for promotion to the selection post of Director was based on merit and eligibility criteria and not on any legal malafide or extraneous considerations. The applicants, who 3 ( 2026:HHC:25164 ) were holding the posts of Secretary (Personnel) and Chief Secretary to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, retired in the years 2010 & 2003, respectively and their names have been incorrectly included in the present suit. On the basis of these averments, the applicants have filed the present applications for deletion of their names from the array of defendants. 2. By filing replies, contents of the applications are denied and dismissal of the same has been prayed on the ground that the applicants are necessary and proper parties to the present proceedings and their presence is essential for the complete and effective adjudication of all the questions in controversy. 3. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicants contended that the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any cause of action against the applicants and the key events cited by the plaintiff, including order dated 01.07.2022 had occurred long after the retirement of the applicants. He further contended that applicants’ inclusion in the present suit constitutes a mis-joinder of parties, as no 4 ( 2026:HHC:25164 ) direct or indirect involvement of the applicants’ in post retirement decisions has been demonstrated. He also contended that the plaintiff has not established any case against the applicants and there is no evidence in support of plaintiff’s claim that the applicants were involved in any adverse decisions taken after their retirement. With these averments, prayer for acceptance of these applications has been made. 4. On the other, learned counsel for the plaintiff contended that these applications are based on misleading statements, concealment of facts and an attempt to evade accountability for actions that directly impacted the plaintiff’s service rights. He further contended that applicants/defendants No. 4 & 6 are necessary and proper parties to the present proceedings and their presence is essential for the complete and effective adjudication of all the questions in controversy. With these averments, prayer for dismissal of the applications has been made. 5 ( 2026:HHC:25164 ) 5. I have heard learned Senior Counsel for the applicants-defendants, non-applicant/plaintiff and also gone through the material available on record. 6. The perusal of material available on record reveals that no independent or subsisting cause of action survives against the applicants/defendants, as the allegations levelled in the plaint are vague, general and bereft of any specific attribution qua the present defendants. The plaint merely attempts to create an illusion of cause of action by way of clever drafting without disclosing any legally sustainable claim against the applicants/defendants. The applicants/defendants had participated in the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) proceedings strictly in discharge of their official duties while functioning in their official capacities as government officers. The DPC conducted in the year 2001 had considered the case of the plaintiff and the plaintiff was declared "not suitable" for promotion to the post in question. The said determination was made collectively by the competent authority strictly in accordance with the applicable Recruitment and Promotion 6 ( 2026:HHC:25164 ) Rules (R & P Rules) and the assessment criteria prevailing at the relevant time. Thereafter, the matter travelled through multiple rounds of litigation before the erstwhile Administrative Tribunal, before this Court and again before subsequent judicial forums. Ultimately, pursuant to the directions issued by this Court in the year 2015, a subsequent DPC was again convened under the chairmanship of the then competent authority namely Sh. S.K.B.S. Negi, the then Principal Secretary (Personnel) and the earlier decision stood reaffirmed and merged into the subsequent decision dated 01.07.2015. The doctrine of merger therefore squarely applies in the present matter. 7. Once the subsequent decision dated 01.07.2015 had re-affirmed the earlier DPC proceedings, the earlier proceedings stood merged into the subsequent proceedings and lost their independent existence. Despite this, the plaintiff has deliberately chosen not to implead the officer(s) who chaired and passed the subsequent decision dated 01.07.2015. Therefore, the present applicants/defendants cannot selectively be proceeded against, when the 7 ( 2026:HHC:25164 ) subsequent competent authority itself has not been arrayed as a party. The plaintiff throughout the earlier rounds of litigation commencing from the year 1999 till 2023 never arrayed the present defendants, as parties, in any independent capacity, nor did he seek any relief whatsoever against them personally. The plaintiff never alleged in any prior proceedings that the applicants/defendants had acted out of personal malice, bias, vendetta, or for extraneous considerations. 8. The plaintiff had earlier instituted proceedings before the learned Tribunal, thereafter before this Court, thereafter execution proceedings, thereafter Letters Patent Appeal proceedings, and subsequently further proceedings challenging the DPC determination. However, at no point of time during nearly two decades of litigation, the plaintiff deemed it necessary to implead the present defendants personally or seek damages against them. The present suit therefore is a clear afterthought and an abuse of process of law. Once the plaintiff had availed remedies arising out of the same alleged cause of action since 1999 and consciously 8 ( 2026:HHC:25164 ) omitted to seek any relief against the present defendants, the principle underlying Order II Rule 2 CPC squarely applies. The plaintiff cannot now, after decades of litigation, attempt to introduce a fresh and belated cause against the answering defendants. 9. The plaintiff himself in paras 15 & 16 of the plaint stated that the alleged cause of action first accrued in the year 1999 and lastly accrued in the year 2023. However, from 1999 till 2023, the applicants/defendants were never personally proceeded against. Moreover, neither any specific act attributable to the answering defendants has been pleaded nor any independent legal injury, if any, caused by the applicants/defendants has been disclosed. Therefore, the plaint itself demonstrates absence of cause of action against the present defendants. 10. It is settled law that cause of action means every fact necessary to establish a legal injury caused by a particular defendant. In absence of any pleaded wrongful act, omission, malice, or personal conduct attributable to the 9 ( 2026:HHC:25164 ) applicants/defendants, the suit qua them is wholly not maintainable. 11. The plaintiff, after obtaining substantial reliefs in earlier proceedings and after accepting the benefits flowing from the judgment passed in his favour, has now instituted the present suit for damages simpliciter. The plaintiff accepted the notional promotion benefits and pensionary consequences granted pursuant to judicial orders and never challenged the same before any superior forum. If the plaintiff was genuinely aggrieved that the benefits granted to him were merely notional or otherwise inadequate, the appropriate remedy available to him was to challenge the judgment before the competent appellate authority by way of filing an LPA or SLP. However, no such challenge was ever made. Having accepted and acted upon the earlier judicial determinations, the plaintiff is estopped from instituting a fresh suit for damages against retired officers who had acted only in their official capacities. 12. The defendants had acted strictly in discharge of statutory and official functions. Any decision taken by a 10 ( 2026:HHC:25164 ) Government Officer in official capacity enjoys a presumption of legality and good faith unless strong and specific material to the contrary is pleaded and established. It is a settled principle of law that acts performed by public officials in discharge of official duties are protected under law and cannot give rise to personal liability merely because a party is dissatisfied with an administrative decision. If every administrative decision taken by members of a DPC is subsequently made a ground to institute personal suits for damages against retired officers, the same would completely paralyze administrative functioning and no officer would be able to take independent decisions in accordance with law. 13. Order I Rule 10(2) CPC specifically empowers the Court to strike out parties who are improperly joined and whose presence is not necessary for effective adjudication of the controversy. The provision itself contemplates that only those parties whose presence is necessary and proper for complete adjudication should remain before the Court. However, in the present case, no effective relief can be granted against the applicants/defendants. The controversy, 11 ( 2026:HHC:25164 ) if any, pertains to governmental decisions, judicial determinations, and service-related issues already adjudicated upon in earlier rounds of litigation. The applicants/defendants are therefore neither necessary nor proper parties. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in recent judgments has repeatedly held that the Courts must not merely proceed on clever drafting or superficial averments but are duty-bound to meaningfully read the plaint to ascertain whether a real cause of action exists. 14. In Manjula and Others vs. D.A. Srinivas, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 6187, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that Courts must pierce the veil of clever drafting and prevent frivolous litigation at the earliest stage. Relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:- “29 …………….. (vii) "Courts below must curtail frivolous suits which are barred by law, and cases where the cause of action disclosed is illusory, by piercing the veil of clever drafting and giving a meaningful and wholesome reading to the plaint and accompanying documents, preferably at the earliest stage of the suit; 15. In the case of Kasturi vs. Iyyamperumal & Ors, AIR 2005 SC 2813 The Hon'ble Supreme Court categorically 12 ( 2026:HHC:25164 ) laid down the principles governing deletion/addition of parties under Order 1, Rule 10(2) CPC and has specifically held that only such parties can be retained in the proceedings whose presence is necessary for effective adjudication of the controversy involved in the suit. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while interpreting Order 1, Rule 10(2) CPC held as under:- “6. …………..From the above, it is now clear that two tests are to be satisfied for determining the question who is a necessary party. Tests are - (1) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings (2) no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such party. 12. …………….Necessary parties are those persons in whose absence no decree can be passed by the Court or that there must be a right to some relief against some party in respect of the controversy involved in the proceedings and proper parties are those whose presence before the Court would be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit although no relief in the suit was claimed against such person.” 16. In the case of Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. vs. Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Pvt. Ltd., 2010 (7) SCC 417 the Hon'ble Apex Court has elaborately considered the scope and ambit of Order I Rule 10(2) CPC and has categorically held that no person can 13 ( 2026:HHC:25164 ) insist upon impleadment merely because he may have some indirect concern or future expectation unless such person is either a necessary party or proper party for effective adjudication of the lis. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- “8. The general rule in regard to impleadment of parties is that the plaintiff in a suit, being dominus litis, may choose the persons against whom he wishes to litigate and cannot be compelled to sue a person against whom he does not seek any relief. …………….."A necessary party' is a person who ought to have been joined as a party and in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the Court. If a necessary party' is not impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed. A 'proper party' is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in disputes in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the court has no jurisdiction to implead him, against the wishes of the plaintiff. The fact that a person is likely to secure a right/interest in a suit property, after the suit is decided against the plaintiff, will not make such person a necessary party or a proper party…..." 17. It is a settled proposition of law that Government servants, police officials, and public authorities cannot ordinarily be held personally liable for acts performed by them in discharge of their official duties while acting in good 14 ( 2026:HHC:25164 ) faith and within the scope of statutory authority. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in G.C. Manjunath and Others vs. Seetaram, 2025 (5) SCC 390, has categorically reiterated the settled principle that public servants acting in discharge of their official functions are entitled to statutory protection and cannot ordinarily be subjected to personal proceedings for acts reasonably connected with official duties. The Hon'ble Apex Court observed that the very object of such protection is to ensure fearless discharge of public duties without apprehension of personal litigation. The Hon'ble Court held as under: "35…………..The underlying rationale of both these statutory provisions is to safeguard public functionaries from frivolous or vexatious prosecution for actions undertaken in good faith in the discharge of, or purported discharge of, their official duties, thereby ensuring that the fear of litigation does not impede the efficient functioning of public administration. 37……………..State performs its obligations through its officers/public servants and every function performed by a public servant is ultimately aimed at achieving public welfare. Often, their roles involve a degree of discretion. But the exercise of such discretion cannot be separated from the circumstances and timing in which it is exercised or, in cases of omission, when the omission occurs. In such circumstances, the courts must address, whether the officer was acting in the discharge of official duties. It was observed that even when an officer acts under the 15 ( 2026:HHC:25164 ) purported exercise of official powers, they are entitled to protection under Section 197 of the Cr. PC. This protection exists for a valid reason so that the public servants can perform their duties fearlessly, without constant apprehension of legal action, as long as they act in good faith……………...” 18. In the case of Amod Kumar Kanth vs. Association of Victim of Uphaar Tragedy and Another, 2023 (16) SCC 239, while considering the protection available to public servants acting in discharge of official duties, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that acts performed by officers in exercise or purported exercise of official functions cannot ordinarily expose them to personal proceedings in absence of statutory sanction and that public servants are protected so that governmental functioning is not paralyzed by retaliatory litigation. Relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:- "36. The State functions through its officers. Functions of the State may be sovereign or not sovereign. But each of the functions performed by every public servant is intended to achieve public good. It may come with discretion. The exercise of the power cannot be divorced from the context in which and the time at which the power is exercised or if it is a case of an omission, when the omission takes place. 37. The most important question which must be posed and answered by the Court when dealing with the argument that sanction is not forthcoming is whether the 16 ( 2026:HHC:25164 ) officer was acting in the exercise of his official duties. It goes further. Even an officer who acts in the purported exercise of his official power is given the protection under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. This is for good reason that the officer when he exercises the power can go about exercising the same fearlessly... public functionaries can act only bona fide. 38. ……….. all these acts were done in the exercise of his official duties. As we have already noted, even if it were to be treated as done in the purported exercise of his official duties, he would still stand protected…….. 41…………. where the act or the omission is indisputably traceable to the discharge of the official duty by the public servant, then for the Court to not accept the objection against cognizance being taken would clearly defeat the salutary purpose which underlies Section 197 of the Cr. P.C." 19. Applying the aforesaid settled proposition of law to the facts of the present case, no relief whatsoever has been sought against the applicants/defendants personally and no effective decree can be passed or denied in their absence, as the lis essentially pertains to the actions of the State and subsequent departmental/judicial determinations. The applicants/defendants had merely participated in the DPC proceedings in discharge of their official functions and no independent personal liability, wrongful act, or enforceable cause of action has been disclosed against them. Mere allegations of mala fide or political victimization 17 ( 2026:HHC:25164 ) without any specific attribution cannot make the applicants/defendants necessary or proper parties to the suit. Mere dissatisfaction with an administrative or official decision does not give rise to a personal cause of action for damages against such officers. It is further settled that where any alleged injury or wrongful act arises out of acts performed by public servants in official capacity, the appropriate remedy, if otherwise available in law, lies against the State under the principle of vicarious liability and not by way of instituting personal civil suits for damages against individual officers. In the present case also, as discussed above, the applicants/defendants had merely participated in the DPC proceedings in discharge of their official and statutory functions and no specific material has been placed on record to demonstrate any personal malice, extraneous consideration, or conduct dehors official duties. Therefore, the present suit seeking personal damages against the applicants/defendants is wholly misconceived, not maintainable in law, and amounts to abuse of the process of the Court. The applicants/defendants 4 & 6 are neither 18 ( 2026:HHC:25164 ) necessary nor proper parties and their continuance in the present proceedings is wholly unwarranted and contrary to the settled principles of law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court under Order 1 Rule 10(2) CPC. Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the continuance of the applicants/defendants in the present proceedings is wholly unwarranted and their names deserve to be struck off from the array of parties under Order 1 Rule 10(2) CPC 20. Hence, considering the entire facts and circumstances in the light of exposition of law as discussed above, the present applications are allowed and names of defendants No. 4 & 6 are ordered to be deleted from array of defendants. Both the applications stand disposed of. ( Sushil Kukreja ) Judge 29th June, 2026 (raman)