2026:JHHC:13641 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P (C) No. 3358 of 2007 --------------- 1. Uday Bhagat 2. Gandura Bhagat 3. Lighter Bhagat All son of Late Biga Bhagat. 4. Sakra Bhagat 5. Somra Bhagat 6. Budu Bhagat 7. Dhadhu Bhagat All sons of Late Lothe Bhagat 8. Sukra Bhagat Son of Late Uday Bhagat @ Sani Bhagat All by caste Oraon all residents of village Sero, PO & P.S.- Bero, District- Ranchi. .......Petitioners Versus 1. The State of Jharkhand through the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi 2. The Divisional Commissioner, South Chhotanagpur Division, Ranchi, 3. ……………. (B) Biglu Orain-Son (C) Deo Lal Oraon-Son (D) Manika Oraon All residing at Vill. Pahar Kandaria, PO & PS-Bero, District-Ranchi ...... Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD For the Petitioners : Mr. Alok Lal, Advocate Mr. Santosh Kumar, Advocate For the State : Mr. Rahul Saboo, GP-II Mr. Gaurang Jajodia, AC to GP-II For the Pvt .Resp. : Mr. P.P.N. Roy, Sr. Advocate Mr. Pandey Ashok Nath Roy, Advocate Ms. Sakshi Charu, Advocate ------------ Order No.16/Dated: 6th May, 2026 I.A No.17020 of 2025 1. The instant interlocutory application has been filed for deletion of name of the respondent no.3(A), namely, Heera Orain @ Bundhain Orain-wife of original respondent no.3, namely, late Chola Oraon from the arrays of the respondent as she had died during pendency of the present writ petition. 2026:JHHC:13641 2 2. It has been stated that the said information has been given orally on behalf of the private respondent during hearing of the present proceeding in the Court on 10.12.2025 when the matter was listed for haring. Thereafter, the instant injterlocutory application has been filed for deletion of the name of Heera Orain @ Bundhain Orain whose legal heirs and successors have already been impleaded as respondent nos. 3(B), (C) and (D) in the present proceeding. 3. There is no opposition by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 4. Accordingly, I.A No.17020 of 2025 stands allowed. 5. Let the name of the respondent no.3(A), namely, Heera Orain @ Bundhain Orain be deleted from the arrays of the respondents. 6. Office to proceed accordingly. 7. I.A. No.17020 of 2025 stands disposed of. W.P.(C) No.3358 of 2007 Prayer: 8. The present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been preferred for the following reliefs: “That in the instant writ application, the petitioner prays for quashing of order dated 17.4.2007 (Annexure-2) passed by the respondent no.2 in S.A.R. Revision Ranchi No.47/2007, whereby and whereunder the revision filed by the petitioner have been dismissed as being barred by limitation and the explanation given by the petitioner for condonation of delay has not been accepted resulting in dismissal of the revision application.” Factual Matrix 9. The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ petition reads as under: 2026:JHHC:13641 3 (i) The petitioners had filed revision application S.A.R. Revision Ranchi No. 47 of 2007 before the respondent no.2 against the order dated 08.09.2006 passed by Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi in SAR. Appeal No. 217 (R) 15 of 1999-2000 whereby and where under the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi restore the land in respect of Khata No.4, Plot Nos. 423, 1064, 1365, 1473, 1587, 1588, 1589, 1613, 1648, 1844, 1924 and 2037 having an area of 1.44 acres, 1.67 acres, 0.10 acre, 1.67 acres, 0.93 acres, 0.04 acres, 0.54 acres, 0.64 acre. 1.23 acres, 0.19 acres, 0.02 acres, 0.09 acres and 1.79 acres respectively situated at village Sero P.S. Bero District Ranchi in favour of respondent No.3. (ii) The respondent no. 3 Chola Oraon (since deceased) had filed an application under section 46 of the Chotanagpur Tendency Act for giving permission to sale the land in favour of Lothe Bhagat, Biga Bhagat, Dhanu Bhagat, Sukra Bhagat before the rent suit Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi which was registered as Misc. Case No 65/R8 II R of 1990-91. (iii) The respondent no.3 filed an application for sale of the land on the ground that the aforesaid lands are situated in village Pahar Kandaria because of the distance the respondent no.3 was facing great difficulty in cultivating the land therefore he wants to sale the land for a price of Rs 85,000/- and purchase a land at near by place in the village Soren. (iv) On the said application of the respondent no. 3, a general notice was issued for inviting objection if any. Since no objection was filed by any of the person the competent authority accorded 2026:JHHC:13641 4 sanction under section 46 of CNT Act fixing Rs. 1,10,000/- as the price of the aforesaid land in terms of order dated 15.01.1991. (v) Petitioners’ states that Dhanu Bhagat refused to get the sale deed executed in his favour with the father of the petitioner nos. 1 to 3 and Lothe Bhagat and Sukra Bhagat. (vi) It is pleaded that the sons of Biga Bhagat requested the respondent no.3 to register and execute the sale deed in the proportionate share. (vii) The respondent no.3 on the request of the petitioners and as per the agreement and contract executed the sale deed which was registered as Sale Deed No. 417 dated 21.01.1997 in respect of land in Khata No.4, Plot Nos. 423, 1064, 1065, 1365, 1473, 1587, 1588, 1589, 1613, 1648, 1844, 1924 and 2037 having an area of 1.01 acre, 1.25 ¼, 0.07 1/2 , 1.25 ¼ , 0.69 ¾ ,0.03 acre, 0.40 ½ acre, 0.48 3/4 , 0.92 ¼ , 0.14 ¼, 0.1 ½ , 0.66 1/4 , and 1.33 ½ respectively having a total area of 8. 35 ¾ acres situated at village Sero, P.S. Bero Thana No.6 District Ranchi. (viii) After the execution of said sale deed the petitioners came into possession of the land and got their name mutated in the office of Circle Officer, Bero Anchal, Bero Ranchi vide mutation case no.34 R/97-98 and thereafter they are paying rent to the State of Bihar now Jharkhand. (ix) Further, Biga Bhagat died living behind his three sons, the petitioner no. 1 to 3, and ever since the death of Biga Bhagat these petitioner nos. 1 to 3 succeeded his properties as legal heirs and they are in possession over the land in question with petitioner nos-4 to 8. 2026:JHHC:13641 5 (x) It is pleaded that in the year 2000 the respondents no.3 initiated a proceeding under section 144 Cr.P.C which was later on converted in/under section 145 Cr.P.C and the possession of the petitioner in terms of the order dated 25.08.2004 was declared. (xi) The respondent no.3 in a counter blast of the complaint case no. 480 of 1998 under sections 323/379 IPC hatched a conspiracy to cancel the sale deed executed by him earlier and in pursuance thereto respondent no.3 filed complaint case no. 595 of 1995 and S.A. Appeal No. 217 R/15 of 1999-2000 against the petitioners. (xii) It is pleaded that in the said proceeding in SAR Appeal No. 217/R 15 of 1999-2000 no notice was ever served upon the petitioners as Biga Bhagat father of petitioners nos.1 to 3 and Lothe Bhagat the father of the respondent no. 4 to 7 had died much earlier and the respondent no. 3 did not substitute their legal heirs, the petitioners herein and the respondent no.1 proceeded to dispose of the appeal filed by the respondent no 3 against dead persons. (xiii) The respondent no. 1 in the order dated 08.07.2006 has held that the permission was sought for by respondent no. 3 for transfer of the land in favour of Lothu Bhagat, Bigha Bhagat, Dhanu Bhagat, Sukra Bhagat but the land has been registered in the name of Bigha Bhagat, Sukra Bhagat, Uday Bhgat, Gandura Bhagat, Lighter Bhagat, Dhadhu Bhagat therefore the sale deed executed in their favour is liable to be cancelled and the names entered into the record of right in favour of the purchaser should also be cancelled. (xiv) The petitioners had no knowledge of the proceeding pending before the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi as no notice was ever 2026:JHHC:13641 6 served upon them, therefore, the petitioners could not appear in the proceeding before the respondent no.1 and contest the case. (xv) Further, the order as contained in annexure-1 passed by the respondent no. 1 is an ex-parte order and the petitioners had no knowledge of the pendency of the proceeding. (xvi) It is pleaded that the petitioners came to know about the order as contained in annexure-1 only on 08.01.2007 when revenue Karamchri of Bero Anchal was making inspection of the land covered under the order as contained in annexure-1 to this application thereafter, the petitioners after getting the knowledge of the order impugned filed an application for obtaining certified copy of the order. (xvii) After getting certified copy of the order as contained in Annexure-1, the petitioners filed revision application before respondent no.2 which was registered as SAR Revision Ranchi No. 47 of 2007. (xviii) It is pleaded that the respondent no.2 without appreciating the circumstance under which the revision application could not be filed by the petitioner in time rejected on the ground of delay. (xix) The order passed by the respondent no.2 is misconceived and deserves to be dismissed on the only ground that the petitioners have been able to establish that they have no knowledge of pendency of the proceeding before the respondent no. 1. (xx) The respondent no.2 has failed to appreciate that the delay in filing the revision application for revision was neither intentional nor wilful and as such the revision application should not have been dismissed in mechanical fashion. 2026:JHHC:13641 7 10. Being aggrieved with the order dated 17.04.2007 passed in S.AR Revision No.47 of 2007 by the respondent no.2, the present writ petition has been preferred by the writ petitioners. 11. Thus, it is the case of the writ petitioners that as per permission required under the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 (in short, CNT Act) the land was to be transferred by way of registered sale deed no.417 dated 21.01.1997. 12. The said order of permission was granted by the Deputy Commissioner and order for transfer of the land, subsequently, has been challenged by one Chola Oraon for seeking a prayer for annulment of transfer on the ground that the permission was got by committing fraud. 13. The land was transferred in pursuance to the permission granted by the Deputy Collector-Land Reforms, Sadar, Ranchi-competent authority and the order passed in Misc. Case No.65/R 8 II R/90-91 vide order dated 15.01.1991. 14. It was the grievance of the appellant, namely, Chola Oraon, that the consideration amount which was agreed since had not been paid and, as such, the land was not transferred. But subsequent thereto by way of impersonation the document has been created to show that the land actually has been transferred. 15. The order of transfer of the land as available in Khata No.4 comprising of 11.15 acres of land has been said to be transferred in favour of the opposite parties, namely, Biga Bhagat. 16. Chola Oraon had preferred an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi being S.A.R Appeal No.217 R/15 of 1999-2000 taking the ground inter alia that the fraud has been committed by way of impersonation. 2026:JHHC:13641 8 17. The Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi got the matter enquired by the Deputy Collector Land Reforms, Sadar, Ranchi who submitted his report vide letter no.322 dt. 17.02.2003. 18. The appellate authority, based upon the report dated 17.02.2003, has annulled the transfer of the land by forwarding a copy thereof to the District Sub-Registrar for cancellation of the transfer of the land in favour of the opposite party. 19. The aggrieved party has preferred a revision being SAR Revision No.47 of 2007 against the order dated 08.07.2006 passed by the appellate authority. In the said revision petition, an application for condonation of delay has been appended and the matter was fixed for hearing on merit. 20. It is the specific case of the writ petitioners that the order passed by the appellate authority was an ex-parte order as would also be found from the face of the order and, as such, by making reference of the order being ex-parte and the moment came to the notice of the writ petitioner, the revision has been filed. Submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners 21. The grievance of the writ petitioners is that the revisional authority without properly appreciated the aforesaid ground has rejected the delay condonation application by coming to the conclusion that the explanation so furnished is found to be unsatisfactory and devoid of merit and, accordingly, the revision petition has been rejected vide order dated 17.04.2007. 22. The said order dated 17.04.2007 is under challenge solely on the ground that without referring any cogent reason showing the explanation not found to be satisfactory the order was passed on 2026:JHHC:13641 9 17.04.2007 which is mechanical one, particularly, on the pretext of the fact that the appellate authority has not bothered to call upon the opposite party before deciding the appeal. 23. This Court has called upon the private respondents, the respondent nos.3 (A) to (D) herein, who are being represented by Mr. P.P.N. Roy, the learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. Pandey Ashok Nath Roy and Ms. Sakshi Charu, the learned counsels. 24. The State is being represented by Mr. Rahul Saboo, the learned GP-II assisted by Mr. Gaurang Jajodia, the learned associate counsel. Submission of the learned state Counsel 25. The learned State counsel has submitted solely basing upon his argument that an inquiry report dated 17.02.2003 by which it came to the notice that the element of fraud has been committed by impersonation and by taking the aforesaid ground the appellate authority has come to the conclusion for annulling the transfer and, therefore, due recommendation was made to the District Sub-Registrar and circle officer for annulling the aforesaid sale deed. 26. The learned State counsel, therefore, has submitted that the reasons that has been assigned, since, based upon the inquiry report dated 17.02.2003 and, therefore, the order passed by the appellate authority cannot be said to be unjustified. 27. However, the learned State counsel has not opposed the submission which has been made on behalf of the learned counsel for the writ petitioners regarding non-availability of the reason said to be based upon the application of mind while rejecting the revision petition by throwing it and threshold on the ground of limitation. 2026:JHHC:13641 10 Submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the Private Respondent: 28. On the other hand, Mr. P.P.N. Roy, the learned senior counsel appearing for the private respondents has submitted that the case, since, is based upon the element of fraud as would be evident from the inquiry, the learned senior counsel, therefore, submits that in such an admitted case where the element of fraud has been made the basis of passing an order by the appellate authority, then the issue of limitation is to be considered also going into the conduct of the petitioners and if that would be taken into consideration then what is being argued on behalf of the writ petitioners that there is no reason assigned by revisional authority while considering the delay condonation application, is not worth to be considered. Analysis 29. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the pleadings made in the writ petition as also the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents. 30. This Court before proceeding needs to refer herein that this Court has called upon the original record of Misc. Case No. 65/R 8 II R/90-91 to appreciate the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties and after much effort, the original record has been placed to this Court. 31. The factual aspect which has been argued on behalf of the writ petitioners is limited to the extent that the issue of limitation has not been properly appreciated as would be evident from the order passed by the revisional authority. 32. While on the other hand, the learned senior counsel appearing for the private respondents has harped upon the propriety of the order passed 2026:JHHC:13641 11 by the appellate authority, since, the appellate authority has passed an order annulling the transfer of the land on the basis of the element of fraud having been found in course of the inquiry. 33. It is pertinent to note that the Statute itself delineates a hierarchy of forums, commencing with the original authority, followed by the appellate authority, and thereafter the revisional authority, as contemplated under the provisions of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908. The legislative scheme, thus, expressly provides for the availability of statutory alternative remedies in the form of appeal and revision. 34. Here, it is admitted that the permission for transfer of land was said to be accorded by the competent authority, i.e., the Deputy Commissioner under the Statute, as required under section 46 (1) of the Act of 1908. 35. The said order or sanction/permission has been disputed so far as its genuineness is concerned on behalf of the learned counsel appearing for the private respondents. 36. The land after having been transferred on the basis of such permission granted said to be fulfilment of condition of transfer of land as per the Statutory mandate, then one application was preferred before the Deputy Commissioner for cancellation of the transfer registered as SAR Appeal No.217(R) 15 of 1999-2000. 37. The grievance was raised that the permission which is being said to be granted by the competent authority is actually no permission in the eyes of law, since, after non-payment of the consideration amount one of the parties, the transferee, has retracted from transferring the land but subsequent thereto the opposite party has got the land transferred by impersonating the opposite party. 2026:JHHC:13641 12 38. The Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi got the matter enquired by the Deputy Collector Land Reforms, Sadar, Ranchi. The inquiry was finally conducted by the Deputy Collector-Land-Reforms and a report was sent contained in letter no.322 dated 17.02.2003 and based upon the same the Deputy Commissioner based upon the same has recommended the District Sub-Registrar to cancel the transfer of the said land. 39. The sole ground as has been taken on behalf of the writ petitioners that whatever may be the reason which led the Deputy Commissioner in the capacity of the appellate authority it was the bounden duty of the authority concerned in order to forbid the miscarriage of justice to issue notice upon the opposite party. But the said exercise had not been carried out. 40. However, the writ petitioners being aggrieved with the said order has preferred a revision before the revisional authority, i.e., the Divisional Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi being S.A.R Revision No.47 of 2007 along with the delay condonation application, since, by the time as is being taken as a ground that the order dated 08.07.2006 passed by the appellate authority has come to the notice of the writ petitioners because there was already lapse of 8 months’ time. 41. The said delay condonation application has been considered by the revisional authority. But the explanation so furnished for condonation of delay has not been found to be satisfactory and the said order is under challenge in the present writ petition. 42. Mr. P.P.N. Roy, the learned senior for the private respondents has placed an order passed by a Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A No.634 of 2022 wherein the issue of limitation has been taken into consideration and by taking aid thereof it has been submitted that delay 2026:JHHC:13641 13 of 8 months is quite long and, as such, it was not fit to be condoned and, accordingly, the order so passed reviewing to condone the delay cannot be said to be justified. 43. This Court is conscious as per the law settled that irrespective of the period of delay the delay is to be condoned depending upon the sufficient cause if shown by the party concerned. 44. It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning of ‘sufficient cause’. The consideration of meaning of ‘sufficient cause’ has been made in Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81], wherein, it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to 15 hereunder:- “9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953] , Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 2026:JHHC:13641 14 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629] . 10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient cause”. 11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] . 12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: “605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.” An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or 2026:JHHC:13641 15 deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] .) 14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830 : AIR 2002 SC 1856] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93 : AIR 1992 SC 1701] . 15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” 45. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted deliberately” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a 2026:JHHC:13641 16 satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The Court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose as has been held in Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs. Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336, Lala Matadin Vrs. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770, Parimal Vrs. Veena @ Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545 and Maniben Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157. 46. It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vrs. Gobardhan Sao & Ors., (2002) 3 SC 195, wherein, at paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder:- “12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute “sufficient cause” or not will be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want 2026:JHHC:13641 17 of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way.” 47. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762, has held that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of the given case, there is no right to the appellant to have delay condoned. At paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder: “12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the court is dealing with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section 2026:JHHC:13641 18 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14. In the present case there is no difficulty in holding that the discretion should be exercised in favour of the appellant because apart from the general criticism made against the appellant's lack of diligence during the period of limitation no other fact had been adduced against it. Indeed, as we have already pointed out, the learned Judicial Commissioner rejected the appellant's application for condonation of delay only on the ground that it was appellant's duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within the period prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a valid ground.” 48. Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay condonation application, the Court of Law is required to consider the sufficient cause for condonation of delay as also the approach of the litigant as to whether it is bona fide or not as because after expiry of the period of limitation, a right is accrued in favour of the other side and as such, it is necessary to look into the bona fide motive of the litigant and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part. 49. It is also evident from the aforesaid judgment that the sufficient cause, as per the interpretation, will be the circumstances which indicates that there is no dereliction or no casual approach having been taken by the party concerned in approaching the higher Forum by preferring an appeal against the impugned judgment/decree. 50. The parties to the litigation are to be vigilant, but if no idea of the pending proceeding, then the same is to be taken into consideration for the purpose of condoning the delay so that the culmination of the suit may not prejudice in the interest of the party concerned, in whose absence the judgment/decree has been passed. Equally, it is also to be seen that the party may not be allowed to take the ground as luxury in order to misuse the judicial proceeding causing prejudice to the other side. The Court is to assess both the aspects of the matter. 2026:JHHC:13641 19 51. There is no dispute that the issue of limitation is to be taken into consideration liberally unless the contesting party is in a position to show that the delay is deliberate one. 52. The sole question which requires consideration in this case is as to whether while rejecting the application for condonation of delay the revisional authority has considered the impact of an order passed which is ex-parte and the second thing which requires consideration is that what lead the revisional authority in coming to the conclusion that the explanation so furnished is not found to be satisfactory. 53. This Court is considering the second issue first for the reason that whether it is a Court of law of quasi-judicial authority where the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable, then it is the bounden duty of the concerned authority to come out with a specific reason for the purpose of reflection of the mind as to what led the concerned authority in coming to the conclusion that the explanation which has been furnished is not found to be satisfactory. 54. If the power has been conferred upon the statutory authority, then it is the bounden duty to consider the ground which is to be reflected from the face of the order, otherwise such order will be said to be without any reason and without any consideration and no one can dispute that the reason is the soul of the order and in absence of the reason, the order will not be said to be an order in the eyes of law. 55. The reason reflects the application of mind and then only it is to be said that the due consideration in the eyes of law has been made. The consideration has been defined by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India and Ors. vs. A. Masilamani, reported in (2013) 6 SCC 530. 2026:JHHC:13641 20 56. When an opportunity is required to be provided under the mandate to the public servant, the same cannot be said to be mere formality, rather, the requirement with the competent authority to delve upon the reply by exercising active application of mind for its consideration. 57. “Consideration” means proper application of mind, as has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India and Ors. (Supra) at paragraph 19, which reads hereunder as :- 19. The word “consider” is of great significance. The dictionary meaning of the same is, “to think over”, “to regard as”, or “deem to be”. Hence, there is a clear connotation to the effect that there must be active application of mind. In other words, the term “consider” postulates consideration of all relevant aspects of a matter. Thus, formation of opinion by the statutory authority should reflect intense application of mind with reference to the material available on record. The order of the authority itself should reveal such application of mind. The appellate authority cannot simply adopt the language employed by the disciplinary authority and proceed to affirm its order. From the interpretation made by the Hon'ble Apex Court with respect to meaning of ‘consideration’, it would be evident that consideration can only be said to be proper consideration if there is active application of mind by the concerned authority who is considering the reply of defence furnished by the persons against whom the allegations have been levelled. 58. This Court adverting to the order passed by the revisional authority has found that no reason has been assigned as to what led the revisional authority in coming to the conclusion that the explanation so furnished is not satisfactory. 2026:JHHC:13641 21 59. The second issue that the delay of 8 months in the backdrop of the fact that the order passed by the appellate authority is without issuance of notice upon the writ petitioners. 60. This Court for the purpose as to whether the notice was issued or not has considered the trial record and found that no notice was issued even prior to calling upon the report of element of commission of fraud or after submission of the inquiry report by the Deputy-Collector-Land Reforms. 61. It also appears from the order passed by the appellate authority that there is no reference of the issue of issuance of notice upon the other side, the writ petitioners herein. 62. The order being an ex-parte and, as such, in a case where ex-parte order is being challenged before the higher Forum and if in the meantime, the period to file the appeal or revision, as the case may be, expired, then the concerned authority as of the Court of law and quasi-judicial functionary is required to consider the factum of having no knowledge about the pending proceeding or its outcome where no notice has been issued to the party concerned. 63. 63. Even it is not a case of ex-parte proceeding, rather proceeding so far as the order passed by the appellate authority is concerned, it is a case where no notice was issued by the appellate authority, In such circumstances, if the limitation petition was filed, then it was the bounden duty of the revisional authority being the Statutory revisional Forum under the provision of the Act of 1908 in the context of the fact that under the CNT Act, 1908 the suit generally not is being entertained, then the availability of the Forum for much importance and in that view of the matter it would have been considered by the revisional authority 2026:JHHC:13641 22 in that angel also but having not done so the revisional authority has committed gross error. 64. Merely because the element of fraud is there, it does not mean that the other side will not have an opportunity to defend, rather in such circumstances giving opportunity to the other side will have more bearing to justify to come to the truth of element of fraud or not? 65. This Court, based upon the aforesaid discussion, is of the view that the order which has been passed by the revisional authority, therefore, suffers from an error and, as such, is to be interfered with. 66. Accordingly, the order dated 17.04.2007 passed in S.A.R. Revision No.47 of 2007 by the revisional authority is hereby quashed and set aside. 67. In consequence thereof, the revisional application being S.A.R. Revision Case No.47 of 2007 is restored to its original file. 68. The revisional authority is to pass an order, on the issue of limitation in accordance with law, based upon the material already available on record within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. 69. Depending upon the outcome of the order which is to be passed on the issue of limitation, the revisional authority will be going to the merit and pass an order which shall be within a further period of two months, meaning thereby, the proceeding is to be completed within a maximum period of four months in total. 70. It is made clear that this Court has not exercised its mind on the issue on merit and the revisional authority is to decide the case based upon the material already available on the original record. 2026:JHHC:13641 23 71. Let the entire record of Misc. Case No. 65/R 8 II R/90-91 be sent back to the revisional authority forthwith. 72. While considering the issue, the revisional authority will provide the effective opportunity of hearing to the parties. 73. Both the parties along with the learned State counsel have undertaken before this Court that they will appear before the revisional authority, i.e., the Divisional Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi on 20.05.2026 positively at 11:00 AM. 74. The office of the revisional authority will acknowledge their appearance and proceed with the matter. 75. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners is directed to supply the copy of the application for condonation of delay well in advance prior to 20.05.2026 along with the memo of revision application to the learned counsel appearing for the private respondents as well as to the learned State counsel. 76. Let the original record of Misc. Case No.65/R 8 II R/90-91 be handed over to Mr. Rahul Saboo, the learned State counsel for sending it back to the revisional authority for proper consideration of the issue. 77. With the aforesaid observation and direction, the instant writ petition stands disposed of. 78. Pending I.As, if any, stands disposed of. (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) Dated:06.05.2026. Sudhir AFR