2026:HHC:24824 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA RSA Nos. 210 and 216 of 2007 Reserved on: 18.5.2026 Date of Decision: 25.6.2026 RSA No. 210 of 2007 Govind Ram and others ...Appellants Versus Dila Ram (deceased) through LRs and others ...Respondents RSA No. 216 of 2007 Govind Ram and others ...Appellants Versus Dila Ram (deceased) through LRs and others ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes. For the Appellants : Mr Bhupender Gupta, Senior Advocate, with Mr Janesh Gupta, Advocate, in both the appeals. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:24824 For the Respondents : Mr Anand Sharma, Senior Advocate, with Mr Karan Sharma, Advocate, in both the appeals. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeals are directed against the judgment and decree dated 27.2.2007, passed by learned District Judge, Solan, HP (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment and decree dated 1.7.2006, passed by learned Civil Judge, (Senior Division), Kasauli, District Solan, H.P., (learned Trial Court) were partly upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeals are that the plaintiffs filed a civil suit for a declaration that they had become the owners in possession of the suit land mentioned in the headnote of the plaint by efflux of time. It was asserted that one Laxmi was the owner of the suit land, who had mortgaged the suit land with possession to Dhani Ram, the predecessor of the plaintiffs, for a sum of ₹350/-. Mutation No. 314, dated 30.4.1953, was registered to this effect. Dhani Ram 3 2026:HHC:24824 expired, and he was succeeded by the plaintiff No.1, Liaq Ram. Laxmi Devi was succeeded by Dila Ram. The mortgage was not redeemed, and the period of redemption expired on 30.4.1983. The plaintiffs became the owners after the efflux of time because of non-redemption. Hence, the suit was filed to seek the relief mentioned above. 3. The suit was opposed by filing a written statement taking a preliminary objection regarding the lack of locus-standi. The contents of the plaint were denied on the merits. It was asserted that the mortgage was oral for a consideration of more than ₹100/- and was required to be effected by way of a registered document. The defendant purchased the land in the year 1971 and paid ₹350/- towards the redemption of the mortgage. The plaintiffs have filed a false suit, taking advantage of the wrong revenue entries. Hence, it was prayed that the present suit be dismissed. 4. No replication was filed. 5. Learned Trial Court framed the following issues: - 1. Whether the plaintiff has purchased the land from Smt. Laxmi vide registered sale deed on 5.1.1971 measuring 19 bighas and 12 biswas? OPP. 4 2026:HHC:24824 2. Whether the plaintiff paid ₹350/- as the alleged mortgage amount and got possession? OPP. 3. Whether the plaintiff is in adverse possession of the suit land, as alleged? OPD. 4. Whether the mortgage is illegal and non est as alleged? OPP. 5. Whether the defendants want to dispossess the plaintiff from the suit land forcibly? OPD. 6. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to file the suit? OPD. 7. Whether the suit is not maintainable as the defendants are in possession of the suit land? OPD. 8. Whether the alleged sale deed is an illegal and fabricated document as alleged? OPD. 9. Whether the suit has not been properly valued for the purpose of court fees and jurisdiction? OPD. 10. Whether the defendants have become owners-in- possession of the suit land by lapse of the period of limitation for redemption? OPD. 11. Relief. 6. The parties were called upon to produce the evidence, and plaintiff No.2 Gobind Ram examined himself (PW1) and Gian Chand (PW2). The defendant examined himself (DW1). 7. Dila Ram also filed a civil suit for seeking a Permanent Prohibitory Injunction for restraining the defendants from interfering in his ownership and possession of the suit land mentioned in para-one of the plaint. It was asserted that Dila Ram had purchased the suit land from one Laxmi vide registered Sale 5 2026:HHC:24824 Deed on 5.1.1971. He had paid ₹350/- as the mortgage money and obtained possession. He continued to be in possession. The defendants threatened to interfere with his possession. Hence, he filed a suit seeking the relief mentioned above. 8. The defendants filed a written statement taking preliminary objection regarding the lack of maintainability, the suit having not been properly valued for the purpose of Court fees and jurisdiction, and the suit being liable to be stayed under Section 10 of the CPC. The contents of the plaint were admitted to the extent that Laxmi Devi had mortgaged the land to Dhani Ram. It was asserted that the defendants became the owners in possession because of non-redemption of the mortgage. The present defendants had also filed a civil suit seeking a declaration that they had become the owners of the suit land by efflux of time. Therefore, it was prayed that the suit be dismissed. 9. The defendants also filed a counterclaim asserting that the suit land was mortgaged by Laxmi Devi with the predecessor of the defendants. Laxmi Devi or her successors failed to redeem the mortgage and the defendants have become the owners by the efflux of time. Hence, it was prayed that the counterclaim be 6 2026:HHC:24824 decreed and the defendants be declared to be the owners of the suit land. 10. A replication denying the contents of the written statement and affirming those of the plaint was filed. 11. The learned Trial Court framed the following issues on 25.4.2003: 1. Whether the plaintiffs have become owners in possession of the suit land by lapse of the period of redemption, as alleged? OPP. 2. Whether the plaintiffs have no locus standi to file the suit? OPD. 3. Relief. 12. Subsequently, an application for consolidation of the suit was filed, which was allowed, and the suits were ordered to be consolidated. 13. The learned Trial Court held that Laxmi Devi had mortgaged the land to Dhani Ram. The period of redemption of the mortgage was 30 years, which had expired. The plea taken by Dila Ram that he had deposited ₹350/- was not sufficient because there was no proof of the payment of the mortgage money to the mortgagee. The period of limitation for redemption of the mortgage was 30 years, and Laxmi Devi had lost her right to 7 2026:HHC:24824 redeem the mortgage. Dila Ram, being the successor of Laxmi Devi, had also lost his title; therefore, the Trial Court dismissed the suit filed by Dila Ram and decreed the suit and counterclaim filed by Govind Ram, etc. 14. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court, the parties filed separate appeals which were decided by the learned District Judge, Solan, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). The Appellate Court held that Laxmi Devi had mortgaged the land to Dhani Ram in the year 1953. The mortgage was not required to be registered because the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act were not in force at the time of the mortgage. Dhani Ram remained in possession, and the plaintiffs were in possession after the death of Dhani Ram. Himachal Pradesh Debt Reduction Act, 1976, provides that a final decree of foreclosure cannot be passed in a suit based upon the redemption. The learned Trial Court had passed a decree of foreclosure without following the provisions of the H.P. Debt Reduction Act. The plaintiffs can only retain possession as the mortgagees till the mortgage is redeemed. The plaintiffs were permitted to retain possession of the suit land till it is redeemed and the defendant, Dila Ram, was restrained from interfering with the suit land till 8 2026:HHC:24824 the redemption of the mortgage. The suit filed by Dila Ram was dismissed. 15. Being aggrieved by the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Appellate Court, Govind Ram, etc., have filed the present appeals, which were registered as RSA Nos. 210 and 216 of 2007. 16. RSA No. 210 of 2017 was admitted on the following substantial questions of law on 20.3.2009: - 1. Whether the plaintiff-respondent at no point of time invoked the provisions of H.P. Debt Reduction Act, exercising the right of redemption of mortgage, has not the Lower Appellate Court acted in a highly illegal, erroneous and perverse manner in creating a new right in favour of the plaintiff for redemption of mortgage, which right stood extinguished by efflux of time under the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act? 2. Whether the Lower Appellate Court has committed grave error of law and jurisdiction in holding that the mortgaged amount falls within the definition of ‘loan’ as defined in the H.P. Debt Reduction Act and acted arbitrarily, in recording erroneous and perverse findings that the provisions of said Act bars the passing of preliminary and final decree for foreclosure? 3. Whether the Lower Appellate Court committed grave illegality and irregularity in ignoring the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act as well as the Limitation Act, especially when the provisions of the H.P. Debt Reduction Act, 1976, could not have been made applicable to the present case? 9 2026:HHC:24824 17. RSA No. 216 of 2017 was admitted on the following substantial questions of law on 20.3.2009: - 1. Whether the Trial Court held that the mortgage was created on 30th April, 1953, which findings were accepted by the Lower Appellate Court, has not the Lower Appellate Court acted in an erroneous and perverse manner in dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs-appellants by wrongly applying the provisions of H.P. Debt Reduction Act, 1976? 2. Whether the Lower Appellate Court has committed grave error of law and jurisdiction in holding that the mortgaged amount falls within the definition of “loan” as defined in the H.P. Debt Reduction Act and acted arbitrarily in recording the erroneous and perverse findings that the provisions of said Act bars the passing of preliminary and final decree for foreclosure? 3. Whether the Lower Appellate Court committed grave illegality and irregularity in ignoring the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act as well as the Limitation Act, especially when the provisions of the H.P. Debt Reduction Act, 1976, could not have been made applicable to the present case? 4. Whether the Lower Appellate Court has acted in excess of its jurisdiction in granting a right to redeem the mortgage to the defendant-respondent, when such right became unenforceable on account of the provisions of the Limitation Act? 18. This Court also formulated the following substantial questions of law on 7.12.2016: - 1. Whether a single appeal was maintainable against the judgment and decree passed by the Court of learned Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Kasauli in Civil Suit No.201/1 of 2002 dated 1.7.2006 vide which learned trial Court while dismissing the suit so filed by plaintiff allowed the counter claim filed by 10 2026:HHC:24824 defendant therein and what will be the effect of non-filing of two distinct appeals in that case in proceedings arising out of Civil Suit No. 230/1 of 2001? 19. I have heard Mr Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Janesh Gupta, learned counsel for the appellants, and Mr Anand Sharma, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Karan Sharma, learned counsel for the respondents. 20. Mr Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior Advocate for the appellants, submitted that the learned Appellate Court erred in reversing the well-reasoned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court. Learned Trial Court had rightly held that the period of redemption is 30 years from the date of the mortgage. Learned Appellate Court applied the provisions of the H.P. Debt Reduction Act to the present case, whereas the definition of creditor showed that it applied to a person who, in the regular course of business, advances money. Dhani Ram was not shown to be advancing the loan in the regular course of business, and the learned Appellate Court erred in applying the provisions of HP Debt Reduction Act to the present case. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. He relied upon the judgments of the 11 2026:HHC:24824 Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kanshi Ram and another Vs. Lachhman (dead) through LRs and others (2001) 5 SCC 546 and Singh Ram (dead) through LRs Vs. Sheo Ram and others (2014) 9 SCC 185 in support of his submission. 21. Mr Anand Sharma, learned Senior Advocate for the respondent, submitted that the learned Trial Court had passed three judgments and decrees; one in the civil suit filed by Govind Ram, etc., second in counterclaim filed by Govind Ram etc and third in the civil suit filed by Dila Ram. Three appeals were required to be preferred before this Court. Two appeals are not maintainable, and the appeals are liable to be dismissed on this short ground alone. On merits, he submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in holding that a period of 30 years applied to the redemption of a usufructuary mortgage. There is no limitation for the redemption of a usufructuary mortgage, and the learned Appellate Court had rightly held that the mortgagor or her successors were entitled to redeem the mortgage at any time. The matter was squarely covered by the provisions of the H.P. Debt Reduction Act, and the learned appellate Court had rightly applied the provisions of the H.P. Debt Reduction Act to the present case. There is no infirmity in the judgments and decrees passed by the 12 2026:HHC:24824 learned Appellate Court. Hence, he prayed that the present appeals be dismissed. 22. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. Substantial Question of Law framed on 7.12.2016: 23. Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court considered the question of filing of appeals in consolidated suits and the counterclaims in Ramesh Chand Vs. Om Raj 2022 SCC OnLine HP 2094 and held as under: - 42. The principles deducible from the afore-discussed law can be summarised as follows: - (i) When two suits are consolidated and tried together with common issues framed and common evidence led by the parties, resulting in a common judgment and decree, the same can be subjected to challenge by way of a single appeal at the instance of the aggrieved party; (ii) Where a single appeal is filed questioning the judgment and decree passed in two suits, which were consolidated and decided by a common judgment, the decision of such single appeal, by a common judgment, reversing or modifying the claim in one suit out of the two, can also be challenged by the aggrieved party also, in a single appeal. (iii) When two suits, though not consolidated, are decided by a common judgment, resulting in the preparation of two separate decrees, the aggrieved party would be required to challenge both of them by 13 2026:HHC:24824 filing separate appeals. (iv) When both the suit and the counterclaim are decreed by a common judgment, regardless of whether a separate decree has been prepared in the counterclaim, both would be required to be challenged by separate appeals; (v) In a case where two separate appeals are required to be filed against the judgment of the suit and the counterclaim and if the appeal is filed only against one and not against the other, non-filing of appeal against such judgment and decree would attach finality thereto and would attract not only the principle of res-judicata but also waiver and estoppel and the judgment and decree not appealed against would be taken to have been acquiesced to by the party not filing an appeal; (vi) When however, two appeals are filed against a common judgment passed by the trial Court, both by the plaintiff and the defendant, and are disposed of by the first appellate Court by modifying/reversing/affirming the judgment of the trial Court, the aggrieved party, would be required to challenge both by two separate appeals, in absence of which, non-filing of appeal against one shall attract bar of the principles of res-judicata against another. (vii) Where more than one appeal are required to be filed or are filed, and one or more of them are dismissed for default, delay or any other similar reason, any such situation would attract res judicata and such dismissal would satisfy the requirement of the appeal being heard and finally decided on merits 'in a former suit' for the purpose of attracting principles of res judicata. 24. In the present case, two suits were consolidated, common evidence was led, but separate judgments were passed. 14 2026:HHC:24824 The suit and the counterclaim were disposed of by one judgment, and the suit was disposed of by another judgment. The judgment of the Hon’ble Division Bench does not deal with an eventuality where the suits are consolidated, but different judgments are passed. However, since common evidence was led, the principle ‘(i)’ should apply to the present case, and one appeal was required to be filed challenging the judgments and decrees in the consolidated suits. A separate appeal was required to be filed challenging the decree in the counterclaim. Therefore, two appeals were maintainable before the learned District Judge. Further, no objection was raised before the learned District Judge that the two appeals were not competent. These appeals were filed by Dila Ram, the present respondent. If his objection is accepted that three appeals were required to be filed, his two appeals preferred before the learned District Judge would not be maintainable, and the judgment and decrees passed by the learned District Judge would be non est, being barred by the principle of res judicata. Therefore, there would be no question of filing the present appeals by Govind Ram, etc., and this submission, instead of helping Dile Ram, goes against him. 15 2026:HHC:24824 25. In Charan Singh vs. Ram Saroop Civil Appeal No. 1585 of 2025, decided on 03.02.2025, a composite appeal was filed before the learned Appellate Court, which was dismissed after holding that such an appeal was not maintainable. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the learned First Appellate Court was right in holding that a composite appeal was not maintainable, but it should have alerted the appellant by making him aware of the requirement of law and by giving him the liberty to file a separate memorandum of appeal. It was observed: “7. In our considered view, reliance was rightly placed by the first appellate court on precedents to hold that a composite appeal was not maintainable in law, but, at the same time, the first appellate court ought to have borne in mind that courts exist for rendering justice, albeit in accordance with law. Once the first appellate court found, correctly, that challenge to the common judgment of the trial court dated 16th March, 2021 had been laid in a composite appeal but law requires to file two appeals with separate memoranda of appeal, which had not been filed by the appellant, the court ought to have at least alerted the appellant by making him aware of the requirement of law and giving him the liberty to file a separate memorandum of appeal. In fact, in terms of Order XLI Rule 1 of the CPC, the appellate court has the power to even dispense with the requirement of law of filing a copy of the impugned judgment twice over if it is part of the memorandum of appeal already filed. In any event, the defect was not such that it was incurable. The composite appeal was filed well within the period of limitation and, except for the fact that a separate memorandum of appeal was not filed, no other 16 2026:HHC:24824 defect, far less serious defect, was shown to exist. If even after being alerted, the appellant had failed to file a separate memorandum, the first appellate court would have been perfectly justified in dismissing the appeal. It is not shown to us that any such endeavour was made.” 26. It was further held that the High Court should have set right the wrong by its interdiction and technicality of this nature should not have been allowed to prevail over the substantive justice. It was observed: “8. The first appellate court having failed to alert the appellant, we would have expected the High Court to intervene to set right the wrong by its interdiction. Technicality of a nature such as this should not have been allowed to prevail over substantive justice. The appellant had filed two second appeals before the High Court, meaning thereby that he had been properly advised, while such advice might have been missing in the district of which the parties are residents. Unfortunately, the High Court did not address the point from the proper perspective either. While spurning the objection of learned counsel for the respondents, who has vehemently argued that there is no occasion to interfere since the appellant did not adhere to the law, we find good reason and ground to interfere.” 27. This judgment was followed by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Desh Raj & Anr. vs. Vinod Kumar & Anr. 2026:HHC:5450, and the matter was remitted to the First Appellate Court with liberty to the defendants to file an independent appeal within three weeks, and once so filed, it was ordered to be treated as within a limitation. 17 2026:HHC:24824 28. Thus, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had treated the non- filing of two separate appeals as not fatal and remitted the matter to the learned Appellate Court to enable the appellant to file a separate appeal without a memorandum of appeal. 29. Since in the present case, the single appeal was to be filed regarding the consolidated suit and a separate appeal was to be filed regarding the counterclaim, the submission that the present appeal is not maintainable cannot be accepted. In any case, the appeal cannot be dismissed on this ground as per the judgment of Charan Singh. Hence, this substantial question of law is answered accordingly. Substantial Questions of Law in RSA 210 of 2007: Substantial Question of Law No.1: 30. The term “loan” has been defined in the H.P. Debt Reduction Act, 1976, as under: - "loan" means an advance in cash or kind and includes any transaction which in substance amounts to such advance but does not include an advance by the Central or State Government or by a local authority authorised by the State Government to make advance, by a co-operative society or by a bank or by the Life Insurance Corporation of India or a loan taken or used for the purposes of trade.” 18 2026:HHC:24824 31. It is apparent from the definition of the loan that it applies to all kinds of advances in cash or kind and includes any transaction that amounts to such an advance. In the present case, the facts proved on record show that Dhani Ram had advanced ₹350/- to Laxmi Devi, who had secured the repayment of money by mortgaging her land. Section 11 contained in Chapter IV of the H.P. Debt Reduction Act provides that, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any enactment for the time being in force, a final decree for foreclosure shall not be passed in respect of agricultural land of a debtor in a suit to which this Act applies. Therefore, there is an absolute prohibition on passing of the final decree of foreclosure regarding agricultural land. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kanshi Ram v. Lachhman, (2001) 5 SCC 546, that the object of the Act is to grant relief to the debtors and enable them to get back the property mortgaged by them with possession for a loan. The Court is bound to grant the relief under the Act when the cause of action had arisen after the enactment of the H.P. Debt Reduction Act. It was observed: - 15. The object of the Act and the scheme underlying it, as obtained from the provisions made therein, is to grant relief to debtors and enable them to get back properties mortgaged by them with possession for a loan. The use of the expression “at any time” for making an application or 19 2026:HHC:24824 filing a suit is indicative of the legislative intent that the Act provides a fresh opportunity to the debtor for getting relief under the Act. The legislature has taken care to make the relevant provisions of the Act granting relief to debtors by giving overriding effect over any law, agreement, contract or decree contrary to the provisions of the Act. It was not disputed before us during the hearing of the case that the plaintiffs filed the suit under the provisions of the Act for the restoration of the possession of the mortgaged property. Undisputedly, there is no decree for foreclosure in favour of the creditor/mortgagee. 16. In the backdrop of the above, the question of limitation is to be considered. The reason given by the High Court in support of the finding that the suit was barred by limitation is that more than 30 years had elapsed since the date of the mortgage (February 1946) when the suit was filed in 1981. Therefore, the mortgagor had lost his right to redeem the property mortgaged. The provisions in Section 27 of the Limitation Act have been considered in support of the finding. This reasoning appears to us to be fallacious. It defeats the object and the purpose of the statute enacted by the legislature, especially to give relief to debtors in the State. The first appellate court had given cogent reasons in support of its finding in favour of the appellants. The court held, and in our view, rightly, that the suit was one for recovery of possession from the mortgagee who was in unauthorised possession of the mortgaged property after the mortgage loan was satisfied. The cause of action for filing such a suit under the Act arose when the enactment was enforced in 1979. Viewed from that angle, the suit was filed in time, and the trial court and the first appellate court rightly recorded the findings to that effect. The High Court erred in reversing the concurrent finding of the courts below on the erroneous assumption that the suit was one for redemption of the mortgage simpliciter. It is relevant to note here that the present suit is not one filed under Section 60 or 62 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is a suit filed for 20 2026:HHC:24824 relief on the basis of the Himachal Pradesh Debt Reduction Act, 1976. 32. Mr Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior Advocate, was at pains to submit that the suit in Kanshi Ram (supra) was filed under the H.P. Debt Reduction Act, whereas in the present case, no suit was filed under the provisions of the Act. Therefore, the judgment in Kanshi Ram (supra) cannot be applied to the present case. This submission cannot be accepted. When the legislature has provided that the provisions of the H.P. Debt Reduction Act will override the provisions of any Act, the Court can not refuse to apply the provisions by holding that they apply to only the suits filed under the provisions of the H.P. Debt Reduction Act and not to any other Act. The interpretation suggested by Mr Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior Advocate, would make the provisions of the H.P. Debt Reduction Act illusory and would not provide the benefit intended by the legislature to the persons who are sought to be protected by the Act. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court was justified in applying the provisions of the H.P. Debt Reduction Act to the present case, and the judgment of the learned Appellate Court cannot be faulted. 21 2026:HHC:24824 33. It is undisputed that the land was mortgaged with possession and was a usufructuary mortgage. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Singh Ram v. Sheo Ram, (2014) 9 SCC 185, that the right to redemption in a usufructuary suit will continue till the mortgaged money is paid, for which there is no time limit. It was observed: - “21. We need not multiply references to the other judgments. Reference to the above judgments clearly spells out the reasons for conflicting views. In cases where distinction in usufructuary mortgagor's right under Section 62 of the TP Act has been noted, right to redeem has been held to continue till the mortgage money is paid, for which there is no time limit, while in other cases, right to redeem has been held to accrue on the date of mortgage, resulting in extinguishment of the right of redemption after 30 years. 22. We, thus, hold that the special right of usufructuary mortgagor under Section 62 of the TP Act to recover possession commences in the manner specified therein, i.e. when mortgage money is paid out of rents and profits or partly out of rents and profits and partly by payment or deposit by the mortgagor. Until then, limitation does not start for the purposes of Article 61 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. A usufructuary mortgagee is not entitled to file a suit for a declaration that he had become an owner merely on the expiry of 30 years from the date of the mortgage. We answer the question accordingly.” 34. In the present case, the plaintiffs had not asserted in the plaint that the usufruct from the mortgage had extinguished the mortgage amount of ₹350/-. Therefore, the right to mortgage will continue, and the learned Appellate Court was right in holding 22 2026:HHC:24824 that the period of limitation had not expired. Thus, the very premises of the suit filed by Govind Ram, etc., that the period of limitation of 30 years applied to the present case, and they had became the owners by way of efflux of time, was bad. Therefore, this substantial question of law is answered accordingly. Substantial Question of Law No.2: 35. Mr Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior Advocate, referred to the definition of creditor and submitted that the provisions of the H.P. Debt Reduction Act apply only when a person is engaged in the business of lending money. This submission overlooks the fact that the definition of creditor applies to chapter-5 of the Act, containing Sections 22 to 30 and not to Chapter 4 containing Section 11. Therefore, no advantage can be derived from the definition of the creditor. The definition of a loan, as noted above, is quite wide and includes advances of any kind. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court had rightly held that the provisions of the H.P. Debt Reduction Act applied to the present case, and the decree for foreclosure could not have been passed without complying with the provisions of the Act. Hence, this substantial question of law is answered accordingly. 23 2026:HHC:24824 Substantial Question of Law No.3: 36. As per the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Singh Ram (supra), there is no period of limitation for redemption of the usufructuary mortgage, and the conclusion drawn by the learned Appellate Court that Dile Ram had a right of redemption cannot be faulted. Hence, this substantial question of law is answered accordingly. Substantial Question of Law in RSA 216 of 2007: Substantial Question of Law No.1: 37. It has been found above that the provisions of the H.P. Debt Reduction Act, 1976, apply to the present case because the suit was for foreclosure in substance; hence, this substantial question of law is answered accordingly. Substantial Question of Law No.2: 38. It has been found above that the definition of a loan is quite wide and includes an advance of any kind; therefore, the learned Appellate Court had rightly applied the provisions of the H.P. Debt Reduction Act to the present case. Hence, this substantial question of law is answered accordingly. 24 2026:HHC:24824 Substantial Question of Law No.3: 39. It has been found above that there is no period of limitation for the redemption of a usufructuary mortgage. The plaintiffs never claimed that the usufruct of the mortgage was sufficient to liquidate the mortgaged amount. Therefore, the suit could not have been decreed on the premise that the right of redemption was lost with time. Hence, this substantial question of law is answered accordingly. Substantial Question of Law No.4: 40. It has been found above that the period of limitation does not apply to the usufructuary mortgage unless there are pleadings that the usufruct of the mortgage was sufficient to liquidate the amount. In the present case, no such pleadings have been made; hence, the suit could not have been decreed by the learned Trial Court, and this substantial question of law is answered accordingly. Final Order: 41. In view of the above, the present appeals fail, and these are dismissed. 25 2026:HHC:24824 42. Pending application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of. 43. Records of the learned Courts below be sent down forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 25th June, 2026 (Chander)