1 2026:CGHC:7271-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 56 of 2022 State of Chhattisgarh, through the Police Station Chandoura, District Surajpur (C.G.). ... Appellant Versus Lakhan Dewangan S/o Karam Sai Dewangan, aged about 26 years, R/o Village Ghumadand, Post Revti, P.S. Chandoura, District Surajpur (C.G.). ... Respondent For Appellant : Mr. Kanhaiya Ram Yadav, P.L. For Respondent : None. Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey, J. Hon’ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal, J. Judgment on Board Per, Rajani Dubey, J. 10/02/2026 1. This present appeal has been preferred by the State/appellant against the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 31.08.2021 passed by the learned Special Judge (POCSO Act, 2012) Pratappur, District- Surajpur (C.G.) in Special Criminal Case No. 09/2020, whereby the Digitally signed by RAVVA UTTEJ KUMAR RAJU 2 accused/respondent has been acquitted of the charge punishable under Sections 457, 376/511 of IPC and Section 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. 2. Brief facts of the case as adumbrated are that the complainant/prosecutrix (PW-03) at Chandoura Police Station lodged written complaint alleging that on 02.09.2020 her mother went to the in- laws’ house of her elder daughter at village Dadkarwan and on the said date, the complainant and her brother were there in the house. On the date of the incident, after having their dinner, both brother and sister went towards their respective rooms to sleep and at that time around 12 am – 1 am, the accused Lakhan Dewangan of village Dhumadadh entered the house of the prosecutrix by jumping over the wall and upon reaching prosecutrix’s room, he found her in sleeping condition and started taking undue advantage by kissing her and touching her inappropriately, when the prosecutrix wanted to make noise, the accused/respondent shut her mouth with this hand and by pulling down her clothes he tried to commit forcible sexual intercourse with her. The prosecutrix in her rescue, kicked the accused/respondent to which the accused/respondent fell down from the cot, the prosecutrix ran towards the other room and latched the door from inside and starting raising alarm of help. Upon hearing her shouts, the accused/respondent fled away from her house. Thereafter, she disclosed about the entire incident to her brother, aunt and cousin sister and then she disclosed about the incident to her mother by phone. As such, on the basis of the written complaint, the crime was found to have occurred and hence the Chandoura Police Station registered a F.I.R. against the accused Lakhan under Crime No. 66/2020 for offence punishable under 3 Sections 457, 376/511 of IPC and Section 8 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short “POCSO Act”) and the matter was taken up for investigation. During the investigation, several seizures were made and the statement of the victim/prosecutrix was recorded before the concerned Jurisdictional Magistrate. 3. After completion of due and necessary investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the present accused/respondent before the concerned Jurisdictional Magistrate, who, in turn, committed the case for trial. On the basis of the material contained in the charge-sheet, learned trial Court acquitted the accused/respondent of the offence under Sections 457, 376/511 of IPC and Section 8 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 against which the present appeal has been filed by the State/appellant. 4. Learned counsel for the State/appellant submits that the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Court is illegal, improper, incorrect and the same is liable to be set aside. The learned trial Court has failed to consider the statement of PW-01 who has stated that the victim had given information about the incident and stated that she was being subjected to sexual assault by the accused. He further submits that in the statement of victim before the Court, the statement of commission of alleged act has remained uncontroverted in the cross-examination, hence the case of the prosecution was proved by the prosecutrix. has erred by acquitting the respondent of the offences levelled against him. The prosecution has been able to prove the criminal intention of the respondent/accused by evidence of the witnesses, beyond the all shadows of reasonable doubts. The learned trial Court has not justified 4 by discarding the evidence of victim without there being any strong reason to discard the evidence of the prosecution. The learned trial Court erred grossly in giving importance to some parts of the cross- examination of the prosecutrix, though it was stated by the prosecutrix herself in her examination before the Court that the report was not read over to her before being submitted, but she had not denied that the act was committed. Therefore, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, the judgment and finding of the learned trial Court is perverse and is liable to be set aside. 5. No one appeared on behalf of the respondent. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the State/appellant and perused the material available on record. 7. It is clear from the record of the learned Trial Court that it framed charges against the accused/respondent under Sections 457, 376/511 of IPC and Section 8 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. As per the prosecution, the prosecutrix was aged about 17 years at the time of the incident and she has stated that her date of birth as 03.10.2004. 8. PW-02, Parmeshwar Tirkey, Principal of Primary School Salhanipara Dhumadand has stated that the police seized School admission Register vide Ex. P/02, copy of the School admission register is Ex. P/03 and as per this Register, date of birth of the prosecutrix was registered as 03.10.2004 and her name was entered in serial No. 65. In para 03 of his cross-examination, he admitted the suggestion of the defence that at the time of admission, the prosecutrix and her parents did not bring any birth certificate or any relevant document and he 5 further admitted that he entered the date of birth of the prosecutrix as stated by the guardian of the prosecutrix. 9. PW-04, the mother of the prosecutrix testified that her daughter is 16 years old, though she was unable to recall the specific date of birth of her daughter. 10. The learned trial Court minutely appreciated the statement of the prosecutrix, her mother, Principal of Primary School and rightly finds that the prosecution had failed to prove the age of the prosecutrix was of below 18 years. 11. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Alamelu and another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, (2011) 2 SCC 385. observed in paras 40 & 48 of its judgment as under: "40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P. held as follows:- “The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of 6 law for the purpose of determining the age of a party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted.” 12. The learned trial Court finds that no clinching and legally admissible evidence has been filed by the prosecution regarding the age of the prosecutrix. 13. PW-03, the prosecutrix has stated that on the date of the incident her mother went to the in-laws’ house of her elder daughter at village Dadkarwan, the prosecutrix and her brother were at home there and at night, after having their dinner, both brother and sister went towards their respective rooms to sleep and at that time around 12 am – 1 am, the accused Lakhan Dewangan of village Dhumadadh entered the house of the prosecutrix, The accused entered the victim's room while she was sleeping and initiated unsolicited physical advances, specifically kissing her and touching her body without consent and further the accused tried to remove her clothes. The prosecutrix in her rescue, kicked the accused/respondent to which the accused/respondent fell down from the cot, the prosecutrix ran towards the other room and latched the door from inside and starting raising alarm of help. Upon hearing her shouts, the accused/respondent fled away from her house. Thereafter, she disclosed about the entire incident to her brother, aunt and cousin sister and then she disclosed about the incident to her mother by phone. In para 15 of her cross- examination, she admitted that there was subsisting enmity of her 7 parents with the accused and his parents since ages and in para 17 of her cross-examination, she admitted that the report of the fateful incident was lodged after two days. In para 24 of her cross- examination, she admitted the suggestion of the defence that she did not make any noise, with the implicit understanding that shouts from the courtyard would have been audible to the neighbors. 14. PW-01, brother-in-law of the prosecutrix has stated that the prosecutrix told him on phone that the accused/respondent entered her room while she was sleeping and took undue advantage of her by molesting her. In his cross-examination, he admitted that he did not testify before the police, he only admitted his signature on the seizure memo vide Ex. P/01. 15. PW-04, mother of the prosecutrix has admitted the suggestion of the defence that with the accused and his family members they had subsisting enmity, as such to implicate the accused/respondent in the crime-in-question, they lodged false report against him. 16. PW-05, Dr. A.K. Vishwakarma, examined the prosecutrix, but he did not find any external or internal injuries on the body of the prosecutrix and gave his report vide Ex. P/10. 17. It is evident that the learned trial Court also minutely appreciated the oral and documentary evidence and rightly finds that the statement of the prosecutrix and her mother are not reliable as the mother in her cross-examination admitted that due to subsisting enmity with the accused and his family they lodged false report against the accused/respondent, as such the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond any reasonable doubt against the accused/respondent and by giving him benefit of doubt acquitted him of the aforesaid 8 charges. 18. The Hon’ble Apex Court in its judgment dated 12.02.2024 passed in Criminal Appeal No.1162 of 2011) in case of Mallappa and Ors. Versus State of Karnataka, has held in para 36 as under:- “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as:- “(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive inclusive of all evidence, oral and documentary; (ii Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal; (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.” 19. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mallappa (supra) and the view which has been taken by the learned trial Court appears to be plausible and possible view and in the absence of any patent illegality or 9 perversity this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment. 20. Accordingly, the acquittal appeal is devoid of any merit and the same is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) (Radhakishan Agrawal) JUDGE JUDGE U.K. Raju