2026:HHC:24002 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CrMMO No.1232 of 2025 Date of Decision: 22.6.2026 _____________________________________________________________________ Vikram Gautam and Ors. ……...Petitioners Versus State of Himachal Pradesh …....Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? Yes. For the Petitioners: Mr. Ajay Kochhar, Senior Advocate with Mr. Sative Chauhan, Advocate. For the Respondent: Mr. Rajan Kahol, Mr. Vishal Panwar and Mr. B.C. Verma, Additional Advocates General with Mr. Ravi Chauhan, Deputy Advocate General. ___________________________________________________________________________ Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral) Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with order dated 10.7.2025 passed by the learned Sessions Judge (Forest) Shimla, whereby prayer made by the petitioners/accused for discharging them under Section 307 of IPC came to be rejected, petitioners-accused have approached this Court in the instant proceedings filed under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, praying therein to set aside afore order in as much as court concerned has arrived at a conclusion that case under Section 307 of IPC is made out against the petitioner. 2026:HHC:24002 2 2. For having bird’s eye view, quintessential facts as emerge from the pleadings as well as material made available to this Court are that report came to be lodged at the behest of the victim/complainant Mohd. Kaleem that on 18.7.2021 at about 8:30pm, while he was in his juice shop and serving the tourists, three persons, came on the counter of his shop and asked for juice. Since complainant was already occupied in serving juice to other tourists, he asked afore persons to wait for some time, but allegedly, these three persons got agitated and started scuffling with the complainant, however dispute was settled with the intervention of the other shopkeepers. Allegedly, after thirty minutes of their having settled the dispute with the complainant, person namely Vikram Gautam, Amit Gautam and Rahul Gautam (petitioners No. 1 to 3) returned back along with two other persons namely Nitish Sharma and Avinash Kanwar (petitioners No. 4 and 5) and started giving beatings to the complainant. Allegedly all the above named persons i.e. petitioners herein, besides causing damage to the juice machine, also gave beatings to the complainant with fist blows and kicks, as a result of which, complainant suffered serious injuries. After receipt of aforesaid complaint, police got the complainant medically examined from IGMC Shimla, whereafter doctor 2026:HHC:24002 3 attending upon the complainant vide opinion dated 18.7.2021 opined the injuries suffered by the complainant to be grievous in nature. Again on 12.8.2021, Medical Officer, IGMC, Shimla, gave opinion that laceration in the scalp could lead to death and there was fracture of left transverse process of L2, L3, L4 and L5 vertebrae, the injuries could endanger the life. 3. On the basis of aforesaid opinion rendered by the medical officer, police proceeded to incorporate Section 307 of the IPC in the FIR already registered against the petitioners under Sections 451, 452, 323, 325, 504, 307, 147, 148 and 149 of IPC. Before learned court below proceed to frame charge on the basis of allegation contained in the challan filed under Section 173 of CrPC as well as documents annexed therewith, petitioners herein submitted before the court concerned that no case much less under Section 307 of IPC is made out against them and as such, they be discharged under the aforesaid provisions of law, however such prayer of them came to be rejected by the learned court below vide impugned order dated 10.7.2025. In the afore background, accused have approached this Court in the instant proceedings praying therein to set aside aforesaid order. 4. Precisely, the grouse of the petitioners as has been highlighted in the petition and further canvassed by Mr. Ajay Kochhar, learned Senior 2026:HHC:24002 4 Advocate, duly assisted by Mr. Sative Chauhan, Advocate, is that learned trial Court while rejecting the prayer of the petitioners to discharge them under Section 307 of IPC wrongly construed term “endangered to life” attracting Section 307 of IPC. While making this Court peruse Section 320 sub clause 8 of IPC, wherein “grievous hurt” has been explained, Mr. Kochhar, learned Senior Advocate, submitted that any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits would fall in the category of grievous hurt and in that situation, accused can be charged under Sections 325 and 326 of IPC, but definitely not under Section 307 of IPC. While making this Court peruse Section 307 of IPC, Mr. Kochhar further argued that most crucial and important ingredient of aforesaid provision of law are “intention” or “knowledge”. While making this Court peruse challan presented in the competent court of law, Mr. Kochhar submitted that it is none of the case of the prosecution that there was any prior animosity inter-se complainant and the petitioners-accused, rather alleged incident happened at the spur of the moment. He further submitted that it is also not in dispute that though nature of injuries suffered by the complainant was opined to be grievous, but complainant was discharged on the same day, meaning thereby, his life was never in danger. Lastly Mr. Kochhar submitted that though there is no sufficient 2026:HHC:24002 5 evidence adduced on record by the prosecution to prove guilt of the accused, but at best, they could be charged under Section 326 IPC, for their having allegedly inflicted grievous injuries on the body of the complainant with dangerous weapon. 5. To the contrary, Mr. Rajan Kahol, learned Additional Advocate General, while supporting the impugned order dated 10.7.2025, vehemently argued that bare perusal of Section 307 of IPC nowhere suggests that there is requirement, if any, of grievous injury, rather accused on his/her having inflicted hurt on complainant/victim can be charged under the afore provision of law. He submitted that to invoke Section 307 of IPC, prosecution is only required to prove overt act and guilty intention of the accused, which in the case at hand stands duly proved. He submitted that use of deadly weapon i.e. grip by the accused coupled with the fact that injury was inflicted on the head of the complainant/victim, itself establishes intention and knowledge of the accused that such act of their can cause death which is sufficient to invoke Section 307 of the IPC. He submitted that mere conduct of the accused clearly reveals that they had come with an intention to kill the complainant. He submitted that at the first instance, three accused after being pacified by the local shopkeepers left the spot, but thereafter after thirty minutes came in group and caused 2026:HHC:24002 6 fatal injury on the head of the complainant with deadly weapon like grip, which act of their clearly suggests that they had come with definite knowledge or intention to kill the complainant. Lastly, Mr. Kahol submitted that very requirement of Section 307 IPC is “hurt” not “grievous hurt” as has been defined under Section 319 IPC. He further submitted that opinion of doctor that injuries caused on the person of the complainant with the help and aid of the deadly weapon like grip could endanger his life, cannot be ignored and mere factum that complainant was discharged on the same day may not be a reason to conclude that no case much less under Section 307 of IPC is made, rather in totality of facts and evidence collected on record, accused are required to be tried for their having committed offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record of the case. 7. Before ascertaining the genuineness and correctness of the submissions and counter submissions having been made by the learned counsel for the parties vis-à-vis prayer made in the instant petition, this Court deems it necessary to discuss/elaborate the scope and competence of this Court to quash the criminal proceedings while exercising power under Section 528 of BNSS (earlier Section 482 of Cr.PC). 2026:HHC:24002 7 8. Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled State of Haryana and others vs. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 has laid down several principles, which govern the exercise of jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C (now Section 528 of BNSS). Before pronouncement of aforesaid judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court, a three-Judge Bench of Hon’ble Court in State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy and others, 1977 (2) SCC 699, held that the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. Relevant para is being reproduced herein below:- “7....In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court’s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity 2026:HHC:24002 8 for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the 58 inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction.” 9. Subsequently, Hon’ble Apex Court in Bhajan Lal (supra), has elaborately considered the scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C. Subsequently, Hon’ble Apex Court in Vineet Kumar and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr., while considering the scope of interference under Sections 397 Cr.PC and 482 Cr.PC, by the High Courts, has held that High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to quashed. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further held that the saving of the High Court’s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose i.e. a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In the aforesaid case, the Hon’ble Apex Court taking note of seven categories, where power can be exercised under Section 482 Cr.PC, as enumerated in Bhajan Lal (supra), i.e. where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafides and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an 2026:HHC:24002 9 ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge, quashed the proceedings. 10. Hon’ble Apex Court in Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293, while drawing strength from its earlier judgment titled as Rajiv Thapar and Ors v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330, has reiterated that High Court has inherent power under Section 482 Cr.PC., to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charge, but such power must always be used with caution, care and circumspection. While invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts and the material adduced on record itself overrules the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. The material relied upon by the accused should be such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would 2026:HHC:24002 10 prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. In the aforesaid judgment titled Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- “22. The proposition of law, pertaining to quashing of criminal proceedings, initiated against an accused by a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as “the Cr.P.C.”) has been dealt with by this Court in Rajiv Thapar & Ors. vs. Madan Lal Kapoor wherein this Court inter alia held as under: (2013) 3 SCC 330, paras 29-30) 29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far reaching consequences, inasmuch as, it would negate the prosecution’s/complainant’s case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. the High Court has to be fully satisfied, that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such, as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such, as would clearly reject and overrule 2026:HHC:24002 11 the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. 30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:- 30.1 Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? 30.2 Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false. 30.3 Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? 2026:HHC:24002 12 30.4 Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice? 30.5 If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal - proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.” 11. Hon'ble Apex Court in Asmathunnisa v. State of A.P. (2011) 11 SCC 259, has held as under: “12. This Court, in a number of cases, has laid down the scope and ambit of the High Court's power under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified 9 by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute. 13. The law has been crystallized more than half a century ago in the case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 wherein this Court has summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings. This Court summarized the following three broad categories where the 2026:HHC:24002 13 High Court would be justified in exercise of its powers under section 482: (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceedings; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge." 14.In Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi and Others (1976) 3 SCC 736, according to the court, the process against the accused can be quashed or set aside : "(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused; (2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no 10 prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (3) where the d iscretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and (4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like". 2026:HHC:24002 14 15. This court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy & Others (1977) 2 SCC 699, observed that the wholesome power under section 482 Cr.P.C. entitles the High Court to quash a proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice requires that the proceedings ought to be quashed. The High Courts have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose. A Court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In this case, the court observed that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice must be administered according to laws made by the Legislature. This case has been followed in a large number of subsequent cases of this court and other courts.” 12. Hon'ble Apex Court in Asmathunnisa (supra) has categorically held that where discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like, High Court would be justified in exercise of its powers under S. 482 CrPC. 13. From the bare perusal of aforesaid exposition of law, it is quite apparent that while exercising its inherent power under Setion 528 of 2026:HHC:24002 15 BNSS/Section 482 CrPC, High Court can proceed to quash the proceedings, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of the law. 14. Now being guided by the aforesaid law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court from time to time, this court would make an endeavour to find out whether offence, if any, punishable under Section 307 of IPC and evidentiary material collected on record by the prosecution is sufficient to connect the accused with the alleged commission of offence or not? 15. Precisely, the question which needs to be determined in the case is “whether opinion rendered by the doctor that injuries caused on the person of the complainant/victim are endangering to life would be sufficient to charge the accused under Section 307 of IPC” and “whether on account of inflicting grievous injuries on the person of victim, accused in routine manner can be charged under Section 307 of IPC or not?” 16. In nutshell, case of the petitioners-accused as has been projected is that they cannot be charged under Section 307 of IPC for their having allegedly inflicted grievous injuries, which according to the doctor are endangering to life being inflicted on the head of the complainant. Though, at this stage, factum of infliction of grievous injuries has been not refuted, but precise argument raised at the behest of the accused is that on 2026:HHC:24002 16 account of infliction of grievous injuries, if any, by the accused, they could at best be charged under Section 326 of IPC, but not under Section 307 of IPC. At this stage, it would be apt to take note of Section 320 of IPC, which reads as under: “320. Grievous hurt— The following kinds of hurt only are designated as “grievous”:— (First) — Emasculation. (Secondly) — Permanent privation of the sight of either eye. (Thirdly) — Permanent privation of the hearing of either ear, (Fourthly) — Privation of any member or joint. (Fifthly) — Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint. (Sixthly) — Permanent disfiguration of the head or face. (Seventhly) — Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth. (Eighthly) — Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits.” 17. Clause-8 of the afore provision of law refers to injuries, which could endanger life or which cause the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, meaning thereby, any hurt which endangers life would fall in the category of grievous injuries. There is a certain difference between expression “endangering life” and “dangerous to life”. Expression "dangerous to life" is somewhat milder and subdued as compared to the expression "endangering life" used in clause 'Eighthly' of 2026:HHC:24002 17 Section 320 of the Indian Penal Code and as such, an injury which is described by the doctor as 'dangerous to life' cannot be held to be one which endangers life. Clause-8 refers to injuries, which are not only dangerous, but which endanger life. Since “hurt” has been specifically defined under Section 319 IPC, “injuries” as referred in Clause 320 Clause 8 IPC appear to have been designed to exclude cases of hurt, which though, dangerous to life, but do not put life in a given case in danger. 18. Admittedly, in the case at hand, at the first instance, medical officer responsible for conducting medical of the complainant opined the injuries suffered by the complainant on his head to be grievous in nature, but in subsequent opinion, he opined such injuries to be “endangering life”. The expression 'dangerous' is an adjective and the expression 'endanger' is verb. An injury which can put life in immediate danger of death would be an injury, which can be termed as 'dangerous to life' and therefore, when a doctor describes an injury as 'dangerous to life', he means an injury which endangers life in terms of clause 8 of Section 320 of Indian Penal Code, because afore provision of law, describes the injury 'dangerous to life' only for the purpose of the said clause. Since in the instant case, doctor opined the injuries to be grievous in nature, which as per him could endanger the life, this court is persuaded to agree with Mr. Ajay Kochhar, learned Senior 2026:HHC:24002 18 Counsel, that injuries allegedly suffered by the complainant in the alleged incident would be deemed to be ‘grievous injury’ in terms of Section 320 Sub Clause 8. 19. At this stage, it would also be apt to take note of Sections 325 and 326 of the Indian Penal Code, which read as under: “325. Punishment for voluntarily causing grievous hurt.— Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. 326. Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means— Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance, or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.” In both the afore provisions of law, specific expression “grievous hurt” has been used. Whoever voluntarily causes grievous hurt shall be punished with imprisonment, which may extend to seven years under Section 325 of IPC and whosoever, voluntarily causes grievous hurt by dangerous weapon 2026:HHC:24002 19 can be punished under Section 326 of IPC with imprisonment for life or for a term, which may extend to ten years, meaning thereby, person accused of having caused voluntarily grievous hurt with dangerous weapon like grip can be imprisoned for life also. 20. Now at this stage, this court also finds it necessary to elaborate upon provision contained under Section 307 of IPC, which deals with “attempt to murder”. Section 307 of IPC reads as under: 307. Attempt to murder.— Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned. Attempts by life convicts.— When any person offending under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death. Illustrations (a) A shoots at Z with intention to kill him, under such circumstances that, if death ensued. A would be guilty of murder. A is liable to punishment under this section. (b) A, with the intention of causing the death of a child of tender years, exposes it in a desert place. A has committed the offence defined by this section, though the death of the child does not ensue. 2026:HHC:24002 20 (c) A, intending to murder Z, buys a gun and loads it. A has not yet committed the offence. A fires the gun at Z. He has committed the offence defined in this section, and if by such firing he wounds Z, he is liable to the punishment provided by the latter part of the first paragraph of this section. (d) A, intending to murder Z by poison, purchases poison and mixes the same with food which remains in A’s keeping; A has not yet committed the offence defined in this section. A places the food on Z’s table or delivers it to Z’s servant to place it on Z’s table. A has committed the offence defined in this section.” 21. If the aforesaid provision of law is read in its entirety, it is in two parts. First part deals with a situation, where a person acts with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances that if he by that act caused death would be guilty of murder and in the situation, he/she would be punished with imprisonment of either description of a term which may extend to ten years. Second part deals with a situation where any person if causes hurt with an intention or knowledge, he/she shall be liable for punishment for life. To invoke afore provision of law, prosecution is necessarily required to prove “intention” or “knowledge” to kill a person. Nature of injury may not be of much relevance for invoking aforesaid provision of law. Even simple hurt caused with intention or knowledge to kill can invite section 307 of IPC. In similar manner, grievous hurt, if any, caused without there being intention or knowledge may not be a ground for the prosecution to invoke Section 307 of IPC. 2026:HHC:24002 21 22. Though during submissions of the case, Mr. Rajan Kahol, learned Additional Advocate General, fairly admitted that mere mentioning of grievous injuries, which could endanger the life, in the opinion rendered by the Medical Officer may not be sole ground for the prosecution to invoke Section 307 of IPC, but his precise case is that very conduct of accused coupled with the use of deadly weapon clearly reveals the intention or knowledge of the accused to cause death of the complainant. Mr. Kahol submitted that had accused no intention or knowledge to kill the complainant, there was no occasion for them to again come back to the spot and give beatings to the complainant with deadly weapon like grip. He further submitted that had accused inflicted injury on the person of the complainant, at the first instance, they would have been right in contending that they had no intention or knowledge to kill the complainant, rather incident happened at the spur of a moment, but their act of returning to the spot after thirty minutes of the incident, that too with deadly weapon clearly suggests that they had come on the spot with intention or knowledge to kill the complainant, however with due respect, this Court after having perused challan under Section 173 CrPC in entirety is not persuaded to agree with learned Additional Advocate General for the reason that police challan nowhere reveals prior animosity, if any, inter-se 2026:HHC:24002 22 accused and complainant/victim, rather as per own case of the prosecution, altercation took place inter-se accused and the complainant on account of delay in serving of juice. Since there were number of tourists in the shop of the complainant and they had come before the accused, complainant asked the accused to wait for some time, but it appears that accused got agitated and started pushing the juice machine of the complainant, however, with the intervention of the local shopkeepers, tension was defused and accused left the spot of the incident. Allegedly, after thirty minutes, three accused i.e. petitioners No. 1 to 3, who had come on the spot at the first instance, came along with other two persons i.e. petitioners No. 4 and 5, and straightaway started giving beatings to the complainant. They also allegedly gave one blow of the “grip” on the head of the complainant, as a result of which, he suffered grievous injury on his scalp, which was subsequently opined to be grievous in nature, which could endanger the life. Mere act of accused returning after thirty minutes of the first incident may not be sufficient to conclude the intention or knowledge if any, of them to cause death of the complainant. Interestingly, complainant at the time of his getting statement recorded under Section 154 of CrPC nowhere mentioned factum of his having been attacked with grip, rather at that juncture, he disclosed that accused hit him with a jug, kicks and fist blows. Story of use of grip, if any, by the accused came to the 2026:HHC:24002 23 disclosed by the complainant while he was being examined by the doctor, who subsequently, proceeded to opine the injuries suffered by the complainant to be grievous in nature caused by a blunt weapon. 23. To prove intention or knowledge as required under Section 307 of IPC, prosecution is /was under obligation to prove that there was a prior animosity inter-se complainant and accused or they were so much hurt with the behaviour of the complainant at the time of first incident that on the second occasion, they purposely with intention and knowledge came on the spot to kill the complainant. In the instant case, it is own case of the prosecution that at the first instance, no injury was caused by the accused to the complainant, rather at that juncture, they only pushed the juice machine. Before tension could escalate inter-se parties, local shopkeepers intervened, whereafter accused left the spot. There is nothing in the challan suggestive of the fact that at the first instance, complainant or any person of the local area, who had come to the rescue of the complainant had provoked or hurled abuses on the accused, which could further provoke them to come prepared for causing murder of the complainant. Incident, which happened at the first instance, was defused without there being any injury, however, allegedly after thirty minutes of such incident, accused i.e. petitioners again came on the spot and straightway gave 2026:HHC:24002 24 beatings to the complainant, which was subsequently opined to be grievous in nature, however such fact of them cannot be said to have been done with an intention or knowledge to kill the complainant 24. By now it is well settled that to infer knowledge or intention as required under Section 307 of IPC, facts of the case in entirety, are required to be taken into consideration. Though, at this stage, Mr. Rajan Kahol, learned Additional Advocate General, attempted to argue that since intention and knowledge are the matter of inference to be drawn from the totality of circumstances, thus it is a question of fact and not one of law and as such cannot be gone into in the instant proceedings, rather required to be decided by the learned trial Court in totality of facts as well as evidence led on record by the respective parties, however this Court is of the view that once bare perusal of challan, wherein complete narration of facts has been given, nowhere discloses intention or knowledge as required under Section 307 of IPC coupled with the fact that Section 227 of CrPC enables an accused to seek discharge on the ground that no case is made out against him/her, this court sees no reason to let the accused face trial for the offence, for which prosecution has not been able to collect cogent and convincing evidence. 2026:HHC:24002 25 25. Leaving everything aside, this Court finds that Section 307 of IPC was incorporated only on the basis of second report of the medical officer, where he opined that injuries suffered by the complainant can endanger his life coupled with the fact that prior to rendering of afore opinion by the doctor, case under Section 325 of IPC, was registered after the rendering of first opinion by the doctor, where he opined the injuries to be grievous in nature. Since doctor had opined injuries to be grievous in nature as has been defined under Section 320 Sub Clause 8 coupled with the fact that there is specific mention of expression “grievous hurt” in the provisions contained under Sections 325 and 326 of IPC, this Court is of the view that learned trial Court ought not have rejected the claim of the petitioners that there are required to be discharged under Section 307 of the IPC, especially when no cogent and convincing evidence ever came to be adduced on record qua the intention or knowledge of the accused to kill the complainant. 26. To invoke Section 307 of IPC, it is not mandatory for the prosecution to prove that accused caused grievous injuries on the person of the complainant/victim, rather they should place on record some evidence to show that act of the accused was done with an intention to cause death or with an intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to 2026:HHC:24002 26 be likely to cause death or if it is done with an intention of causing bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death or if the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous in all probabilities that death will be caused, which is likely in the present case. Since it may not be possible for the prosecution to prove intention or knowledge in every case, specific provision has been made under Sections 325 and 326 of IPC, wherein person accused of causing grievous hurt can be punished. To invoke aforesaid provisions of law, there is no requirement, if any, for the prosecution to prove intention and knowledge. In case submission made by the learned Additional Advocate General is accepted, as has been noticed herein above, provisions contained under Sections 325 and 326 of IPC would become redundant. 27. Reliance is placed upon judgment dated 11.12.2023 passed by coordinate Bench of this Court in CrMMO No. 891 of 2023, titled as Chetan and Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh and Anr., relavant paras whereof read as under: 5. In the present case, the status report mentions that as per the FIR, Chetan inflicted a blow on the head of the victim Abhishek Mishra with an iron rod due to which he started bleeding. As per the opinion of the Medical Officer, the nature of the injury was grievous caused by blunt force trauma and was endangering the life. Therefore, the police added Section 307 of IPC. 6. The medical report clearly shows that the nature of the injury was grievous and endangering to life. It was laid down by Punjab and Haryana High Court in Atma Singh Vs. State of Punjab 1980 Crim. 2026:HHC:24002 27 L.J. 1220 that IPC recognizes only four kinds of injuries — simple, grievous, injuries inflicted with intent to commit murder and injuries sufficient to cause death. There is no provision in the IPC which recognizes injury dangerous to life or which endangers life. The injury endangering the life will fall within Section 20(8) of IPC and such an injury will be grievous. It was observed:- “10. When the doctor is required to carry out a medicolegal examination of the injury suffered in a criminal assault, he is required to examine the injury from two standpoints : (1) for the purpose of opining the kind of weapon used to inflict the injury in question and, (2ndly) to form an opinion regarding the degree of seriousness of the injury in order to enable to see as to what offence has the accused committed by inflicting the injury in question. The Indian Penal Code recognises from the standpoint of seriousness only four types of injuries, (1) simple injuries; (2) grievous (3) injuries of the kind inflicted with intent to commit murder described in clauses 'Firstly' and '2ndly' of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, (4) injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature envisaged by clause Thirdly' of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. There is no provision in the Indian Penal Code, which envisages or refers to an injury described as 'dangerous to life'. The medicolegal examination of an injured person is intended to enable the Investigating Agency and the Court to find out the nature of the offence and, therefore, the doctor examining an injured person has to opine that the injury in question is one or the other of the type recognised in the Indian Penal Code for the purposes of a given offence. When a doctor describes an injury as 'dangerous to life' one has to see what had the doctor intended to convey thereby. Is one to hold that since the injury has not been described by the doctor as one which 'endangered life', so the concerned injury cannot be held to be grievous on the specious ground that an injury described as 'dangerous to life' is not as serious an injury which 'endangers life'. 11. It appears that the doctors who had been conducting the medico- legal examinations have been using the term 'dangerous to life' as synonymous with an injury, which 'endangers life'. Even the Courts at times have considered an injury described as dangerous to life as an injury envisaged in clause 'Eighthly of Sec. 320 of the Indian Penal Code. In this regard reference can be made to Mahamed Rafi v. Emperor, AIR 1930 Lah 305 : (31 Cri LJ 77). In that case, the injury was on the right side of the neck about 2½" x -" in dimension inflicted with a sharp-edged weapon. The doctor had, in fact in that case deposed that there was every possibility of the deceased surviving but for the wound becoming septic apparently as a result of it being pressed with hands and bandaged with dirty cloth in the 2026:HHC:24002 28 initial stages before the deceased was taken to the hospital. The Court held that though a finding that the appellant knew that his act was likely to cause death, was not justified but at the same time, a wound on the neck must at least be considered to be 'dangerous to life' within the meaning of Clause (8), Section 320, Indian Penal Code, and therefore, grievous'. 12. Palekar, J., too in Jai Narain Mishra v. State of Bihar, 1972 Cr App R 19 : (1972 Cri LJ 469) (SC), held, a penetrating wound 1½ x ½ x chest wall deep on the right side of the chest caused with a bhala and described as 'dangerous to life', as grievous injury and in the latter part of paragraph 11 called this injury as one endangering life. 13. The expression 'dangerous' is an adjective and the expression 'endanger' is a verb. An injury, which can put life in immediate danger of death would be an injury which can be termed as 'dangerous to life' and, therefore, when a doctor describes an injury as 'dangerous to life', he means an injury, which endangers life in terms of clause (8) of Section 320, Indian Penal Code, for, it describes the injury 'dangerous to life' only for the purpose of the said clause. He instead of using the expression that this was an injury which 'endangered life' described it as that the injury was 'dangerous to life', meaning both times the same thing. 14. K. S. Tiwana, J. in Crl. Appeal No. 1489 of 1974, (Sukhdev Singh v. The State of Punjab), decided on January 18, 1979, was concerned with the statement of a doctor who had merely externally examined the injury and had opined it to be dangerous to life. The doctor who had performed the operation had not preferred any opinion. The injury was a penetrating wound with clean-cut margins of the size of 1¼" x ½" on the left side of the chest, 5" below the nipple. The depth of the wound was not measured by the doctor who had given the opinion. In this case, the learned Judge did not accept the opinion of the doctor that the injury was dangerous to life on the ground that he was not qualified to say so merely by looking at the injury and the one who had performed the operation and had seen the damage had not given any such opinion. The learned Judge did not go into the question that an injury described as dangerous to life in no case could be considered a grievous injury. 15. S. S. Dewan, J., in Crl. Appeal No. 1007 of 1975 (Harbans Singh v. The State of Punjab) decided on February 8, 1979, observed as did S. C. Mital, J., in Jagrup Singh's case (1973 Chand LR (Cri) 253) (Punj) that the term 'dangerous to life' is milder than the expression 'endangers life'. He merely followed his earlier decision holding that an injury described as dangerous to life cannot be considered grievous. 2026:HHC:24002 29 16. A. S. Bains, J., in Crl. Appeal No. 355 of 1976, (Surjit Singh v. The State of Punjab), merely followed the decision in Jagrup Singh's case (1973 Chand LR (Cri) 253) (Punj) and held that injury described as 'dangerous to life' would not satisfy the requirement of clause (8) of Section 320, Indian Penal Code and would not be a grievous injury. In all these decisions, with respect, there is no discussion in depth. 17. We are of the view that the Court is not absolved of the responsibility while deciding a criminal case to form its conclusion regarding the nature of the injury, the Expert's opinion notwithstanding. The Court has to see the nature and dimension of the injury, its location and the damage that it has caused. Even when an injury is described as to be one which endangers the life the court has to apply its mind and form its own opinion in regard to the nature of the injury, having regard to the factors that should weigh with the Court, already mentioned. We are also firmly of the view that wherever a doctor describes an injury as 'dangerous to life’ and the nature of the injuries is such which could merit such a conclusion then such an injury has to be treated as 'grievous hurt' of the description mentioned in the first portion of clause (8) of Section 320 of the Indian Penal Code.” (Emphasis supplied) 7. Therefore, on the basis of the status report, it cannot be said that the offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC was made out. Since the matter has been compromised, therefore, 10 the chances of securing conviction under Section 307 of IPC would be bleak. 28. Reliance is also placed upon judgment dated 28.11.2023, passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Criminal Appeal No. 3619 of 2023 (@Special leave petition (Crl.) No. 5136 of 2022), titled as Sivamani and Anr. v. State represented by Inspector of Police. Relevant paras of the afore judgment reads as under: “9. In State of Madhya Pradesh v Saleem, (2005) 5 SCC 554, the Court held that to sustain a conviction under Section 307, IPC, it was not necessary that a bodily injury capable of resulting in death should have been inflicted. As such, non-conviction under Section 307, IPC on the premise only that simple injury was inflicted does not follow as a matter of course. In the same judgment, it was pointed out that ‘…The court has to see whether the act, irrespective 2026:HHC:24002 30 of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section.’ The position that because a fatal injury was not sustained alone does not dislodge Section 307, IPC conviction has been reiterated in Jage Ram v State of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 366 and State of Madhya Pradesh v Kanha, (2019) 3 SCC 605. Yet, in Jage Ram (supra) and Kanha (supra), it was observed that while grievous or life-threatening injury was not necessary to maintain a conviction under Section 307, IPC, ‘The intention of the accused can be ascertained from the actual injury, if any, as well as from surrounding circumstances. Among other things, the nature of the weapon used and the severity of the blows inflicted can be considered to infer intent.’ 10. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case and submissions of learned counsel for the parties, this Court is convinced that the Impugned Judgment of the High Court requires to be interfered with. Admittedly, there is no allegation of repeated or severe blows having been inflicted. Even the injuries on PW1 and PW2 have been found to be simple in nature, which is an additional point in the appellants’ favour. 11. We are further inclined to accept the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants that from the materials on record, only offences under Sections 3232 and 3243 of the IPC can Para 13 of Kanha (supra). ‘323. Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt.—Whoever, except in the case provided for by Section 334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.’ ‘324. Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means.—Whoever, except in the case provided for by Section 334, voluntarily causes hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.’ be made out. As such, the conviction under Section 307, IPC is unsustainable. 2026:HHC:24002 31 12. In the background of the discussions made hereinabove and on taking an overall view, the Impugned Judgment is varied only to the extent that the conviction of the appellants stands modified to that under Sections 323 and 324 of the IPC and the sentence imposed is also reduced to the period already undergone. The fine imposed is maintained. The appellants stand discharged of the liabilities of their bail bonds, if any.” 29. Reliance is also placed upon judgment dated 22.5.2026, passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Criminal Appeal No. 2207 of 2011 titled as Roshan Lal v. State of Haryana and Anr. Relevant paras of the afore judgment reads as under: “ANALYSIS BY THIS COURT 24. The principal question that arises for consideration before this Court is whether the accused persons can be held guilty of the offence punishable under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, and, in particular, whether the essential ingredients of the said provision stood satisfied on the basis of the materials brought on record. 25. Section 307 IPC reads as below: 307. Attempt to murder.—Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned. 26. In order to constitute an offence under Section 307 IPC two elements are essential to be established. First, the intention or knowledge to commit murder. Secondly, the actual act of trying to commit the murder. Thus, it must have both the necessary mens rea and actus reus. Hence, to sustain a conviction under this section, it is necessary to establish that had the accused succeeded in his 2026:HHC:24002 32 attempt and had the victim met his death because of such act, the offence of murder punishable u/s 302 IPC would be established. 27. However, an accused charged u/s 307 IPC cannot be acquitted merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of simple hurt, as the determinative factor is intention or knowledge and not the nature of the injury. This principle was discussed by this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Saleem @ Chamaru, (2005) 5 SCC 554, the relevant paragraph of which reads hereunder: “12. To justify a conviction under this section, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if any. Such an act may not be attended by any result so far as the person assaulted is concerned, but still there may be cases in which the culprit would be liable under this section. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted. What the court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof.” Nevertheless, the nature of injury actually caused does render considerable assistance to the court in ascertaining the intention of the accused. However, courts may also ascertain the intention from other circumstances, even without reference to actual wounds. The aforesaid principle stands reiterated in the case of Bipin Bihari v. State of M.P. (2006) 8 SCC 799, as follows: “9. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained 2026:HHC:24002 33 without any reference at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof” 28. Keeping in mind the above principles, what falls for determination before this Court is whether the appellants caused the injuries in question, and whether such act accompanied by the requisite intention or knowledge, was committed in circumstances which, if resulting in death, would render the act culpable as murder. 29. The evidence of eye-witness Rama Nand (PW4) is unwavering and consistent. PW4 has specifically named all the accused persons with specific acts attributable to each appellant-accused, in his testimony. Further, the evidence of the informant Amar Singh (PW3) itself clearly describes the specific roles played by each of the accused- appellants herein. The appellants have also not led any evidence to disprove the testimonies of Amar Singh (PW3) and Rama Nand (PW4). Hence, it can be concluded without an iota of doubt that the appellants had caused the injuries to the informant, which could have led to his death. 30. Having concluded as above, we now proceed to examine the crucial issue as to whether the injuries in question were inflicted with the requisite intention or knowledge, and in such circumstances that, had death ensued, the act would amount to murder. 31. The words 'such intention' found in Section 307 IPC, refer to the intention referred to in Section 300 IPC. It means: (i) intention to cause death; (ii) intention to cause such bodily injury, which the offender knows is likely to cause death; (iii) intention to cause such bodily injury, which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The essential ingredient of the offence of attempt to murder is the intention to cause death. Such intention exists prior to the actual attempt and must be established independently of the act itself or the actus reus. Once the requisite intention to commit murder is proved, the eventual outcome of the attempt becomes irrelevant, 2026:HHC:24002 34 unless the attempt culminates in death, in which case the offence would fall within Section 300 IPC. In the absence of proof of intention, a conviction under this provision cannot be sustained. 32. Intention, however, can be inferred from surrounding circumstances, such as the type of weapon employed, the words spoken by the accused at the time of the incident, the motive behind the act, the parts of the body targeted, the nature and extent of the injuries inflicted, as well as the force and manner in which the blows were delivered. 33. Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid legal principles, the factual matrix of the present case may now be considered. There is no history of enmity known between the appellants and the injured. The prosecution has also failed to bring on record any material suggesting prior planning, preparation, or concerted intention on the part of the appellants to cause the death of Amar Singh (PW3). On the contrary, the evidence reveals that the incident occurred suddenly when the injured intervened in an altercation involving the driver of the jeep. The assault, therefore, appears to have arisen in the heat of the moment and as a spontaneous reaction to such intervention, rather than pursuant to any pre-conceived intention to eliminate the complainant. 34. The circumstances, viewed holistically, suggest that the object of the appellants was primarily to deter or intimidate the complainant from interfering in the ongoing altercation. It is also significant that the weapons allegedly used by the appellants were ordinary lathis, which, though capable of causing grievous hurt depending upon the manner of use, cannot in the facts of the present case be regarded as inherently deadly weapons. There is nothing on record to indicate that the appellants persisted in the assault with such brutality or ferocity so as to unmistakably disclose an intention to cause death. 35. Undoubtedly, the injuries sustained by Amar Singh (PW3) were grievous in nature, and the medical evidence demonstrates that the injury to the head subsequently led to serious complications. However, the gravity of the injury by itself cannot be determinative of the offence under Section 307 IPC unless the prosecution is able to establish the requisite mens rea contemplated under the provision. The intention to commit murder cannot be presumed merely because the injuries were ultimately opined to be dangerous to life. In the absence of evidence showing prior motive, premeditation, repeated deliberate blows with deadly weapons, or any conduct indicative of a 2026:HHC:24002 35 determined effort to cause death, this Court is unable to hold that the appellants possessed the intention or knowledge necessary to attract Section 307 IPC in the light of Bipin Bihari (supra). 30. Consequently, in view of the aforesaid discussion as well as law taken into consideration, this Court finds merit in the present petition and accordingly, same is allowed and impugned order dated 10.7.2025 passed by the learned Sessions Judge (Forest) Shimla, is quashed and set aside. It is clarified that any observation/finding returned is only for the purpose of discharge sought by the petitioners under Section 307 of IPC and same shall have no bearing on the framing of charge under other provisions of law i.e. Sections 451, 452, 323, 325, 504, 307, 147, 148 and 149 of IPC. It is also open for the learned trial court to consider framing of charge against the petitioners under Section 326 in totality of facts as well as observations made in the instant order. 31. The petition stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms, along with all pending applications. June 22, 2026 (Sandeep Sharma), (manjit) Judge