2026:HHC:24835 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP(M) No.892 of 2026 Date of Decision: 25.06.2026 Ritesh Sharma ….Petitioner Versus State of H.P. ….Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Ms Shikha Chauhan, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge (Oral) The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in FIR No. 58 of 2025, dated 14.03.2025, registered at P.S. Sadar, District Bilaspur, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 61(2), 109 & 238 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 and Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:24835 2. It has been asserted that the petitioner was arrested by the police of the police station Sadar, District Bilapsur, H.P., in the aforesaid FIR on 15.03.2025. The petitioner is innocent, and he was falsely implicated. Co-accused Sourabh Patial alias Fandi was granted bail by this Court in Cr.MP(M) No. 2448 of 2025, on 10.03.2026. Co-accused Rohit and Kuldeep were released on bail by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bilaspur, H.P. The petitioner is also entitled to bail on the principle of parity. The police have completed the investigation and filed the charge sheet before the Court. No fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police received information about the shootout in the residence of ex MLA Bambar Thakur. The police went to the hospital where Bambar Thakur was admitted. The Medical Officer certified that he was not fit to make the statement. The police recorded the statement of injured Vishal Chandel, who stated that he was present in the residence of Bambar Thakur on 3 2026:HHC:24835 14.03.2025. Bambar Thakur, Vishal Chandel and 3-4 persons were talking to each other in the courtyard. The four people came into the courtyard, and two of them shot at Bambar Thakur and the other persons. Bambar Thakur, Sanjeev and the informant Vishal sustained injuries in the incident. Police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The medical examination of the injured showed that they had sustained injuries from a gunshot. The police checked the CCTV footage and call details record and suspected the involvement of Hitesh Sharma, Manjeet Singh Nadda and Rohit Kumar Rana. The police arrested them. They revealed the involvement of Saurabh Patial. The police associated Saurabh Patial and interrogated him. The police also seized Saurabh Patial’s vehicle bearing registration No. HP-23E-1000. The call details record disclosed that Manjeet Singh Nadda and Rohit Kumar Rana had talked to each other before and after the incident. The location of the other shooters was found at Bilaspur. Saurabh Patial had enmity with Bambar Thakur, and FIR No. 67 of 2024, dated 23.02.2024 was registered against him. Bambar Thakur had engaged the shooters to shoot Saurabh Patial, who also engaged the shooters to take revenge. Saurabh Patial had made the arrangements for the stay of the shooters. 4 2026:HHC:24835 He had provided the pistol and the cartridges to Aman, one of the shooters. Saurabh Patial was present at Rohtak on the date of the incident to mislead the police, and Kuldeep had gone to Haridwar after the incident. The petitioner, Ritesh Sharma, was aware of the fact that Saurabh Patial was injured in a shootout, and he wanted to take revenge for the shootout. The petitioner conspired with the co-accused and shared the information regarding the movements of the ex-MLA. Saurabh Patial knew that 14.03.2025 was Holi and the people would visit the residence of the ex-MLA to wish him on Holi. He conspired with Rohit Kumar Rana, Manjeet Singh, and the petitioner, Ritesh Sharma, and asked them to keep an eye on the movement of the ex-MLA. Ritesh Sharma used his vehicle bearing registration No. HP-69- 7257 to keep an eye on the movement of the ex-MLA. He had taken Aman, Sagar, Ajay and Bobby in his vehicle after the incident. The location of the mobile phones of Rohit Kumar Rana, Manjeet Singh, and the petitioner, Ritesh Sharma, was found to be near the place of the incident. The petitioner moved from Bilaspur to Mandi soon after the incident with Rohit Rana and Manjeet Singh Nadda. The locations of co-accused Sagar, Ajay and Bobby tallied with the petitioner’s location from Bilaspur 5 2026:HHC:24835 towards Mandi. The petitioner had deleted the data from his mobile phone. Live and empty cartridges were found in the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-69-7257, owned by the petitioner. The petitioner made a disclosure statement which led to the recovery of two pistols, one Katta, eight live cartridges of Katta, fourteen cartridges of 7.6 mm and one carry bag. The co- accused also revealed that they had concealed the weapons in the petitioner's vehicle after the incident. The petitioner would indulge in the commission of a similar offence. The petitioner had beaten Sunny during their incarceration. The petitioner is a dangerous person who would intimidate the witnesses if released on bail. Hence. It was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 4. I have heard Ms Shikha Chauhan, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State. 5. Ms Shikha Chauhan, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. He was asked to carry the co-accused in his vehicle to Mandi, and he complied. He could not be expected to 6 2026:HHC:24835 raise any hue and cry after seeing the weapons in the hands of the co-accused. He did not abscond and visited the police station after the police had called him. These circumstances, prima facie, show that the petitioner was not part of the conspiracy. Hence, she prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr Lokinder Kutlehria, Learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner had taken the shooters from Bilaspur to Mandi. He knew about the place where the shooters had thrown the weapons of the offence. The petitioner had not reported the matter to any authority regarding the movements of the shooter, which, prima facie, show his complicity. The offence alleged against the petitioner is heinous. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed 7. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the record carefully. 7 2026:HHC:24835 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail 56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9) “7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of 8 2026:HHC:24835 evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied) 57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) “8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied) 58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3) “3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a 9 2026:HHC:24835 judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While placement of the accused in the society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, and the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied) 59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9) “9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other 10 2026:HHC:24835 circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied) xxxxxxx 62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35) “35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, 11 2026:HHC:24835 frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record so as to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied) 9. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court 10. The status report mentions that the petitioner had transported the co-accused, Aman, Sagar, Ajay, and Bobby, from Bilaspur to Mandi in his vehicle bearing registration No. HP-69- 7257. This was confirmed by the recovery of the live and empty cartridges from the petitioner’s vehicle. The petitioner had also made a disclosure statement leading to the recovery of the weapons and the cartridges. His location and the location of the shooters were found to be the same. The petitioner had deleted the data from his mobile phone. These allegations prima facie show the petitioner's involvement in the commission of the crime. 12 2026:HHC:24835 11. It was submitted that bail is the rule and jail is the exception, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on this consideration. This submission will not help the petitioner. The petitioner is, prima facie, involved in the commission of an offence punishable under Section 109(1) of the BNS, which is punishable with imprisonment for life. Thus, the offence is heinous, and the punishment is severe. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 327 that when the punishment is severe, the person is not entitled to bail. It was observed at page 244: “6. Let us have a glance at the pros and cons and the true principle around which other relevant factors must revolve. When the case is finally disposed of and a person is sentenced to incarceration, things stand on a different footing. We are concerned with the penultimate stage, and the principal rule to guide release on bail should be to secure the presence of the applicant who seeks to be liberated, to take judgment and serve a sentence in the event of the Court punishing him with imprisonment. In this perspective, the relevance of considerations is regulated by their nexus with the likely absence of the applicant for fear of a severe sentence, if such be plausible in the case. As Erle. J. indicated that when the crime charged (of which a conviction has been sustained) is of the highest magnitude and the punishment for it assigned by law is of extreme severity, the Court may reasonably presume, some evidence warranting, that no amount of bail would secure the presence of the convict at the stage 13 2026:HHC:24835 of judgment, should he be enlarged. [ Mod. Law Rev. p. 50 ibid., 1852 I E & B 1] Lord Campbell, C.J., concurred in this approach in that case, and Coleridge J. set down the order of priorities as follows: [Mod. Law Rev. ibid., pp. 50-51] “I do not think that an accused party is detained in custody because of his guilt, but because there are sufficient probable grounds for the charge against him as to make it proper that he should be tried, and because the detention is necessary to ensure his appearance at trial .... It is a very important element in considering whether the party, if admitted to bail, would appear to take his trial; and I think that in coming to a determination on that point, three elements will generally be found the most important: the charge, the nature of the evidence by which it is supported, and the punishment to which the party would be liable if convicted. In the present case, the charge is that of wilful murder; the evidence contains an admission by the prisoners of the truth of the charge, and the punishment of the offence is, by law, death.” 7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence also is pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 12. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to bail considering the severity of the punishment. 13. It was submitted that the co-accused has been released on bail, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on the principle of parity. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Bhavan 14 2026:HHC:24835 Rathod v. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana, (2021) 6 SCC 230: (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 722: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 335 that while determining the parity, the role of the accused has to be considered. It was observed at page 246 “Parity, while granting bail, must focus upon the role of the accused. Merely observing that another accused who was granted bail was armed with a similar weapon is not sufficient to determine whether a case for the grant of bail based on parity has been established. In deciding the aspect of parity, the role attached to the accused, their position in relation to the incident, and the victims is of utmost importance. The High Court has proceeded on the basis of parity on a simplistic assessment as noted above, which again cannot pass muster under the law.” 14. This position was reiterated in Tarun Kumar v. Enforcement Directorate, AIR 2024 SC 169: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1486, wherein it was observed: “18. The submission of learned Counsel Mr Luthra to grant bail to the appellant on the ground that the other co-accused, who were similarly situated as the appellant, have been granted bail, also cannot be accepted. It may be noted that parity is not the law. While applying the principle of parity, the Court is required to focus upon the role attached to the accused whose application is under consideration.” 15. The petitioner had actively participated in the transportation of the co-accused, which would distinguish his 15 2026:HHC:24835 case from the case of the co-accused, and the petitioner cannot claim bail on the principle of parity with the co-accused. 16. No other point was urged. 17. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 18. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 25th June, 2026 (ravinder)