1 2026:CGHC:20120 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 4935 of 2021 P. Nageshwar Rao S/o Late Shri P. Appa Rao Aged About 38 Years Working As P. T. I. (L. B.) And Posted At Govt. Higher Secondary School Takiyapara, District Durg Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Panchayat And Rural Development, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar Nawa Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh. 2 - District Education Officer Durg District Durg Chhattisgarh. 3 - Chief Executive Officer Zila Panchayat Durg District Durg Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner : Mr. Shashi Kumar Kushwaha, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Ajay Shrivastava, Advocate For State : Mr. Abhyuday Tripathi, Panel Lawyer Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 30/04/2026 1. The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking the following relief(s):- “10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash Annexure P-1 and respondents authorities to consider and grant seniority/promotion w.e.f. date of competition of 7 years of service with all consequential benefit, in the interest of justice. 10.2 Any other relief which may be suitable in the facts and circumstances of the case, may also be granted.” 2 2. Mr. Kushwaha, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that petitioner was appointed to the post of Assistant Teacher (Panchayat) pursuant to order dated 30.09.2005. He would further submit that the services of the petitioner are governed by the Chhattisgarh Teacher (Panchayat) Cadre (Recruitment Condition of Service) Rules, 2012 (for short, the Rules, 2012). As per Schedule-II of the said Rules,2012 upon completion of seven years of service, the petitioner became eligible for promotion. He would contend that the claim of the petitioner was considered in the year 2017, and thereafter a promotion order was issued on 25.01.2018 but the petitioner moved an application before the respondent authorities seeking grant of notional seniority from the date of eligibility for promotion. He would further contend that the said representation was rejected by respondent No. 3 vide order dated 25.11.2019, and thus, the respondent authorities may be directed to consider the claim of the petitioner for grant of seniority from the date of eligibility. 3. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents would oppose the submissions made by counsel for the petitioner and submit that the petitioner was appointed in the year 2005 and has approached this Court after inordinate delay. He would further submit that the representation of the petitioner was rejected on 25.11.2019, whereas the present petition has been filed on 01.09.2021; therefore, the petition is hit by the principles of delay and laches and deserves to be dismissed. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents placed on file. 5. The petitioner has claimed notional seniority from the date of entitlement for promotion. The petitioner became eligible for promotion in the year 2012, whereas the present petition has been filed 3 in the year 2021 without any sufficient explanation for such inordinate delay. The representation of the petitioner was rejected on 25.11.2019, and thereafter also, the petitioner has approached this Court at belated stage. 6. The Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and others v. Tarsem Singh reported in (2008) 8 SCC 652 summarized the principles with regard to delay & latches in the following manner:- “7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or re fixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion,etc.., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.” 4 7. From the above quoted judgment, it is clear that delayed service- related claims are generally rejected due to delay or limitation; however, an exception exists in cases of a continuing wrong where relief may still be granted despite delay. Nevertheless, this exception does not apply if granting relief would disturb the settled rights of third parties (such as in matters of seniority or promotion). In such cases, the claim will be treated as stale. Further, even where relief is granted, arrears are usually limited to a period of three years prior to filing the petition. 8. In paragraph 7 of the petition, it is stated that there is no delay in filing the petition; thus, the petitioners have failed to explain sufficient cause for such long delay. 9. Again, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the matter of Tridip Kumar Dingal & ors v. State of West Bengal & others, (2009) 1 SCC 768, in paragraph 56 to 58 held as under:- “56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ-Court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. 57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ- Court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime [vide State of M.P. & Anr. V. Bhailal Bhai, (1964) 6 SCR 261; Moon Mills v. Industrial Court, Bombay, AIR 1967 SC 1450; Bhoop Singh v. Union of India & Ors., (1992) 2 SCR 969]. This principle applies even in case of an 5 infringement of fundamental right [vide Trilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, (1969) 1 SCC 110; Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller, (1969) 1 SCC 185; Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 84]. 57. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a Court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the Court depending on and vary from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose.” 10.It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. Remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. Court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons; such delay does not deserve any indulgence, and on the said ground alone, the writ petition may be dismissed. The doctrine of delay and laches, or for that matter, statutes of limitation, are considered to be statutes of repose and statutes of peace. There must be a lifespan during which a person must approach the court for a remedy. Otherwise, there would be unending uncertainty as to the rights and obligations of the parties. 11.Taking into consideration the above discussed facts and law, the petition being hit by delay and laches, deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- Rakesh Mohan Pandey JUDGE Nadim