[2026:RJ-JP:30717-DB] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 723/2021 CNR: RJHC020531592021 | URN: SAW / 1215U / 2021 In S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 20732/2019 Sudesh Agrawal Daughter Of Late Sh. Badri Prasad Agrawal, Aged About 50 Years, Present Address C/o Dr. K.L. Mittal, House No. 846, Mishra Rajaji Ka Rasta, Chandpole Jaipur-302001 At Present Terminated From Services As Teacher Grade-III From Government Upper Primary School, Bhagwan Under Panchayat Samiti, Nohar, Distt. Hanumangarh (Raj.). ----Appellant Versus 1. The Secretary Primary Education, Secretariat, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur. 2. The Director, Primary Education, Bikaner. 3. District Education Officer, Primary Education, Hanumangarh (Rajasthan). ----Respondents For Appellant(s) : Mr. Dinesh Kumar Mishra, Adv. For Respondent(s) : Mr. Chinmaya Saxena, Asst.GC with Ms. Ritika Naruka, AAAG for Mr. S.S. Naruka, AAG HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MONGA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHUTOSH KUMAR Order(Oral) Reportable 06/08/2026 Per: Arun Monga, J. 1. Instant intra court appeal is directed against an order and judgment dated 12.07.2021 passed by the learned Single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 20732/2019, whereby the writ petition challenging the Appellant’s termination from service, vide an administrative order dated 06.11.2012 passed under Rule 86 of the [2026:RJ-JP:30717-DB] (2 of 10) [SAW-723/2021] Rajasthan Service Rules, was dismissed solely on the ground of delay and laches. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the Appellant was appointed as a Grade-III Teacher by Respondent No. 3 vide order dated 23.02.1999 under the quota prescribed for divorcees in the State of Rajasthan. She was initially posted at Government Primary School, 4 CYM, Nohar, District Hanumangarh. She was thereafter transferred to Government Primary School, Bhagwan, Tehsil Nohar, where she joined on 11.11.2001. The Appellant states that she suffered from health related ailments and remained absent from duty on medical grounds. In response to the show cause notice dated 12.09.2011 proposing action under Rule 86 of the Rajasthan Service Rules for her absence from 02.07.2011, she apprised the authorities of her medical condition. She sought permission to resume duties and withdrawal of the proposed proceedings. She joined on 08.10.2011 and thereafter sought further medical leave. 2.1 While undergoing treatment at Kathmandu, the Appellant suffered an accidental fall resulting in fractures and continued treatment there. She states that she was declared fit to resume duties on 20.05.2013. Upon approaching the authorities for joining in July 2013, she came to know that her services had already been terminated vide order dated 06.11.2012, with effect from 09.10.2011, under Rule 86 of the Rajasthan Service Rules on the ground of unauthorised and wilful absence. The Appellant thereafter submitted a representation dated 11.11.2013 before the Governor of Rajasthan seeking review of the termination order, inter alia, on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. The outcome of the representation was not [2026:RJ-JP:30717-DB] (3 of 10) [SAW-723/2021] communicated to her. Subsequent demand notices dated 26.11.2015 and 06.02.2018 are also stated to have remained unanswered. 2.2 The Appellant thereafter sought relevant service records under the Right to Information Act. Upon receiving information from the Chief Block Education Officer, Nohar-Hanumangarh, in September 2019, she states that she became aware of the circumstances relating to her termination. She consequently instituted S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 20732/2019 challenging the termination order dated 06.11.2012. The learned Single Judge, vide order dated 12.07.2021, dismissed the writ petition primarily on the ground of delay and laches, without examining the challenge to the termination on merits. 2.3 Hence, the instant appeal. 3. Learned counsel for the Appellant argues that the learned Single Judge erred in dismissing the writ petition on the ground of delay. He submits that the Appellant came to know only in September 2019, upon obtaining the relevant information and documents through RTI, that her services had been terminated without holding any inquiry. Immediately upon acquiring knowledge of the alleged illegality, the Appellant preferred S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 20732/2019 on 03.12.2019. He further contends that the learned Single Judge failed to consider that the Appellant's challenge raised a serious issue concerning violation of Article 311 of the Constitution and the principles of natural justice. No Government servant can be removed from service without being afforded an opportunity of hearing and without following the procedure prescribed by law. 3.1 He further submits that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate the applicability of Rule 86 of the Rajasthan Service Rules and the judgments governing its interpretation. Relying upon the [2026:RJ-JP:30717-DB] (4 of 10) [SAW-723/2021] decisions in State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Smt. Suji Devi (D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 1045/2018) and Manjulata Shukla (Ku.) v. State & Ors. (2008 Supreme (Raj.) 790), he contends that although Rule 86 provides for consequences of wilful absence, sub rule (3) specifically empowers the disciplinary authority to initiate departmental proceedings under the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules where the allegation is of wilful absence exceeding one month. He submits that, therefore, the Appellant could not have been removed from service on the ground of prolonged or alleged wilful absence without holding a regular departmental inquiry. The termination order is consequently illegal and arbitrary. 3.2 He further contends that the learned Single Judge failed to distinguish the judgment relied upon by the respondents, namely, Union of India & Ors. v. Chaman Rana, (2018) 5 SCC 298. The said case related to promotion, which is not a constitutional right, whereas the present case concerns removal from public employment, to which the constitutional protection under Article 311 directly applies. He submits that the Appellant had also obtained material documents through RTI which revealed that her application for leave for the period commencing from 12.10.2011 had remained undecided. The relevant correspondence of the Headmaster with the Block Education Officer had also not been considered, thereby causing serious prejudice to her. He argues that these facts could not have been examined by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the petition solely on the ground of delay. 3.3 Lastly, learned counsel for the Appellant submits that termination from service on the ground of alleged unauthorised absence, without conducting an inquiry, is excessively harsh and amounts to an arbitrary [2026:RJ-JP:30717-DB] (5 of 10) [SAW-723/2021] exercise of power. He further argues that the termination order dated 06.11.2012 was given retrospective effect from 09.10.2011, which is impermissible in law. Reliance is placed upon R. Jeevaratnam v. State of Madras, MANU/SC/0314/1965, and State Bank of Patiala & Ors. v. Ram Niwas Bansal (Dead) through LRs, MANU/SC/0165/2014. He, therefore, submits that the impugned judgment, having failed to examine the matter on merits and having overlooked the mandatory requirement of departmental inquiry under Rule 86(3) of the RSR, deserves to be set aside and the order of termination quashed. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents contends that the Appellant had been appointed on 23.02.1999 as Teacher Grade-III under the divorcee quota. After being transferred to Government Primary School, Bhagwan, Tehsil Nohar, District Hanumangarh, she remained absent from duties on the ground of illness and availed medical leave as well as leave without pay. He submits that the Appellant's absence was wilful. Despite being duly informed, she failed to resume her duties. Her services were ultimately terminated vide order dated 06.11.2012, with effect from 09.10.2011, under Rule 86 of the Rajasthan Service Rules. 4.1 He further submits that due procedure under Rule 86 of the RSR was duly followed before terminating the Appellant's services. The Block Elementary Education Officer, Nohar, informed the District Education Officer regarding the Appellant's absence vide letter dated 30.08.2011. Thereafter, show cause notice dated 12.09.2011 was issued to the Appellant and directions were issued on 13.09.2011 to initiate proceedings under Rule 86. He contends that further notices were issued to the Appellant, including the final notice dated 31.01.2012 and [2026:RJ-JP:30717-DB] (6 of 10) [SAW-723/2021] notice dated 09.04.2012 requiring her to resume duties within seven days. 4.2 He further submits that, despite the aforesaid notices, the Appellant neither resumed her duties nor submitted any reply or explanation. A notice was even published in the daily newspapers, namely, Dainik Bhaskar and Seema Sandesh, on 10.10.2012, but the Appellant failed to respond thereto. He, therefore, submits that her services were terminated vide order dated 06.11.2012 only after affording sufficient opportunity and upon following the procedure prescribed under Rule 86 of the RSR. The allegation that she was terminated without any inquiry or opportunity of hearing is wholly misconceived. 4.3 Lastly, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the learned Single Judge rightly dismissed the writ petition vide judgment dated 12.07.2021 on the ground of inordinate delay. The order of termination was passed on 06.11.2012, whereas the Appellant approached the Court only in the year 2019 by filing S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 20732/2019. In view of the unexplained delay, coupled with the Appellant's prolonged absence and failure to respond to the notices issued to her, no interference is warranted with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. The present appeal deserves to be dismissed. 5. In the aforesaid backdrop, we have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the case file. 6. At the outset, we may observe that the explanation offered by the Appellant for the long delay in approaching the writ Court is wholly mechanical. It reflects no application of mind. No specific details or day to day explanation, or even a broad and cogent account of the intervening years, has been furnished as to why the challenge remained [2026:RJ-JP:30717-DB] (7 of 10) [SAW-723/2021] withheld from 2013, when the Appellant admittedly acquired knowledge of the termination, till 17.08.2019, when the writ petition came to be filed. 7. Affirmatively pleaded case by her is that being aggrieved from illegal action of termination of her services, which she came to know in September-2019, she immediately filed a writ petition before this Court as S.B. W.P No. 20732/2019 which was dismissed vide impugned order dated 12.07.2021. 8. At this stage, it would be apposite to have a look at the impugned order dated 12.07.2021. For ready reference, the relevant paragraphs of the said order are reproduced hereinbelow: "5. Heard counsel for the petitioner and perused the record. 6. This writ petition filed by the petitioner deserves to be dismissed for the reasons; firstly the petitioner has challenged the order dated 06.11.2012 by way of this writ petition after a delay of almost 7 years in 2019; secondly mere submitting representations is of no help to the petitioner in view of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India (supra), lastly in the facts and circumstances of the present case, I am not inclined to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India at this belated stage. 7. In that view of the matter, this writ petition stands dismissed." 9. Having perused the impugned order along with the material appended with the appeal, we find no ground to interfere in the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction. Let us see why and how. 9.1 The averments in the appeal itself demolish the plea of want of knowledge. On the Appellant's own showing, she came to know of the termination order in the second week of July 2013, when she presented herself for joining. She, in fact, submitted a representation to Hon'ble the Governor on 11.11.2013 assailing the very order on the very grounds now urged, namely, violation of the principles of natural justice. The cause of action, therefore, stood crystallised in July 2013 at the latest. Yet the writ petition came to be filed only on 21.11.2019, i.e., [2026:RJ-JP:30717-DB] (8 of 10) [SAW-723/2021] after more than six years of acquiring knowledge. The plea that knowledge was acquired only in September 2019 through RTI is, thus, contrary to the record and is nothing but an afterthought to overcome the bar of laches. 9.2 The RTI route cannot come to the Appellant's rescue, which has been pleaded as the star reason of knowledge of termination order. What was obtained under the RTI Act in 2019 was, at best, the record and correspondence relating to a termination of which she was fully aware since 2013. Knowledge of the order is what triggers the obligation to act with promptitude. Knowledge of additional documents supporting the challenge does not furnish a fresh cause of action. 9.3 Equally settled is the position that repeated representations and legal notices do not keep the cause of action alive, nor do they extend the period within which the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 ought to be invoked. The representation dated 11.11.2013 and the notices dated 26.11.2015 and 06.02.2018 cannot, therefore, salvage the delay. 9.4 The plea founded on Article 311 and the alleged non-compliance of Rule 86(3) of the RSR also cannot, by itself, dissolve the bar of laches. Delay and laches operate on the discretionary character of the jurisdiction under Article 226, irrespective of the apparent strength of the grounds of challenge. Even an order alleged to be void or passed in breach of natural justice must be assailed within a reasonable time. A party aggrieved by such an order cannot sleep over the matter for years and then claim adjudication on merits as of right. Public employment involves public interest. 9.5 Furthermore, the vacancy occasioned by the Appellant's termination would, in the ordinary course, have been dealt with [2026:RJ-JP:30717-DB] (9 of 10) [SAW-723/2021] administratively long ago. Reopening the matter after six years, with the attendant claim of reinstatement and consequential benefits, would unsettle the settled position and burden the public exchequer for a period during which the Appellant admittedly rendered no service. 9.6 Even otherwise, the record does not reveal a case of a defenceless employee condemned unheard. The respondents issued the show cause notice dated 12.09.2011, followed by further notices dated 31.01.2012 and 09.04.2012 requiring the Appellant to resume duties. A public notice was also published in two daily newspapers on 10.10.2012. Despite all this, the Appellant, who on her own showing was away at Kathmandu, neither responded nor resumed duty. Suffice it to observe that the material on record dispels the impression of a wholly ex parte and arbitrary exercise of power, which, if it were so, could have possibly persuaded us to overlook such gross delay. 9.7 The Appellant's plea of continued illness till 2013 may explain the period of her absence from duty. It does not explain the six years of inaction after July 2013. The demise of her father in January 2014, though unfortunate, cannot account for the entire intervening period, particularly when her counsel was admittedly issuing notices on her behalf in 2015 and 2018. A litigant who is in a position to instruct counsel to issue demand notices is equally in a position to institute proceedings. The delay, therefore, remains unexplained in its entirety. 10. In view of the above, we find nothing wrong in the approach adopted by the learned Single Judge and we are in respectful agreement with the same. The writ petition was rightly dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, without adverting to the merits. As an upshot, the present appeal also fails and is hereby dismissed. [2026:RJ-JP:30717-DB] (10 of 10) [SAW-723/2021] 11. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. No order as to costs. (ASHUTOSH KUMAR),J (ARUN MONGA),J 22/Mohita/Parshant