2026:JHHC:13516-DB 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI L.P.A. No.209 of 2026 1. Pushp Lata, aged about 53 years, Wife of Sri Anil Kumar, resident of Jharudih, Near Hanuman Mandir, Ρ.Ο. + P.S.-Dhanbad, District- Dhanbad. 2. Amita Choubey, aged about 58 years, Wife of Braj Bhushan Dwivedi, resident of B-2/57, Moonidih, P.O.-Moonidih, P.S.-Putki, District- Dhanbad. 3. Nanda Kumari, 38 years, Wife of Sachitanand Singh, resident of Manaitand, P.O.-Manaitand, P.S.-Dhansar, District-Dhanbad. …. ... Appellants Versus 1. The State of Jharkhand through the Secretary, Human Resources Development Department, Government of Jharkhand, having its office at Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S. Hatia, District-Ranchi. 2. The Joint Secretary, Human Resources Development Department, Government of Jharkhand, having its office at Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S.- Hatia District-Ranchi. 3. The Regional Deputy Director of Education, North Chotanagpur Division, Hazaribagh, P.O. + P.S.-Hazaribagh, District-Hazaribagh. 4. The District Superintendent of Education, Dhanbad, P.O.+ P.S.- Dhanbad, District-Dhanbad, 5. Jharkhand Public Service Commission through its Secretary, having its office at Circular Road, Lalpur, P.O. + P.S.-Lalpur, District-Ranchi. …. ... Respondents --------- CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR --------- For the Appellants: Mr. Jay Prakash Jha, Sr. Advocate. Mr. Afaque Ahmad, Advocate Mr. Aishwarya Prakash, Advocate Mr. Amrit Arunay, Advocate For the State: Mr. Jayant Franklin Toppo, G.A.-V. For the JPSC: Mr. Sanjoy Piprawall, Advocate Mr. Rakesh Ranjan, Advocate Mr. Jay Prakash, Advocate Mr. Prince Kumar, Advocate --------- 03/Dated: 06.05.2026 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. This L.P.A. is directed against learned Single Judge’s order dated 27.11.2025 dismissing W.P.(S) No. 6050 of 2016 instituted by the appellants. 2026:JHHC:13516-DB 2 3. In W.P.(S) No. 6050 of 2016, the appellants (original petitioners) had prayed that they be granted pay- scale of Rs.5500- 9000/- (revised in terms of the recommendations of the 6th Pay Commission to Rs. 9,300-34,800/- with grade pay of Rs.4,600/-). 4. Mr Jay Prakash Jha, the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants firstly pointed out that the appellants were wrongly non-suited on the ground that they had acquiesced with the lower pay-scale which was granted to them at the stage of their initial appointment in 2003-2004. He submitted that since the appellants were alleging discrimination and violation of Article 14 of the Constitution, there was no question of any waiver because no person could be non-suited on the ground of having waived the right to challenge discrimination. He relied on State of Nagaland and others vs. Amos Seb and others, (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1223 to support this contention. 5. Mr Jha then submitted that in 2015, some candidates, having the same qualifications as those possessed by the petitioners were appointed. He submitted that the nature of duties discharged by those appointees was identical to the duties being discharged by the petitioners. Accordingly, he submitted that, since the qualifications and nature of the duties were the same, the principle of parity required that the petitioners be granted the higher pay scale as claimed in the petition. He submitted that the denial of this higher pay scale and further promotional opportunities amounted to discrimination and, therefore, violated the principle of parity enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. 6. For the above two reasons, Mr Jha submitted that the learned Single Judge’s impugned judgment and order warrant interference. 2026:JHHC:13516-DB 3 He further submitted that the reliefs prayed for by the appellants in their petition deserve to be granted in their entirety. 7. Mr Jayant Franklin Toppo, the learned G.A.-V, defended the impugned judgment and order based on the reasoning reflected therein. He pointed out that from 2003 until the institution of the petition in 2016, the appellants had never protested the pay scale granted to them, and this was a belated challenge, which attracted the doctrine of laches. 8. Without prejudice, Mr Toppo submitted that the appointees of 2015 were to the post of Intermediate Trained Teachers, unlike the petitioners, who were appointed to the posts of Matric Trained Teachers in 2003-2004. Besides, he pointed out that an additional qualification of passing the TET was mandatory for appointees to the posts of Intermediate Trained Teachers under the RTE Act, 2009, and the directives under the NCTE Act issued on 23.08.2010. He submitted that thus, the appointees of 2015 were to entirely different posts carrying a higher pay scale. 9. Mr Toppo submitted that the principle of equality can be only amongst equals, and there is no question of alleging discrimination amongst unequals. He submitted that even if, co-incidentally, the appointees to a post carrying a lower pay-scale were to acquire or had already acquired some higher qualifications, that by itself would not entitle them to claim the higher pay-scale on the basis of parity or by alleging discrimination. He submitted that in such circumstances, there is no question of any violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. 10. The rival contentions now fall for our determination. 2026:JHHC:13516-DB 4 11. In the learned Single Judge’s order dated 27.11.2025, no doubt, paragraph 5 records a contention that the appellants were appointed under the advertisement of the years 2002-2003, in which it was clearly specified that they were being appointed to the post of Matric Trained Teachers. 12. There is also a reference to the petitioners having not challenged the pay scale awarded to them from 2003 till 2016, i.e., the date of institution of the writ petition. The further contention that since the appellants accepted the condition of the advertisement and appointment, they would be barred from challenging the same at this belated juncture is also noted in paragraph 5. 13. Still, in the reasoning reflected in paragraphs 9 to 11, the emphasis is not merely on the above contention, but no relief has been granted to the appellants after examining their contentions on the merits. This is not a case where the appellants’ petition was dismissed solely on the ground that they had accepted the terms and conditions of the advertisement, and therefore, they were precluded from challenging the pay scale without simultaneously challenging the foundational notification and the applicable Rules. 14. Therefore, even if we accept the principle laid down in Amos Seb (Supra) that fundamental rights cannot normally be waived, it is still necessary to examine whether the substantive reason given by the learned Single Judge for non-suiting the petitioners warrants interference in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 15. The records, in this case, clearly show that the petitioners were appointed in 2003-2004 pursuant to an advertisement for the posts of Matric Trained Teachers. The mere fact that the appellants, or at least some of them, had higher qualifications at the time of their 2026:JHHC:13516-DB 5 appointments is quite irrelevant. Based on such higher qualifications alone, the appellants cannot insist that they be treated as appointed to other, higher posts that were not even reflected in the advertisement and for which the appellants were never appointed. Any attempt in this direction would be entirely misconceived. The learned Single Judge has therefore not accepted the appellants’ case on this basis. 16. The next argument concerns the appointments made in 2015 and the principle of parity/equality invoked in such appointments. 17. The 2015 appointments were admittedly made to the post of “Intermediate Trained Teachers” and not “Matric Trained Teachers”, a post that was advertised and to which the appellants were appointed in 2003. These posts of Intermediate Trained Teachers required not only a degree and basic training as a minimum, but also a TET clearance. All this was in pursuance of the RTE Act, 2009, and the directives issued under the NCTE Act on 23.08.2010. Thus, the 2015 appointments were to an entirely different post requiring higher qualifications, and which consequently carried a higher pay scale. 18. Merely because the appellants may have possessed or acquired such higher qualifications post their appointments as Matric Trained Teachers, does not entitle them to claim parity or equality with the posts of Intermediate Trained Teachers. As was rightly contended by Mr Toppo, equality must be amongst equals. 19. The argument about the appellants discharging the same work is neither clearly pleaded nor, in any event, made out. In any event, if two persons are appointed against different posts carrying different qualifications and different pay scales, there is no question of 2026:JHHC:13516-DB 6 pleading discrimination or claiming parity. In such a situation, there is no question of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. 20. The learned Single Judge, in paragraphs 9 and 10, has precisely held that this was not a case of discrimination because the 2015 appointees were appointed to a different post with different qualifications, and consequently different pay-scales. There is no reason to interfere with this view of the learned Single Judge. 21. For the above reasons, we see no merit in this L.P.A. and dismiss the same without any order for costs. 22. Interlocutory applications, if any, will not survive and are disposed of. (M. S. Sonak, C.J.) (Rajesh Shankar, J.) 06.05.2026 N.A.F.R. APK/VK Uploaded on 08.05.2026