2026:HHC:24412 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP(M) No. 2695 of 2025 Reserved on: 17.6.2026 Date of Decision: 24.6.2026. Daleep Singh …. Petitioner Versus Radha Devi …. Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the petitioner : Mr Surender K. Sharma, Advocate. For the Respondent : None. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The appellant/applicant has filed the present application seeking leave to appeal against the judgment dated 19.7.2025, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chamba, District Chamba, H.P., (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondent (accused before learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act). (The parties shall 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:24412 hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present application are that the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. It was asserted that the parties were known to each other. The accused used to borrow money from the complainant. The accused requested the complainant to lend him an amount of ₹4,50,000/- for her domestic needs. The accused issued a cheque of ₹3,50,000/- drawn on H.P. State Cooperative Bank to repay part of the amount and promised to pay ₹1,00,000/- in future. The complainant presented the cheque at his bank, but it was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘funds insufficient’. The complainant sent a legal notice to the accused asking her to repay the amount within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. This notice was served upon the accused, but she failed to repay the amount. Hence, the complaint was filed before the learned Trial Court for taking action against the accused as per the law. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, notice of accusation was 3 2026:HHC:24412 put to her for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which she pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The parties were called upon to produce the evidence, and the complainant examined Vinod Kumar (CW1) and himself (CW2). 5. The accused, in her statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC), denied the complainant’s case in its entirety. She examined herself (DW1) in her defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the complainant admitted in his cross-examination that he had advanced ₹4,50,000/- to the husband of the accused. This corroborated the version of the accused on oath that she had never borrowed any money from the complainant. The complainant has failed to prove the essential ingredient of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, that the cheque should have been issued for consideration to discharge the debt/liability. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the complainant/appellant/applicant has filed an 4 2026:HHC:24412 appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the material placed before it. The accused had taken the loan from the complainant and issued a cheque to return the amount. Thus, the cheque was issued to discharge the debt, and the learned Trial Court erred in holding otherwise. Therefore, it was prayed that the present application be allowed and leave to appeal be granted. 8. Mr Surinder K. Sharma, learned counsel for the applicant, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in dismissing the complaint. It was duly proved on record that the cheque was issued by the accused to discharge her legal liability. Learned Appellate Court ignored the presumption contained in Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instrument Act. Therefore, he prayed that the present application be allowed and the leave to appeal be granted. 9. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 10. The complainant had specifically asserted in his complaint that he had advanced money to the accused, and the accused had issued the cheque for the part payment of the money and promised to pay the rest of the money in future. When he 5 2026:HHC:24412 appeared in the witness box, he admitted in his cross-examination that the money was advanced to the husband of the accused. The complainant had not asserted in the complaint that the accused had issued the cheque to discharge the liability of her husband; rather, he asserted that the accused had issued the cheque to repay the loan taken by her. When the complainant himself admitted that he had not advanced the money to the accused but to her husband, the accused could not have issued a cheque in favour of the complainant to repay the money taken by him. 11. Therefore, the presumption contained in Sections 118A and 139 of the NI Act was rebutted by the cross-examination of the complainant. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa, (2019) 5 SCC 418: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 491 that the accused can rely upon the material submitted by the complainant to rebut the presumption. It was observed at page 433: 25.3. To rebut the presumption, it is open for the accused to rely on evidence led by him, or the accused can also rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a probable defence. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which they rely. 6 2026:HHC:24412 12. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh, (2023) 10 SCC 148: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1275 that the presumption applies in the absence of evidence and disappears after the evidence is produced. It was observed: “38. John Henry Wigmore [John Henry Wigmore and the Rules of Evidence: The Hidden Origins of Modern Law] on Evidence states as follows: “The peculiar effect of the presumption of law is merely to invoke a rule of law compelling the Jury to reach the conclusion in the absence of evidence to the contrary from the opponent but if the opponent does offer evidence to the contrary (sufficient to satisfy the Judge's requirement of some evidence), the presumption ‘disappears as a rule of law and the case is in the Jury's hands free from any rule’.” 13. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view that could have been taken based on the material placed before it and no interference is required with the judgment of the learned Trial Court. 14. In view of the above, the present application fails and is dismissed. Cr. Appeal (A-SB) ST No. 9586 of 2025 15. In view of the dismissal of the application for the grant of special leave to appeal, the proposed appeal also stands disposed of, so also the pending application(s), if any. 7 2026:HHC:24412 16. Records of the learned Courts below be sent back forthwith, along with a copy of this judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 24th June, 2026 (Chander)