2026:HHC:24408 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 273 of 2014 Reserved on: 3.6.2026 Date of Decision: 24.6.2026. State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Kamlesh Kumar ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant : Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. For the Respondent : Ms Anjali Soni Verma, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 14.3.2014, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kangra at Dharamshala, Camp at Palampur, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 15.7.2009, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class-I, Palampur, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Trial Court), were set aside. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:24408 in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant Vinod Singh (PW3), his sister Babita (PW2) and Peeyush Sipahiya, son of Babita, were going to Mount Caramel School on 23.10.2007, at about 8.30 a.m. A truck bearing registration No. HP-37-4976 came from Parour at high speed and hit Peeyush, who fell and sustained injuries. The driver stopped the truck and went away from the spot. Peeyush was brought to the hospital. An intimation was given to the police, and the police recorded an entry (Ex.PW5/A) in the daily diary. ASI Brahm Dass (PW6) went to the hospital for verification. Vinod Singh (PW3) made a statement (Ex.PW3/A), which was sent to the Police Station, where FIR (Ex.PW6/A) was registered. An application (Ex.PC) was filed for the medical examination of Peeyush (Ex.PW6/C), and MLC (Ex.PC) was obtained. Peeyush succumbed to his injury. An inquest on the dead body was conducted. The post-mortem examination of 3 2026:HHC:24408 Peeyush was conducted, and the cause of death was found to be haemorrhagic shock produced by trauma to the left lung by multiple fractured ribs. Report (Ex.PB) was issued. Brahm Dass visited the spot and prepared the spot map (Ex.PW6/D). He took the photographs (Ex.PW6/E Ex.PW6/H). He seized the truck bearing registration No. HP-37-4976 vide memo (Ex.PA) The mechanical examination of the truck was conducted, and no defect was found in it that could have led to the accident. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per the version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the IPC and Section 187 of the Motor Vehicle Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined six witnesses to prove its case. Isha Sood (PW1) and Nirmal Arora (PW4) did not support the prosecution's case. Babita (PW2) is the mother of Peeyush, 4 2026:HHC:24408 and Vinod Singh (PW3) is the informant and uncle of the deceased Peeyush. Rajinder Chand (PW5) proved the entry in the daily diary. Brahm Dass (PW6) investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC), admitted that he was driving the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-37-4976 on 23.10.2007. He denied the rest of the prosecution's case. He stated that Master Peeyush himself hit the rear side of the truck when he fell from the culvert. He admitted that the matter was reported to the police, and the police had investigated the matter. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that Peeyush had died in an accident involving the truck being driven by the accused. The plea taken by the accused that Peeyush had fallen from the culvert was falsified by the suggestion given to Vinod Singh. The accident occurred because of the rash and negligent driving by the accused. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as follows. Conviction Sentence Section 279 of IPC To undergo rigorous 5 2026:HHC:24408 imprisonment for a period of three months and to pay a fine of ₹1,000/- and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days. Section 304-A of IPC To undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay a fine of ₹2,000/- and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. Section 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act. To pay a fine of ₹500/- and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for 07 days. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). The Appellate Court held that Vinod Singh admitted in his cross-examination that he had reached the spot after the accident. Witnesses admitted that Peeyush was standing on the parapet. The informant admitted that the truck was not driven towards the parapet located on the side of the culvert. The site plan made the prosecution’s case suspect. The prosecution had failed to prove the exact manner of 6 2026:HHC:24408 the accident, and the learned Trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. Hence, the learned Appellate Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Appellate Court erred in acquitting the accused. It was duly proved that the truck had hit Peeyush at high speed. The defence of the accused that Peeyush was standing on the parapet and fell by himself was falsified by the suggestion made to Vinod Singh. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant-State and Ms Anjali Soni Verma, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 10. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant-State, submitted that the learned Appellate Court erred in reversing the well-reasoned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court. The statements of prosecution 7 2026:HHC:24408 witnesses proved that the accused was driving the truck at a high speed and hit Peeyush. The defence taken by the accused that Peeyush fell from the culvert was not proved on record. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 11. Ms Anjali Soni Verma, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the learned Appellate Court had rightly appreciated the evidence. The informant admitted that he had reached the place of the accident after the accident, and he cannot be called an eyewitness. The defence taken by the accused that Peeyush was standing on the culvert and fell from the culvert was highly probable. Learned Appellate Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Appellate Court, even if another view is possible. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 8 2026:HHC:24408 Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, based on misreading of evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed on page 438: “24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 14. This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, wherein it was observed: 21. We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event, should the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the 9 2026:HHC:24408 cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudarv.State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581andRajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471. 15. A similar view was taken in Tulasareddi v. State of Karnataka, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 89, wherein it was observed: “29. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court, it can be said that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the findings of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court. Further, if the view taken is a possible view, the Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible. The following principles have to be kept in mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the appeals against an order of acquittal: (a) whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; (b) whether the judgment is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence on record; (c) an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a compelling reason for interference.’ (d) the appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; (e) if the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 10 2026:HHC:24408 (f) the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 16. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 17. Vinod Singh (PW3) stated in his cross-examination that Peeyush was moving ahead of him with other children. He was told by the children that Peeyush was standing on the parapet of the culvert. He volunteered to say that the accused had climbed the parapet. He admitted that he reached the spot after the accident, and he was told about the accident by the children. The statement of this witness in the cross-examination makes it highly doubtful that he was present at the time of the accident. He categorically stated that he reached the spot after the accident and was told about the accident by the children. 18. Babita (PW2) admitted in her cross-examination that Peeyush was standing on the parapet with other children. She admitted that the truck had not crossed the parapet. Nirmal Arora (PW4) stated in his cross-examination that the children 11 2026:HHC:24408 were standing on the parapet. The truck had not crossed the culvert. 19. Therefore, the statements of the witnesses clearly established that Peeyush and other children were on the parapet and the truck had not crossed the culvert. The site plan (Ex.PW6/D) shows a culvert at Point ‘C’, and the place of accident in the middle of the road before the parapet for a vehicle coming from Parour. Learned Appellate Court had rightly held that the site plan does not explain how Peeyush could have fallen in the middle of the road if he was standing on the parapet of the culvert. Thus, the prosecution has failed to prove the exact manner of the accident. 20. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mahadeo Hari Lokre v. State of Maharashtra, (1972) 4 SCC 758, that if a person suddenly crosses the road, the driver may not be able to avoid the accident, and he cannot be held liable for negligence. It was observed at page 759: - “4... But the case assumes a different complexion if we agree with the sole eyewitness in the case, Dayanand PW 1, that at the time of the impact, Ravikant was actually crossing the road from West to East. That would mean that if Ravikant suddenly crossed the road from West to East without taking note of the approaching bus, there was 12 2026:HHC:24408 every possibility of his dashing against the bus without the driver becoming aware of his crossing till it was too late. If a person suddenly crosses the road, the bus driver, even if he is driving slowly, may not be in a position to avoid the accident. Therefore, it will not be possible to hold that the bus driver was negligent.” 21. This Court also took a similar view in Gurcharan Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1989 SCC OnLine HP 18: 1990 ACJ 598 and observed at page 600: - “14. Coming to the statements of witnesses on this aspect, it has been stated that the truck was moving at high speed, but it has not been said what that speed actually was. To say that a vehicle was moving at a high speed is neither proper nor legal evidence of high speed, nor does it in any way indicate rashness on the part of the driver. The prosecution should have been exact on this aspect as the speed of the vehicle is an essential point to be seen and proved in a case under section 304-A of the Penal Code, 1860. Further, there are no skid marks, which eliminates the evidence of the high speed of the vehicle. In addition to this, it has been stated by the witnesses that the vehicle stopped at a distance of 50 feet from the place of the accident. This appears to be exaggerated. However, it is not a long distance looking at the two points, viz., the first impact of the accident and the last tyres of the vehicle and the total length of the body of the truck in question. If seen from these angles, the distance stated by the witnesses cannot be considered to be very long and thus an indication of high speed. The version of the petitioner that he blew the horn near the place of the curve, which frightened the child, cannot be considered to be without substance. This can otherwise be reasonably inferred that the petitioner would have blown the horn on seeing the child on the road as it is in evidence that the child had come on the pucca portion of the road while there is no 13 2026:HHC:24408 evidence as to whether the witnesses, more particularly, Ghanshyam, PW 7, Chander Kanta, PW 8, mother, and a few other witnesses were there at that particular time. Rather, the depositions of these witnesses indicate that they were coming from some village lane that joined the main road in question. Children of this age, usually crafty by temperament, move faster than their parents and are in advance of them while walking. This appears to have happened in the present case. A minute examination of the circumstances of this case and the evidence brought on the record discloses that the deceased had reached the pucca portion of the road much before the arrival of his parents and the witnesses. That is why, in their deposition, they have said that the child had been run over by the truck. On the other hand, the petitioner has stated that the child got frightened by the blowing of the horn by him and started crossing the road, which could not be seen by him, and the result was the accident and the death of the child. In case some pedestrians suddenly cross a road, the driver of the vehicle cannot save the pedestrian, however slow he may be driving the vehicle. In such a situation he cannot be held negligent; rather it appears that the parents of the child were negligent in not taking proper care of the child and allowed him to come alone to the road while they were somewhere behind and they could have rushed to pull back the child before the approaching vehicle came in contact with him as it is in their depositions that the truck driver was at a distance coming at a high speed and in case the child wanted to cross the road, it could do so within the time it reached at the place of the accident. How the accident actually took place has not been clearly and comprehensively stated by any of the witnesses. They appear to have been prejudiced by the act of driver’s act. Their versions are, therefore, coloured by the ultimate act of the petitioner and the fact that the child had been finished.” (Emphasis supplied) 14 2026:HHC:24408 22. A similar view was taken in State of H.P. vs. Manpreet Singh, Latest HLJ 2008(1) 538, wherein it was observed as under: “7…The respondent, in his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has explained that on seeing the deceased, he had blown the horn, and the deceased stopped on the road. As soon as he reached near him, he immediately tried to cross the road and got hit. His version has been duly corroborated by Hardeep Singh (DW1), who was a pillion rider with him. Ajay Kumar (PW1) has admitted that this version is that the respondent had blown the horn, and Daya Ram, on hearing it, had stopped for a while. In these circumstances, if a person suddenly crosses the road, without taking note of the approaching vehicle and its Driver may not be in a position to save the accident, it will not be possible to hold the Driver guilty of the offence. In the instant case, the deceased, knowing fully well at least the approaching vehicle stopped on hearing the horn while crossing the road, but when the motorcycle reached near him, he darted before it, and the accident took place. Thus, in my opinion, the prosecution could not prove the offence charged against the respondent beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent was driving rashly or negligently. Therefore, in these circumstances, the learned trial Court had rightly acquitted the respondent of the charges framed against him...” (Emphasis supplied) 23. A similar principle would apply to the present case, and the accused cannot be held liable on the facts so found by the learned courts below. 24. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court will 15 2026:HHC:24408 not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned appellate Court even if another view is possible. 25. No other point was urged. 26. Consequently, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. The appeal stands disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. 27. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 28. Records be sent back to the learned Trial Court forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 24th June, 2026 (Chander)