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2026 DAILYLAW 12972 (CHH)

STATE OF CHHATTISGARH v. ASHISH DUBEY @ DURGA DUBEY

ACQA/330/2018 · 2026-02-09

Shri Radhakishan Agrawal, Smt Rajani Dubey

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Judgment text

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1 2026:CGHC:7270-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 330 of 2018 • State of Chhattisgarh, Through the Station House Officer, Police Station Tikrapara, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ---Appellant versus • Ashish Dubey @ Durga Dubey, S/o Narendra Dubey, aged about 22 Years, R/o Postal Colony, B-7, Tikrapara, Police Station Tikrapara, District Raipur Chhattisgarh. --- Respondent For Appellant : Mr. Atanu Ghosh, Deputy Government Advocate. For Respondent : Ms. Vaishali Jaswani, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Sangeet Kumar Kushwaha, Advocate. Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey & Hon'ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal Judgment on Board 10.02.2026 Per Radhakishan Agrawal, J. 1. This acquittal appeal filed by the appellant/State arises out of the judgment dated 11.01.2017 passed by the Seventh Additional Sessions Judge (F.T.C.), Raipur, District Raipur, C.G., in Special Criminal Case. 1110/2015, whereby the learned trial Court acquitted the accused/respondent of the charges under Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(n) of Indian Penal Code (for short, 'IPC') and Section 6 of Protection of AKHILESH BEOHAR Digitally signed by AKHILESH BEOHAR Date: 2026.02.12 12:52:09 +0530 2 Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (in short, 'the Act, 2012') on the basis of benefit of doubt. 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 15.08.2015, PW-4 mother of the prosecutrix, lodged a report at Police Station Tikrapara, Raipur, alleging that her daughter/prosecutrix, aged about 17 years and 3 months, had gone missing from the house at about 8:15 p.m. without informing any family member. It was further alleged that despite making searches and inquiries, prosecutrix could not be traced. On the basis of the said report, a missing report was registered. During the course of investigation, it was alleged that respondent/accused had taken the prosecutrix away from the lawful guardianship of her parents without their consent, induced her on the pretext of marriage and committed forcible sexual intercourse with her repeatedly. On the basis of these allegations, FIR (Ex.P-17) was registered against the accused/respondent. 3. During the course of investigation, spot map was prepared vide Ex.P-9 and prosecutrix was recovered from the possession of the accused/respondent vide Ex.P-3. After obtaining the consent of her parents, prosecutrix was sent for medical examination, whereupon PW-1 Dr. N.A. examined her and did not notice any injury on the person of the victim either internally or externally and also did not give any definite opinion regarding recent sexual intercourse and gave MLC report vide Ex.P-1. Vide Ex.P-4, underwear of the prosecutrix was seized. Vide Ex.P-14, School Admission Register was seized. Vide Ex.P-16, underwear of the accused/respondent was seized. Vide Ex.P-18, vaginal slide of prosecutrix was seized. Seized articles were sent to FSL for 3 chemical examination and FSL report was brought on record vide Ex.P-33, however, no seminal spots or human spermatozoa were found on the underwear of the accused/respondent. 4. Statements of the witnesses were recorded and after completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the accused/respondent before the concerned trial Court. Accused/respondent abjured the guilt and prayed for trial. 5. The trial Court, after hearing counsel for the parties and appreciating the evidence on record, by the impugned judgment acquitted the accused/respondent of charges leveled against him. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant/State submits that the learned trial Court has erred in acquitting the accused/respondent of the aforesaid charges by recording perverse findings. He further submits that there is ample evidence available on record, particularly the testimony of PW-2 (prosecutrix), which clearly establishes that prosecutrix was minor and that, despite having knowledge of the said fact, the accused/respondent, on the false pretext of marriage, established physical relations with her on several occasions. Despite the availability of sufficient and cogent evidence on record, the learned trial Court committed a grave error in acquitting the accused/respondent. Consequently, the impugned judgment of acquittal suffers from perversity and illegality and is liable to be set aside. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent/accused supports the impugned judgment and submits that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. It is further submitted that the learned trial Court, after proper appreciation of the evidence available on record, has 4 rightly acquitted the accused/respondent and the said judgment does not call for any interference by this Court. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 9. The Supreme Court in the matter of Jafarudheen and others vs. State of Kerala reported in (2022) 8 SCC 440 has considered the scope of interference in Appeal against acquittal, which reads as under:- “25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 CrPC, the appellate court has to consider whether the trial court's view can be terms as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analysed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.” 10. The first question for consideration before this Court is whether the learned trial Court is justified in holding that the victim/prosecutrix was not below 18 years of age on the date of the incident. 11. In order to ascertain the age of the prosecutrix, she was examined as PW-2. In her evidence, she categorically admitted that her mother had told her that her date of birth was 02.05.1997. She further stated that at the time of her admission to school, her parents had increased her age by one year and accordingly got her date of birth recorded in the school records. She specifically admitted that the age recorded in the school register was not correct. Although the prosecution relied upon the class IX Dakhil Kharij Register (Ex.P-11C) to establish the age of the prosecutrix as 02.05.1998, but no birth certificate, Kotwari register, or primary school admission record was produced by the prosecution. Further, the document (Ex.P-11C) does not disclose the basis on which the date of birth of 5 prosecutrix was entered. In view of the clear admission of the prosecutrix that her age was deliberately increased at the time of school admission, the document (Ex.P-11C) produced by the prosecution cannot be treated as conclusive proof of her age. In absence of any reliable or documentary evidence to conclusively establish the age of the prosecutrix, the learned trial Court, after proper appreciation of the evidence available on record, was justified in holding that at the time of the incident, prosecutrix was major and above the age of 18 years. Accordingly, we affirm the said finding recorded by the learned trial Court. 12. Next question for consideration is whether the respondent/accused is the author of the crime in question. 13. PW-2 prosecutrix stated in her deposition that she was acquainted with accused/respondent and that they were in love with each other. She further stated that her parents were forcing her to marry another person and were planning to send her to Odisha. She also stated that she informed the accused/respondent about this situation and requested him to take her away. She further deposed that accused/respondent initially refused and advised her to talk to her parents, but later agreed due to her insistence. She categorically stated that she left her house voluntarily and accompanied the accused/respondent on her own free will. She also stated that when the police intercepted them during checking, she herself informed the police that she had left her house because her parents were forcing her into marriage. In her entire examination-in-chief, she did not allege that accused/respondent had kidnapped or abducted her, or that he had induced her on any false promise. She also did not allege that accused/respondent had committed sexual intercourse with her. Even during cross-examination, she specifically denied that accused/respondent 6 had ever established any physical or sexual relationship with her. She further admitted that she had gone with accused/respondent only to save herself from the forced marriage being arranged by her parents. Thus, the prosecutrix (PW-2) turned hostile and did not support the case of the prosecution. 14. From the evidence of the prosecutrix, it clearly emerges that on the date of the incident, she left her parental house on her own volition and voluntarily accompanied the accused/respondent. There is no allegation of use of force, threat, or inducement nor is there any allegation of sexual assault against the accused/respondent. Consequently, the essential ingredients of the aforesaid offences are not established against the accused/respondent. The learned trial Court, after elaborately discussing and analysing the evidence led by the prosecution, rightly concluded that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and, accordingly, acquitted the accused/respondent of the charges levelled against him by extending the benefit of doubt. 15. After considering the material available on record as well as the elaborate judgment impugned passed by the trial Court, we are of considered opinion that the judgment impugned acquitting the accused/respondent of the aforesaid charges is just and proper and does not call for any interference. 16. Accordingly, the acquittal appeal filed by the appellant/State against the acquittal of accused/respondent is hereby dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) (Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge Judge Akhilesh