2026:HHC:24387 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 319 of 2026 Reserved on: 15.05.2026 Date of Decision: 23.06.2026. Fathe Singh ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes For the Petitioner : Mr Anirudh R.H. Sahrma, Advocate. For Respondent/State : Mr Tarun Pathak, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present petition is directed against the order dated 12.12.2025, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Kandaghat, District Solan, H.P. (learned Trial Court) in case titled State of H.P. vs. Fateh Singh, vide which an application filed by the respondent/State for leading additional evidence was allowed. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:24387 manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Section 341, 323 and 325 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The State filed an application for placing on record the informant’s original OPD slip. It was asserted that the Medical Officer Bhavika Sharma stated during her examination-in-chief that the history of a roadside accident was inadvertently mentioned in the informant’s MLC because of several cases of roadside accidents. The OPD slip mentions the history of physical assault by one person. The OPD slip was not annexed to the record. The OPD slip is material for the determination of the matter pending before the Court. Hence, it was prayed that the application be allowed and the OPD slip be taken on the record. 3. The application was opposed by filing a reply taking preliminary objections regarding the lack of maintainability. The contents of the application were denied on the merits. It was asserted that Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 3 2026:HHC:24387 (Cr.P.C) does not enable the Court to place the documents on record, but to summon the witnesses. The Medical Officer had rightly mentioned the history of roadside accidents in the MLC. The application has been filed to fill up the lacuna. The document was not filed with the charge sheet. Hence, it was prayed that the application be dismissed. 4. The learned Trial Court held that the Court had the jurisdiction to summon any witness or direct him to produce any document or any other thing under Section 311 read with Section 242 (2) of Cr.P.C. The document was essential for the just decision of the case. Therefore, the learned Trial Court allowed the application. 5. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused has filed the present petition asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in allowing the application, the prosecution had mentioned the name of Dr Bhavika Sharma, at Sl. No. 6 to prove the documents mentioned in the list of documents. Learned Magistrate wrongly referred to section 242 of Cr.P.C. This provision was exhausted by summoning Dr Bhavika Sharma. The prosecution had not relied upon the OPD slip, and it was 4 2026:HHC:24387 impermissible to allow the prosecution to place the OPD slip on record. The production of the document would prejudice the accused. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 6. I have heard Mr Anirudh R.H. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Tarun Pathak, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 7. Mr Anirudh R.H. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in allowing the application. The prosecution had not mentioned the OPD slip in the list of documents, and it was impermissible to place the OPD slip on record. The application was filed to fill up the lacuna left by the statement of Dr Bhavika Sharma that the injuries were caused by a roadside accident. The accused would be seriously prejudiced by placing the OPD slip on record. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. Mr Tarun Pathak, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that Section 311 Cr.P.C. 5 2026:HHC:24387 empowers the Court to examine any witness at any stage. Learned trial Court had exercised the discretion vested with it. The purpose of Section 311 of Cr.P.C. is to impart justice to the parties, which includes justice not only to the accused, but to the informant as well. There is no infirmity in the order passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 9. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 10. It was laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in V.N. Patil v. K. Niranjan Kumar, (2021) 3 SCC 661: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 172, that the object underlying under Section 311 of Cr.P.C. is that there should not be any failure of justice due to the mistake of either party in bringing the valuable evidence on record or leaving ambiguity in the statements of witnesses examined from either side. It was observed: 14. The object underlying Section 311 CrPC is that there may not be a failure of justice on account of the mistake of either party in bringing the valuable evidence on record or leaving ambiguity in the statements of the witnesses examined from either side. The determinative factor is whether it is essential to the just decision of the case. The significant expression that occurs is “at any stage of any 6 2026:HHC:24387 inquiry or trial, or other proceeding under this Code”. It is, however, to be borne in mind that the discretionary power conferred under Section 311 CrPC has to be exercised judiciously, as it is always said, “the wider the power, the greater is the necessity of caution while the exercise of judicious discretion”. xxxxx 16. This principle has been further reiterated in Mannan Shaikh v. State of W.B., (2014) 13 SCC 59: (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 547 and thereafter in Ratanlal v. Prahlad Jat, (2017) 9 SCC 340: (2017) 3 SCC (Cri) 729 and Swapan Kumar Chatterjee v. CBI, (2019) 14 SCC 328: (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 839. The relevant paragraphs of Swapan Kumar Chatterjee v. CBI, (2019) 14 SCC 328: (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 839] are as under: (Swapan Kumar Chatterjee case [Swapan Kumar Chatterjee v. CBI, (2019) 14 SCC 328: (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 839], SCC p. 331, paras 10-11) “10. The first part of this section which is permissive gives purely discretionary authority to the criminal court and enables it at any stage of inquiry, trial or other proceedings under the Code to act in one of the three ways, namely, (i) to summon any person as a witness; or (ii) to examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness; or (iii) to recall and re-examine any person already examined. The second part, which is mandatory, imposes an obligation on the court (i) to summon and examine, or (ii) to recall and re-examine any such person if his evidence appears to be essential to the just decision of the case. 11. It is well settled that the power conferred under Section 311 should be invoked by the court only to meet the ends of justice. The power is to be exercised only for strong and valid reasons, and it should be exercised with great caution and circumspection. The court has the power under this section to even 7 2026:HHC:24387 recall witnesses for re-examination or further examination, necessary in the interest of justice, but the same has to be exercised after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of each case. The power under this provision shall not be exercised if the court is of the view that the application has been filed as an abuse of the process of law.” 17. The aim of every court is to discover the truth. Section 311 CrPC is one of many such provisions that strengthen the arms of a court in its effort to unearth the truth by procedure sanctioned by law. At the same time, the discretionary power vested under Section 311 CrPC has to be exercised judiciously for strong and valid reasons and with caution and circumspection to meet the ends of justice.” 11. It was held in State v. N. Seenivasagan, (2021) 14 SCC 1: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 212, that the true test under Section 311 is whether the evidence of the person who is sought to be examined or recalled is essential to the just decision of the case or not. It was observed: “12. In our view, having due regard to the nature and ambit of Section 311 of the CrPC, it was appropriate and proper that the applications filed by the prosecution ought to have been allowed. Section 311 provides that any court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceedings under CrPC, summon any person as a witness, examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or recall and re-examine any person already examined and the Court shall summon and examine or recall and re- examine any such person “if his evidence appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the case”. The true test, 8 2026:HHC:24387 therefore, is whether it appears to the Court that the evidence of such a person who is sought to be recalled is essential to the just decision of the case. 13. In Manju Devi v. State of Rajasthan, (2019) 6 SCC 203 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 765, a two-Judge Bench of this Court noted that an application under Section 311 could not be rejected on the sole ground that the case had been pending for an inordinate amount of time (ten years there). Rather, it noted that: (SCC p. 209, para 13) “13. … the length/duration of a case cannot displace the basic requirement of ensuring a just decision after taking all the necessary and material evidence on record. In other words, the age of a case, by itself, cannot be decisive of the matter when a prayer is made for examination of a material witness. Speaking for the Court, Dinesh Maheshwari J. expounded on the principles underlying Section 311 in the following terms: (Manju Devi case [Manju Devi v. State of Rajasthan, (2019) 6 SCC 203: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 765], SCC pp. 207-08, para 10) “10. It needs hardly any emphasis that the discretionary powers like those under Section 311CrPC are essentially intended to ensure that every necessary and appropriate measure is taken by the Court to keep the record straight and to clear any ambiguity insofar as the evidence is concerned, as also to ensure that no prejudice is caused to anyone. The principles underlying Section 311CrPC and amplitude of the powers of the court thereunder have been explained by this Court in several decisions [Vide Mohanlal Shamji Soni v. Union of India, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 271: 1991 SCC (Cri) 595; Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158: 2004 SCC (Cri) 999; Mina Lalita Baruwa v. State of Orissa, (2013) 16 SCC 173 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 218; Rajaram Prasad Yadav v. State of Bihar, (2013) 14 SCC 461 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 256 and Natasha Singh v. CBI, (2013) 5 SCC 741 : (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 828]. In Natasha Singh v. CBI 9 2026:HHC:24387 [Natasha Singh v. CBI, (2013) 5 SCC 741 : (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 828], though the application for examination of witnesses was filed by the accused but, on the principles relating to the exercise of powers under Section 311, this Court observed, inter alia, as under : (Natasha Singh case [Natasha Singh v. CBI, (2013) 5 SCC 741 : (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 828], SCC pp. 746 & 748-49, paras 8 & 15) ‘8. Section 311CrPC empowers the court to summon a material witness, or to examine a person present at “any stage” of “any enquiry”, or “trial”, or “any other proceedings” under CrPC, or to summon any person as a witness, or to recall and re-examine any person who has already been examined if his evidence appears to it, to be essential to the arrival of a just decision of the case. Undoubtedly, CrPC has conferred a very wide discretionary power upon the court in this respect, but such a discretion is to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. The power of the court in this context is very wide, and in the exercise of the same, it may summon any person as a witness at any stage of the trial or other proceedings. The court is competent to exercise such power even suo motu if no such application has been filed by either of the parties. However, the court must satisfy itself that it was in fact essential to examine such a witness, or to recall him for further examination, in order to arrive at a just decision of the case. *** 15. The scope and object of the provision are to enable the court to determine the truth and to render a just decision after discovering all relevant facts and obtaining proper proof of such facts, to arrive at a just decision of the case. Power must be exercised judiciously and not capriciously or arbitrarily, as any improper or capricious exercise of such power may lead to undesirable results. An application under Section 311CrPC must not be allowed only to fill up a 10 2026:HHC:24387 lacuna in the case of the prosecution, or of the defence, or to the disadvantage of the accused, or to cause serious prejudice to the defence of the accused, or to give an unfair advantage to the opposite party. Further, the additional evidence must not be received as a disguise for retrial or to change the nature of the case against either of the parties. Such a power must be exercised, provided that the evidence that is likely to be tendered by a witness is germane to the issue involved. An opportunity of rebuttal, however, must be given to the other party. The power conferred under Section 311CrPC must therefore be invoked by the court only in order to meet the ends of justice, for strong and valid reasons, and the same must be exercised with great caution and circumspection. The very use of words such as “any court”, “at any stage”, “or any enquiry, trial or other proceedings”, “any person” and “any such person” clearly spells out that the provisions of this section have been expressed in the widest possible terms, and do not limit the discretion of the court in any way. There is thus no escape if the fresh evidence to be obtained is essential to the just decision of the case. The determinative factor should therefore be whether the summoning/recalling of the said witness is, in fact, essential to the just decision of the case.” (emphasis in original)” 12. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Varsha Garg v. State of M.P., (2023) 19 SCC 646: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 986 that the Court has the jurisdiction under Section 311 Cr.P.C. to summon any witness, recall or re-examine any person for the just decision of the case. It was observed at page 659: - 31. Having clarified that the bar under Section 301 is inapplicable and that the appellant is well placed to pursue this appeal, we now examine Section 311 of CrPC. Section 311 provides that the court “may”: 11 2026:HHC:24387 (i) Summon any person as a witness or to examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness; and (ii) Recall and re-examine any person who has already been examined. This power can be exercised at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under the CrPC. The latter part of Section 311 states that the court “shall” summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such person “if his evidence appears to the court to be essential to the just decision of the case”. Section 311 contains a power of the court in broad terms. The statutory provision must be read purposively to achieve the intent of the statute to aid in the discovery of truth. 32. The first part of the statutory provision, which uses the expression “may”, postulates that the power can be exercised at any stage of an inquiry, trial or other proceeding. The latter part of the provision mandates the recall of a witness by the court as it uses the expression “shall summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such person if his evidence appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the case”. Essentially, the evidence of the person who is to be examined, coupled with the need for a just decision of the case, constitutes the touchstone that must guide the decision of the court. The first part of the statutory provision is discretionary, while the latter part is obligatory. 33. A Two-Judge Bench of this Court in Mohanlal Shamji Soni v. Union of India, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 271: 1991 SCC (Cri) 595, while dealing with pari materia provisions of Section 540 of the Criminal Code of Procedure, 1898, observed: (SCC p. 279, para 16) “16. The second part of Section 540, as pointed out, imposes upon the court an obligation of summoning or recalling and re-examining any witness, and the only condition prescribed is that the evidence sought to be obtained must be essential to the just decision 12 2026:HHC:24387 of the case. When any party to the proceedings points out the desirability of some evidence being taken, then the court has to exercise its power under this provision — either discretionary or mandatory — depending on the facts and circumstances of each case, having in view that the most paramount principle underlying this provision is to discover or to obtain proper proof of relevant facts in order to meet the requirements of justice.” 34. S. Ratnavel Pandian, J. speaking for the two-Judge Bench, noted that the power is couched in the widest possible terms and calls for no limitation, either with regard to the stage at which it can be exercised or the manner of its exercise. It is only circumscribed by the principle that the “evidence to be obtained should appear to the court essential to a just decision of the case by getting at the truth by all lawful means. In that context, the Court observed: (Mohanlal Shamji Soni case [Mohanlal Shamji Soni v. Union of India, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 271: 1991 SCC (Cri) 595], SCC p. 280, para 18) “18. … Therefore, it should be borne in mind that the aid of the section should be invoked only with the object of discovering relevant facts or obtaining proper proof of such facts for a just decision of the case, and it must be used judicially and not capriciously or arbitrarily because any improper or capricious exercise of the power may lead to undesirable results. Further it is incumbent that due care should be taken by the court while exercising the power under this section and it should not be used for filling up the lacuna left by the prosecution or by the defence or to the disadvantage of the accused or to cause serious prejudice to the defence of the accused or to give an unfair advantage to the rival side and further the additional evidence should not be received as a disguise for a retrial or to change the nature of the case against either of the parties.” 13 2026:HHC:24387 35. Summing up the position as it obtained from various decisions of this Court, namely, Rameshwar Dayal v. State of U.P., (1978) 2 SCC 518: 1978 SCC (Cri) 311, State of W.B. v. Tulsidas Mundhra, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 413: 1963 Supp (1) SCR 1, Jamatraj Kewalji Govani v. State of Maharashtra, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 19 : (1967) 3 SCR 415: AIR 1968 SC 178, Masalti v. State of U.P., 1964 SCC OnLine SC 30 : (1964) 8 SCR 133: AIR 1965 SC 202, Rajeswar Prasad Misra v. State of W.B., 1965 SCC OnLine SC 122 : (1966) 1 SCR 178: AIR 1965 SC 1887 and Ratilal Bhanji Mithani v. State of Maharashtra, (1971) 1 SCC 523: 1971 SCC (Cri) 231], the Court held : (Mohanlal Shamji Soni v. Union of India, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 271: 1991 SCC (Cri) 595], SCC p. 283, para 27) “27. The principle of law that emerges from the views expressed by this Court in the above decisions is that the criminal court has ample power to summon any person as a witness or recall and re- examine any such person even if the evidence on both sides is closed and the jurisdiction of the court must obviously be dictated by exigency of the situation, and fair play and good sense appear to be the only safe guides and that only the requirements of justice command the examination of any person which would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.” 36. The power of the court is not constrained by the closure of evidence. Therefore, it is amply clear from the above discussion that the broad powers under Section 311 are to be governed by the requirement of justice. The power must be exercised wherever the court finds that any evidence is essential for the just decision of the case. The statutory provision goes to emphasise that the court is not a hapless bystander in the derailment of justice. Quite to the contrary, the court has a vital role to discharge in ensuring that the cause of discovering truth as an aid in the realisation of justice is manifest. 14 2026:HHC:24387 13. It was further held that filling up the loopholes is a subsidiary factor, and the Court should be concerned with the essentiality of the evidence. It was observed at page 662: - 43. In the decision in Zahira Habibullah Sheikh (5) v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 3 SCC 374 : (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 8, which was more recently reiterated in Godrej Pacific Tech. Ltd. v. Computer Joint India Ltd., (2008) 11 SCC 108 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 455], the Court specifically dealt with this objection and observed that the resultant filling of loopholes on account of allowing an application under Section 311 is merely a subsidiary factor and the court's determination of the application should only be based on the test of the essentiality of the evidence. It noted that: [Zahira Habibullah Sheikh (5) v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 3 SCC 374: (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 8], SCC p. 393, para 28] 28. … The court is not empowered under the provisions of the Code to compel either the prosecution or the defence to examine any particular witness or witnesses on their side. This must be left to the parties. But in weighing the evidence, the court can take note of the fact that the best available evidence has not been given, and can draw an adverse inference. The court will often have to depend on intercepted allegations made by the parties, or on an inconclusive inference from facts elicited in the evidence. In such cases, the court has to act under the second part of the section. Sometimes, the examination of witnesses as directed by the court may result in what is thought to be “filling of loopholes”. That is purely a subsidiary factor and cannot be taken into account. Whether the new evidence is essential or not must, of course, depend on the facts of each case, and has to be determined by the Presiding Judge.” (emphasis supplied) 15 2026:HHC:24387 44. The right of the accused to a fair trial is constitutionally protected under Article 21. However, in Mina Lalita Baruwa v. State of Orissa, (2013) 16 SCC 173 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 218, while reiterating Rajendra Prasad v. Narcotic Cell, (1999) 6 SCC 110: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1062, the Court observed that it is the duty of the criminal court to allow the prosecution to correct an error in interest of justice. In Rajendra Prasad v. Narcotic Cell, (1999) 6 SCC 110: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1062, the Court had held that: (Rajendra Prasad case [Rajendra Prasad v. Narcotic Cell, (1999) 6 SCC 110: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1062], SCC p. 113, para 8) “8. Lacuna in the prosecution must be understood as the inherent weakness or a latent wedge in the matrix of the prosecution case. The advantage of it should normally go to the accused in the trial of the case, but an oversight in the management of the prosecution cannot be treated as an irreparable lacuna. No party in a trial can be foreclosed from correcting errors. If proper evidence was not adduced or a relevant material was not brought on record due to any inadvertence, the court should be magnanimous in permitting such mistakes to be rectified. After all, the function of the criminal court is administration of criminal justice and not to count errors committed by the parties or to find out and declare who among the parties performed better.” (emphasis supplied) 45. In the present case, the importance of the decoding registers was raised in the examination of PW 41. Accordingly, the decoding registers merely being additional documents required to be able to appreciate the existing evidence in the form of the call details, which are already on record but use codes to signify the location of the accused, a crucial detail, which can be decoded only through the decoding registers, the right of the accused to a fair trial is not prejudiced. The production of the decoding registers fits into the requirement of being relevant material that was not brought on record due to inadvertence. 16 2026:HHC:24387 46. Finally, we also briefly deal with the objection of the respondents regarding the stage at which the application under Section 311 was filed. The respondents have placed reliance on Swapan Kumar Chatterjee v. CBI, (2019) 14 SCC 328 : (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 839, a two-Judge Bench decision of this Court, to argue that the application should not be allowed as it has been made at a belated stage. The Court in Swapan Kumar Chatterjee v. CBI, (2019) 14 SCC 328: (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 839 observed: (SCC p. 331, paras 11-12) “11. It is well settled that the power conferred under Section 311 should be invoked by the court only to meet the ends of justice. The power is to be exercised only for strong and valid reasons, and it should be exercised with great caution and circumspection. The court has wide power under this Section to even recall witnesses for re-examination or further examination, necessary in the interest of justice, but the same has to be exercised after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of each case. The power under this provision shall not be exercised if the court is of the view that the application has been filed as an abuse of the process of law. 12. Where the prosecution evidence has been closed long back, and the reasons for non-examination of the witness earlier are not satisfactory, the summoning of the witness at a belated stage would cause great prejudice to the accused and should not be allowed. Similarly, the court should not encourage the filing of successive applications for recall of a witness under this provision.” 47. In the present appeal, the argument that the application was filed after the closure of the evidence of the prosecution is manifestly erroneous. As already noted above, the closure of the evidence of the prosecution took place after the application for the production of the decoding register and for the summoning of the witness under Section 311 was dismissed. Though the dismissal of 17 2026:HHC:24387 the application and the closure of the prosecution evidence both took place on 13-11-2021, the application by the prosecution had been filed on 15-3-2021, nearly eight months earlier. As a matter of fact, another witness for the prosecution, Rajesh Kumar Singh, was also released after examination and cross-examination on the same day as recorded in the order dated 13-11-2021 of the trial court. 48. The court is vested with a broad and wholesome power, in terms of Section 311 CrPC, to summon and examine or recall and re-examine any material witness at any stage, and the closing of prosecution evidence is not an absolute bar. This Court in Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158: 2004 SCC (Cri) 999 while dealing with the prayers for adducing additional evidence under Section 391CrPC at the appellate stage, along with a prayer for examination of witnesses under Section 311CrPC explained the role of the court, in the following terms: (SCC pp. 188-89, para 43) “43. The courts have to take a participatory role in a trial. They are not expected to be tape recorders to record whatever is being stated by the witnesses. Section 311 of the Code and Section 165 of the Evidence Act confer vast and wide powers on presiding officers of the court to elicit all necessary materials by playing an active role in the evidence- collecting process. They have to monitor the proceedings in aid of justice in a manner that something, which is not relevant, is not unnecessarily brought into the record. Even if the prosecutor is remiss in some ways, it can control the proceedings effectively so that the ultimate objective, i.e. truth, is arrived at. This becomes more necessary where the court has reasons to believe that the prosecuting agency or the prosecutor is not acting in the requisite manner. The court cannot afford to be wishful or pretend to be blissfully ignorant or oblivious to such serious pitfalls or dereliction of duty on the part of the prosecuting agency. The prosecutor who does not act fairly and acts more 18 2026:HHC:24387 like a counsel for the defence is a liability to the fair judicial system, and courts cannot also play into the hands of such a prosecuting agency, showing indifference or adopting an attitude of total aloofness.” (emphasis supplied) 49. Further, in Zahira Habibullah Sheikh (5) v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 3 SCC 374: (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 8, the Court reiterated the extent of powers under Section 311 and held that: (SCC p. 392, para 27) “27. The object underlying Section 311 of the Code is that there may not be failure of justice on account of mistake of either party in bringing the valuable evidence on record or leaving ambiguity in the statements of the witnesses examined from either side. The determinative factor is whether it is essential to the just decision of the case. The section is not limited only for the benefit of the accused, and it will not be an improper exercise of the powers of the court to summon a witness under the section merely because the evidence supports the case of the prosecution and not that of the accused. The section is a general section which applies to all proceedings, enquiries and trials under the Code and empowers the Magistrate to issue a summons to any witness at any stage of such proceedings, trial or enquiry. In Section 311, the significant expression that occurs is at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code. It is, however, to be borne in mind that whereas the section confers a very wide power on the court on summoning witnesses, the discretion conferred is to be exercised judiciously, as the wider the power, the greater is the necessity for application of judicial mind.” (emphasis supplied) 50. The Court while reiterating the principle enunciated in Mohanlal Shamji Soni v. Union of India, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 271: 1991 SCC (Cri) 595 stressed upon the wide ambit of Section 311 which allows the power to be exercised at any stage and held that : (Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of 19 2026:HHC:24387 Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158: 2004 SCC (Cri) 999], SCC p. 189, para 44) “44. The power of the court under Section 165 of the Evidence Act is, in a way, complementary to its power under Section 311 of the Code. The section consists of two parts, i.e., (i) giving a discretion to the court to examine the witness at any stage, and (ii) the mandatory portion which compels the court to examine a witness if his evidence appears to be essential to the just decision of the court. Though the discretion given to the court is very wide, the very width requires a corresponding caution. In Mohanlal Shamji Soni v. Union of India, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 271: 1991 SCC (Cri) 595 this Court has observed, while considering the scope and ambit of Section 311, that the very usage of the words such as, “any court”, “at any stage”, or “any enquiry or trial or other proceedings”, “any person” and “any such person” clearly spells out that the section has expressed in the widest-possible terms and do not limit the discretion of the court in any way. However, as noted above, the very width requires a corresponding caution that the discretionary powers should be invoked as the exigencies of justice require and exercised judicially with circumspection and consistently with the provisions of the Code. The second part of the section does not allow any discretion but obligates and binds the court to take necessary steps if the fresh evidence to be obtained is essential to the just decision of the case, “essential” to an active and alert mind and not to one that is bent to abandon or abdicate. The object of the section is to enable the court to arrive at the truth irrespective of the fact that the prosecution or the defence has failed to produce some evidence which is necessary for a just and proper disposal of the case. The power is exercised, and the evidence is examined, neither to help the prosecution nor the defence, if the court feels that there is a necessity to 20 2026:HHC:24387 act in terms of Section 311, but only to subserve the cause of justice and public interest. It is done with an object of getting the evidence in aid of a just decision and to uphold the truth.” (emphasis supplied) 51. While reiterating the decisions of this Court in Karnel Singh v. State of M.P., (1995) 5 SCC 518: 1995 SCC (Cri) 977, Paras Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1999) 2 SCC 126: 1999 SCC (Cri) 104, Ram Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1998) 4 SCC 517: 1998 SCC (Cri) 1085 and Amar Singh v. Balwinder Singh, (2003) 2 SCC 518: 2003 SCC (Cri) 641 this Court held that the court may interfere even at the stage of appeal : (Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158: 2004 SCC (Cri) 999], SCC p. 196, para 64) “64. It is no doubt true that the accused persons have been acquitted by the trial court and the acquittal has been upheld, but if the acquittal is unmerited and based on tainted evidence, tailored investigation, unprincipled prosecutor and perfunctory trial and evidence of threatened/terrorised witnesses, it is no acquittal in the eye of the law and no sanctity or credibility can be attached and given to the so-called findings. It seems to be nothing but a travesty of truth, fraud on the legal process and the resultant decisions of courts — coram non judis and non est. There is, therefore, every justification to call for interference in these appeals.” 14. A similar view was taken in K.P. Tamilmaran Vs. State and others 2025 INSC 576 wherein it was observed: - 47. Before moving further, we consider it necessary to deal with the law relating to section 311 CrPC under which PW- 49 was summoned as a witness. Section 311 CrPC reads as follows: “311. Power to summon a material witness or examine a person present.— Any Court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, 21 2026:HHC:24387 summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or recall and re-examine any person already examined; and the Court shall summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such person if his evidence appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the case.” Section 311 of the CrPC provides wide powers to a Criminal Court to do the following: I. Summon any person as a witness, or ii. Examine any person present in court, though not summoned as a witness, or iii. Recall and re-examine any person already examined. The above powers can be exercised ‘at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding’ under the CrPC. The provision can be divided into two parts. The word ‘may’ is used in the first part of the section, which grants the Court the discretion to summon a witness. In contrast, the second part of the Section uses the word ‘shall’, which casts a duty on the Court to summon and examine or recall or re-examine any such person as a witness when it appears to the Court that it is essential to do so for a just decision in the case. In other words, the second part is mandatory, and Courts are obligated to exercise their powers under Section 311 CrPC when the evidence of any person is essential for a just decision of the case. (See: Jamatraj Kewalji Govani v. State of Maharashtra, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 19) 48. As is clear from the language of the provision itself, there is a wide discretion with the Courts under Section 311 CrPC. These powers can be exercised suo motu or on an application moved by either side. After all, the object is that the Court must not be deprived of the benefit of any valuable evidence. It is absolutely necessary that the Court must be apprised of the best evidence available. Thus, Courts have been given wide powers to decide on their own if a witness is required to be called or recalled for 22 2026:HHC:24387 examination or re-examination. This power under Section 311 CrPC can be invoked at any stage of the trial, even after the closing of the evidence. Section 311 CrPC can also be read along with Section 165 of the Evidence Act, as the powers of the Court under Section 165 of the Evidence Act are complementary to Section 311 of CrPC. As discussed above, powers under Section 311 CrPC can either be exercised on an application moved by either side to the case or suo moto by the Court. In case a person is not listed as a witness in the charge-sheet but later the prosecution desires to bring that person as an additional prosecution witness, then the prosecution can move an application to bring this person as a prosecution witness. It is then for the Court to decide whether such a person is required as a witness or not. If the Court finds that such a person should have been examined as a prosecution witness and he/she was omitted from the list of witnesses due to some oversight, mistake or for any other reason, the Court may allow the application and such a person can be examined as a prosecution witness. Thereafter, the normal course of examination-in-chief, cross-examination, etc., would follow as per the procedure. On the other hand, when the Court calls a person as a Court witness, there are some restrictions regarding the cross-examination of such a witness. 15. In the present case, the production of OPD slip was essential to show the earlier version disclosed to the medical officer and explain the history of road side accident recorded in the MLC; hence, the learned Trial Court was justified in allowing the application. 16. It was submitted that the court does not have the jurisdiction under Section 311 of Cr.P.C to allow the production of 23 2026:HHC:24387 documents. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Orissa High Court in State v. Haris Chandra Kar Mohapatra, 1965 SCC OnLine Ori 35: AIR 1966 Ori 189 that the Court can allow the production of the documents not filed with the charge sheet. It was observed at page 190: “6…. Learned counsel for the petitioner rightly contended that the powers of the court under section 640 of the Cr PC are wide enough to allow such evidence at any stage of the trial, and the mere fact that they were not filed before the committing court is no ground to reject the documents of the prosecution. With regard to the supply of copies of documents, under section 173 of the Cr PC their Lordships of the Supreme Court in a decision reported in AIR 1964 SC 286Noor Khan v. State of Rajasthan observed that the object of sections 162, 178(4) and 207-A(3) is to enable the accused to obtain a clear picture about him before commencement of the enquiry, but the failure to furnish any statement or copy of such evidence will not necessarily mean that the case itself will fall on that ground. Regarding the belated filing of certain documents. The Privy Council, in a case reported in AIR 1928 PC 80, Jewan Lal Daga v. Nilmani Chandhuri, said that where certain account books were not filed within the proper time. The objection to the documents upon the ground that it has not been produced at the proper time renders its authenticity the subject of suspicion, and all other grounds upon which a document can be successfully impeached remain open, but refusal to permit a man to refresh his memory under section 159 by proper relevant contemporaneous documents might lead to a grave injustice.” 17. It was held in Jagmohansingh @ Chhotu Mahipalsing vs State 1983 GLH 469 = 1983 1 GLR 749 that the Court has a 24 2026:HHC:24387 jurisdiction to permit the filing of the documents under Section 311 of CrPC. It was observed: 4. The learned advocate for the appellant, however, has submitted that under sec. 311, a witness can be called at any stage of the proceedings to depose on oath without documents. But his submission is that a witness for production only cannot be summoned by virtue of sec. 311 Cr. P.C. In this connection, the learned Public Prosecutor has drawn our attention to Ramm Lal Madhav Lal Kharva v. State of Gujarat and Others (13 GLR 914). In this case, it has been held by a single Judge of this Court that once the Court reaches a conclusion that the evidence of any particular witness neither examined by the prosecution nor examined by defence, appears to the court essential to the just decision of the case, the court in order to perform the paramount duty cast upon it, namely, to do justice between the parties, must examine such a witness untrammelled and unfettered by any other provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. Sec 540 of the Criminal Procedure Code may not be used to give one party an unfair advantage over the other. But the court is constituted to discharge the paramount duty, namely, to do justice between the parties and if, in performance of this duty, the court, in order to arrive at a just decision of the case, considers it essential to summon and examine any witness, no other provisions of the Code can stand in the way of the court to summon and examine such a witness. In ultimate analysis, every procedure is devised to advance the course of justice, and no procedural provision can stand in the way to retard justice. Sec. 540 cannot be interpreted so as to whittle down the power which was wisely conferred upon the court. This was a decision in respect of sec. Section 540 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898. The said sec. 540, however, is in pari materia with sec. Section 311 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. It is pertinent to note, however, that in this case it has not been considered as to whether, by exercising powers under the section in 25 2026:HHC:24387 question, it is open to the Court to summon a witness merely for production. 5. In support of his submission, the learned advocate for the appellant has not referred to any decided case. The words of sec. 311 does not show that such a witness cannot be examined. If the Court can summon any person to depose as a witness under sec. 311 Cr. P. C. It stands to reason that the Court can also summon a person as a witness only to produce documentary evidence. It is possible that a person may be in possession of relevant and important documents who may not have any personal knowledge regarding the said documents. In such a case, unless the documents are before the Court, no evidence regarding the contents thereof can be led at all. It, therefore, seems to us that such a power is implied in the said sec. 311 Criminal P. C. It is true that such a witness at best can only produce documents, but the same cannot be considered to have been brought on record unless the same are duly approved or judicial notice thereof can be taken. Therefore, when such documents are produced by a witness before taking such documents on record, the Court will have to consider whether judicial notice thereof can be taken and if not, whether the same are duly proved before they are exhibited in the case. For the purpose of proving such documents, the Court may further order to summon such witnesses who can prove such documents. But unless one or the other is done, the documents which are merely produced by a witness cannot be looked into and relied upon by the Court. If such documents are duly brought on record and exhibited, then an opportunity will also have to be given to the accused to explain or say whatever they want to in connection with those documents. Unless that is done, the Court will not be justified in considering such documents while deciding the case. It, therefore, seems to us that in exercise of the powers under sec. Section 311 Criminal P. C., it is open to the Court to issue a witness summons merely for the production of documents. We, therefore, feel that the Court was justified in passing the aforesaid order under sec. 311 Criminal P. C. 26 2026:HHC:24387 18. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sameer Sandhir v. CBI, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1206, that the documents can be produced during the Trial even if they were not annexed to the charge sheet. It was observed: 11. It is necessary to refer to the decision of this Court in the case of R.S. Pai (2002) 5 SCC 82. Paragraph 7 of the said decision is material, which reads thus: “7. From the aforesaid sub-sections, it is apparent that normally, the investigating officer is required to produce all the relevant documents at the time of submitting the charge-sheet. At the same time, as there is no specific prohibition, it cannot be held that the additional documents cannot be produced subsequently. If some mistake is committed in not producing the relevant documents at the time of submitting the report or the charge-sheet, it is always open to the investigating officer to produce the same with the permission of the court. In our view, considering the preliminary stage of prosecution and the context in which the police officer is required to forward to the Magistrate all the documents or the relevant extracts thereof on which the prosecution proposes to rely, the word “shall” used in sub-section (5) cannot be interpreted as mandatory, but as directory. Normally, the documents gathered during the investigation upon which the prosecution wants to rely are required to be forwarded to the Magistrate, but if there is some omission, it would not mean that the remaining documents cannot be produced subsequently. Analogous provision under Section 173(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 was considered by this Court in Narayan Rao v. State of A.P. [AIR 1957 SC 737: 1958 SCR 283: 1957 Cri LJ 1320] (SCR at p. 293) and it was held that the word “shall” occurring in sub-section (4) of Section 173 and sub-section (3) of 27 2026:HHC:24387 Section 207-A is not mandatory but only directory. Further, the scheme of sub-section (8) of Section 173 also makes it abundantly clear that even after the charge-sheet is submitted, further investigation, if called for, is not precluded. If further investigation is not precluded, then there is no question of not permitting the prosecution to produce additional documents that were gathered prior to or subsequent to the investigation. In such cases, there cannot be any prejudice to the accused. Hence, the impugned order passed by the Special Court cannot be sustained.” (emphasis added) This decision holds that if there is an omission on the part of the prosecution in forwarding the relied upon documents to the learned Magistrate, even after the chargesheet is submitted, the prosecution can be permitted to produce the additional documents which were gathered prior to or subsequent to the investigation. 12. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant relied upon what is held in paragraph 38 of the decision in the case of Mariam Fasihddin 2024 SCC OnLine SC 58, which reads thus: “38. It is a matter of record that in the course of ‘further investigation’, no new material was unearthed by the investigating agency. Instead, the supplementary chargesheet relies upon the Truth Lab report dated 15.07.2013, obtained by Respondent No. 2, which was already available when the original chargesheet was filed. The term ‘further investigation’ stipulated in Section 173(8) CrPC obligates the officer-in-charge of the concerned police station to ‘obtain further evidence, oral or documentary’, and only then forward a supplementary report regarding such evidence, in the prescribed form.” This decision is of the Bench of two Hon'ble Judges. It does not make any departure from the decision of this Court in the case of R.S. Pai (2002) 5 SCC 82. 28 2026:HHC:24387 13. Another Bench of this Court, consisting of three Hon'ble Judges, in its decision in the case of Arjun Panditrao Khotkar (2020) 7 SCC 1, in paragraph 55, reiterated the law laid down in the case of R.S. Pai (2002) 5 SCC 82. Paragraphs 55 and 56 of the said decision read thus: “55. In a criminal trial, it is assumed that the investigation is completed and the prosecution has, as such, concretised its case against an accused before commencement of the trial. It is further settled law that the prosecution ought not to be allowed to fill up any lacunae during a trial. As recognised by this Court in CBI v. R.S. Pai [CBI v. R.S. Pai, (2002) 5 SCC 82: 2002 SCC (Cri) 950], the only exception to this general rule is if the prosecution had “mistakenly” not filed a document, the said document can be allowed to be placed on record. The Court held as follows: (SCC p.85, para 7) “7. From the aforesaid subsections, it is apparent that normally, the investigating officer is required to produce all the relevant documents at the time of submitting the charge-sheet. At the same time, as there is no specific prohibition, it cannot be held that the additional documents cannot be produced subsequently. If some mistake is committed in not producing the relevant documents at the time of submitting the report or the charge-sheet, it is always open to the investigating officer to produce the same with the permission of the court.” 56. Therefore, in terms of general procedure, the prosecution is obligated to supply all documents upon which reliance may be placed to an accused before commencement of the trial. Thus, the exercise of power by the courts in criminal trials in permitting evidence to be filed at a later stage should not result in serious or irreversible prejudice to the accused. A balancing exercise in respect of the rights of parties has to be carried out by the court, in examining any application by the prosecution under Sections 91 or 311 CrPC or Section 165 of the Evidence Act. Depending on the facts 29 2026:HHC:24387 of each case, and the court exercising discretion after seeing that the accused is not prejudiced by want of a fair trial, the court may, in appropriate cases, allow the prosecution to produce such a certificate at a later point in time. If it is the accused who desires to produce the requisite certificate as part of his defence, this again will depend upon the justice of the case — discretion to be exercised by the court in accordance with law.” 14. Strong reliance was placed on the decisions of this Court in the cases of Sidharth Vashisht (2010) 6 SCC 1 and V K Sasikala (2012) 9 SCC 771. These two decisions operate in completely different fields. The decisions are on the right of the accused to get copies of all the relied upon documents. Basically, these two decisions deal with Section 207 of the CrPC, which deals with the supply of a copy of the Police report and other documents to the accused. In the present case, the question is whether the respondent- CBI can be permitted to produce the CDs, which were inadvertently not produced along with the supplementary chargesheet. Even if the documents or things which were inadvertently not produced along with the chargesheet are allowed to be produced, the decisions in the cases of Sidharth Vashish (2010) 6 SCC 1 and V K Sasikala (2012) 9 SCC 771 will have no application. 19. It was submitted that the production of the document would cause a serious prejudice to the accused. This submission cannot be accepted. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the State that the Court has to do justice, not only to the accused but to the informant as well. The Court has to find out the truth, and the pursuit of truth cannot cause any prejudice to a person. Therefore, the submission made on behalf of the accused that 30 2026:HHC:24387 production of the document would cause prejudice to him cannot be accepted. 20. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly exercised the jurisdiction vested in it, and there is no need to interfere with it while exercising the inherent jurisdiction. 21. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed, so also the pending applications, if any. 22. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 23rd June, 2026 (ravinder)