2026:HHC:24390 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 457 of 2026 Reserved on: 15.05.2026 Date of Decision: 23.06.2026 Uttam ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & others ...Respondents _____________________________________ Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr Rajesh Kumar Parmar, Advocate. For the respondents : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No.1. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of F.I.R. No. 157 of 2025, dated 12.07.2025, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 115(2), 351(1) and 79 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, at Police Station Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour, H.P. and consequential proceedings arising out of it. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant (name being withheld to protect her 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:24390 identity) was working as a software developer. She had known the petitioner for the past four years. The petitioner was working as a PSI in Kalaburagi. He purchased a new car and invited the informant to visit temples. He told the informant that only police officials would be travelling with him in the car. The petitioner picked up the informant on 19.02.2025. She accompanied him to the Kumbh Mela and Ayodhya. They planned a further trip to Manali. The informant expressed her disinclination to accompany the petitioner to Manali. The petitioner abused and molested the informant on 24.02.2025 in the car. He slapped her and twisted her left hand. He snatched the informant’s mobile phone and switched it off. The informant shouted for help and was rescued by local people. She was taken to the Police Station, Paonta Sahib, where she narrated the incident to the police. The petitioner left Paonta Sahib and continued his journey. The matter was reported to the police at Karnataka, and the police registered the F.I.R., which was forwarded to Police Station Paonta Sahib, District Simrour, H.P. 3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the F.I.R. The petitioner has filed the present petition, asserting that the petitioner and the informant were well acquainted with each other for about four years. They had visited many places together, which 3 2026:HHC:24390 showed a consensual relationship. The incident had taken place in a moving vehicle in the presence of independent witnesses, which made the incident inherently improbable. The informant filed a false complaint against the petitioner after much delay. No formal F.I.R was lodged by the police at the Police Station Paonta Sahib, which falsifies her version. Respondent No.2 made unlawful demands for money from the petitioner and threatened to falsely implicate him. The allegations in the F.I.R. are vague and do not constitute the commission of any cognizable offence; therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R. be quashed. 4. I have heard Mr Rajesh Kumar Parmar, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused and Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 5. Mr Rajesh Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he has been falsely implicated. The relationship between the petitioner and the informant was consensual. She had voluntarily accompanied the petitioner to many places. The allegations made by her are inherently improbable, as it is difficult to believe that the 4 2026:HHC:24390 petitioner would have hurt and molested the informant in a moving car. She had access to the police of Police Station Paonta Sahib, but had not reported the matter to the police. There is a delay in reporting the matter to the police, which makes the prosecution's case highly suspect. The continuation of the proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed. 6. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondents No.1 and 2/State submitted that the police are investigating the matter to verify the allegations made by the informant. The allegations, prima facie, show the commission of cognizable offences. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the 5 2026:HHC:24390 decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code, except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 6 2026:HHC:24390 (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. 7 2026:HHC:24390 Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 9. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 10. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 8 2026:HHC:24390 11. The allegations in the FIR show that the informant had expressed her reluctance to visit Manali with the accused and other persons. The accused gave beatings to the informant and sexually harassed her. She was rescued by the local people and was taken to the Police Station in Paonta Sahib. All these allegations, prima facie, constitute the commission of cognizable offence. 12. It was asserted that there was a delay in reporting the matter to the police. This is not acceptable. The informant stated in the FIR that she went to Bengaluru, where she consulted people. She went to the hospital on 26.02.2025, where she was treated. F.I.R. No. 74 of 2025 was lodged in Madivala Sub Division, Bengaluru City, on 01.03.2025. She has explained, in the column the reason for the delay in reporting the complaint, that she had visited the hospital for treatment. She was hesitant about whether to file a complaint after recovering and overcoming the fear. These explanations, prima facie, appear to be correct, and it cannot be said that there is some delay in reporting the matter to the police. 13. Reliance was placed upon the typed transcription of the audio call between the informant, his advocate, and some police 9 2026:HHC:24390 officials. It is difficult to see how the F.I.R. can be quashed because some third person had said something about the F.I.R. 14. The transcription of the audio call shows that the informant had made a complaint to the Police Station in Himachal. Further, she was coming to the police station for three days for lodging the F.I.R and had also got her MLC done. These typed transcriptions do not support the petitioner’s version that no complaint was made to the Police at Paonta Sahib, or that there is an unexplained delay in reporting the matter to the police. 15. It was submitted that the payments were made to the victim, which showed that she is demanding money from the accused, and the FIR was registered with some ulterior purpose. This submission will not help the petitioner. The payments are shown to have been made to someone who is not connected to the informant, at this stage. Further, the payments were made from 19.02 2025 to 25.02 2025, and the context of making the payment is not clear. The police are investigating the matter and will verify the correctness of these payments. However, the F.I.R. cannot be quashed at the stage merely because some payments are shown to have been made to some persons. 10 2026:HHC:24390 16. It was submitted that the allegations are false. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was held in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, that the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC has to treat the allegations in the complaint as correct. It was observed: - “29. It is settled law that the power of quashing of a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely according to its whims or caprice.” 17. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed: - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of 11 2026:HHC:24390 the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060: “14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 18. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini-trial 12 2026:HHC:24390 while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It was observed on page 397: “17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) 6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.” 19. This position was reiterated in Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2355, wherein it was observed: - 22. On the aspect of the powers of the Courts under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., it is settled that at the stage of quashing, the Court is not required to conduct a mini-trial. Thus, the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. with respect to quashing is somewhat limited as the Court has to only consider whether any sufficient material is available to proceed against the accused or not. If sufficient material is available, the power under Section 482 should not be exercised. Xxxx 13 2026:HHC:24390 27. We are of the view that the High Court has erred in law by embarking upon an enquiry with regard to the credibility or otherwise of the allegations in the complaints and the FIR. Normally, for quashing an FIR, it must be shown that there exists no prima facie case against the accused persons…” 20. Therefore, it is impermissible for this Court to conduct a mini-trial to determine the correctness of the FIR. 21. The police are investigating the matter and will file final report/charge sheet after the conclusion of the investigation. The allegations in the FIR prima facie show the commission of a cognizable offence. Hence, the F.I.R. cannot be quashed in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. 22. No other point was urged. 23. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed, so also the pending applications, if any. 24. The observations made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the present petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 23rd June, 2026 (ravinder)